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Deprived of Their Liberty explores Americans' changing conceptions of legitimate 
wartime violence by analyzing how the revolutionaries treated their captured enemies, 
and by asking what their treatment can tell us about the American Revolution more 
broadly.  I suggest that at the commencement of conflict, the revolutionary leadership 
sought to contain the violence of war according to the prevailing customs of warfare in 
Europe. These rules of war—or to phrase it differently, the cultural norms of war—
emphasized restricting the violence of war to the battlefield and treating enemy prisoners 
humanely. Only six years later, however, captured British soldiers and seamen, as well as 
civilian loyalists, languished on board noisome prison ships in Massachusetts and New 
York, in the lead mines of Connecticut, the jails of Pennsylvania, and the camps of 
Virginia and Maryland, where they were deprived of their liberty and often their lives by 
the very government purporting to defend those inalienable rights.  My dissertation 
explores this curious, and heretofore largely unrecognized, transformation in the 
revolutionaries' conduct of war by looking at the experience of captivity in American 
hands.  
Throughout the dissertation, I suggest three principal factors to account for the 
escalation of violence during the war. From the onset of hostilities, the revolutionaries 
encountered an obstinate enemy that denied them the status of legitimate combatants, 
labeling them as rebels and traitors. They faced the divided loyalties of their own 
population, which threatened civil war. And they were ideologically constrained from 
forming a centralized government capable of effectively limiting the war's violence. 
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These factors shaped the very nature of the war they fought and forced the revolutionary 
leadership to reconsider their basic assumptions about warfare. In doing so, revolutionary 
leaders unwittingly radicalized the struggle, transforming a war for colonial self-
determination into a truly revolutionary conflict. 
 
Advisor: Philip D. Morgan 

















 I always read the acknowledgements.  They are an unrivalled window onto the 
scholarly process.  By giving thanks, an author explicitly diagrams the intellectual 
network and support-system that shaped the forthcoming pages.  Much can be gleaned 
from a close reading of this seemingly perfunctory piece of prose.  Perhaps more 
importantly, they are very often a delight to read.  With the trials of writing in the past, an 
author's acknowledgements abound with joy and gratitude.  It is my hope that my words 
of appreciation not only inform the reader of how this project came to be, but also convey 
in some small measure the pleasure and honor it has been to call the following 
individuals and institutions my friends, collaborators, and supporters.  Words cannot 
repay debts, but I have crafted these in the wish that they could. 
 From the moment I met Philip D. Morgan, as a quivering prospective graduate 
student over seven years ago, I knew that I had come to the right place.  In that brief 
meeting, Phil—as I would later hesitantly come to call him—casually demonstrated his 
encyclopedic knowledge of the historiography of the American Revolutionary period and 
his enthusiastic support of my intellectual interests.  I was in awe, and I still am.  Phil is 
an unattainable model of scholar, teacher, and friend.  Indefatigable and meticulous in his 
scholarship, Phil inspires me to be a better historian, intellectual, and citizen of the 
scholarly community.  As an advisor, he was always there when I needed him, but 
equally important, he gave me the freedom to research and to write for long stretches of 
time unhindered by meddlesome inquiries.  A consummate empiricist, Phil never shied 
away from demanding copious evidence to support my claims, but he has always allowed 
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me to be the historian I aspire to be.  If I have at times sacrificed brevity in the interest of 
telling a good story, no blame can be laid at his door.  He has endured chapter after 
chapter with a knowing grin that each could have been much longer.  Though Phil 
indulged my preference for narrative history, he never ceased to demand rigorous 
analysis and persuasive argument.  The dissertation that follows is much improved 
because I heeded his advice, though not nearly enough for his taste I am sure.  When Phil 
Morgan accepted me as his student, I heard often from friends and teachers that I was 
extremely fortunate to work with such a luminary.  They hoped that some of his scholarly 
fame might rub off on me.  In seeing him only as a renowned academic, they did him a 
disservice.  In Phil, the scholar, educator, and mentor are seamlessly blended.  His 
dedication to his students, passion for teaching, and generosity of spirit know no bounds.  
I will never be able to thank him enough. 
 Before coming to Johns Hopkins, I made one of the best decisions of my life 
when I knocked on Alex Roland's door at Duke University.  Upon hearing a beckoning 
"come in," I meandered through a labyrinth of bookcases into what I would later come to 
know as "Fortress Roland."  Tucked away in the back was a man who would go on to 
play an enormous role in my professional and personal development.  On that warm 
August day in Durham twelve years ago, Alex agreed to shepherd me through the 
undergraduate degree at Duke in the hopes that I might go on to study history 
professionally. Little did he know what a drain on his time and resources I would 
become.  For the next four years, I pestered him with requests to read my overly florid 
prose, to write letters of recommendation, and to tell me what I needed to do in order to 
have his job one day.  He never complained.  Rather than scoff at my passion for the past 
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or dismiss it as boyish enthusiasm, he accepted me for whom I was, while impressing on 
me the need to develop a critical eye and to question the accepted narrative.  He 
introduced me to the world of historiography, the dynamics of change over time, the 
importance of contingency, and the perils of hagiography.  Alex treated my senior honors 
thesis as if it were a doctoral dissertation.  An uncompromising editor with an 
unsurpassed appreciation for the complexities of the English language, he diligently 
pored over every sentence, always urging me to be more succinct.  Alex taught me that 
history was an art before it was a science and that style matters.  His belief that jargon is a 
poor substitute for clarity became the foundation of my approach to historical writing.  
Given the immense role he played in my undergraduate education, it may surprise readers 
to learn that his greatest influence on my life came when I was a graduate student.  Not 
only did he read and comment on each draft of my dissertation, as well as agree to serve 
on my committee, he also introduced to me to the love of my life, Kathryn Maxson.  As 
we were both his former students and both hopelessly caught up in esoteric pursuits, Alex 
thought we would be perfect for one another.  He could not have been more prophetic.  
For this and everything else he has done for me, I am eternally grateful.  
 During my second year of graduate school as I prepared for my comprehensive 
examinations, I had the privilege and pleasure of working with two extraordinary 
historians: Michael Johnson and David Bell.  In his seminar on the nineteenth-century 
American south, Mike encouraged me to look beyond a book's flaws to see its virtues.  In 
seminar, Mike's questions strike the perfect balance between trenchant critique and 
enthusiastic support.  His is a model I have long aspired to emulate.  As I progressed 
through the program, Mike not only read my entire dissertation, but also generously 
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shared drafts of his own work pertaining to the Continental navy and the siege of 
Charleston.  His ideas helped shape my thinking on those subjects.  When I decided to 
come to Johns Hopkins, I was thrilled by the possibility of studying with David Bell.  His 
interest in the culture of war in eighteenth-century Europe overlapped significantly with 
my own.  I had long known of his reputation as an elegant writer, and I soon learned he is 
an equally gifted pedagogue.  David showed me how the ideas of Michel Foucault, 
Clifford Geertz, and Norbert Elias, among others, could be applied to the study of war.  
Taking his advice to heart, I set out to study the culture of war in Revolutionary America 
and have never looked back.  Although I was initially saddened to hear of his departure 
for Princeton, the move soon proved fortuitous for me.  When I informed him that I 
would be moving to Princeton to accompany Kathryn as she began her graduate work in 
history, David was delighted.  Soon after our arrival, he thoroughly read my work and 
treated me to a series of delicious lunches during which we discussed my project's 
broader implications.  Many of the finer points of my arguments developed from those 
conversations.  I trust he will be pleased to see the imprint of his influence throughout the 
dissertation. 
 The cornerstone of graduate education in early American history at Johns 
Hopkins is the Early American Seminar (sometimes known as the Atlantic Seminar).  A 
forum for graduate students to present works in progress, the seminar was an 
omnipresent, often terrifying, and always enlightening component of my experience in 
graduate school.  When I arrived, senior students told me that there was no better 
preparation for the conference circuit than presenting at the Early American Seminar.  
They were right.  Questions come fast, furious, and at times ferocious, but all are 
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animated by the principle of "tough love."  All but one of the chapters that follow was 
eviscerated by the members of the seminar.  The end product is much improved because 
of their efforts.  The intellectual energy of the seminar does not dissipate after the 
scheduled two hours elapses.  More often than not, the members adjourn to a choice 
watering hole to continue the discussion in less formal environs.  I received some of the 
best advice about my work and the profession in general during these post-seminar 
gatherings at the Charles Village Pub and Rocket to Venus.  I am thankful for the 
critique, support, and friendship of every member of the seminar during my tenure at 
Hopkins, but especially Molly Warsh, Justin Roberts, James Roberts, Andrew Devereux, 
Jess Roney, Jonathan Gienapp, Claire Gherini, Steph Gamble, Lisa Bob, Nick Radburn, 
and Katherine Smoak. Writing is often a lonely process, but the above mentioned 
individuals and others helped pull me away from my work and put the entire process in 
perspective.  I am fortunate to call them friends first and colleagues second.  
 I entered graduate school at a unique moment for which I am immensely grateful.  
Having recently returned from a stint at Princeton, Phil accepted four students to 
matriculate at Hopkins in the fall of 2007: Jonathan Gienapp, Claire Gherini, Steph 
Gamble (née Crumbaugh), as well as myself.  Much to his horror I am sure, we all 
showed up.  We attended seminar together, studied together, ate together, socialized 
together, and matured as scholars together.  Having a close cadre of graduate students 
studying early American history was a tremendous boon to my education.  All helped me 
to refine my thinking and to challenge my assumptions on a regular basis. 
 Four of my graduate school friends merit extended mention.  Jonathan Gienapp 
was my constant companion and partner in crime throughout my time at Hopkins.  
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Studying the political culture of the Revolutionary era, he was an ally from the beginning.  
Jonathan's natural charm, razor-sharp intellect, and infectious sense of humor have 
delighted and challenged me ever since.  When times were good, Jonathan was always 
ready to celebrate, and when they were not, I could count on him to talk me off the ledge.  
Ours is a friendship that I will always cherish.  A year ahead of me in the program, Craig 
Hollander immediately accepted me as one of his own.  Craig's loyalty and generosity to 
his friends are unmatched, and his hospitality is the stuff of legend.  He shares my 
passion for telling a good story and few are better at so doing than Craig.  I was very 
lucky to spend even more time with Craig this past year in Princeton.  Living in New 
York and teaching at Princeton, Craig would often stay at our apartment when he had 
evening obligations on campus.  Invariably, he would take me and Kathryn to dinner 
whenever he was in town.  On more than one occasion, Craig and a bottle of his finest 
Scotch helped me cope with the job-market or an impending chapter deadline.  Being so 
close to New York allowed me to celebrate the birth of Craig's beautiful daughter Lydia.  
Craig and his wife Jeni welcomed me into their home numerous times to share their food 
and spirits and enjoy the company of little Lydia.  I cannot thank the Hollander family 
enough for their friendship and generosity.   
 Back in Baltimore, I was blessed by the friendship of Claire Gherini and Meredith 
Raucher.  Both were early friends that have remained dear to my heart.  Late night 
debriefing sessions with Claire opened my eyes to the richness and diversity of the 
history of medicine and to the complex and nuanced character development in HBO's 
Game of Thrones.  Although often away on fellowships, Claire was always reachable to 
chat about life, discuss sources, or debate historiography.  Our summer trips to the 
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Library of Congress made research so much more enjoyable.  Meredith Raucher and I hit 
it off right away.  An immensely talented historian of late-Medieval art, Meredith is as 
kind as she is brilliant.  Through many an evening sipping wine and pretending to watch 
Law and Order, Meredith talked me through some of the most difficult periods in the 
program.  I only hope that I returned the favor.  During my research trips, I always looked 
forward to returning to Baltimore to hear about Meredith's triumphs and to catch up on 
the latest news from around campus.  I anticipate many more such sessions in the future. 
 I am indebted to several other members of the Johns Hopkins community.  The 
Senior Academic Program Coordinator in the Department of History, Megan Zeller, 
ensured I progressed through graduate school satisfactorily and smoothed out the 
inevitable bumps along the way.  Without her help, I am certain I would have failed out 
of the program numerous times due to bureaucratic snafus.  I would also like to thank 
Angus Burgin and Randall Packard for agreeing to evaluate a dissertation that is 
chronologically and thematically far afield from their own areas of study.  I look forward 
to incorporating their thoughts and suggestions into my work.  The students who attended 
my course, "Riots, Revolts, and Revolutions: Violence in Early American History" 
deserve a hardy round of applause for their patience, insight, and achievement in the fall 
of 2012.  Their feedback in seminar helped me refine and expand my thinking in 
significant ways.  I also want to thank John Marshall and John Matsui for providing 
excellent advice and encouragement about the academic job-market over the years. 
 In addition to my colleagues and friends at Hopkins, I have been blessed by the 
support and assistance of numerous other very generous scholars.  I first met Ira Gruber 
at a reception at the Library of the Society of the Cincinnati, and he has been a steadfast 
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supporter of mine ever since.  He has kindly read and offered insightful suggestions on 
much of my work.  Similarly, Holly Mayer has deeply engaged with this dissertation, 
reading and commenting on my drafts as though she were my primary advisor.  Her 
comments have sharpened my prose and refined my arguments.  I could not be more 
grateful to her.  I met Wayne Lee when I was applying to graduate school.  A fellow 
"Dukie," Wayne was also a student of Alex Roland.  Engaging with his work and 
enjoying his company over the years has been an honor and delight.  Daniel Krebs, a 
fellow student of prisoners of war during the Revolutionary period, has been a fount of 
support, source material, and good times since I met him in 2012.  I am also grateful for 
the advice and encouragement of Margaret Sankey and Paul Springer.  As an 
undergraduate, I worked closely with Dirk Bonker who enthusiastically encouraged me to 
first apply to and then attend Johns Hopkins.  Without his advice, this dissertation would 
not have come to fruition.  Also of Duke, Bob Cook-Deegan was immensely supportive 
of my work when I was a visiting scholar there in 2012.  He proved a most excellent 
travel companion during a research trip to London in the summer of 2013, and I am much 
indebted to him for sharing his knowledge of and passion for the popular eighteenth-
century libations Port and Madeira.  Recently, Alan Taylor and Andrew Jackson 
O'Shaughnessy have provided me with source suggestions and thoughts for how to revise 
the manuscript into a publishable monograph.  Though he does not know it, Peter Onuf 
deserves much credit for the line of argument I pursue in this work.  Listening to his 2011 
Patrick Henry Lecture, entitled "Imperialism and Nationalism in the Early American 
Republic," challenged many of my preconceived assumptions and started me down the 
path of rethinking my argument.  Finally, I am thankful for the friendship, mentorship, 
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and kindness of Dr. Douglas Marshall. "Uncle Doug" shared my interests and supported 
all my academic endeavors over the years.  I am deeply saddened by his recent passing.  I 
will miss him always. 
 This dissertation has benefited enormously from the help and encouragement of 
many dedicated public historians.  Their zeal for accuracy and passion for the material 
world of the past continues to impress me.  Joel Bohy shared his formidable knowledge 
of the battles of Lexington and Concord and numerous sources with me when I began 
working on this topic.  Todd Braisted encouraged me not to forget the loyalists and 
proved an invaluable resource for materials.  Don Hagist took an early interest in this 
work and has unselfishly given me access to his vast collection of source material related 
to British enlisted prisoners.  Conversations with Eric Schnitzer helped me better 
understand the shadowy history of the Convention army.  At a very difficult time in his 
life, Patrick Morton made the effort to provide me with a copy of a hard-to-access 
Hessian soldier's journal that was of great use.  Jason Melius generously offered his 
thoughts about the multiple captivities of the Royal Fusiliers. For his close friendship of 
over a decade, as well his knowledge of the material culture of eighteenth-century 
soldiering, I will always be grateful to Carl Ivar Johnson.  Before I even began the 
research phase of this project, Jim Kochan was on board.  He suggested several important 
archival collections to me and shared documents that were part of his private collection.  
As this list of impressive scholars demonstrates, academic historians of the Revolutionary 
era who ignore the resources and enthusiasm of the public history community do so to 
their detriment.   
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 I could not have written this dissertation without a staggering amount of financial 
assistance.  When I entered graduate school, I was fortunate to be awarded a George and 
Sylvia Kagan Graduate Fellowship from the Department of History at Johns Hopkins, 
generously supplementing my departmental stipend. As I began to research this project, I 
was privileged to receive a Scholar's Grant from the Society of the Cincinnati, a 
Residential Research Fellowship from the David Library of the American Revolution, a 
Mellon Research Fellowship from the Virginia Historical Society, a Jacob M. Price 
Visiting Research Fellowship from the Clements Library, an Andrew W. Mellon 
Foundation Fellowship from the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, and a Society of the 
Cincinnati Fellowship from the Massachusetts Historical Society.  Numerous archivists 
and librarians assisted me during my fellowships at these prestigious institutions, but I 
would particularly like to single out Ellen McCallister Clark, William P. Tatum, Daniel 
Rolph, Kathy Ludwig, Barbara DeWolfe, and Conrad Wright.  As I entered the writing 
stage of the dissertation, I was incredibly fortunate to receive a Harry Frank Guggenheim 
Foundation Dissertation Fellowship, which allowed me to relocate to Princeton while I 
drafted large segments of the project.  Brian F. Neumann was of immense help in 
securing me a very generous U.S. Army Center of Military History Fellowship, which 
allowed me to finish research and writing from the comfort of home.  I am also thankful 
for funding from the Department of History at Hopkins, which was made possible by the 
generous contributions of the Dr. Alexander Butler Foundation. 
 These acknowledgements were composed in a beautifully-appointed office at the 
Fred W. Smith National Library for the Study of George Washington at Mount Vernon.  I 
had the great honor to receive the inaugural Amanda and Greg Gregory Family 
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Fellowship at the library.  The library is an inspirational location in which to think and 
write about the founding era.  Few experiences can better rouse one's passion for the 
period than watching the sunrise over the Potomac from the estate's piazza on a beautiful 
spring morning.  While in residence at the library, I have benefited from many convivial 
conversations with its founding director, Dr. Douglas Bradburn.  In less than a year, 
Doug has established the library as the scholarly Mecca for the study of the American 
Revolution.  Living at the DeVos house alongside such prominent scholars as James 
Kirby Martin, Edward Larson, and Lydia Brandt has been a privilege and a gift.  Each 
has enriched this study in numerous ways.  They all have my appreciation.   
 My greatest debts are owed to my closest friends and family, without whom I 
could never have endured this process.  My college roommate, Jake Levy, has been a 
wellspring of hilarity and enthusiasm for as long as I have known him.  His gentle chides 
over the years to finish faster have finally paid off.  Perhaps now he will allow me to stop 
calling him "Dr. Jakey."  Meeting Kathryn Maxson four years ago changed my life 
immeasurably.  Her brilliance, beauty, benevolence, and nerdiness continue to confound 
me.  How can one person be so exquisite?  Each day I am floored to find myself falling 
more in love with her than the day prior.  She has been around from the inception of this 
project to its completion, cheering my triumphs and soothing my sorrows.  She is so 
much more than I could ever have asked for in a partner.  I can't wait to spend the rest of 
my life with her. 
 I would not be writing these words had it not been for the unquestioning love and 
support of my parents, Randy and Connie Jones.  They recognized early on that my 
passion for the past was not a passing fad but was instead my "perfect pitch."  Growing 
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up, I dragged them, not the other way around, to forts, battlefields, and museums all over 
the country.  If they would rather have been doing something else, they never let on.  
Though they might not think of themselves this way, my parents are extraordinary 
teachers.  They raised me and my truly exceptional brothers, Chance and Charles, to 
value hard work, education, and personal integrity, but reminded us not to take ourselves 
too seriously.  All they ever wanted was for us to be the best versions of ourselves and to 
remember that kindness costs nothing.  I could not have asked for better or more loving 
parents.  It is as a proud son that I dedicate this dissertation to them with love and 
admiration. 
 
T. Cole Jones  
Mount Vernon, VA 
June 4th, 2014 
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Note on Style 
I have made a concerted effort to accurately reproduce the often inconsistent eighteenth-
century spelling, capitalization, and punctuation used in the sources I have consulted. 
When necessary for comprehension, I have added punctuation or clarifying words, which 
are clearly denoted in brackets. The full citations of frequently utilized sources have been 
shortened after their initial occurrence.  Abbreviations for these sources can be found on 




Throughout the dissertation I have referred to those inhabitants of Great Britain's North 
American colonies who embraced the struggle against the crown as revolutionaries, or 
simply Americans, and those who supported reconciliation with Britain as loyalists.  I 
have eschewed the laudatory or derogatory terms "Patriot," "Rebel," and "Tory."  
Additionally, I have referred to those subjects of the Holy Roman Empire who served as 
military auxiliaries of the British crown as Germans or Britain's Germanic allies.  Only 
when I am sure the soldiers in question came from Hesse-Kassel or Hesse-Hanau have I 
called them Hessians, despite the widespread American practice of referring to all 
German auxiliaries as Hessians. 
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This is a story about war, the rules we make to control it, and what happens when 
we abandon those rules.  It is a story of an infant nation that enshrined the rules of war in 
its founding document—its declaration of independence—only to repudiate them in 
thought, word, and deed.  It is a story of a cycle of violence, retaliation, and retribution so 
gruesome that it had to be forgotten.  At its center, this is a story about how the 
experience of war radicalized an American rebellion into the American Revolution. 
 
.............................. 
 In early December 1775, the elected representatives of the thirteen British 
colonies in America resolved to remind the British government that even in war there are 
rules.  Already aware of Thomas Jefferson's persuasive pen, Congress looked to the 
thirty-two-year-old Virginia delegate to draft a "declaration" protesting the British abuse 
of American prisoners of war and enunciating Congress's stance that the violence of war 
should be restricted to the field of battle.  As Jefferson phrased it, Congress was 
determined that this war would "not be decided by reeking [sic] vengeance on a few 
helpless captives, but by atchieving [sic] success in the fields of war."  Jefferson was the 
ideal choice for the declaration's draftsman.  Few in Congress could boast either his depth 
of knowledge or breadth of reading on the prevailing European conceptions of how war 
should be conducted.  Like most of his fellow Congressmen, Jefferson believed that, 
though clearly misled by a tyrannical ministry, the British people remained "brave and 
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civilized."  To Jefferson's horror and indignation, however, in late 1775 it appeared as if 
the British had abandoned the contemporary European rules of war— or in other words, 
the cultural norms of war— which emphasized restraining war's violence and treating 
enemy prisoners humanely.  After capture, enemy prisoners were not to be objects of 
violence but compassion.  In his stern reproof, Jefferson reminded his British readers that 
"it is the happiness of modern times that the evils of necessary war are softened by 
refinement of manners and sentiment, and that an enemy is an object of vengeance, in 
arms and in the feild [sic] only."  By contrast, the British seemed determined "to revive 
antient [sic] barbarism, and again disgrace our nature with the practice of human 
sacrifice."  This was no mere rhetoric.  As Jefferson crafted his declaration, American 
prisoners starved in pestilent prisons under the constant threat of execution for treason 
while British prisoners in American custody enjoyed "every comfort for which captivity 
and misfortune called."  In deference to General George Washington's negotiations with 
his British counterpart, Jefferson's declaration was never sent, but Congress echoed his 
sentiments when it resolved on January 2nd to indict the British for "the execrable 
barbarity, with which this unhappy war has been conducted."  Despite deep provocation, 
Congress could take pride that the American cause had not been stained by such 
inhumanity.1 
 Three years later as governor of Virginia, Jefferson penned a very different 
declaration on the conduct of war.  In the intervening period, British and Native 
                                                
 1 Draft of a Declaration on the British Treatment of Ethan Allen by Thomas Jefferson.  January 
2nd, 1776. The Papers of Thomas Jefferson Digital Edition, Barbara B. Oberg and J. Jefferson Looney, eds. 
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, Rotunda, 2008). 
<http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/TSJN-01-01-01-0006>, hereafter cited as PTJ; Journals of the 
Continental Congress, 1774-1789, ed. Worthington C. Ford et al. (Washington, D.C., 1904-37), 34 vols., 
4:21, hereafter cited as JCC. 
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American raiding parties had plagued Virginia's frontiers, bands of armed loyalists had 
plundered the countryside, thousands of enslaved Africans had fled to British lines, many 
taking up arms against their former masters, hundreds of Virginia's soldiers and sailors 
had perished in British jails and prison ships, and the British navy had burned sections of 
Norfolk and Portsmouth.  To compound Jefferson's concerns, Congress had saddled 
Virginia with the responsibility of housing and feeding thousands of enemy prisoners 
who were anxious for an opportunity to rejoin their comrades.  With a British army 
ensconced in Georgia and poised to march northward, it looked as if they might soon get 
their chance.  In late 1779, Jefferson's Virginia was surrounded by enemies from both 
within and without: enemies that evinced no intention of observing "the usage of polished 
Nations; gentle and humane."  Instead, as he apprised John Jay, they were guilty of 
committing "ravages and enormities, unjustifiable by the usage of civilized nations."  
This was the context in which Jefferson expressed a very different vision of the conduct 
of war from that he had espoused in the waning days of 1775.  As he wrote a Virginian 
officer in enemy custody, the British had transformed the conflict into "a contest of 
cruelty and destruction," and henceforth Americans would "contend with them in that 
line, and measure out misery to those in our power."  This was not an idle threat of 
proportional retaliation for British misdeeds as sanctioned by the European laws of war.  
This was the deliberate articulation of a radical alteration in the revolutionaries' conduct 
of the war: war that would be carried out with "a severity as terrible as universal."2 
 Deprived of Their Liberty explores this widespread, and heretofore largely 
unrecognized, transformation in the revolutionaries' conduct of war by analyzing how 
                                                
 2 Jefferson to William Phillips. July 22nd, 1779. Williamsburg, VA; Jefferson to John Jay. June 
19th, 1779.  Williamsburg, VA; Jefferson to George Mathews. October 8th, 1779. In Council. PTJ. 
 4 
revolutionary Americans treated their captured enemies over the course of the conflict.  It 
asks what their treatment can tell us about the American Revolution more broadly.  I 
begin by arguing that colonial Americans were unprepared for the challenges of waging a 
European-style conflict in 1775.  Lacking both experience and a professional military 
establishment, they relied on a small cadre of European-trained officers to formulate and 
execute military policy.  Despite a deep-seated commitment to the normative practice of 
war in Europe, this fledgling nation soon found the care and management of prisoners of 
war to be a daunting challenge.  What was to become of these men?  How were they to be 
treated?  Who would pay to house and feed them?  In answering questions such as these, 
I contend that the manner in which the revolutionary authorities dealt with enemy 
prisoners over the course of the war reflects the radicalization of popular American 
assumptions about the limits of acceptable violence in warfare. The violence of America's 
war for independence is both proof of the radicalism of the American Revolution and a 
driving factor behind that radicalism.  The Revolution did not just radicalize American 
politics, ideology, and society, though the consequences for all three were profound, it 
also radicalized Americans' understanding of war: how it should be prosecuted and who 
should have a say in ordering its conduct.  When the struggle began, the revolutionary 
leadership worked tirelessly to control the war's violence according to the prevailing 
European norms, but the experience of the conflict so outraged ordinary Americans that 
their cries for radical change could not be ignored.  Faced with unremitting popular 
pressure for retaliatory violence, revolutionary leaders such as Jefferson, slowly and in 
fits and starts, began to reconsider their humane position on the conduct of war.  The 
result was a torrent of violence unimaginable at the commencement of hostilities.     
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 Three principal factors account for this transformation.  From the onset of 
hostilities, the revolutionaries encountered an obstinate enemy that officially denied them 
the status of legitimate combatants, labeling them as rebels and traitors.  They faced the 
divided loyalties of their own population, which threatened civil war.  And they were 
politically constrained from forming a centralized government capable of effectively 
limiting the war's violence.  These three imperatives shaped the very nature of the war 
they fought and forced revolutionary leaders to reconsider their basic assumptions about 
warfare.  In doing so, they unwittingly radicalized the struggle, transforming a war for 
colonial self-determination into a truly revolutionary conflict. 
 Although revolutionary Americans believed that their grievances justified taking 
up arms, British political and military officials considered them criminals in need of 
chastisement.  When suppressing rebellions, the British army had a long history of 
denying the conventional European protections of war to insurgents in locales as diverse 
as Scotland, Ireland, Jamaica, and Acadia.  While the cultural resemblance between the 
British and their American colonists was so strong that the violence of Britain's response 
never matched that of the preceding rebellions, the British army’s belief that the 
American war was an unlawful rebellion strongly influenced its military practice.  
American prisoners in British hands were the principal victims of Britain's effort to end 
the rebellion by force.  Historians estimate that somewhere between 8,500 and 18,000 
American soldiers, sailors, and privateers expired in British custody.  Despite the 
discrepancy in total numbers, most agree that roughly one half of all Americans who fell 
into British hands during the war perished in captivity: a statistic unprecedented in 
eighteenth-century European warfare.  The prisoners did not suffer in silence.   The 
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revolutionary leadership wasted no time in capitalizing on the prisoners' ordeals for 
propagandistic purposes.  As accounts of British abuses proliferated in the press— 
usually exaggerated but rarely without some truth— ordinary Americans, thirsting for 
vengeance, began to demand retaliation.  To infuriated revolutionaries, British prisoners 
looked like the ideal objects of revenge.3 
 Responding to the siren call of vengeance, the revolutionary authorities retaliated 
first and most violently upon those Americans who took up arms in opposition to the 
"glorious cause."  The British ministry's decision in 1776 to arm loyalists to assist in the 
suppression of the rebellion inaugurated a civil war in America in which abuse would 
compound abuse for the next six years.  Once the quest for independence replaced any 
hope of reconciliation, the revolutionaries ceased to tolerate disloyalty.  No longer seen 
as merely deluded or disaffected by the revolutionaries, loyalists represented an 
existential threat to the new nation by openly espousing an alternate vision for America's 
future.  By taking up arms, loyalists undermined American claims to political unity and 
sovereign status in the eyes of the world.  Confronted by multiple threats of loyalist 
uprisings, the revolutionaries began to conceive of their loyalist neighbors as rebels and 
traitors.  Re-imagined in this way, the enemies of the Revolution no longer merited the 
humane treatment due to prisoners of war that the revolutionaries had so assiduously 
maintained at the conflict’s outset.  Occupying a liminal space between benign contempt 
and begrudging toleration in the minds of most revolutionaries before independence, after 
the declaration, loyalists had no place at all.  As rebels against their country, they could 
                                                
 3 Edwin Burrows, Forgotten Patriots: The Untold Story of American Prisoners during the 
Revolutionary War (New York: Basic Books, 2008), ix, 64, 197-201, 315-317, n. 7-12 and Howard H. 
Peckham, ed., The Toll of Independence: Engagements & Battle Casualties of the American Revolution 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 132. 
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be imprisoned at whim, held with little prospect of release, tried as traitors, and even 
summarily executed.  This alteration in how the revolutionaries conceived of their 
enemies had drastic consequences for the treatment of loyalist prisoners in American 
hands.    
Despite the popular outcry against British abuses and the exigencies of civil war, 
revolutionary leaders might have succeeded in sustaining their humane vision of warfare 
had they been willing to create a military bureaucracy capable of enforcing it.  Steeped in 
republican ideology and its suspicion of standing armies, the revolutionary leadership 
was loath to relinquish control of prisoner affairs to its military branch.  George 
Washington eventually succeeded in establishing a commissariat of prisoners for the 
Continental army, roughly equivalent to that of the British army, but Congress never 
granted the commissary the power or the purse necessary to adequately provide for 
enemy prisoners.  Without the support of tax revenue, Congress was reduced to the 
necessity of outsourcing prisoner management to individual states.  In this decentralized 
system, local revolutionary authorities often interpreted congressional orders as mere 
suggestions.  Accountable to its citizens before Congress, state governments jealously 
guarded the enemy prisoners in their hands for the purpose of exchanging them for their 
own constituents in British custody, contrary to Washington's desire for exchanges to be 
based on length of captivity alone.  More seriously, once the prisoners were out of 
Washington's hands, he could do little to guarantee their safety or humane treatment.  
Local officials, deeply mired in their own civil wars and constantly pressed by 
constituents to exact retribution for British atrocities, often escalated retaliation beyond 
proportionality.  Prevented by Congress from ever entering into a general treaty for the 
 8 
exchange of prisoners with the British, Washington could do nothing but lament the 
prisoners' plight and the escalation of the war's violence.    
By analyzing how these factors influenced the revolutionaries' practice of war, 
Deprived of Their Liberty questions the standard narrative of the Revolutionary War and 
its role in the broader history of the American Revolution.  Summarizing the popular 
American conception of the Revolution, Gordon Wood has claimed that America's 
revolution "does not appear to resemble the revolutions of other nations in which people 
were killed, property was destroyed, and everything was turned upside down."  The 
revolutionaries were "too much the gentlemen" who "made speeches, not bombs."  In his 
account of the social transformations wrought by the Revolution, the war's violence has 
no place.  Those historians who have critiqued Wood for his apparent emphasis on ideas 
over actions, patricians over plebs, and have sought instead to recover the agency of those 
disenfranchised by the Revolution, are equally responsible for our sanitized image of the 
revolutionary era.  While Marcus Rediker, Gary Nash, T.H. Breen, and others have 
observed that a very different revolution took place "out of doors," away from the halls of 
Congress or genteel drawing rooms, the battlefield and its aftermath appear rarely in their 
narratives.  Furthermore, neither interpretation has accounted for why common tradesmen 
and day laborers joined their voices to those of elite merchants and landed gentlemen in 
the call for, first, retaliation and then violent retribution for British mistreatment of 
American prisoners.4  
                                                
 4 Gordon Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1991), 
3.  In a similar vein, the flood of recent scholarship on the "founding fathers" has done more to glorify the 
war than illuminate its horrors.  See for instance, Joseph Ellis, Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary 
Generation (New York: Alfred A.  Knopf, 2000), John Ferling, Setting the World Ablaze: Washington, 
Adams, Jefferson, and the American Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), and Stephen 
Brumwell, George Washington: Gentleman Warrior (New York: Quercus, 2012).  Equally surprising, 
scholars working in the tradition of the "new social history" have all but ignored the violence of the 
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 Although military historians have long taken the experience of the war seriously, 
they have traditionally portrayed the war in two categories: first as a limited conflict in 
the eighteenth-century European tradition between the regular forces of Great Britain and 
the nascent United States, and second as a "total" conflict between these two powers and 
their various Native American adversaries and civilian militias.  Within this bifurcated 
conception of the conflict, the war of the Revolution looks much like the colonial wars of 
the eighteenth-century.  The violence of the regular war has been downplayed while that 
of the militia war has been emphasized.  Unsurprisingly, John Shy's claim that the war 
was "militarily conservative" has endured, largely unchallenged.5  
                                                                                                                                            
Revolutionary War except when that violence was directed against traditionally-ignored historical actors.  
For instance, Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, 
and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic (Boston: Beacon, 2000), Gary Nash, The Unknown 
American Revolution: The Unruly Birth of Democracy and the Struggle to Create America (New York: 
Viking, 2005), and T. H. Breen, American Insurgents, American Patriots (New York: Hill and Wang, 
2010).   
 5 For traditional military histories of the war see Robert Middlekauff, The Glorious Cause: The 
American Revolution, 1763-1789 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), Don Higginbotham, The War of 
American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practice, 1763-1789 (New York: Macmillan, 
1971), Christopher Ward, The War of the Revolution (New York: Macmillan Company, 1952), 2 vols. For 
an excellent, though geographically limited, study of the interplay of atrocity and restraint during the war in 
North Carolina see Wayne E. Lee, Crowds and Soldiers in Revolutionary North Carolina: The Culture of 
Violence in Riot and War (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001). Recent work that has explored 
Anglo-American conflicts with Native Americans has further obfuscated just how widespread the violence 
of the revolutionary era really was by over emphasizing the violence of the frontier war in contrast to the 
"regular" war.  Peter Silver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America (New 
York: W. W.  Norton, 2008) and John Grenier, The First Way of War: American War Making on the 
Frontier (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).  Notable exceptions include Robert Parkinson, 
"Enemies of the People: The Revolutionary War and Race in the New American Nation" (Ph.D. diss., 
University of Virginia, 2005), and Michael McDonnell, The Politics of War: Race, Class, and Conflict in 
Revolutionary Virginia (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007).  John Shy, who came 
closest to noting the radicalism of the Revolutionary War, is in large measure responsible for its 
obfuscation.  In his essay, "American Strategy: Charles Lee and the Radical Alternative," Shy examines 
Lee's view of American strategic aims and argues for their radical departure from conventional European 
ideas about strategy.  Yet, because of his concentration on strategy, and Lee's ultimate failure to garner 
congressional support for his plans, Shy fails to appreciate the widespread and radical transformation in the 
revolutionaries' practice of war during the period.  In the end, he concludes that "Historians have often 
noted that the American Revolution was a 'conservative' revolution, with surprising stability of institutions 
and continuity of leadership.  But few have noticed that it was also militarily conservative." John Shy, A 
People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American Independence (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1976), 135-162, 161.   
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Focusing largely on battlefield operations, or on the social composition or combat 
motivations of American forces, the war's principal historians have neglected the problem 
of prisoners of war during the conflict.  The majority of scholars who have examined the 
war's prisoners have chosen to focus on the experience of American prisoners held by the 
British.  Those works that have looked at American treatment of enemy prisoners have 
concluded, from a narrow evidentiary base, that the Americans were generous and 
merciful to their captives.  Moreover, few of these studies have adopted a chronological 
organization, thus failing to appreciate how American military practice evolved during 
the war.  This dissertation, which is the first comprehensive analysis of American 
treatment of enemy prisoners during the revolutionary era, attempts to center the war, and 
its consequent horrors, in the scholarly debate about the character and consequences of 
the American Revolution. Long overshadowed in the scholarly literature by the violence 
of revolutionary France, the American Revolution, for those who endured it, was a 
searing experience for which they were entirely unprepared.6    
                                                
6  Prisoners of war are hardly mentioned in either Charles Royster, A Revolutionary People at War: 
The Continental Army and American Character, 1775-1783 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1979) or James Kirby Martin and Mark Edward Lender, A Respectable Army: The Military Origins 
of the Republic ( Wheeling, Ill. : Harlan Davidson, Inc., 2006). For a provocative and recent study of the 
British treatment of American prisoners see Burrows, Forgotten Patriots.  See also: Larry G. Bowman, 
Captive Americans: Prisoners During the American Revolution (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 
1976), Lindsey, "American Prisoners of War," Charles Henry Metzger, The Prisoner in the American 
Revolution (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1971), 5-32, Richard H. Amerman, "Treatment of American 
Prisoners during the Revolution," Proceedings of the New Jersey Historical Society, 78 (1960), 257-75, 
Eugene L. Armbruster, The Wallabout Prison Ships, 1776-1783 (New York, 1920), Danske Dandridge, 
American Prisoners of the Revolution (Charlottesville, VA: The Michie Company, 1911.), Alice M. Earle, 
Martyrs of the Prison-Ships of the Revolution (Philadelphia, 1895), George Taylor, Martyrs to the 
Revolution in the British Prison-Ships in Wallabout Bay (New York, 1855). For other accounts of 
American treatment of enemy prisoners see Gerald Haffner, "The Treatment of Prisoners of War by the 
Americans During the War of Independence," (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1952),  Daniel Krebs, A 
Generous and Merciful Enemy: Life for German Prisoners of War During the American Revolution 
(Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2013), Judith L. Van Buskirk, Generous Enemies: Patriots 
and Loyalists in Revolutionary New York (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), Martha 
W. Dixon, “Divided Authority: The American Management of Prisoners in the Revolutionary War" (Ph.D.  
diss., University of Utah, 1977), Paul J. Springer, America’s Captives: Treatment of POWs from the 
Revolutionary War to the War on Terror (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2010), and Robert C. 
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I came to this project at a time when one could not pick up a newspaper or turn on 
CNN without being confronted by a barrage of accounts of prisoner-of-war abuse.  
Political analysts and pundits, infatuated by what Newsweek termed "Founders Chic," 
delighted in contrasting contemporary American misdeeds with the "virtuous" and 
"humanitarian" practices of the revolutionary generation.  Intrigued by the juxtaposition, 
I scoured the existing literature on the subject for evidence supporting their claims.  
Quotes from prominent revolutionary leaders abounded, professing the centrality of the 
humane treatment of enemy prisoners to the American cause.  Elias Boudinot, the first 
American Commissary General of Prisoners and future president of the Continental 
Congress, was not alone when he boasted in 1777 that "humanity to Prisoners of War has 
ever been the peculiar Characteristic of the american [sic] Army."  It looked as if the 
revolutionaries had been steadfast in their defense of the "laws of humanity" in the face 
of continual British atrocities.  Maybe there was something to American 
"exceptionalism" after all.  Pursuing the topic further, I wanted to know why the 
revolutionaries embraced what David Hackett Fischer called "An American Way of 
Fighting" that privileged "a policy of humanity"?  The answer I came upon in the 
archives looked nothing like Fischer's laudatory assertion that the revolutionaries 
conducted the war "in a manner that was true to the expanding humanitarian ideals of the 
American Revolution."  My findings challenged both my preconceptions about how the 
war was fought and about the centrality of the war itself to the broader phenomenon of 
                                                                                                                                            
Doyle, The Enemy in Our Hands: America’s Treatment of Enemy Prisoners of War from the Revolution to 
the War on Terror (Lexington: University of Kentucky, 2010).  For a concise précis on the debates about 
the "American Way of War" see Wayne Lee, "Early American Ways of War: A New Reconnaissance, 
1600-1815," The Historical Journal, vol. 44 (March, 2001), 259-89. 
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the American Revolution.  The results of my research are arranged in a largely 
chronological narrative consisting of the six chapters briefly outlined below.7 
The first two chapters of the dissertation establish the context for understanding 
the dramatic transformations in the revolutionaries' conduct of the war and analyze their 
treatment of British and allied prisoners during the first year of the struggle.  Chapter One 
(The Vision of War) begins by examining the place of war within the intellectual and 
cultural world of Anglo-Americans on the eve of conflict with Great Britain.  I explore 
the development of eighteenth-century Europe's culture of limited war, as well as its 
migration across the Atlantic, and I argue that these European norms shaped 
revolutionary Americans' vision of war: how it should, and would, be conducted.  At the 
outset of hostilities, the revolutionary leadership expected the British to observe the 
norms of intra-European warfare and resolved to adhere to the same standards.  Through 
their experience in the Seven Years' War and their reading of contemporary European 
military treatises and international juridical works, colonial American military authorities 
imagined this new war in European terms.  They also believed that reconciliation with the 
British crown and Parliament was not only possible but probable.  Thus, abusing the 
king’s soldiers, sailors, and loyal subjects would do little to demonstrate the justice and 
legitimacy of their grievances.  Chapter Two (The Novelty of War) reveals that such 
                                                
 7 Boudinot to James Wilson and Christian Forster.  Morris Town, NJ.  July 5th, 1777.  Joseph Lee 
Boyle, "Their Distress is almost intolerable": The Elias Boudinot Letterbook, 1777-1778 (Westminster, 
MD: Heritage Books, 2002), 14; Evan Thomas, "Founders Chic: Live from Philadelphia," Newsweek (July 
9, 2001), 48; David Hackett Fischer, Washington's Crossing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 375.   
For works that have attempted to contrast the United States' alleged violations of the laws of war during the 
"war on terror" with the revolutionaries' supposed adherence to them see Jane Mayer, The Dark Side: The 
Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned into a War on American Ideals (New York: Doubleday, 
2008), Philippe Sands, Torture Team: Rumsfeld's Memo and the Betrayal of American Values (New York: 
Palgrave, 2008), and Louis Fisher, American Military Tribunals and Presidential Power: American 
Revolution to the War on Terrorism (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2005).   For the most balanced 
account of this issue see John Fabian Witt, Lincoln's Code: The Laws of War in American History (New 
York: Free Press, 2012). 
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resolve on the part of the revolutionary leadership even survived popular demands for 
retribution for alleged British misconduct during the campaign to capture Canada.  In the 
aftermath of the Declaration of Independence, the revolutionary leadership, no longer 
hopeful for reconciliation, was motivated by the desire to appear as a legitimate nation-
state in the eyes of potential European allies.  The cries and lamentations of British 
prisoners would serve only to undermine that cause.  Enemy prisoners were no longer 
simply the inconvenient byproducts of revolt: they began to take on a symbolic meaning, 
as tangible evidence of American martial prowess and national legitimacy.   
 As the war progressed, and word of British abuse of American prisoners spread, 
the revolutionaries' vision of humane and moderate war began to fade.  In Chapter Three 
(The Realities of War), I turn to the revolutionaries' campaign to suppress armed loyalism 
in 1776 and 1777.  During this period, the threat of loyalist uprisings and the truly 
staggering mortality rate of American prisoners in British hands persuaded ordinary 
Americans to re-imagine their British foes as barbarians and loyalists as rebels and 
traitors.  Reconceived in this way, the enemies of the revolution were no longer entitled 
to the protections of "civilized" warfare in their minds.  The ramifications of this shift 
become manifest in Chapter Four (The Fortune of War), which examines the fate of the 
British army that surrendered under the protection of the Convention of Saratoga in 1777.  
By nullifying the Convention, Congress openly flouted the norms of the European culture 
of war that the revolutionary leadership had held sacrosanct at the commencement of 
hostilities.  This radical departure from previous prisoner-of-war policy reflected a drastic 
shift in public opinion.  In the spring of 1778, retaliation had come to dominate the public 
discourse on prisoner treatment, and Congress resolved to ignore the demands for 
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retribution no longer.  By suspending the Saratoga captives' departure for England as 
stipulated by the Convention, while failing to provide for the prisoners' sustenance and 
support, Congress held the Convention army hostage for the duration of the war.  Of the 
six thousand men who surrendered at Saratoga, fewer than eight hundred made it back to 
British lines at war's end.   
Chapter Five (The Vengeance of War) looks at the brutal, backcountry civil war 
that developed in the south after the fall of Charleston in 1780.  During this phase of the 
conflict, exaggerated accounts of British brutality radicalized southern revolutionaries, 
galvanizing them to wage a war of vengeance against Britons and loyalists alike.  
Embracing retaliation for enemy atrocities, the destruction of the property of enemy 
civilians, the revocation of surrender agreements, the wholesale arrest and imprisonment 
of enemy noncombatants, and the execution of prisoners of war, the revolutionaries 
engaged in a cycle of retaliatory violence in the last years of the conflict that would have 
been unthinkable at the war’s outset.  The war in the south was not a contest over abstract 
political principles, but an existential conflict for national, local, and individual survival.  
This was not the war the revolutionary elite had envisioned in 1775. 
Set against the backdrop of the European culture of naval warfare, Chapter Six 
(The War at Sea) explores how this process of escalating violence unfolded in the case of 
captured British and loyalist privateers and naval personnel.  In the aftermath of 
Parliament’s criminalization of American privateering with the enactment of the High 
Treason Bill of 1777, revolutionary authorities responded not by reaffirming their 
dedication to the restraint of violence as enshrined in Enlightenment customs of the laws 
of war, but by declaring the British barbarians and loyalists rebels, both beyond the pale.  
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Reconceived in this way, British maritime prisoners became suitable targets for 
retaliatory violence.  Despite continual British efforts to negotiate a large-scale, informal 
exchange of captive mariners, Congress refused to compromise.  Only after the arrival of 
the articles of peace in 1783 did Congress relent.   
As the struggle drew to a close, American pamphleteers and politicians decried 
the British treatment of American prisoners as “savage cruelty” and lauded the “justice 
and humanity” of the "virtuous Americans," but both stories obfuscated the reality of 
America's war for independence.  Revolutionary leaders had hoped to conduct the 
conflict according to the restrained principles of European warfare, but in the aftermath 
of independence they found themselves engaged in a struggle for national survival 
against a competing vision for America’s future.  The violence of that conflict so far 
exceeded their pre-war conceptions of "civilized" warfare that the only way post-war 
Americans could reconcile their own part in the war's devastation was to deny it 
altogether.  In their narratives of the war, accounts of the horrors of the British prison 
ships proliferated, coloring Americans' collective memory of the conflict.  
Unsurprisingly, the noisome and insalubrious conditions of American prison ships, jails, 
and camps where the king’s supporters were deprived of their liberty and often their lives 
by the very government purporting to defend those inalienable rights, faded from 
memory.  In their place, later generations have accepted a narrative of American 
generosity, moderation, and humanity in warfare that persists to this day.  Concerned 
primarily with teasing out the Revolution's ideological, social, economic, racial, or 
gender ramifications, historians have exacerbated this trend by largely ignoring the 
experiences of those whose lives were shattered by the conflict.  As Allan Kulikoff has 
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reminded us, “Unless we understand the Revolution as a war—a violent and protracted 
conflict—we shall not understand it at all."  The Revolution's prisoners needed no 
reminder of its violence.  To them, American independence brought only terror, penury, 
pain, and privation.8
                                                
8 Freeman's Journal, January 2nd, 1782, Pennsylvania Packet, January 19th, 1782 Burrows, 
Forgotten Patriots, 187; Allan Kulikoff, “Revolutionary Violence and the Origins of American 
Democracy,” Journal of the Historical Society, II, no. 2 (Spring 2002), 229-260, 232. 
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Chapter One: 




 George Washington had been in command of the infant Continental army for just 
over a month when he penned a letter of stern reproach to his former comrade, British 
Lieutenant General Thomas Gage, on “the Obligations arising from the Rights of 
Humanity, & Claims of Rank.”  Washington rebuked his opponent for the treatment of 
American prisoners confined in Boston.  In his scathing reprimand, Washington asserted 
that these men, most of whom had been captured during the fighting at Bunker Hill in 
May, were “thrown indiscriminately, into a common Gaol” overflowing with disloyal 
Bostonians, suspected spies, unruly redcoats, and common criminals.  The wounded and 
sick sweltered alongside the healthy in the summer heat with only a single bucket of 
water a day for both hydration and sanitation. The prisoners were deprived of 
nourishment and “the Comforts of Life” at the whim of the British provost.  In the 
opinion of one prisoner, “The place seems to be an Emblem of Hell.”1   
 For Gage, an officer who had served with distinction in the 1745 Jacobite 
Rebellion, the War of Austrian Succession, and the Seven Years’ War, chastisement from 
a man whose most impressive military accomplishment had simply been to survive the 
defeat of General Edward Braddock in 1755 must have smacked of the impudence of a 
rank amateur.  The British general would not tolerate a lecture on the proper conduct of 
                                                
 1 When I use the appellation American, I am referring to those inhabitants of Britain's thirteen 
North American colonies who embraced rebellion and later independence.  Those North Americans who 
stayed loyal to Great Britain will be referred to as loyalists. Washington to Gage. August 11th, 1775. 
Cambridge, MA.  The Papers of George Washington Digital Edition, Theodore J. Crackel, ed., 
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, Rotunda, 2008) 
<http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/GEWN>, hereafter cited as PGW; “A Journal Kept by John 
Leach during His Confinement by the British, in Boston Gaol, in 1775” in New England Historical and 
Genealogical Register, (1865), vol. 19, 260, 259. 
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war from a novice and a traitor to his king and country.  Gage reminded Washington that 
“under the Laws of the Land” he and his entire army deserved to hang for treason; simply 
foregoing summary execution was thus a sign of British mercy.  He refused to 
countenance any claim of rank that was not derived from a king's commission.  The 
officers would remain in the same jail with common criminals.  Nevertheless, Gage 
strongly asserted that captured rebels had “hitherto been treated with care and kindness.”  
He defended this assertion by invoking European customs for the treatment of prisoners 
of war: “To the Glory of Civilized Nations, humanity and War have been compatible; and 
Compassion to the subdued, is become almost a general system.” This was language that 
Washington understood.  Well-read in contemporary military literature and theory and a 
veteran of King George’s latest war against the French, Washington shared a set of 
values about the conduct of war with his British antagonist.  As Gage’s comment 
indicates, the “civilized” nations of Europe possessed a common culture of war: what 
Wayne Lee has defined as “a broadly understood set of cultural expectations about the 
uses and forms of war.”  By the late eighteenth century, Europe's culture of war 
emphasized restraining war's violence and protecting enemy prisoners.2 
 
 In order to recover revolutionary Americans' cultural expectations about the 
treatment of prisoners when war commenced in 1775, this chapter examines the factors 
that succeeded in limiting war's destructiveness and improving the plight of prisoners in 
eighteenth-century Europe, as well as their migration across the Atlantic.  I argue that 
                                                
 2 Both Washington and Gage had been present when British General Edward Braddock's army 
was defeated by a much smaller French and allied Native American force at the Battle of the Monongahela 
on July 9th, 1755. Gage to Washington. August 13th, 1775.  Boston, MA. PGW;. Lee, Crowds and 
Soldiers, 99. 
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these European norms shaped the colonial American elite's vision of how war should be 
conducted.  While Americans had experienced over a century and a half of nearly 
endemic warfare with the native peoples of North America, they were largely unprepared 
to wage a European-style war in 1775.  Nonetheless, revolutionary leaders thought they 
knew how the conflict would unfold.  They imagined that both sides would conform to 
the prevailing European norms of acceptable violence in warfare.  This vision of 
restrained and limited war as conducted amongst "civilized" peoples conditioned the 
revolutionary leadership's response to captured British soldiers when war erupted during 
the spring and summer of 1775.  By treating their prisoners according to these European 
customs, influential revolutionaries, such as Washington, intended to demonstrate the 
legitimacy of their cause to their British enemies.  Given the inherent illegitimacy of 
rebellion, they could hardly have done otherwise. 
 There was another vision of war available to colonial Americans, a vision that 
Washington, as a veteran of the French and Indian War, knew well: retaliatory warfare.  
In the colonial wars of the eighteenth century, Anglo-American forces had encountered in 
Native Americans an enemy with a very different understanding of the norms of 
acceptable violence in warfare.  While the British and their American auxiliaries had 
hoped to conduct operations in North America during the Seven Years' War according 
the practices of "civilized" nations, on the frontier, where war parties and rangers roamed, 
alleged atrocities committed by one side had been answered with severe acts of 
retaliation by the other.  Away from the judgmental gaze of their European superiors, 
both Franco-Canadian and Anglo-American forces had aped the practices of their native 
allies, escalating the conflict's violence well beyond European norms.  Twenty years 
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later, Washington and many of his fellow American veterans of the war were determined 
that their dispute with Britain would never devolve into a similar cycle of retaliatory 
violence.  In this new war, enemy prisoners would be treated with humanity, according to 
an idealized vision of European practice.  Or so they thought. 
 
 
The Culture of War in Early Modern Europe 
(Fig. 1) 
The Battle of Fontenoy, by Henri Félix Emmanuel Philippoteaux, 1873 
Victoria and Albert Museum 
 
In 1873, the French painter Henri Félix Emmanuel Philippoteaux, still reeling 
from the astonishing defeat of his beloved patrie in the Franco-Prussian War, crafted an 
indelible image of war in an earlier, gentler, and more humane age: the age of 
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Enlightenment.  In Philippoteaux’s depiction of the 1745 battle of Fontenoy, the 
machines of industrialized late nineteenth-century warfare—the repeating rifle, the early 
machinegun, the railroad car—were replaced with billowing banners, shining spears, and 
glittering bayonets.  The shelled-ruins of once vibrant cities and the corpses of unarmed 
civilians, all too common in France's latest conflict, had no corollaries in Philippoteaux’s 
imagination of eighteenth-century warfare.  The illustration of long, symmetrical, and 
ordered lines of French guardsmen under the command of lavishly uniformed, properly 
powdered, and exquisitely mounted officers patiently awaiting their English opponents’ 
fire, bears little resemblance to the battlefields of 1870.  The tableau is not devoid of 
death, but the victims are few and their wounds far from ghastly. The field of Fontenoy, 
as rendered by Philippoteaux, is neat and precise, clean and unsullied. In his vision of 
war, the battlefield remained distinct from the rest of society, a site where violence could 
be safely enacted in a limited, restrained, and controlled manner.3  
 Appealing both to his French audience’s intense desire to recall a more victorious 
martial past and to their antiquarian fantasies of a more “enlightened” age, Philippoteux’s 
painting portrays a culture of war radically different from that of his own time. Through 
Philippoteux’s painting, Parisians could look back and imagine warfare "carried on with 
so much moderation and indulgence," to borrow eighteenth-century Swiss lawyer 
Emmerich de Vattel’s phrase.  In this vision of war, it was entirely probable that a French 
officer would hail his English counterpart from across the field to offer his adversary the 
pleasure of firing first.  The contrast was stark.  France’s recent experience with war was 
                                                
 3 For an examination of atrocities committed by German soldiers during the Franco-Prussian War 
see Mark. R. Stoneman, “The Bavarian Army and French Civilians in the War of 1870–1871: A Cultural 
Interpretation,” War in History 8.3 (2001), 271–93.  For an excellent narrative account of the Franco-
Prussian War see Michael Howard, The Franco-Prussian War (New York: Dorset Press, 1961). 
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characterized by mud, murder, and humiliating defeat.  From the perspective of the late 
nineteenth century, war in the age of the Enlightenment was genteel, colorful, even 
elegant, and its violence controlled, limited, and restrained.4 
While Philippoteaux’s picture sanitizes and glorifies the charnel houses that were 
the fields of Malplaquet, Fontenoy, and Minden, his work nevertheless underscores a 
very real transformation in the conduct of war that limited the destructiveness and 
violence of warfare and improved the plight of prisoners of war in early modern Europe.  
A thorough examination of how the rules of war in Europe—or to phrase it differently, 
the cultural norms of war—developed during this period is crucial to understanding what 
eighteenth-century Britons thought about the conduct of war, and therefore how prisoners 
of war should be treated when fighting broke out in their North American colonies.  This 
section explores the significant alterations in the organization of European armies, and 
even the states that raised them, the evolving culture of honor and restraint amongst the 
aristocracy, and the juridical tradition of the laws of war that all coalesced in post-
Reformation Europe to ensure that warfare in the eighteenth century would look 
remarkably different from that of centuries prior.  As products of this culture of war, 
eighteenth-century British officers carried these cultural norms with them to war in 
America.5   
 
                                                
 4 Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations; or, Principles of the Law of Nature Applied to the 
Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, Book III, accessed August 5th, 2008, 
<http://www.constitution.org/vattel/vattel_03.htm>; David Bell, The First Total War: Napoleon's Europe 
and the Birth of Warfare as We Know It (New York: Mariner Books, 2007), 35. 
 5 I agree with Wayne Lee that culture is not a determinant of military affairs, but a society’s 
understanding and expectations of legitimate conduct in war does “condition” actual practice. Lee, Crowds 
and Soldiers, 4. 
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The transformation of Europe’s culture of war had its roots in the vicious 
religious conflicts of the seventeenth century. The Protestant Reformation that divided 
the continent launched Europe on a thirty-year path of destruction, disease, famine, and 
fury. With salvation itself at stake, Protestants and Catholics alike made little effort to 
mitigate the horror of war and proceeded to kill and maim one another on a scale not seen 
in Europe since antiquity.  James Turner, an English volunteer serving with the Protestant 
forces of Sweden’s Gustavus Adolphus, recalled the conduct of his Finnish allies: “After 
the battles I saw a great many killed in cold blood by the Finns, who professed to give no 
quarter.”  Europeans viewed this conflict in existential terms; the survival of 
Protestantism imperiled the future of Catholicism and vice versa.6 
 When prisoners of war were taken, their fate depended largely on the caprice of 
the captors. If the prisoner were a wealthy aristocrat or senior officer, he might be 
ransomed or exchanged for an equally wellborn captive on the other side. For common 
soldiers and civilians, who had little monetary value, the outcome was bleak.  Housing 
and feeding large numbers of enemy prisoners were beyond the capacity of the 
mercenary armies and infant states that waged the religious wars. While occasional 
exchanges of prisoners did occur, those fortunate enough to be taken alive were very 
often impressed into the enemy’s army.  Most were simply put to death.  The horrors of 
war were compounded by the prevalence of siege warfare.  The populations of fortified 
cities and towns that resisted an enemy's conquest could expect the worst when the city's 
                                                
 6 Charles Carleton, Going to the Wars: The Experience of the British Civil Wars, 1638-1651 
(London: Routledge, 1992), 8, 19. Although the ancient Romans were very punctilious about declaring 
their justifications for going to war, they had few qualms about killing or selling into slavery enemy 
combatants and noncombatants alike.  Robert C. Stacey, "The Age of Chivalry," in Michael Howard, 
George J. Andreopoulous, and Mark. R. Shulman eds., The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the 
Western World (New Haven: Yale, 1994), 27.  For an excellent account of the Thirty Years' War see Peter 
H. Wilson, The Thirty Years' War: Europe's Tragedy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009). 
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defenses failed: pillage, rape, and murder on a massive scale.  Atrocities were legion, and 
the death toll staggering.  Prisoners of war and civilian men, women, and children paid 
the price for the religious and political affiliations of their social superiors.  Scholars 
estimate that the German states alone suffered over eight million fatalities during the first 
half of the seventeenth century. The Thirty Years’ War so ravaged Europe that the image 
of marauding bands of mercenaries, owing allegiance to none but the highest bidder, 
pillaging, plundering, and purging their way across the continent, were still 
uncomfortably fresh in the imaginations of Europeans a century later.7 
The 1648 treaty of Westphalia that ended the religious wars did not signal the end 
of warfare in Europe, but it did usher in a series of changes in the practice of war that had 
the surprising effect of constraining its horrors.  When the cannons of the religious wars 
fell silent, the culture of war in Europe was already in a state of flux.  Seventeenth-
century armies looked very little like the feudal hosts of the middle ages.  Numerous 
scholars have isolated and examined a series of developments in military technology, 
tactics, and organization that had a profound influence on the very structure of the 
European state and the conduct of war in this period.  Michael Roberts and Geoffrey 
Parker have argued that Europe experienced an early modern “military revolution” that 
began with the introduction of gunpowder and resulted in the creation of a tax-supported, 
centralized, bureaucratic state necessary to pay and provide for the large armies needed to 
                                                
 7  Peter H. Wilson, "Prisoners in Early Modern European Warfare," in Sibylle Scheipers, ed., 
Prisoners of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 49, 51-52; Norbert Elias, The Civilizing 
Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations, trans., Edmund Jephcott (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell, 1994), 163. Take for instance the siege of Magdeburg by imperial troops in 1631.  The city was 
destroyed and over 20,000 people were killed.  Wilson, "Prisoners in Early Modern European Warfare," 45; 
Bell, The First Total War, 45. 
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wield these gunpowder weapons in the complex tactical evolutions required by the new 
technology.8  
The introduction of effective gunpowder weapons to Europe did not, however, 
have an immediate limiting effect on the violence of war.  Initially, increased firepower 
produced increased casualties. The matchlock musket and its eighteenth-century 
successor, the flintlock, were hardly foolproof, but they were relatively simple and 
certainly deadly weapons. An untutored musketeer could be trained in the manual 
exercise in a matter of weeks—days if necessary—while the medieval long-bowman 
required years of constant practice to develop the muscle memory, and intuition, 
necessary to deliver his missile accurately.  Once in the field, the musketeer’s projectile 
could easily pierce the armor breastplates of his knightly opponents while the arrow 
rarely could.  Although notoriously inaccurate, when massed together in the serried ranks 
advocated by Maurice of Nassau in the sixteenth century, musketeers could unleash a 
nearly continuous volley of fire upon the enemy.  When the musketeers were properly 
protected by a shield of men armed with long pikes, the dominance of cavalry on the 
battlefield that had existed since the development of the stirrup was at an end. Battles 
could no longer be waged by a small class of aristocratic knights or by a cadre of 
mercenaries who sold their swords to the prince with the largest purse.  The relative ease 
with which the matchlock musket could be manufactured and mastered by new recruits 
opened the door to the possibility of larger armies.  By the end of the seventeenth 
                                                
 8 Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-
1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).  For the best summary of this ongoing debate see 
Clifford J. Rogers, ed., The Military Revolution Debate: Readings in the Military Transformation of Early 
Modern Europe (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995). 
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century, France's King Louis XIV boasted a royal army of 340,000 men: an unheard of 
number at the beginning of the century.9 
Even for monarchs with more modest aims than le roi soleil, wars were not cheap 
and training soldiers with new weapons in novel tactics was beyond the means of minor 
lords or petit princes.  Once armed and drilled, soldiers still had to be fed, paid, and 
clothed regardless of whether or not they were doing any actual fighting.  Large standing 
armies of musketeers, dragoons, and artillerists required a tremendous financial outlay for 
any monarch, and those who were most successful at war were very often those who had 
best harnessed the economic potential of their populations. Only an organized state 
apparatus, capable of extracting funds from its populace through taxation, could maintain 
such standing armies, especially in times of peace.  Unsurprisingly, the value of a 
prosperous civilian population freed from the horrors and anxieties of war quickly 
became manifest to Europe’s ruling elite.  Farmers whose crops were not trampled, 
whose homes were not burned, and whose families were not molested or made prisoner, 
were much more likely to pay taxes than those who were all too familiar with the hard 
hand of war.  Monarchs had a vested interest in curtailing the ravages of war to protect 
both their tax base and their newly created and tremendously expensive royal armies.10  
The soldiers for their part could now expect steady pay and regular supplies of 
provisions and clothing, thus diminishing their need to “live off the land.”  Some of the 
                                                
 9 Ira D. Gruber, "Atlantic Warfare" in The Oxford Handbook of the Atlantic World, 1450-1850 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 419-20; Guy Chet, Conquering the American Wilderness: The 
Triumph of European Warfare in the Colonial Northeast (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts 
Press, 2003), 8-10; Carleton, Going to the Wars, 74; Gruber, "Atlantic Warfare", 427.  For a thorough 
history of the rise of France's standing army in the seventeenth century see John A. Lynn, Giant of the 
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worst excesses of the Thirty Years’ War had been occasioned by starving soldiers in 
search of sustenance or discharged mercenaries taking advantage of defenseless civilians.  
An army prowling for plunder could easily devolve into a rapacious mob; in such 
situations, theft often escalated into rape and murder.  Plundering was not unknown to 
eighteenth-century armies, but the conduct of soldiers, loyal to the king’s person rather 
than simply his coffers, could now be regulated by military discipline and punishment.  
Written articles of war specifying acceptable conduct proliferated, and they were 
enforced by the swift justice of the lash and the noose. The execution of prisoners of war, 
which had been all too common during the wars of religion, was discouraged because it 
eroded discipline and prompted reprisals.  Paradoxically, the desire of early modern 
monarchs to wage war on a grander and more decisive scale actually served to limit the 
destructiveness of warfare by creating a disciplined soldiery that was required to respect 
civilian lives and property and spare enemy prisoners out of their superior’s naked self-
interest.11  
The changes to the character and composition of early modern armies resulting 
from the “military revolution” also improved the treatment of prisoners of war by 
increasing the value of an individual soldier’s life.  While the common foot soldier of 
medieval Europe was expendable in the eyes of his knightly superiors and was rarely 
taken prisoner, the monarchs of eighteenth-century Europe recognized the value of their 
professional soldiers and could ill afford to have them in enemy hands for long.  The 
crowned heads of Europe established elaborate treaties, known as cartels, for the 
exchange of prisoners.  These allowed for the speedy repatriation of prisoners, thereby 
                                                
 11 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1977), 135-169; Hew Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War (London: 
Routledge, 1983), 8-22. 
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negating the need to feed and quarter enemy soldiers for the remainder of the war. 
Soldiers were exchanged according to mutually agreed rates based on their military rank: 
privates for privates, sergeants for sergeants, generals for generals. With exchange, rather 
than death, the likely result of captivity, recruiting parties found it far easier to attract 
new cannon fodder for the armies of Europe. Far from infallible, the cartel system 
nonetheless promised, even if it did not always deliver, relief and release from the 
hardship of prolonged captivity.  With this system firmly in place, the capture of enemy 
prisoners became not only psychologically advantageous, by boosting the morale of the 
captors, but militarily beneficial as well.12   
Once a monarch had gone to the expense of raising, equipping, and training an 
army in the latest evolutions of linear warfare, the slightest provocation might easily 
induce him to embrace hostilities. Although widespread revulsion at the violence of the 
Thirty Years' War had tempered religious fervor, Europeans were not at a loss for reasons 
to harm one another.  As Montesquieu would later explain, “The spirit of monarchy is 
war and enlargement of dominion.”  Nevertheless, the goals of war became more modest.  
No longer vying for everlasting salvation, princes could make war over such mundane 
issues as territorial disputes, economic resources, and dynastic succession; and many did 
so with reckless disregard for cost.  Eighteenth-century Europe experienced fewer than 
seven years of peace.  Expansion, both in territory and the ever tenuous balance of power, 
required armies to be set on the march.13 
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  When two opposing early modern armies collided, the results were predictably 
gruesome.  Generals and military theorists both longed for battle and feared its 
consequences.  The deadliness of battle, where men could be torn from the world of the 
living by projectiles invisible to the naked eye, imbued in it an almost mythical character 
in the minds of the combatants.  In their view, battles were decisive, as if an indication of 
God’s judgment or divine providence.  The risks were high, but the rewards were real.  A 
victory on the battlefield could presage a political settlement and the return of peace with 
the balance of power adjusted in the victor’s favor.  Their logic, as well as their 
battlefield formations, was linear; victory in war depended upon victory in battle.14   
Nevertheless, the expense of battle, as well as the uncertainty of the results, 
prompted European generals to prefer maneuver to combat.  Unlike one seventeenth-
century military theorist who declared, “Of all the actions of war the most glorious and 
most important is to give battle,” Maurice de Saxe, a titan of eighteenth-century-military 
thought and victor of the battle of Fontenoy, famously proclaimed, “I do not favor 
pitched battles…I am convinced that a skillful general could make war all his life without 
being forced into one.”  As one who reaped the rewards of victory—the king of France 
awarded him the palatial Château de Chambord in recognition of his victory at 
Fontenoy— de Saxe knew well the risks of battle and was understandably cautious.  Each 
grenadier or fusilier he lost in battle was hard to replace.  In the military culture of the 
day, generals faced no shame if victory could be achieved without risking a general 
action.  Indeed, most eighteenth-century European conflicts consisted of, and very often 
were decided by, a series of prolonged sieges of towns and fortifications.  In siege 
                                                                                                                                            
attitudes about battle and its decisiveness see James Q. Whitman, The Verdict of Battle: The Law of Victory 
and the Making of Modern War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012).  
 14 Lee, Crowds and Soldiers, 106.  See also, Whitman, The Verdict of Battle. 
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warfare, victory or defeat could be accurately estimated by a series of calculations: how 
long would the besieged garrison’s food supplies hold, how many feet of trench could be 
dug in a day, how many rounds of solid shot were needed to batter a breach in the 
enemy’s walls, and so forth. If the garrison were not relieved, the besieging force could 
expect victory without resorting to capturing the town by storm.  The lives of both 
soldiers and civilians would be spared.15   
Thus, while the battlefield became more lethal in the early modern period, battles 
themselves became increasingly rare occurrences.  When two armies did meet on the 
Field of Mars, they were manned by professionals, loyal to their sovereign, who had been 
drilled, disciplined, and admonished from harming civilian populations.  Enemy prisoners 
were granted quarter and provided for until they could be exchanged. There were of 
course myriad exceptions to these broad outlines, but eighteenth-century Europeans 
thought of them as just that, exceptional.  Atrocities committed by soldiers invited strong 
rebuke and societal condemnation.  Common soldiers alone, however, did not have a 
monopoly on the violence of war; they had to be led by their social superiors.   
Eighteenth-century Europe was a deeply hierarchical society, and her armies 
reflected this hierarchy. While the rank and file could be controlled by discipline, drill, 
and corporal punishment, the officers, who were drawn from the aristocracy, landed 
gentry, and the moneyed elite, flocked to their king’s standard to preserve and perform 
their honor and gain royal favor.  Although not all eighteenth-century officers were 
aristocrats, they were all products of a society, and members of an institution, that 
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sanctified aristocratic values.  This phenomenon, described by Armstrong Starkey as a 
“culture of honor,” is crucial to understanding eighteenth-century Europeans’ 
perceptions, assumptions, and values about warfare.16   
  Honor was not a revolutionary concept; in fact, eighteenth-century aristocrats 
saw themselves as the lineal descendents of a proud medieval tradition of chivalry, 
service, and sacrifice for God and monarch.  For them, honor could not be earned through 
piety, bravery, or loyalty however: honor was inherited.  In their worldview, it was 
assumed that those of elevated birth possessed honor because their ancestors had been 
honorable. Those of more humble origin had precious few means of elevating themselves 
to rank among the innately honorable.  Although honor could not be purchased, it could 
very easily be lost.  Any insult, reproach, or slight that was not answered could deprive a 
noble of his honor.  Appearing honorable in the presence of peers was paramount, and 
social ostracism faced the gentleman who declined an invitation to cross blades or 
exchange shots on the field of honor.   
The possession of honor was best displayed through acts of valor.  Facing an 
opponent in a duel was a public indication of courage.  Valor could also be displayed on 
the field of battle, where princes dueled. The presence of tens of thousands of potential 
witnesses induced countless noble officers to chance their lives in foolhardy displays of 
dash and daring.  In the eighteenth century, gallantry mattered only if it was conspicuous.  
Capturing an enemy's regimental color, leading a “forlorn hope” assault on a fortification, 
or engaging in single combat with a socially worthy enemy were undeniable indications 
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of the possession of honor.  A common grenadier could be brave, but that was the base 
bravery of blind ignorance; only a gentleman could be valorous.17   
Although obsession with honor could lead a European officer to accept a 
challenge over a trivial affair or to engage in reckless abandon on the battlefield, the 
centrality of honor to the eighteenth-century aristocrat's identity also had a limiting effect 
on the violence of war.  As David Bell has argued, eighteenth-century nobles saw war as 
unexceptional, unavoidable, and even natural, but they also recognized their opponents 
on the other side of the battlefield as members of a common culture and caste.  
Aristocracy, though it took slightly different forms throughout Europe, looked much the 
same if you were in Paris or Vienna.  Even in England, where the hereditary aristocracy 
was comparatively small, the landed gentry aped the styles, manners, and behaviors of 
their more illustrious continental peers.  What might rightly be referred to as a pan-
European aristocratic culture stressed rigorous standards of self-control.  From the 
manner of their dress, to their posture, poise, and prose, European nobles were 
exceedingly conformist: excess was rigidly curtailed.  This was not a society that valued 
eccentrics. Any behavior seen to be untoward would invite censure and dishonor.18 
 These deeply held values of restraint and self-control translated naturally to the 
battlefield. The bloodlust that so characterized the religious wars was incompatible with 
eighteenth-century aristocratic culture.  While the battlefield was the natural theater of 
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the aristocracy, noble officers could not be seen to enjoy their part too much.  Death in 
the service of one’s king was a noble sacrifice, but the taking of a common soldier's life 
was beneath the dignity of a noble.  Officers carried flimsy and highly decorated swords 
and nearly useless pikes, known as spontoons, rather than firearms.  They were expected 
to set an example of personal bravery under fire but to leave the killing to the common 
men.  It was also incumbent upon officers to restrain their soldiers from any excesses in 
the heat of battle. This rule applied doubly to the protection of wounded or captured 
enemy officers.  Seeing their opponents as fellow gentlemen and nobles, or as Wayne Lee 
has termed it “brothers,” European officers granted quarter and the “honors of war” to 
their conquered foes.19  
Once captured, defeated officers who had behaved honorably in battle could 
expect from their captors every courtesy in proportion to their rank and social station.  
Upon offering their parole of honor not to escape or aid the enemy, these men would 
customarily be allowed to retain their swords and personal property.  It was not 
uncommon for noble officers to entertain their captured opponents as dinner guests. 
Captured officers likewise escaped the rigors of confinement and were allowed to live as 
lavishly as their purses, or lines of credit, would allow until they could be honorably, if 
not always equitably, exchanged.  Many officers were allowed to return to their homes to 
await exchange or the cessation of hostilities in ease and comfort.  The entire system was 
predicated upon an officer’s scrupulous adherence to his word of honor.20 
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 Officers who violated the norms of self-restraint or betrayed the confidence of 
their peers were very often publically castigated.  Fear of ostracism, and the constant 
need to be seen as honorable, prompted many officers to adopt a punctilious insistence on 
the protocol of war.  Form mattered as much if not more than function.  Negotiations 
between opponents required elaborate rituals that could drag out interminably as each 
side acknowledged, praised, and saluted the other. The least breach of etiquette evoked 
strong rebuke.  When opposing officers entered into conventions, treaties, or agreements, 
it was understood that the terms were inviolate. Refusing to accept offers of surrender, 
denying care to the wounded, or reneging on treaties all reflected poorly on the 
perpetrators. With honor at stake, material advantage took a backseat to decorous 
conduct.  For most eighteenth-century nobles, death was preferable to dishonor.21   
 Practical considerations also supported the moderation of war’s violence.  Given 
the relative ease with which European powers shifted their military alliances, it was 
common for officers who served with one another in the past to be arrayed against each 
other in the next conflict. Friendships that bridged the battle lines were commonplace, 
and officers who had been prisoner with the enemy and well treated relished the 
opportunity to return the favor. European nobles recognized their own self-interest and 
readily adopted unwritten codes of conduct based on the principle of reciprocity.22 
Predictably, the culture of war in the age of the Enlightenment had its intellectual 
influences as well. What is surprising is how little the Enlightenment’s quest for 
rationality permeated the battlefield.  As David Bell has demonstrated, the great 
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Enlightenment philosophes wasted little time devising methods to mitigate war’s horrors.  
Instead many imagined the dawn of an age without war: peace in perpetuity.  Eighteenth-
century soldiers and statesmen, however, did not share this grand vision.  Most imagined 
that war was inevitable, and they prepared accordingly.  Nonetheless, they were not 
insensible of the need to rationalize their behavior.  In so doing, Europe’s elite warriors 
drew on a longstanding intellectual current: the laws of war.23  
 Laws governing both when to go to war, jus ad bellum, and those for how to 
conduct the process once war was declared, jus in bellum, had existed in Europe since 
early Christian theologians struggled with the bellicosity of their secular rulers.  These 
Christian intellectuals, however, were principally interested in defining what constituted 
just war; the governing of war’s practice they left to its practitioners. The intellectual 
tradition of the laws of war continued to evolve in Renaissance and early modern Europe, 
but it was not until the mid-eighteenth century that Swiss jurist Emmerich de Vattel 
popularized a series of laws for the conduct of war.24 
Vattel, like other European aristocrats, was utterly obsessed with form and the 
appearance of propriety. His 1758 treatise, The Law of Nations, clearly reflected the 
values of the aristocratic culture of war into which he was born.  Although Vattel paid lip 
service to the standard justifications for going to war, he invariably agreed with the 
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framework established by St. Augustine: what mattered was that once begun, war should 
be conducted with honor and restraint. When looking at the battlefields of Europe, he was 
generally impressed. Vattel observed, “At present, the European nations generally carry 
on their wars with great moderation and generosity.” This moderation was commendable, 
but standard and customary practice needed to be codified lest violators claim ignorance 
in exculpation of misbehavior.  For Vattel, such a code was deducible from the laws of 
nature and amounted to a series of “maxims of humanity, moderation, and honour.”  
Once a law of nations was promulgated, the court of international opinion would see it 
enforced.25 
What exactly did Vattel’s vision of moderate and generous war look like?  He 
began with the premise that there was a common humanity with shared interests among 
the "civilized" peoples of Europe.  Seemingly obvious, this simple premise forbade the 
very frequent tendency of armies to demonize their enemies.  Parliamentarian troops 
during the English Civil War had found massacring Royalists easier if they renamed them 
“Papist Dogs,” and Royalists in turn excused their excesses by labeling their foes as 
“Rebel Vermin.”  This form of dehumanization was just the type of behavior that Vattel 
hoped to avoid.  He argued, “Let us never forget that our enemies are men. Though 
reduced to the disagreeable necessity of prosecuting our right by force of arms, let us not 
divest ourselves of that charity which connects us with all mankind.”  With common 
humanity established, enemies could no longer butcher one another indiscriminately.  
Civilians as well had “nothing to fear from the sword of the enemy" because “at present, 
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war is carried on by regular troops: the people, the peasants, the citizens, take no part in 
it.”26  
Even in war conducted between regular armies, enemy soldiers were subject to 
capture; yet for Vattel, their status as prisoners of war was not incompatible with the 
dictates of humanity.  He warned combatants, “As soon as your enemy has laid down his 
arms and surrendered his person, you have no longer any right over his life.”  Although 
he did not go as far as twentieth-century military jurists by suggesting that prisoners of 
war had any rights other than to their lives, he asserted that the execution of prisoners had 
no place in contemporary warfare.  For their habit of massacring the survivors of battles, 
Vattel rebuked the ancient Greeks and Romans.  By contrast, he lauded England and 
France as “generous nations” for their treatment of prisoners during the Seven Years' 
War.  Prisoners of war, he reminded his readers, “are men, and unfortunate.”  European 
nations deserved praise because prisoners of war were “seldom ill-treated among them.”  
Vattel no doubt approved of the civilian committee established in England in 1758 to 
“relieve the wants of the French Prisoners of War.” The English intellectual Samuel 
Johnson summarized the prevailing European opinion when he wrote in favor of the 
committee: “The relief of enemies has a tendency to unite mankind in fraternal affection; 
to soften the acrimony of adverse nations, and dispose them to peace and amity.”27  
Violence remained a useful tool in war, however, and Vattel was quick to admit 
that civilian property could be seized and cities bombarded if deemed militarily 
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necessary.  In his view, the entire population of an enemy’s country was at least 
theoretically at war; therefore, civilians who actively supported military activity were 
legitimate subjects of violence.  Retaliation was a just and necessary means of requiring 
the enemy “to observe the laws of war.”  The gray area created by these concepts of 
military necessity and reprisal were used by many eighteenth-century generals to justify 
conduct that was not strictly generous.  Nonetheless, Vattel was clear: violence 
perpetrated without a direct military end was forbidden.  As he termed it, “All damage 
done to the enemy unnecessarily, every act of hostility which does not tend to procure 
victory and bring the war to a conclusion, is a licentiousness condemned by the law of 
nature.”  Vengeance was not sufficient cause to escalate retaliation beyond what modern 
legal scholars call proportionality.  Generosity and moderation were to be admired.  In 
Vattel, we see the vision of war that Philippoteaux imagined when he painted the Battle 
of Fontenoy over a century later: war carried on by two rival armies of disciplined 
professionals, officered by aristocrats who shared a common culture, and prosecuted 
without harming civilians or prisoners of war.  Unlike centuries past, the battlefield, 
rather than the farmer’s cottage, parish church, or village square, was the primary locus 
of human destruction.28 
Eighteenth-century soldiers, however, had little to learn from Vattel.  Vattel’s 
laws only reinforced the “customs and usages of war” as they already knew them.  
Geoffrey Best has referred to Vattel as a “publicist,” and the appellation is apt.  Vattel 
was no innovator, but he did refine and make public a series of ideas about the conduct of 
war that had been developing for centuries.  The work of seventeenth-century Dutch 
jurist Hugo Grotius was chief among his intellectual debts. Living during the religious 
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wars when all of Europe seemed to be in arms, Grotius turned his pen to the practice of 
war.  His 1625 treatise, The Law of War and Peace, laid out a bold agenda to restrain the 
conduct of war.  War, he accepted, was natural, even necessary, but it could and should 
be controlled.  He strongly discouraged the execution of prisoners and promoted a system 
of exchange.  Although his writings had little effect in his own day, a period 
characterized in Grotius’ words by “a lack of restraint in relation to war, such as even 
barbarous races should be ashamed of,” his work did have a lasting influence on both 
international relations and the conduct of war.  Published in England in 1654, The Laws 
of War and Peace proved popular with a people torn apart by their own religiously 
motivated civil war. The juridical works of Grotius and Vattel gave voice to the 
prevailing sentiment of moderation in warfare that developed in Europe in the aftermath 
of the Thirty Years' War.  The laws of war lent authority to a code of conduct that was 
already comfortable, customary, and respected by European nations.  The structural 
transformations in the European nation-state in the early modern period allowed for their 
widespread adoption in a manner never before possible.29 
Eighteenth-century soldiers and military jurists agreed, however, that the laws of 
war did not extend to political traitors, domestic rebels, or the “uncivilized,” such as the 
indigenous populations of European empires.  This caveat to the “laws of humanity” was 
based on the presumption that rebels and non-Europeans were beyond the pale of society 
and civilization and therefore would not obey the laws of war.  European armies could 
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not be expected to maintain a higher standard than their “savage” enemies.  When 
fighting "the other," towns and villages could be burned, crops plundered, and 
noncombatants enslaved and killed.  Some of the most horrific excesses in the history of 
warfare occurred in this age of limited war when European armies imposed their will 
upon the native peoples of America, Africa, and Asia and ruthlessly suppressed internal 
revolts and rebellions.  In conflicts such as these, where European cultural restraints on 
war lapsed, violence begot more violence.30 
While the unrestrained application of violence against non-Europeans, or the 
cultural “other,” required little justification, the issue of rebellion posed more problems.  
Rebellion proved particularly vexing for Vattel who devoted considerable space to the 
subject.  He maintained that, “Every citizen should even patiently endure evils, which are 
not insupportable, rather than disturb the public peace” by engaging in rebellion.  In the 
case of armed rebellion, Vattel defended the sovereign’s right and “duty to repress those 
who unnecessarily disturb the public peace.”  Yet Vattel was also aware of historical 
instances in which monarchs had exceeded their duty by ravaging rebellious provinces 
and executing rebel prisoners.  Such severity, though sanctioned by the laws of war, was 
inadvisable and inconsistent with justice.  Vattel advised monarchs “to show clemency 
towards unfortunate persons” and to suppress the rebellion with moderation.  Rebels 
rarely entered the conflict with established military forces; and naturally they evinced a 
haphazard and amateurish image unrecognizable to professional soldiers as anything 
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other than civilians in arms. Seen as subjects rather than soldiers by their adversaries, 
these captives faced the judgment of civilian law for treason and sedition: almost 
certainly the death penalty.  If, however, the rebels were numerous and organized enough 
to field a professional style army, the rules changed; the conflict became a civil war in 
which the sovereign must observe the laws of war.  Monarchs ignored this distinction at 
their own peril; unfettered cruelty would be met with reprisal and retribution.31   
 In practice, few eighteenth-century monarchs heeded Vattel’s advice.  
Rebellions, no matter how futile, struck at the very heart of a regime’s legitimacy. A 
single victory might easily legitimize the rebel cause and destabilize the regime.  This 
phenomenon was compounded in monarchies, in which power rested on the ephemeral 
shoulders of a single life.  When eighteenth-century British North American colonists 
resorted to arms to obtain redress for their grievances with Britain’s ministry and 
parliament, they were well aware of the crown’s record of brutally suppressing domestic 
rebellions. Lingering disputes over dynastic succession and confessional politics resulting 
from the English Civil Wars and the Glorious Revolution of the seventeenth century 
prompted numerous Irish and Scots to oppose the Hanoverian succession by force of 
arms.  Although these rebellions appear in hindsight to have been reckless and doomed to 
failure, they had the very real potential of devolving into civil war, or worse yet, inviting 
an invasion by Catholic France or Spain. The English had already executed one king and 
dethroned another by the close of the seventeenth century; and although most Britons 
rejoiced in the Protestant succession, few were assured of its perpetual ascendency and 
even fewer were willing to defend it with their lives.   
                                                
 31  Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book III. 
 42 
From the point of view of American colonists contemplating revolt, Britain’s 
suppression of the 1745 Jacobite Rebellion was a sobering precedent.  That rebellion 
began when highland Scots under the command of Prince Charles Edward Stuart, the son 
of a pretender to the British throne, captured Scotland, brushed away a British army at 
Prestonpans, and marched on London. Hanoverian Britain’s response to the exiled Stuart 
dynasty’s last grasp at the throne was swift and harsh. When government forces brought 
the Jacobite rebels to battle at Culloden in April of 1746, calls for quarter went unheard 
and prisoners perished alongside unarmed civilians.  In the aftermath of the battle, British 
dragoons mercilessly cut down fleeing Scots without concern for age, sex, or dynastic 
allegiance.  King George II’s son, William Augustus, the Duke of Cumberland, earned 
the macabre moniker of “the Butcher” in the weeks following the rebellion's defeat. 
Throughout that summer, the British army launched punitive expeditions into the 
highlands.  Their orders were chillingly simple: “You will constantly have in mind to 
distress whatever country of rebels you may pass through, and to seize or destroy all 
persons you can find who have been in the rebellion or their abettors.”  None who had 
supported the rebel cause were to survive.32 
The suppression of the Jacobite Rebellion did not, however, rise to the level of 
what came to be called in the twentieth century "genocide."  Most former Jacobites 
escaped with their lives; it was their cause and culture that Hanoverian Britain was 
determined to stamp out.  A series of laws aimed at remaking the highlands into a loyal, 
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docile, and above all Protestant region succeeded in drawing the highlanders into the 
British imperial fold.  Nevertheless, the British army’s terror campaign in the highlands 
was so shocking to those on the receiving end that it has scarce been forgotten since.  In 
England, the violence was portrayed in print and pamphlet as the just vengeance of a 
righteous monarch. The virulence of the popular reaction to the Jacobite challenge 
reflected not only the very real threat that Charles Stuart and his highlanders posed to the 
Hanoverian dynasty, but also the cultural, religious, and ethnic differences between the 
highlanders and other Britons.  Most early modern rebellions occurred within a single 
polity whose denizens shared similar conceptions about the practice of war, thus limiting 
the violence of their conflict; but when the rebels were seen as culturally distinct, as was 
the case in the rebellions on Britain’s Celtic fringe, the laws and customs of war did not 
apply. The principal leaders of the rebellion, except Prince Charles, who narrowly 
escaped, were tried and many were put to death for “High treason and levying War.”  The 
precedent was set; rebel was synonymous with traitor, and traitors were hanged. In the 
imaginations of late-eighteenth-century Britons, the Jacobites had made rebellion so 
odious that execution seemed the only fitting punishment.33 
Perhaps their greatest sin in the eyes of most Englishmen was that the Jacobites 
had failed to organize an army of regulars that employed conventional tactics and obeyed 
the norms of the culture of war in Europe.  The highland host descending from the 
mountains looked “like troops of hungry wolves” to one Hanoverian loyalist. Through 
their conduct of the war, the Jacobites lost the struggle for legitimacy in the eyes of 
enemies and sympathizers alike.  Their behavior was outside the norms of conduct for 
“civilized” warfare as embodied by the redcoated professionals who opposed them and 
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codified in the juridical works of Grotius and Vattel.  Their transgressions called out for 
retaliation in kind.34   
The suppression of the ’45 is an instructive case for understanding the limits of 
the cultural restraint of warfare in eighteenth-century Europe.  Because rebellions by their 
very nature call into question the legitimacy of the political order, European monarchs 
were loath to legitimize their conduct by observing the customs and conventions of 
“civilized” warfare.  Rebellions presented monarchs, and the aristocrats and armies who 
defended them, with an existential problem.  Unlike defeat at the hands of a neighboring 
monarchal state, which at its worst would redraw the map and shift the balance of power, 
failing to quell a rebellion could prove a regime’s unmaking.  It was not enough to simply 
defeat the rebels, they had to be crushed, both to exterminate all life from the movement 
and to dissuade future adventures.  Although the modern descendents of the British 
regiments that fought at Culloden prefer not to remember their regiments' part in 
suppressing the rebellion, the officers and soldiers who engaged in that campaign were 
proud of their service and saw nothing incongruous about their behavior.  The British 
suppression of the 1745 Jacobite rebellion reveals that when rebellion was compounded 
by cultural difference, eighteenth-century Europeans were capable of and inclined to 
excessive cruelty and disregard for the humanity of their opponents.  The helpless—
civilians and prisoners of war—suffered most of the horrors.   
As Wayne Lee has demonstrated, eighteenth-century warfare was characterized 
by this duality: atrocity and restraint.  The “butchers” and “hangmen” of Culloden were 
also capable of accepting a French officer’s surrender, returning his sword, and inviting 
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the unfortunate man to dine.  They were products of a culture of war that had developed 
over the previous century as a result of structural changes in European armies and states 
brought about by the “military revolution,” the burgeoning culture of honor and restraint 
shared by Europe’s aristocracy, and the evolving legal traditions of the laws of war.  In 
this culture of war, violence between “civilized” nations was largely limited to the 
sanguinary, though increasingly rare, confrontations between professional armies in 
battle.  French military theorist Jacques de Guibert summarized the prevailing European 
opinion in his 1773 essay on tactics: “War is become less barbarous and cruel.  When 
battles are finished, no longer is any blood shed; prisoners are well treated, towns not 
sacked, countries are not ravaged and laid waste.”35  
When British soldiers crossed the Atlantic to combat another rebellion in 1775, 
the memory of the ’45 was alive and well, but so too were Vattel’s cautions and the 
customs of war among “civilized” nations.  The Americans were not an alien or “savage” 
people, and they did not pose an immediate threat to the stability of the Protestant 
succession or the Hanoverian dynasty.  How would the British army respond?  The New 
Englanders who opened fire on British soldiers in April of 1775 thought they knew.  On 
the eve of war, most Americans not only saw themselves as the just inheritors of the 
rights of freeborn Englishmen, they also shared the same set of deeply ingrained values 
and expectations about the conduct of war as their British opponents. They would march 
off to war confident that their conduct, and that of their enemy, would conform to 
customs of “Humanity and Politeness.”36 
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War in Colonial America to 1775 
By the spring of 1775, war had come to the colonies; but how would it be fought 
and what fate would befall its prisoners?  To answer these questions, it is necessary to 
first examine colonial American conceptions of war, and the accepted treatment of enemy 
prisoners, prior to the outbreak of hostilities.  While not denying the very real effects of 
the peoples, ecology, and topography of North America on practice of war in the early 
stages of English colonization, by 1775 the Anglo-Americans elite shared the prevailing 
European culture of limited and restrained war.  In their vision of "civilized" warfare, 
enemy prisoners were to be treated with politeness and compassion, but rebellion and 
savagery were not to be tolerated.   
 While most late eighteenth-century Americans were novices at the practice of 
war, they were hardly pacifists.  Warfare had been a reality in colonial America since the 
first Europeans landed in the new world.  English colonists arrived in Virginia wearing 
armor, with swords drawn and muskets primed.  Much of the leadership of the English 
colonial effort had learned well the lessons of war on the continent and in Ireland.  Over 
the next century and a half, colonial Americans faced the nearly omnipresent threat of 
European rivals, in the form of Catholic Spanish and French forces, and hostile Native 
Americans.  Much like their contemporaries in Europe, colonial Americans accepted war 
as unavoidable, even necessary.37   
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 The conduct of warfare in colonies, however, diverged quickly from the European 
model.  The verdant open fields and gently undulating hills of the Low Countries, France, 
and Germany that had facilitated the rise to primacy of musket-armed infantry in the 
sixteenth century were nowhere to be seen in America.  Densely packed forests prevented 
anything close to the rigid discipline of the European battlefield from becoming a reality 
in the New World until the eighteenth century. The absence of an established 
infrastructure of roads, magazines, and cantonments hindered the movement of troops; 
and starvation and new world diseases decimated the ranks of militarily eligible men.38 
 To compound their woes, English colonists encountered an enemy in the native 
peoples of North America that possessed its own deeply embedded set of cultural norms 
about the legitimate practice of war, one entirely at odds with that of the Europeans.  One 
historian has dubbed the resultant conflict as a “collision of military cultures.”  
Predictably, cultural misunderstandings about what constituted the legitimate practice of 
war exacerbated tensions and escalated violence. Numerous scholars have analyzed  
Native American cultures of war, some even arguing for a monolithic “Indian way of 
war,” but all agree that European practices of war were as foreign to the native peoples of 
America as Indian methods appeared to Europeans.  Wayne Lee has pointed to the 
cognitive dissonance created by these divergent conceptions of war and its practices as 
the primary cause of the rapid escalation of violence in wars between Native Americans 
and European colonists.  Others have emphasized proto-racial hierarchies in European 
thought, changing conceptions of Indian technologies and bodies, or prior European 
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experience with extirpative war.  Whatever the root cause or causes, it is evident just as 
Europeans began to embrace both stated and implied restrictions on war’s cruelty, 
American colonists and their Indian adversaries adopted increasingly horrific and deadly 
practices in their wars with one another.  Attacks on Native American villages and crops 
escalated precipitously into enslavement and massacre. Those considered uncivilized or 
savage by the English colonists, as had been the case of the Catholic Irish in the sixteenth 
century, were unworthy of any protection from the fury of war.39   
 Military institutions in the colonies also developed differently from their 
European counterparts.  While seventeenth-century European monarchs increasingly 
relied on armies of professionals paid for by expansive tax bases, American colonists 
looked to themselves for their defense in the form of militias.  The concept of universal 
male military service was hardly an American innovation; its roots can be traced to the 
ancient world and its practice enshrined in the Magna Carta.  An island nation protected 
in theory, if not always in practice, by the “wooden walls” of her navy, England had little 
need for a professional army on the scale of France or Spain and consequently boasted a 
strong militia tradition.  Civilians as soldiers also made sound political sense to a people 
deeply suspicious of the power and prerogative of royalty unchecked by Parliament.  A 
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less than virtuous monarch might use his army to impose an alien religion or subvert 
English liberties.  While the kings of England might have aspired to a royal army on par 
with that of the French kings, Parliament’s “power of the purse” prevented such excesses.  
When King Charles I, and later his son James II, attempted to circumvent Parliament by 
creating ever larger armies of professionals, Parliament and its supporters responded with 
violence.  King Charles lost his head, his son, merely his crown.  For seventeenth-century 
Englishmen, power and liberty were at odds and nothing represented the corrupting 
influence of power more visibly than a standing army.40 
 Although ideally adapted to republican ideology, militias by their very nature 
were defensive organizations, incapable of waging the ever more complex and 
technologically sophisticated European practice of war. Thus in the aftermath of the 
Glorious Revolution, with England’s religious future firmly secured in the Protestant 
camp, Englishmen came to accept the professionalization of their armed forces as long as 
these soldiers submitted to Parliamentary, rather than royal, supervision.  Provided they 
campaigned on the continent or in the colonies, these soldiers posed little threat to 
English liberties, and the militia system, England’s bulwark against tyranny, slipped 
quietly into decline.  Militia musters became glorified village fairs with a martial 
veneer.41 
 In England’s North American colonies, the trajectory was somewhat different.   
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Although the deficiencies of a universal militia in offensive operations were 
manifest early on, the colonies individually lacked the resources necessary to maintain 
peacetime armies, and until the Seven Years' War, England failed to provide substantive 
numbers of regulars for colonial defense.  Instead the colonies developed what John 
Dederer calls a "bifurcated militia system."  The colonial militia came to resemble its 
English mother as primarily a social and political organization, while actual military 
service was performed by a select group of volunteers or draftees contractually recruited 
to serve for the duration of the conflict.  Subjected to greater levels of military discipline 
than the militia, these volunteers, or provincial regulars as they were known, bore the 
brunt of colonial defense until the Seven Years' War when large numbers of British 
troops arrived in North America for the first time.  Unlike Britain’s red-coated regulars, 
provincials served only in times of crisis and scrupulously maintained the contractual 
nature of their employment with the colonial governments.  Nevertheless, they were 
modeled on, and very often officered by, European professionals.  Gradually European 
weapons, uniforms, drill manuals, and codes of conduct crossed the Atlantic and found 
expression in the colonial provincial regulars.  These troops campaigned farther and 
farther away from the densely populated Atlantic coast as the threat from Native 
Americans receded into the North American hinterland.  By the middle of the eighteenth 
century, defense had become someone else’s problem for the majority of British 
Americans.42   
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 As British America developed from a perilous string of outposts and villages on 
the Atlantic coat into established colonies with claims to the interior of the continent, the 
threats facing the colonies changed as well.  Colonial Americans began to see the Native 
Americans who opposed their progress not as foreign enemies but as domestic rebels and 
traitors.  Those who had lived in peace with the colonists and later took to the warpath 
were seen as especially deserving of the rebel’s fate.  The Massachusetts Assembly 
passed a resolve in 1706 granting a reward and “the benefit of Plunder, and all Indian 
Women and Children Prisoners under 12 Years of Age” to every soldier “who shall Kill 
or Take Any Male Indian Enemy or Rebel…above the age of 12 Years.” By labeling the 
Indians rebels, the assembly licensed and legitimized their destruction. The militiamen 
probably needed little added incentive to murder and maim a people they already 
considered savage and barbaric.  When Abenaki war parties aided by the French raided 
the Connecitcut frontier in 1722, Governor Samuel Shute did not call out the militia for 
the defense of the colony against an external threat, but instead declared the Abenaki 
“Rebels, Traitors, and Enemies to His Majesty King George” and required all loyal 
inhabitants of the colony “to do and Execute all Acts of Hostility upon them.”  If the 
Abenaki were to remain on their ancestral lands, their lives were forfeit.  The 
Massachusetts Assembly offered £100 to anyone who produced an Abenaki scalp.  
Scores of New England men volunteered to give the Abenaki their just desserts.  The 
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ensuing conflict, known as Father Rale’s War, resulted in Massachusetts' acquisition of 
what is now Maine and the retreat of the Abenaki deeper into French-controlled lands.43 
 By the turn of the century, it was clear to colonial Americans that France, in the 
form of her Canadian colonies, was an intractable barrier to their expansion and a 
looming threat to English liberty, freedom of commerce, and the Protestant faith.  
Unsurprisingly, as Britain and France vied for control of the balance of power in Europe, 
their colonists fought for supremacy in North America.  In the series of imperial wars that 
erupted after 1689, Britain’s American colonies were drawn ever further into the imperial 
fold and into the prevailing European culture of war, in part because the capture of 
Canada demanded more financial, logistical, and military resources than any one colony 
could provide.  After numerous failed attempts to reduce the French colony by invasion, 
American colonists looked to Britain for aid.44 
 Scholars of colonial America’s consumer and political culture have observed an 
“Anglicization” of Britain’s colonies in the century preceding the revolution, and this 
process was just as true for the practice of war as it was for commerce.  American 
colonists embraced their countrymen’s vision of a Protestant and British Atlantic world, 
and they accepted uncritically that such an empire would be won by force of arms. The 
paltry provincial forces that had wrested control of Louisbourg from the French in 1745 
were no match for New France’s reinforced garrison of regular troops commanded by an 
aggressive continental veteran, the Marquis de Montcalm, a decade later.  From 1755 to 
1757, the French pushed back successive Anglo-American invasion attempts, defeated 
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several major British armies, captured numerous forts, and successfully invaded New 
York.  By 1758, it was abundantly clear to colonial administrators, British generals, and 
the newly appointed secretary of state for the southern department, William Pitt, that only 
overwhelming numerical and logistical superiority would check French advances in 
North America.45   
 In what Ian Steele has termed “a minor revolution in government,” Pitt succeeded 
in “Europeanizing” the contest for North America. He insured that the troops who fought 
the campaigns of 1758 and 1759 would be overwhelmingly British regulars, commanded 
by veterans of the European wars, and operating under the existent laws and customs of 
war.  French prisoners of war were accorded the civilities due to their rank and station 
and were administered and provided for by the British military rather than their colonial 
counterparts.  General Montcalm’s predecessor, the Baron Dieskau, who had fallen 
prisoner to William Johnson’s army in 1755, passed much of his captivity in the English 
resort town of Bath, where according to Lord Barrington he merited “a Claim to every 
Civility and assistance” from the town’s mayor.  Although such luxuries were beyond the 
reach of the French enlisted men who fell into British hands, their imprisonment was no 
more severe than that of their counterparts captured in Europe.46   
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 The restraints of the European culture of war proved much more difficult to 
enforce when Native Americans were involved.  Atrocities committed by both sides were 
uncomfortably common place. British and colonial American forces rarely took native 
warriors as prisoners.  Nevertheless, the calculated mistreatment of captured French 
soldiers and sailors was never sanctioned by the British.  Frenchmen, though Catholics 
and therefore perfidious, were Europeans and by extension, civilized.  British military 
authorities in America assumed their French opponents operated under the same norms of 
conduct as themselves.  When General Montcalm’s Indian allies attacked a column of 
British and American troops that had surrendered Fort William Henry in 1757, the 
American press cried “massacre,” and British generals deemed the convention violated 
and sent the surviving soldiers to the frontlines. The attack on the British troops, which 
cost the lives of as many as 185 British and American soldiers and civilians, highlighted 
alleged “Gallic Perfidy” in contrast to British humanity in the minds of Anglo-
Americans.  According to the customs of war in Europe, the surrendered redcoats were 
Montcalm’s responsibility, and his inability to protect them soiled not only his personal 
honor but that of France’s king and army.47   
 Montcalm, who had not sanctioned the attack, was horrified.  With his personal 
honor at stake, he worked tirelessly to ransom the survivors from their Native American 
captors and argued for the imprisonment of the warriors who had taken part.  Paying as 
much as 130 livres and 30 bottles of brandy per prisoner, Montcalm succeeded in 
recovering most the English prisoners but not his reputation.  When he perished on the 
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Plains of Abraham during the climactic battle for Quebec in 1759, the stain of the 
“massacre” remained.  It was the memory of this event, compounded by other lesser 
outrages, which prompted General Jeffery Amherst to deny the last remaining French 
garrison in 1760 the honors of war.  France’s troops in Montreal were unharmed and even 
transported home with their personal property unmolested, but they did so under the 
cloud of shame of an army that had violated the norms of acceptable practice in war. 
Amherst wanted justice for “the infamous part the troops of France had acted in exciting 
the savages to perpetrate the most horrid and unheard of barbarities in the whole progress 
of the war.”  The French soldiers' inability to restrain their native allies negated their 
claim to an honorable defeat.  They were forced to quit the garrison without their flags 
waving or drums beating.  Rather than give up the colors of their proud regiments, the 
French burned them prior to surrendering themselves, and Canada, to the British.  As he 
watched the French troops file out of the battlements in silence, Amherst was 
undoubtedly pleased that the conventions of European warfare had been maintained on 
the other side of the Atlantic, and the army that had held on to those standards most 
conscientiously had prevailed militarily as well.48 
 American provincial soldiers like George Washington had stood shoulder-to-
shoulder with British regulars in order to drive the French from the continent, and their 
conceptions of legitimate and illegitimate practices in war were profoundly shaped by 
this contact.  Although many Americans were put off by the haughty airs and 
condescension of the crown’s officers, and by the coarse ways and unthinking submission 
of the rankers, the redcoats’ courage, discipline, and conduct in battle were never in 
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question.  For the American provincials who fought the French and Indian War, the 
British army was the paragon of military efficacy.  In Washington's estimation, its 
prowess stemmed not merely from rote practice but also from careful study. In an age 
before the widespread foundation of military academies and training depots, soldiers 
learned their craft in the field with their regiments.  Although a subaltern officer might 
learn much from a senior enlisted man, or from his fellows in the mess, by the second 
half of the eighteenth century a modicum of literacy in the history, theory, practice, and 
laws of war was expected of a young man entering the profession of arms.49   
 This literacy could be obtained by reading both classic and contemporary 
European military treatises.  As Ira Gruber has demonstrated, British officers favored the 
continental experts, of whom Vattel was one.  Washington was not alone when he 
emulated his British colleagues by purchasing a copy of Turpin de Crissé's Essay on the 
Art of War in order to “obtain a small degree of knowledge in the Military Art."  In 1756, 
Washington advised his regiment’s major “in the strongest terms” of “the necessity of 
qualifying yourself by reading.”  Many American officers heeded Washington's advice 
and continued to devour European treatises on war well into the revolution.  While 
pillaging an American officer's baggage, Hessian officer Johanan Ewald was shocked "to 
see how every wretched knapsack, in which were only a few shirts and a pair of torn 
breeches, would be filled up with military books."  These books, primarily penned by 
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French and German authors, were translated into English so that those not fluent in 
French, as indeed Washington himself was not, could benefit from their insights.  Ewald 
was tremendously impressed with American officers' literary preferences, and he 
favorably compared the officers of the American army who "studied the art of war while 
in camp" to those of their opponents who preferred to divert themselves with "some 
novels or stage plays."50  
 Nevertheless, the British were not devoid of learned students of the theory and 
practice of war in the eighteenth century.  The work of one such authority, Lieutenant 
Colonel James Anderson’s 1761 Essay on the Art of War, found its way into 
Washington’s library. Although much of Anderson's essay concerns tactics, operations, 
and a lengthy discourse on the Roman militia, Anderson was very clear on how prisoners 
of war should be treated in contemporary conflict.  “As the Chance of War is uncertain, 
Politics as well as Humanity oblige the different Powers to treat the Prisoners of War on 
both Sides with Gentleness.”  In his estimation, it was the commanding general’s 
responsibility to “comfort the Officers who are taken, and furnish them with whatever is 
necessary.”  In order to accomplish this humane and politically savvy project, Anderson 
advised that a cartel be established between the belligerent powers so that “Officers and 
Soldiers are exchanged against each other according to their Rank.”  These men were not 
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only valuable commodities of exchange; they were also “visible Marks of Victory.”  A 
prudent general “ought to spare Blood, as it is much more glorious to make 
Prisoners…than to massacre Soldiers who surrender.”  On these points, Anderson was 
merely repeating and reflecting the prevailing European sentiment, but it was a sentiment 
with which Washington likely agreed.51 
 When Washington was called upon by the Second Continental Congress to 
command the army at Cambridge for the defense of the colonies in 1775, he left his 
British uniform at home, but he brought with him an understanding of "civilized" war, 
and how it should be conducted, that was entirely derived from his experience with the 
British army and his exposure to contemporary European military culture.  Many of the 
officers he found commanding the New Englanders had been provincial soldiers in the 
last war, and while most had probably not studied Vattel or Grotius, they were products 
of a culture that understood war in only two ways: restrained and thus “civilized” or 
unbridled and therefore “savage.”  The bloody religious and Indian wars of the 
seventeenth century were a distant memory.  In taking up arms to defend their British 
liberties from ministerial tyranny, elite Americans envisioned that the ensuing contest 
would be polite, restrained, humane, and above all, civilized.  They were mistaken.52 
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“The Sword is now drawn": Prisoner Treatment at Lexington, Concord, Bunker 
Hill, April-June, 1775 
 
 Josiah Smith, a wealthy merchant from South Carolina, was no soldier.  Like 
most elite colonial Americans, he had never seen a shot fired in anger when he received 
news of the fighting at Lexington and Concord.  Wars were distant and peripheral in his 
imagination; they were fought in Europe, on the frontier, in Canada, or the West Indies.  
As a savvy man of business, he was aware that wars held the potential for both financial 
windfall and bankruptcy, but they posed no immediate threat to his personal safety.  Even 
though the colony of South Carolina required his participation in militia training, as a 
man of means, there was never any real likelihood of his being sent on campaign.  All of 
the colonies had long ago crafted a military system that spared their more established and 
financially secure citizens the obligations of actually fighting.  When war had last erupted 
on the frontier in 1754, Smith and his peers in Charleston’s elite society never left the 
comforts of home.  Instead, colonial authorities raised regiments of provincial regulars 
from among the landless and itinerant youth of the colony.  In conjunction with 
independent companies of British regulars, these South Carolina provincials protected the 
colony and ensured that men like Smith never knew the horrors of war.  The years since 
the expulsion of the French from Canada and the subordination of the western tribes to 
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British rule had been peaceful.  Smith and his contemporaries on the western banks of the 
Atlantic were largely unprepared for news of the events of April 19, 1775.53 
 Although for an eighteenth-century South Carolinian, Boston must have seemed 
very far away, the outbreak of combat so near a major colonial port city struck Smith as 
too close to home.  In his estimation, the British soldiers who fired on the men of 
Massachusetts had “committed most horrid Barbarities,” which “caused the boiling of 
much blood” among Charlestonians.  By attacking American militiamen who were 
merely attempting to defend their hearth and home, the British troops had violated 
Smith’s conception of acceptable and legitimate conduct in warfare.  Smith was not alone 
in his astonishment and rancor.  Embellished accounts of British grenadiers firing on 
unarmed men, abusing women and children, and dispatching the wounded at the point of 
the bayonet permeated the press throughout the colonies in the aftermath of the battle.  
Conjuring images of the bodily mutilation practiced by Native Americans during the 
Seven Years' War, The Massachusetts Spy reported an account of “the savage barbarity 
exercised upon the bodies of our unfortunate brethren who fell.”  For the author, these 
atrocities strained credulity.  That British soldiers could be guilty of “shooting down the 
unarmed, aged and infirm” and “mangling their bodies in the most shocking manner” was 
quite literally “incredible.”  In the days after the battle, real atrocities were magnified and 
exaggerated by propagandists to elicit the ire of the populace.  Israel Putnam, a veteran of 
the Seven Years’ War and one of the premier soldiers in the colony, claimed the British 
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troops “behaved in a very cruel and barbarous Manner; going into Houses and killing sick 
People…putting the Muzzle of the Gun into their mouths and blowing their Heads in 
Pieces.  Some Children had their Brains beat out!”  These titillating accounts had the 
desired effect. The reported conduct of the king’s troops on that April morning was 
confirmation enough for thousands of Americans of the corruption of the British ministry 
and the degradation of the British constitution.  Along the eastern seaboard, Americans of 
varying ethnic, religious, and political backgrounds confronted the reality that “The 
Sword is now drawn."  By June of 1775, Smith could report with pride "that a very 
martial Spirit now reigns among Persons of all Ranks here.”54 
 When the British column returned to Boston on the evening of April 19th, they 
had lost 273 men killed, wounded, or captured.  Three days later, Lieutenant General 
Gage wrote Britain’s Secretary at War, Lord Barrington, reporting on the events of that 
day.  In his estimation, the conflict was “nothing to trouble your Lordship.”  There had 
been a small skirmish in which the king’s troops had “behaved with their usual 
Intrepidity.”  Gage was perplexed by the vitriolic accounts inundating the American press 
                                                
 54 Josiah Smith to James Poyas. Charleston, S.C. May 18th,  1775. Josiah Smith Letter Book. 
Wilson Special Collections Library.  The University of North Carolina. Chapel Hill, N.C. This dissertation 
emphasizes the importance of print in the dissemination of accounts of British atrocities and argues that 
these accounts eroded over time Americans' conventional understanding of limited and restrained war, 
thereby encouraging acts of retaliatory vengeance. While I agree with Trish Loughran that Americans in 
1775 lived "in a world still largely dominated by the limits of locale", and thus were incapable of creating a 
"'nationalized' print public sphere," Loughran ignores the influence of the Revolutionary War on print 
circulation.  Accounts of enemy operations and actions circulated widely during the war, and I contend, 
much like Jill Lepore's The Name of War, that the war of words influenced behavior in the war on the 
ground. Trish Loughran, The Republic in Print: Print Culture in the Age of U.S. Nation Building, 1770-
1870 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), xix; The Massachusetts Spy: Or, American Oracle of 
Liberty, May 3rd, 1775; Letter of Israel Putnam. Cambridge, April 22nd, 1775.  Printed in The Norwich 
Packet, April 20th- 27th, 1775. On April 26th, 1775, the Provincial Assembly of Massachusetts published a 
resolve condemning the actions of the British troops at Lexington and Concord: “To give a particular 
account of the ravages of the troops, as they retreated from Concord to Charles Town, would be very 
difficult, if not impracticable; let it suffice to say, that a great number would disgrace the annals of the most 
uncivilized nations. These, brethren, are the marks of ministerial vengeance against this colony, for 
refusing, with her sister colonies, a submission to slavery.” The Remembrancer, or Impartial Repository of 
Public Events (London: J. Almon, 1775), 3; The New-Hampshire Gazette, April 21st, 1775; Josiah Smith to 
George Appleby, June 16th, 1775. Josiah Smith Letter Book. Wilson Library. University of North Carolina. 
 62 
of his troops' conduct.  In another letter to Barrington, Gage complained that the 
Americans had “Published the most false and inflammatory Accounts of the Skirmish on 
the 19th.”  Exaggerated though they certainly were, there was some truth to the accounts 
of barbarity.  The British troops and their officers were unprepared for armed opposition 
and most had never seen combat before.  In the chaos that ensued, these inexperienced 
soldiers often denied quarter to surrendering Americans.  While some American 
militiamen were undoubtedly less than restrained as well, descriptions of American 
atrocities were few.  One American newspaper boasted “that notwithstanding the highest 
provocations given by the enemy, not one instance of cruelty that we have heard of was 
committed by our Militia; but, listening to the merciful dictates of the Christian religion, 
they breathed higher sentiments of humanity.”55   
 While the revolutionary press was pleased to congratulate the militia for its 
restraint and to demonize the crown forces, the reality of the situation was that confusion 
and disorganization better characterized the Americans than piety or humanity.  
Throughout the day, hordes of militiamen poured into the fighting from around the 
countryside with little sense of order or control.  No individual American officer 
possessed the authority and gravitas necessary to take command of the offensive 
operations, much less to restrain the men or give instructions for the care and treatment of 
captured enemy soldiers.  During the British retreat from Concord, a group of American 
militiamen captured the son of a man known to be sympathetic to the British government.  
Accusing him of guiding the redcoats to the town, the men first arrested the boy before 
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shooting him when he attempted escape.  According to one Connecticut whig, his was “a 
death too honourable for such a villain!”  This boy's well known status within the 
community as a loyalist made him an easy target for those bent on revenge.  Other 
prisoners, protected by the legitimacy of their scarlet uniforms, fared better.  Lieutenant 
Edward Gould of the 4th Regiment of Foot, who was wounded at the Concord bridge, 
reported that he was “treated with the greatest humanity, and taken all possible care of by 
the provincials at Medford.”  A similar sentiment was expressed by the wife of a captured 
private soldier in a letter to her siblings in England.  She reported that "my husband was 
wounded and taken prisoner, but they use him well."  The Americans brought this 
wounded Briton, whose leg was broken, to a hospital in Cambridge.56 
 The future for unscathed prisoners was much less certain. In the days following 
the battle, militiamen struggled with how to treat their new captives. Who was 
responsible for these men?  Where could they be confined?  Were they prisoners of war?  
Was this even a war?  Captain James Reed of Burlington arrived in Lexington after the 
main column of British troops had already moved on to Concord.  Upon his arrival, he 
discovered a lone redcoat—likely a deserter or shirker in search of plunder—who with 
the assistance of a Woburn man, he made prisoner.  After seizing his arms and 
ammunition, Reed marched the soldier back to his own home.  Word spread that Reed 
was guarding a British prisoner and soon thereafter several of his neighbors handed off 
their captured charges to his care.  By afternoon, Reed had 9 or 10 redcoats under guard.  
According to Reed, “Towards evening, it was thought best to remove them from my 
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house,” and with the assistance of his comrades Reed marched the party of redcoats to 
Billerica and then to Chelmsford.  The sight of captured British soldiers “much 
frightened” the townspeople, and Reed was hard pressed to pass off responsibility for the 
men.  Eventually, he was able to persuade the Committee of Safety of Chelmsford to take 
the prisoners provided that his militia company left a guard for their security.57  
 Reed’s experience was likely the norm, as no one was expecting to fight that day; 
there certainly had been no plan or provision provided for what might happen if British 
soldiers fell into American hands.  Unsurprisingly, British prisoners were dispersed 
throughout Massachusetts: some in jails, others barns, and the lucky ones, in private 
domiciles.  Realizing the importance of having British prisoners, John Hancock 
frantically wrote the Massachusetts Committee of Safety demanding to know, “what has 
taken place, and what your plan is; what prisoners we have, and what they have of ours.”  
The committee did not have an answer.  Within days, however, the impropriety of 
holding British prisoners so close to a major British garrison dawned on the committee 
and on the 26th they ordered the fifteen prisoners held in Concord to be taken to the jail at 
Worcester and delivered to the care of Mr. Ephraim Jones, Jail-keeper.  The committee 
turned over one of these prisoners, who was by trade a paper-maker, to Mr. Boyce to 
work in his mills: a confinement likely more comfortable than the Worcester jail.  Even 
those who remained in confinement did not complain about their treatment.  Reverend 
William Gordon of Roxbury, a man whose loyalties lay firmly with his king and 
Parliament, wrote to a friend in England, "The prisoners at Worcester, Concord, and 
Lexington, all agreed in their being exceedingly well used.  The policy of the people 
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would determine them thereto, if their humanity did not." Gordon, who had no reason to 
congratulate men he considered rebels, attributed the prisoners' good treatment to sound 
judgment on the part of the Americans in arms.  In his mind, the sins of April 19th were 
reversible if the sinners begged forgiveness.  The king, in all his benevolent majesty, was 
merciful.  Mistreating the king's soldiers would only serve to add insult to injury and 
ensure the king's wrath.58 
 Exactly how many British prisoners were captured that day remains something of 
a mystery.  The Provincial Council appointed Mr. Dix, Dr. Taylor, and Mr. Bullen as a 
committee “to inquire into the conduct of the several Towns relative to the prisoners,” but 
their report has not come to light.  Israel Putnam’s statement that “70 or 80" men were 
taken was almost certainly too optimistic. Years later, American militia officer William 
Heath recalled the capture of 28 British prisoners. In the immediate aftermath of the 
battle, General Gage reported 24 of his men missing, at least fifteen of whom were the 
prisoners transferred from Concord to Worcester.59   
 Gage's troops had captured some American prisoners as well.  According to 
Lieutenant Frederick Mackenzie, the British had “about ten prisoners, some of whom 
were taken in arms.  One or two more were killed on the march while prisoners by the 
fire of their own people.”    When Gage wrote Barrington in early May, he noted “Five or 
                                                
 58 John Hancock to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety. Worcester, April 24th,1775. Force, 
American Archives, 4th series, 2:384; Resolutions of the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, Cambridge, 
April 26th, 1775. Force, American Archives, 4th series, 2:746.  When Boyce refused to pay for the 
prisoner's transportation, the committee ordered the prisoner removed and returned to their custody.  The 
Committee of Safety of Massachusetts to Mr. Vose.  Cambridge, May 2nd, 1775. Force, American 
Archives, 4th series 2:474; "Account of the commencement of hostilities between Great Britain and 
America, in the Province of Massachusetts-Bay, by the Reverend Mr. William Gordon, of Roxbury, in a 
Letter to a Gentleman in England."  Force, American Archives, 4th series, 2:625. 
 59 Proceedings of the Massachusetts Provincial Council. April 30th, 1775; Force, American 
Archives, 4th series, 2:776; Israel Putnam to the Committee of New-London and Lyme. Cambridge, April 
22nd, 1775. Printed in Norwich Packet, April 22nd, 1775; Almon, The Remembrancer (1775), 41. 
 66 
Six Prisoners taken in Arms.” The captured Americans, or provincials as the British 
called them, were transferred to a British warship in Boston harbor to await their fate.  
The Provincial Congress of Massachusetts immediately began contriving a method to 
obtain their release.  A committee of the congress that had been appointed to consider the 
issue recommended that an appeal be "sent to General Gage, signed by the wives or 
nearest relations of such prisoners," in the hopes that the general, whose own wife was an 
American, might be coaxed into releasing the men.  Gage was unsure of how to respond; 
he knew that he could do nothing that might be seen to legitimize the resistance 
movement.  While he attempted to sort matters out, the men remained in custody.60 
 Although firing on the king’s troops, no matter how provoked, was 
unquestionably an act of rebellion, both the British and the Americans were hesitant to 
use the term rebel in the immediate aftermath of the battle.  They knew too well the 
consequences of applying that term to his majesty’s subjects in America.  From the 
American perspective, their quarrel was not with the king, but with his ministers and 
Parliament.  They had taken up arms in his name to defend their customary British 
liberties.  The British leadership in America was equally reticent.  General Gage, who 
presumed resistance was isolated to New England, did not want to exacerbate the 
situation by labeling it a rebellion. According to former royal governor of Massachusetts, 
and friend to America, Thomas Pownall, “General Gage…does not call the Americans 
Rebels.”  Despite many of his officers' strongest suggestions, Gage refused to declare 
                                                
 60 Undoubtedly, those unfortunate men were not the only to fall to friendly fire that day.  Frederick 
Mackenzie, Diary of Frederick Mackenzie: Giving a Daily Narrative of His Military Service as an Officer 
of the Regiment of Royal Welch Fusiliers During the Years 1775-1781 in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and 
New York (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1930), 2 vols., 1:42; Gage to Barrington, May 13th, 1775.  
Boston.  Carter, ed., The Correspondence of General Gage, 2:678; "Report of Committee on liberating 
Prisoners taken by Gen. Gage, the 19th of April, (Note) Resolve on the same subject." Watertown, 
Massachusetts.  May 3rd, 1775.  Force, American Archives, 4th series, 2:784. 
 67 
martial law and forbade his troops from firing on the American provincials who encircled 
Boston effectively besieging the town.61   
 Gage even agreed to an exchange of prisoners.  On June 6th, American generals 
Israel Putnam and Dr. Joseph Warren met with British Major Thomas Moncrief [sic] for 
the purpose of exchanging some of the men who had been captured on April 19th. The 
Americans were accompanied by Captain Chester's company of Weathersfield, 
Connecticut militiamen, who were the only troops in the American forces besieging 
Boston to posses a uniform set of clothing, arms, and accoutrements. In an effort to 
display to British onlookers their martial mastery, and by extension the legitimacy of 
their cause, the Americans paraded through the town of Charlestown "marching slowly 
through it."  Once arrived at the designated site of exchange, the ritual that followed 
looked much the same as those carried out in Flanders during the last European war. 
According to an article in the Norwich Packet, "The meeting was truly cordial and 
affectionate." After the exchange of private soldiers had taken place, "Major Moncrief, 
and the other officers returned with General Putnam and Dr. Warren, to the house of Dr. 
Foster, where an entertainment was provided for them."  Moncrief and Putnam had been 
friends prior to the conflict, and neither man saw the commencement of hostilities as 
reason to give up good cheer and convivial company.  Both men shared the same vision 
of how war should be conducted: violence was restricted to the battlefield, prisoners were 
well cared for, officers afforded each other the courtesy due to their military and social 
rank, and parlays and truces were meticulously upheld.  The author of the article proudly 
reported, "The whole was conducted with the utmost decency and good humor; and the 
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Weathersfield Company did honor to themselves, their officers, and their country."  If the 
American author is to be believed, the British concurred: "Those who had been prisoners 
politely acknowledged the genteel, kind treatment they had received from their captors."  
As the HMS Lively carried the newly liberated Britons back to Boston, all concerned 
would have agreed that the coming contest would be fought with moderation and 
humanity.62   
 Still, the seeds of a shift in British thinking had already been planted.  When news 
of the battles of Lexington and Concord reached England, most were in disbelief.  
Domestic opinion in Britain was highly divided on how best to proceed.  People in the 
peripheries of Britain—Northern England, Scotland, and Wales—tended to see the 
actions of April 19 as nothing short of rebellion and treason, while central and southern 
Englishmen largely favored reconciliation.  Some newspapers described the violence at 
Lexington as a "squabble" and spoke of Americans as "our oppressed Brethren on the 
other Side of the Atlantic."  For the hardliners, on the other hand, the insurrection in 
Massachusetts was just another in a long series of rebellions in British history that had 
been successfully suppressed by the proper application of force.  One Tory correspondent 
hoped that the British generals in America would "adopt the principles of the late Duke of 
Cumberland, which, with a few of the Prime Rebel Heads…will have an admirable effect 
in again reducing those worst kind of Traitors to Reason."  Executing the rebellion's 
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leadership had been a successful tactic of Cumberland's in 1746.  Some went so far as to 
suggest that all rebels deserved to suffer death.  In the opinion of the English author 
writing under the pseudonym "Politicus," the people of Massachusetts were "rebel 
vermin" whose actions would "consign them to the gallows whenever they are taken."  
This was the constituency to whom Lord North and his advisors listened.  Under English 
law, the Americans were rebels; firing on the king’s troops was tantamount to firing on 
the king himself.63 
 On June 12th, facing mounting pressure, Gage declared the colony of 
Massachusetts in a state of "avowed Rebellion," proclaimed martial law, and began 
arresting "Rebels and Traitors."  To Americans who believed they had taken up arms in 
self defense, the appellation "rebel" sat uneasily. They were well aware that the title was 
accompanied by the certain prospect of the hangman's noose. Pennsylvania delegate to 
the Continental Congress John Morton wrote to a friend in London early in June 
expressing his concern that the British had "declared the New England People 
Rebels…this putting the Halter about our Necks."  He declared that "we may as well die 
by the Sword as be hang'd like Rebels."  John Leach, an English seaman then living in 
Boston, shared Morton's resilient defiance when Gage's officers came to arrest him on 
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June 29th.  Accused of being a spy, Leach spent ninety-seven days in a filthy prison cell 
alongside future Continental Congressman James Lowell and three others.  According to 
Leach, the American prisoners were "very close confined."  Anyone who openly 
challenged royal authority or questioned Gage's actions could expect a similar fate. 
Seeing the power of print to advance the rebel cause, Gage ordered the arrest of Peter 
Edes, the son of Boston Gazette publisher Benjamin Edes, to guarantee the cooperation of 
his more illustrious father.  Imprisoned with Leach, Edes recorded that the prisoners were 
"daily treated with Fresh insults and abuses."64  
 Militiamen soon joined their civilian counterparts in Boston's jail.  In the 
aftermath of the Battle of Bunker Hill on June 17th, the jail was flooded with American 
prisoners. The battle's wounded suffered grievously and received little medical attention. 
The "lucky" few that did receive the ministrations of a British surgeon fared little better.  
Edes claimed that "not one survived amputation."  Those who escaped injury had to 
contend with the cruel hand of the British Provost officer, who used their status as 
"Damned Rebel[s]" to justify his sadism.  American soldiers suffered a more rigorous 
confinement than their civilian compatriots.  A corporal named Walter Cruise was kept 
"close confined, and allowed nothing but bread in water" in the jail's dungeon.  
Americans everywhere were outraged.  In a letter to a British prisoner held in 
Philadelphia, Joseph Reed expressed his contempt for the conditions of confinement in 
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Boston: "General Gage's Treatment of our Officers even of the most respectable Rank 
would justify a severe Retaliation—They have perished in a common Goal under the 
Hands of a Wretch."  While prisoners died from the neglect or malpractice of surgeons 
"never before…employ'd but in the Diseases of Horses," the Provost regularly indulged 
his caprice by humiliating the prisoners.  On one occasion, he forced a prisoner to "get 
down on his knees in the yard and say, God bless the King" before locking him in the 
solitary confinement of the "dungeon."  Denied the status of either civil or military 
prisoners, captive Americans endured constant privation and abuse at the hands of their 
captors. As soon as Americans became rebels in the eyes of the British, they lost any 
claim to humane treatment.  His majesty's officers and soldiers had been killed and 
captured by the rebels.  Retribution was required.  By August, Gage conceded to 
Barrington that “The Dye is Cast.”  All that remained was for Britannia to “exert her 
Force.”  Much to Gage's surprise, it was American militiamen, not British regulars, who 
struck the first offensive blow.65   
 
"Pleasure unfelt before": The Capture of the Garrison of Fort Ticonderoga  
 In 1775, Captain William Delaplace of His Majesty's 26th Regiment of Foot had 
the unenviable responsibility of defending a peacetime frontier fort on New York's Lake 
George.  His enthusiasm for independent command would quickly have been subsumed 
by the tedium of an isolated post far from the comparative urban luxuries of Boston, New 
York, or Philadelphia.  Despite the garrison's distance from the metropole, military 
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custom and English societal norms combined to ensure that Delaplace's only companion 
was his lieutenant, Jocelyn Feltham.  Delaplace was utterly isolated from the social world 
of Fort Ticonderoga's forty-eight man garrison.  With no impending French or Indian 
threat, these men soon fell into the routine of maintenance: cooking, cleaning, and 
mending.  Manual exercise and other martial activities took a backseat to the more 
pressing concern of surviving on the frontier.66  
 It is little wonder, then, that only a lone sentry stood his post at the fort's gate 
when Ethan Allen, Benedict Arnold, and a party of Allen's Green Mountain Boys arrived 
at the fort near dawn on May 10th, 1775.  As the Americans approached, the sentry's 
musket misfired, but his cries succeeded in rousing the garrison.  It was too late.  Allen 
and Arnold rushed into the parade ground and up a set of stairs to the officers' quarters.  
There they found the partially clothed Feltham and demanded his surrender.  Not having 
heard of the events near Boston, the lieutenant demanded to know on whose authority the 
fort had been taken.  Allen responded, "In the name of the great Jehovah and the 
Continental Congress."  According to a letter published in the Essex Gazette, Delaplace 
asked that he and his men be "treated with Honour."  Aware of the rigorous confinement 
of American prisoners in Boston, one of Allen's men rejoined that the captain "should be 
treated with much more Honour than our People had met with from the British Troops."  
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Upon hearing this and seeing that resistance was futile, Captain Delaplace surrendered 
his sword to Allen.67  
 The ritual of surrender continued as it might have in Europe. The men of the 26th 
Foot laid down their arms, and the king's colors were lowered from the fort's walls so that 
they might be sent to the Continental Congress as a trophy of war.  With the elation of 
victory still running high the next day, Allen dashed off a missive to the Massachusetts 
Congress in which he confessed that in capturing the fort he experienced a "pleasure 
never felt before." Allen was rightly pleased with his accomplishment, and he was 
particularly proud of the manner in which it had been achieved.  As a man on the fringe 
of the law who lacked any formal military training, it was of vital importance that he and 
his men scrupulously uphold the conventions of European warfare.  Through his 
treatment of Captain Delaplace and his men, Allen not only reinforced his personal claim 
to officer's rank and status, but also Congress's assertion of political legitimacy.  Unlike 
the Marquis de Montcalm, who had been incapable of protecting his British and 
American prisoners during the last war, Allen had restrained his men and guaranteed the 
safety of their captives.  He would later claim in a letter to British General Prescott, "I 
treated them with every mark of friendship and generosity, the evidence of which is 
notorious, even in Canada."68 
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 Captain Delaplace and his company did not share Allen's enthusiasm.  Their 
captors were not professional soldiers; few of Allen's men had uniforms and most were 
hardened and coarse veterans of border disputes with New York.  Allen admitted that his 
men had behaved "with restless fury" and "uncommon rancour," which "terrified the 
King's Troops."  Yet the Green Mountain Boys did not put the garrison to the sword.  
Victory had been achieved without the loss of a single life on either side.  The Americans 
now possessed fifty enemy prisoners who could be used as political leverage to extract 
more favorable treatment of Americans held prisoner in Boston.  Writing to Connecticut's 
governor Jonathan Trumbull, Allen boasted, "I make You a Present of a Major a Captain 
and Two Lieuts [sic] in the regular Establishment of George the Third.  I do hope they 
may serve as ransoms for some of our Friends at Boston." Without delay, Allen 
dispatched Delaplace's men to Connecticut, where they could be securely kept until 
exchanged.  At Hartford, Delaplace and his comrades were soon joined by the men 
mentioned in Allen's letter: Major Andrew Philip Skene, an inactive British officer living 
in the vicinity of the fort, and Lieutenant Wadman, who commanded a landing post on 
Lake George.  In the opinion of the Connecticut General Assembly "the dictates of 
humanity require that said officers and soldiers with their families should be provided for 
and supported" while they remained in the colony.  But how would they be provisioned 
and who would pay for their upkeep?69   
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 Connecticut's assemblymen, who now found themselves with the onerous task of 
housing, feeding, clothing, and otherwise providing for over fifty British prisoners and 
their families, asked Governor Trumbull to write the Continental Congress to inquire as 
to who was responsible for the prisoners' maintenance.  While the Assembly awaited 
Congress's response, they appointed a committee "to take care of and provide for said 
officers and soldiers…and see that they be treated with humanity, kindness and respect, 
according to their rank and station."  The members of the Assembly knew well that 
Delaplace's company had to be treated according to the customs of war in Europe.  Any 
breach of conduct on their part would undermine the colony's claim to legitimate 
combatant status.  They immediately resolved that the men were to be cared for "at the 
expence [sic] of this colony," but they were also aware that according to customary 
European practice, the British officers, once paroled, were responsible for their own 
accommodation and sustenance.70   
 In ordering that the prisoners be administered "according to their rank and 
station," the Assembly not only placed the burden of maintaining a genteel lifestyle while 
in captivity on Captain Delplace and his officers, they also publicly affirmed their 
commitment to upholding the prevailing European norms of prisoner treatment.  The 
British officers now had to appeal to General Gage for lines of credit so that they could 
afford the rent of Hartford's finest boarding houses and the expenses of the city's taverns 
and diversions.  The private soldiers, rather than being confined to barracks or a prison 
yard, were encouraged to obtain "such profitable labour and business as they may be 
capable of" from anyone "willing to entertain and give them employment."  As would 
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have been the case in Europe, the enlisted soldiers were able to hire out their labor in 
return for wages.  The farmers, shoemakers, tailors, and smiths who employed the 
prisoners provided for their needs and stood security for their good behavior.  What 
might have been an onerous drain on the colony's coffers quickly became a boon. 
Through their treatment of these prisoners, the Connecticut Assembly conveyed a potent 
message to General Gage; though they opposed the actions of Britain's ministry and 
Parliament, they were not lawless rebels unfamiliar with the customs of war.  As accounts 
of the fort's capture spread throughout the colonies, the contrast between the treatment of 
Ticonderoga's garrison and that received by Gage's prisoners in Boston could not have 
been more stark.  This was a point upon which newly appointed commanding general of 
the Continental army George Washington was keen to remind his old friend and comrade 
General Gage.71   
 When Washington arrived in Boston in July, he faced the momentous task of 
building a professional army from the conglomeration of humanity besieging the city.  
While republican ideologues decried the perils of standing armies and warned of the 
corrupting influence of a victorious general, Washington was more concerned with the 
appearance of legitimacy that could only be acquired through the performance of 
European military culture.  This task proved difficult.  Although Congress quickly 
instituted articles of war based on a British model for the governance of the army, the 
volunteers of 1775 continued to resist the imprint of a soldier.  With no standardized 
dress, armament, or drill, the Continental army could maintain cohesion, order, and 
discipline only through its conduct.  Washington assiduously insisted that though they 
might not look like a European army, they would behave like one.  When he heard that an 
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American officer was attempting to extort "compensation for some expense incurred" 
from the Massachusetts General Court by refusing several British prisoners their 
baggage, Washington informed fellow revolutionary James Otis that "a procedure of this 
kind would, in my opinion, much dishonour the American arms, and be attended with 
very disagreeable consequences."  Under the conventions of European warfare, 
surrendered officers were entitled to their personal effects, and the prospect of an 
American officer violating those conventions for pecuniary gain was repugnant.72  
 That officer's mercenary actions paled by comparison to what Washington viewed 
as the "unworthy Treatment shewn to the Officers, and Citizens of America" by General 
Gage.  He was incensed.  While he worked tirelessly to turn his men into a semblance of 
a respectable army by playing politics, attending to local custom, and stroking numerous 
egos, Gage failed to take notice.  To the British general, Washington and his men were all 
rebels and would be treated accordingly.  Reminding Gage that his "Officers, and 
Soldiers have been treated with a Tenderness due to Fellow Citizens, & Brethren" and 
that even loyalist demagogues, whom Washington referred to as "execrable Parricides," 
had "been protected from the Fury of a justly enraged People," Washington bid farewell 
to his friend, "perhaps forever," with a defiant threat: "If your Officers who are our 
prisoners receive a Treatment from me, different from what I wish'd to shewn them, they, 
& you, will remember the Occasion of it."  Well accustomed to the norms and 
conventions of European warfare, Washington felt assured that the mere hint of 
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retaliation would suffice to change the position of the British government and ensure that 
this conflict would be carried on with moderation and humanity.  When his rebuke failed 
to achieve the desired effect, Washington, "very Contrary to his Disposition," ordered 
captive British officers on parole in Watertown and Cape Ann "to be confined in 
Northampton Gaol."  But Washington was too much the European officer to carry out 
this retaliation in earnest. The officers instead were "indulged with the Liberty of waking 
about…Town."  In a straightforward expression of Washington's vision of war, he 
requested that the prisoners be shown "every other Indulgence & Civility consistent with 
their Security."  The general hoped that these indulgences would lead the prisoners, and 
Britons in general, to conclude "that Americans are equally merciful as brave."73   
 When news arrived in Boston in late September that Gage had been removed 
from command and formally replaced with the moderate Whig, and longtime friend of 
America, William Howe, Washington and the revolutionary leadership had every reason 
to expect that the realities of war from then on would conform to their vision: war as 
described by Vattel, and later painted by Philippoteaux, humane, restrained, and civilized.  
They would be disappointed. 
 
.............................. 
 For colonial British Americans in 1775, war was either "civilized" or "savage."  
This duality was a reflection of both the systemic changes to the European practice of 
war over the preceding century that had combined to limit war's violence and their 
practical experience of war with the native peoples of the continent.  It was the former 
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vision of war, one where conflict was carried out by armies of professionals, regulated by 
discipline, and officered by gentlemen of honor who restrained the use of violence to the 
field of battle and humanely treated prisoners of war in its aftermath, that the American 
elite brought to the dispute with Great Britain in 1775.  Seeing themselves not as rebels 
or traitors to the crown, but as virtuous and civilized freeborn Englishmen, duty bound to 
oppose tyranny by force, these men were determined to scrupulously uphold the 
conventions of European warfare.  At Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill, the British 
had violated these conventions by denying quarter and mistreating prisoners.  Although 
outraged, Washington responded not by retaliating in kind but by further committing 
themselves to conducting war with humanity and moderation.  Lurking under the surface, 
however, was the memory of another type of war: war where humanity had no place.  In 
the summer of 1775, the potential for "savage" retaliatory warfare was obscured by a 
vision of generosity, magnanimity, and humanity in Congress's prosecution of the 




The Novelty of War 
 
 
 Ethan Allen, the "hero of Ticonderoga," did not look the part of a conqueror as he 
sat chained, both hands and feet, in the bowels of HMS Gaspé in late September 1775.  
According to Allen, he and his men were shackled together in pairs and "treated with the 
greatest severity, nay as criminals."  Upon hearing that one of the prisoners was the man 
who had captured Fort Ticonderoga, the British officer commanding Montréal, General 
Robert Prescott, "put himself into a great rage" and promised Allen that he would "grace 
a halter at Tyburn."  In Prescott's imagination, Allen was a rebel of the worst sort: a 
successful one.  Rather than accepting Allen's surrender, proffering him a lenient parole, 
and entertaining him at his table, Prescott ordered him "put into the lowest and most 
wretched part of” a ship of war with weighty leg irons "close upon [his] ancles [sic]."  
According to Allen, Prescott instructed Captain Royal of the Gaspé to treat his prisoners 
with "severity" and allowed his officers to amuse themselves by regularly mocking and 
insulting Allen at their pleasure.  Allen vociferously protested Prescott's "injustice and 
ungentleman [sic] like usage" and demanded "an honourable and humane treatment as an 
officer of my rank and merit should have," but his cries fell on deaf ears.  Three months 
later, Allen and his comrades crossed the Atlantic in chains to face the fury of the British 
crown.1  
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 By fall 1775, the British military had made it abundantly clear to the 
revolutionaries that their actions constituted rebellion, which would be severely punished.  
Yet, the revolutionary leadership not only continued to insist that their opponents respect 
European conventions, but also assiduously maintained them themselves. Unprepared for 
the violence of the British war effort, the revolutionary elite clung to a vision of 
restrained, limited, and humane warfare between "civilized" peoples.  Ordinary 
Americans, who enthusiastically embraced the war effort in 1775 and 1776, had little 
cause to question their social superiors.  Although many had borne arms against Native 
American adversaries, few had much experience with European-style warfare.  
Confronted with the novelties of war, and no longer able to depend on the British military 
bureaucracy to guide, supervise, and manage the minutia of conflict, the revolutionaries 
naturally relied on the handful of professional soldiers in their midst to steer their military 
policy and practice.  Their adherence to the norms of war in Europe was soon 
complicated both by the actions of the British army and by the reactions of their own 
citizens demanding vengeance. In light of widespread reports of the British abuse of 
American prisoners, how would the united colonies' fledgling government respond?  Was 
reconciliation with Britain's king even possible, let alone desirable, when royal 
representatives persecuted captive Americans with more severity than they would 
Frenchmen or Spaniards?2 
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 By examining the first significant campaign of the war, the American invasion of 
Canada, this chapter argues that the political and military leadership of the revolutionary 
movement diligently strove to humanely treat their captured enemies in order to perform 
the legitimacy of their cause to Britain’s king, parliament, metropolitan subjects, and 
fellow colonists at home and abroad. Through their treatment of British soldiers captured 
in Canada, American leaders conveyed a powerful message to both their antagonists and 
to each other: though reduced to the necessity of taking up arms to obtain redress for their 
grievances, how they fought would reflect why they fought.  As they struggled to combat 
one of the preeminent military and naval powers on the globe, without the benefit of an 
established military bureaucracy or centralized government, the revolutionary leadership 
nonetheless created a system of prisoner management largely consonant with European 
norms.  When confronted with British violations of the customs of “civilized” war, 
Americans threatened retaliation but declined to follow through time and again.  Instead, 
the revolutionaries' military and civilian leadership, as well as whig propagandists, 
delighted in contrasting American humanity with British savagery.  General Philip 
Schuyler, one of the architects of the Canadian invasion, summarized the American 
stance: “It has been the invariable rule of Congress, and that of all its officers, to treat 
prisoners with the greatest humanity, and to pay all due deference to rank.”  By the 
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conclusion of the campaign, the revolutionaries would have ample reason to reconsider 
that position.3 
 
"Blending the Christian with the Conqueror": Prisoner Treatment during the 
American Invasion of Canada 
 
 Early in the summer of 1775, the ambitious Allen parlayed his reputation as the 
first victorious commander of the conflict into a position in the hierarchy of the united 
colonies' northern army.  Though many senior American officers considered him brash 
and reckless, Allen's popularity and aggressive spirit made him ideally suited for the 
revolutionaries' next move. While Washington contended with Gage in Boston, 
revolutionary Americans in Connecticut and New York saw a golden opportunity in 
Voltaire's "few acres of snow."  With Ticonderoga, Crown Point, and thus all of Lake 
Champlain in their hands, the path to Canada lay open.  The Americans wasted little time 
in organizing an expedition northward to secure their exposed northern flank and to bring 
the former French colony into the revolutionary fold.   
 Attempts by colonial Americans to invade Canada were hardly novel in 1775.  In 
virtually every preceding conflict of the past century, American provincial forces had 
attempted a two-pronged invasion of the Saint Lawrence valley by both land and sea. 
Lacking the resources and unanimity necessary to subdue so vast a domain, American 
colonists had failed monumentally in every prior attempt.  It was not until Britain threw 
the weight of her fiscal-military state at New France in 1759 that Canada was finally 
coupled to the British Empire.4  
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4th series, 4:818. 
 4 For an excellent brief overview of the colonial wars see Ferling, Struggle for a Continent. 
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 In 1775, Canada once again posed a threat to American security.  As a point of 
embarkation for an invasion of New York, a location rich with potential Native American 
allies and adversaries, and as a vital base of supply for Britain's navy, British-held 
Canada imperiled the future of the revolutionary cause.  Believing that the native French-
speaking population would rally to their side, the revolutionaries launched a simultaneous 
assault on Montréal and Québec under generals Richard Montgomery and Benedict 
Arnold respectively.  Arnold's force struggled overland through the Maine wilderness 
while Montgomery's troops advanced via Lake Champlain.5 
 An Irishman, and former British officer who had taken part in Britain's conquest 
of New France in 1759, Montgomery was an obvious choice to command the audacious 
and intricate assault.  Montgomery, however, had no shortage of difficulties controlling 
an army of headstrong New York and New Englanders; neither group was particularly 
fond of the other and both were suspicious of Ethan Allen and his Green Mountain Boys 
from the New Hampshire Grants.  Not one to be impressed by claims of rank, Allen 
viewed Montgomery's instructions as mere suggestions rather than orders.  Much as he 
had at Ticonderoga, Allen set out on his own.  Hoping to trump the laurels of 
Ticonderoga by capturing Montréal, the formerly fortunate Allen became instead the first 
senior American officer to fall into enemy hands when the British learned of his surprise 
assault.6 
 Allen's capture did not go smoothly.  Abandoned by Major John Brown's two 
hundred-man supporting force, Allen and his hodgepodge command of 110 Canadians 
and New Englanders occupied an untenable position in front of the walled city.  After a 
                                                
 5 Hatch, Thrust for Canada, 29-42. 
 6 Gabriel, Major General Richard Montgomery, 88-89; Hatch, Thrust for Canada, 48. 
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brief exchange of fire with British regulars, Native American auxiliaries, and Canadian 
militia, Allen proposed surrender on the condition that he "be treated with honor, and be 
assured of good quarter for myself and the men with me."  He was apprehensive that 
quarter might be denied.  After all, the bulk of his force was composed of Canadian 
farmers not American soldiers.  Allen's recruitment of the Canadians was not strictly 
consonant with European customs of war.  In his treatise on the laws of war, Vattel 
strictly forbade enlisting soldiers in enemy territory: even going so far as to suggest that 
the practice "violates one of the most scared rights of the prince and the nation."  Allen's 
commission from Governor Trumbull of Connecticut did not entitle him to recruit beyond 
the borders of the colony.  If his British captors consulted Vattel, Allen would be "hanged 
without mercy, and with great justice."  To his great relief, the British officer accepted 
Allen's surrender and allowed the American rank and file to lay down their arms.  While 
in the process of surrendering, Allen and his men were accosted by several native 
warriors.  Products of a very different military culture, the natives sought to capture Allen 
as a spoil of war.  Only the interposition of a British soldier with "a fixed bayonet" saved 
the New Englander from "so awful a death."7  
 Despite the best efforts of both Allen and his opponents to conduct warfare 
according to European norms, the realities of war in America complicated the picture.  As 
if to apologize for their inability to restrain the violence of their allies, the British officers 
who captured Allen treated him "with great civility and politeness."  Nevertheless, the 
inauspicious manner of his capture should have alerted Allen that his troubles were far 
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from over.  Upon his arrival in the city, General Prescott summarily overturned his 
subordinate officer’s promises, and ordered Allen and his men into close confinement.8 
 While Allen languished in captivity aboard the Gaspé, American forces under 
Montgomery laid siege to the British garrison at St. John's guarding the southern 
approach to Montréal via the Richelieu River.  The earthen fortress was formidable, 
boasting forty pieces of artillery and a garrison of nearly 600 men commanded by Major 
Charles Preston, a former acquaintance of Montgomery's.  Had the Americans bypassed 
the fort and marched directly on Montréal, their interior lines would have been 
compromised and their line of retreat cut off. To capture Canada, St. John’s had to fall.  
Unfortunately for the revolutionaries, they lacked both the heavy artillery and well-
disciplined troops necessary to reduce the fortification by storm.  Montgomery had to rely 
on a lengthy and costly siege.  St. John’s did not possess an inexhaustible supply of 
provisions however.  Without resupply or relief, the fort’s resistance was only a matter of 
time.9   
 The garrison at St. John's best hope for support lay with Major Joseph Stopford of 
the 7th Regiment of Foot and the British supply depot at Fort Chambly six miles to the 
north.  Montgomery quickly dispatched Major Brown with a small force to capture the 
post.  The antiquated stone fortress was in no position to withstand a siege, and Stopford 
knew it.  On October 18th, after only two days of light bombardment, Stopford proposed 
terms for the surrender of his eighty-three man garrison. In accordance with European 
custom, the major sought the most favorable terms possible for his men.  He suggested 
that "the garrison, officers, and men, [were] not to be made prisoners, but to march 
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unmolested…drums beating, colours flying" to Montréal.  With Montréal's own garrison 
severely depleted, these British regulars would have been invaluable to the defense of 
Canada.  Stopford's terms were unacceptable.  Major Brown countered: Stopford and his 
men were to "surrender prisoners of war," but the soldiers would be allowed to keep their 
personal baggage and the women and children of the fort would be permitted to go with 
the men and take their effects.10   
 Considering Stopford's paltry defense of his post, the American terms were 
lenient.  Perhaps Brown thought the stain on Stopford's honor was punishment enough.  
Much to the disgrace of the proud heritage of the 7th Regiment, known as the Royal 
Fusiliers, Stopford surrendered the fort, his regiment's colors, and the entire garrison 
without even bothering to destroy his magazine and other military stores.  The fusiliers' 
flags were sent to Congress to adorn the walls of the Pennsylvania State House and the 
powder and ball were forwarded to Montgomery, sealing the fate of St. John's.  The 
king's munitions were soon returned to the British via the muzzles of Montgomery's 
cannon.11   
 When news of Chambly's fall reached Montgomery, he was elated.  He had a 
problem however.  The British prisoners, their families, and all of their baggage were six 
miles upriver at Chambly and Fort St. John’s guarded the passage south.  Major Preston, 
without much trouble, could have obstructed the passage of the prisoners, perhaps even 
intercepting the column and liberating Stopford's men.  As a European officer, however, 
Preston could not violate the terms of Stopford's agreement with Brown, despite the 
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shameful circumstances of their creation, without dishonoring himself and British arms.  
Montgomery sent one of his officers to negotiate the passage of the prisoners around St. 
John’s.  In his report to General Schuyler, Montgomery, clearly relieved, observed that 
"the commanding officer at St. John' s has been so polite as to let our batteaus pass to the 
head of the rapids in order to take in the baggage of the Chambly garrison."  Montgomery 
was pleased that the Briton had "behaved very genteelly" to his negotiating officer.  As a 
former captain in the British army, Montgomery naturally sought to return the favor by 
entertaining the officers from among his new prisoners.  He was particularly impressed 
with Stopford, whom he described to Schuyler as "a man of Family in Ireland."  
Stopford’s officers, who were “genteel men" in Montgomery's opinion, were welcome 
additions to the general’s evening soirées.  Montgomery admitted that he felt "great 
pleasure in shewing [sic] them all the attention in my power."12   
While the enlisted men were immediately hurried south to confinement in 
Connecticut, the officers were proffered lenient paroles and allowed to remain in Canada 
until their families could join them.  Bound by their word of honor as gentlemen, the 
officers were under no further “restraint” while in Montgomery’s custody.  The men were 
“to be accommodated with refreshments Etc at the Public expence [sic]” and loaned the 
ready cash needed for their trip southward.  Once prepared to travel, the officers were 
given their choice of lodgings in New Jersey or Pennsylvania.  Ever the gallant, 
Montgomery even released several women who had been captured at Chambly to join 
their husbands at St. John’s.  In doing so, Montgomery demonstrated to Preston, and his 
besieged garrison, that he understood the conventions of European warfare.  Given the 
                                                
 12Montgomery informed Schuyler on October 20th, 1775: "Their number of women & quantity of 
baggage is astonishing.” Montgomery to Schuyler. Camp before St. John’s. October 20th and 23rd. Reel 19. 
Schuyler Papers, NYPL.  
 89 
ramshackle appearance of the American forces and their haphazard conduct of the siege, 
the men of the garrison were likely concerned about their fate should the fort fall.  Would 
the rebels grant them quarter and the honors of war?  Jacobite Irish and Scottish rebels 
had rarely observed the niceties of European warfare.  Montgomery, however, did not 
imagine himself as a rebel.  He was a quintessential European officer; it would never 
have occurred to him to have behaved otherwise.13 
 To Sir Guy Carleton, the British governor of Canada, Montgomery was nothing 
more than a traitorous rebel.  A fellow Irishman and comrade of Montgomery's from both 
the Louisbourg and Havana campaigns of the Seven Years' War, Carleton had no 
sympathy for a man who compounded rebellion with the betrayal of his brother officers 
and native land.  Unable to punish Montgomery directly, the governor vented his anger 
on the closest surrogate: Ethan Allen.  Following Allen's capture, Carleton had Allen 
paraded through the streets of Montréal in chains to impress upon the Canadian 
population the gravity of defying the king's authority.  Despite the unease of a number of 
his own officers at Allen's treatment, Carleton did not countermand Prescott's orders and 
allowed Allen and his men to remain chained in Gaspé's hold. Carleton, like Prescott, 
rebuffed Allen's pleas for relief. 14   
 Prior to his capture, Allen's relationship with Montgomery was already strained.  
To Montgomery, an Irish gentleman who had held a king's commission, Allen appeared 
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uncouth, untrustworthy, and unabashed in his ambition.  Upon learning of Allen's 
misfortune, he wrote Schuyler: "I have to lament Mr. Allen's imprudence & ambition."  
Nevertheless, Allen was an officer in the American army and Montgomery's subordinate.  
In the European culture of war so familiar to Montgomery, he had a responsibility to 
ensure that Allen was treated according to his rank as an American officer, even if he did 
not measure up to Montgomery's standards as a gentleman.  Carleton's treatment of Allen 
and his men was a direct assault on the legitimacy of the American army and 
Montgomery's authority.  If the general could not protect his men, how could he expect 
them to follow him into harm’s way?15   
 In Montgomery's estimation, Carleton required a reminder of the principal of 
reciprocity that undergirded Europe's culture of war.  He instructed one of his officers to 
communicate to Carleton "that if Mr. Allen or any other prisoner of our troops…are 
treated with cruelty, or more severity than is necessary for their security, I must, much 
against my inclination, retaliate on those who already are or may fall into my hands."  
After the capture of Chambly, Montgomery had plenty of suitable subjects for retribution.  
Much as Washington had threatened Gage with retaliation for the treatment of the Bunker 
Hill prisoners, Montgomery was confident that the mere suggestion of retaliation would 
suffice to alleviate Allen's sufferings.  In a report to Schuyler, Montgomery revealed his 
intention to "endeavour by means of the Chambly garrison to obtain better treatment for 
Allen & the other prisoners."  He was equally concerned for the Canadians who had been 
captured with Allen. These men, who were direct subjects of Governor Carleton, were 
more likely to face summary judgment than Americans who would probably be 
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transferred to England for trial.  If Montgomery did nothing to stop Carleton from 
hanging the Canadians, any hope of recruiting further allies from among France's former 
subjects would be at an end.16 
 Montgomery's threat did not produce the desired result.  Carleton ignored him.  
Growing desperate, Montgomery asked Major Stopford to inform the governor of "the 
fatal consequences which must attend the carrying on so barbarous a war."  In 
Montgomery's opinion, treating "unfortunate prisoners with the most cruel severity, [and] 
loading them with irons" was beneath the dignity of so estimable an officer as Carleton.  
Writing the governor personally on October 22nd, Montgomery referred to Carleton as 
"one of the most respectable officers of the Crown." He lamented "the melancholy and 
fatal necessity" of remonstrating against Carleton's treatment of American prisoners.  
This was no false flattery.  Carleton had led the British assault against the castle of El 
Morro in Cuba in 1762, and young Lieutenant Montgomery had seen first hand his 
bravery under fire.17  
 As governor of Canada, however, Carleton no longer looked the part of the brave 
and honorable officer in Montgomery's eyes.  He obviated not only his humanity but also 
his prudence by treating Allen and his men so severely.  Did he not fear retaliation?  
Montgomery now possessed far more British prisoners than Carleton had Americans and 
the entire garrison of St. John’s was poised to fall into his hands.  As a gentleman and 
man of sensibility, he admitted feeling "the most painful reluctance on this melancholy 
occasion," but Montgomery's duty to his own troops demanded retaliation in kind.  
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Carleton’s treatment of Allen was a "shocking indignity" that required Montgomery, 
"with the most painful regret," to "execute with rigour the just and necessary law of 
retaliation" upon the Chambly prisoners.  Far exceeding the lex talionis, or law of 
retaliation, Montgomery threatened that if he did not receive a response in six days, he 
would interpret Carlton’s silence as "a declaration of a barbarous war," in which no 
quarter would be asked or given. Carleton, unwilling to negotiate with rebels and traitors, 
remained mute.  In a letter to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Earl of 
Dartmouth, the governor vented, "I shall treat all their threats with silent contempt, and in 
this persevere, were I certain of falling into their hands the following week."  Such 
bravado stemmed from his firm belief that he was not "at liberty to treat otherwise those 
who are traitors to the King."  This was not a war between rival European dynasties, and 
Montgomery was no longer a fellow officer and gentleman.  Rebellion had to be stamped 
out and rebels had to be punished.18 
 Despite the vehemence of his official stance, and Carleton's recalcitrance, 
Montgomery had no intention of eschewing the restraints of "civilized" warfare.  He was 
well aware that the legitimacy of the American cause in general, as well as their claim to 
be "liberating" Canada, depended upon the rigid adherence to European customs of war.  
Instead of retaliating on the prisoners at his disposal, Montgomery did nothing.  He knew 
that if St. John's fell, Montréal would be indefensible; Carleton would have to surrender, 
and Allen and his men would be liberated.  Montgomery ignored his retaliatory threats 
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and concentrated on the siege of St. John's.  When the Americans opened a new battery 
on the fort's flank in late October, Major Preston had little choice but to seek the best 
terms possible for his men.  On November 1st, Montgomery demanded the fort's 
surrender.19   
 Unlike Stopford, Preston had resisted the siege diligently, and he attempted to 
parlay the strength of that defense into a convention rather than a capitulation.  Instead of 
becoming prisoners of war, he hoped his men would be allowed to "embark for Great 
Britain" on the condition that they not serve in America again.  Montgomery was 
sympathetic to Preston's position.  He had skillfully defended his post: maintaining his 
honor as a gentleman, and that of his regiment, under extremely adverse conditions.  But 
the prize of over six hundred British prisoners was too great for Montgomery to 
relinquish.  Preston's position was hopeless, and under the conventions of European 
warfare he was in no position to negotiate.  As Montgomery phrased it, "if you do not 
surrender this day, it will be unnecessary to make any future proposals; the garrison shall 
be prisoners of war, without the honours of war, and I cannot ensure the officers their 
baggage."  Had Preston rejected Montgomery's ultimatum, the Americans would have 
stormed the fort under no obligation to grant the British garrison quarter.  Preston 
acquiesced.20 
 After a siege of forty-eight days, on the morning of November 3rd Preston and his 
men marched out of the battered fortress "with the honours of war…due to their fortitude 
and perseverance" and grounded their arms in front of a rough-hewn and patchwork 
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parade of American soldiers.  This armed assemblage of farmers, tradesmen, apprentices, 
and servants now possessed as prisoners nearly all of the regular British soldiers in 
Canada.  The official articles of capitulation signed by Preston and Montgomery boasted 
that British "prisoners have been constantly treated with a brotherly affection" and 
promised that "the effects of the garrison shall not be withheld from them."  The officers 
were allowed to keep their swords and presumably their regimental colors as no mention 
was made of them in the articles of capitulation or in the records of the Continental 
Congress.  At the conclusion of the ceremony, the prisoners embarked for confinement in 
Connecticut, "there to remain till our unhappy differences shall be compromised, or till 
they are exchanged."  Quite contrary to his earlier show of bravado to Carleton, 
Montgomery relished extending professional courtesies to the captured British officers, 
even releasing "an officer or two to go to their families…at Montreal" on parole.  He 
explained his reasoning to Schuyler: "They cannot do us any harm, and there would have 
been a degree of inhumanity in refusing them."  Although the general had been quick to 
invoke the law of retaliation in his protestations to Carleton, when faced with an 
opportunity for revenge, he did just the opposite.  Seeing fellow officers and gentlemen in 
distress, Montgomery offered them every indulgence.  The rank and file of the garrison 
were treated with respect, allowed to keep their personal property, and promised a lenient 
confinement until they could be exchanged.21 
 General Schuyler, a veteran of New York’s provincial forces and a scion of one of 
the wealthiest and most politically-connected families in the colony, was equally 
concerned with performing his gentility in front of his new captives.  He acquainted 
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Governor Trumbull of Connecticut of his past relationships with the garrison's officers: 
"From Major Preston, and the officers of the Twenty-Sixth Regiment, I have experienced 
the most polite and friendly attentions when I was a stranger and traveller [sic] in 
Ireland."  Remembering their gentlemanly courtesy and sociability, Schuyler 
recommended them to the governor's "notice" and requested that "if there is any choice in 
the quarters which you shall destine to them, that theirs were the best."  On their route 
southward, the prisoners were "to be Entertained at the Publick expence [sic]" and 
"treated with the utmost attention and politeness."  Schuyler warned the officer of the 
guards conveying the prisoners to "be particularly attentive that no person, who may have 
forgot [sic] the rights of mankind and the principles of Englishmen offer the least insult 
to any of the Gentlemen, the Soldiers, their Wives, or Children."  Still imagining himself 
as a British gentleman, Schuyler insisted that his subordinate officers do likewise.  
Montgomery and Schuyler were not men prepared to exercise the lex talionis. Instead, the 
American generals forwarded the captured Britons and Canadians to New York and 
Connecticut where they could more easily and more comfortably be provisioned and 
lodged.22   
 As the transports carrying Preston's men sailed down the Richelieu towards 
confinement, Carleton began preparations to abandon Montréal.  Knowing that he could 
not possibly hold the city with his meager garrison, the governor fled rather than contest 
Montgomery's advance.  Before he decamped to Québec, Carleton conveyed Allen and 
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the other American prisoners to the capital where they were confined aboard ship in the 
Saint Lawrence so that they would not fall into American hands.  In a letter to Dartmouth, 
Carleton admitted that the Allen's men were confined in irons, a security measure far too 
stringent for traditional prisoners of war.  Carleton explained: "We have neither prisons 
to hold, nor troops to guard them." Nevertheless, he asserted that "they have been treated 
with as much humanity as our own safety would permit."  Carleton's justifications aside, 
Allen's confinement was neither humane nor safe.  With Benedict Arnold's column 
nearing Québec, the city's commander, Lieutenant Governor Hector Cramahé, made the 
strategic decision to send Allen and the other Americans to England.  Lacking suitable 
jails and the manpower necessary to guard the prisoners, Cramahé was ecstatic to be rid 
of so many useless mouths to feed. 23    
 Allen, however, was less than confident.  Any chance of escape or rescue was at 
an end.  Instead, he and his men endured the trans-Atlantic passage under the stewardship 
of a captain named Brook Watson who Allen described as "a man of malicious and cruel 
disposition."  Watson ordered all thirty-four prisoners confined in a purpose-built pen in 
the hold of ship where they were forced to both “eat and perform the office of evacuation, 
during the voyage to England."  According to Allen, Watson claimed "the place was good 
enough for a rebel" and "that anything short of a halter was too good for" him.  Every 
league the ship drew closer to England, the captain's threat grew closer to reality.  In 
Canada, the absence of any official policy for how to treat American prisoners had 
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preserved his life, though it ensured the severity of his captivity.  In England, Allen 
would be subject to civil law, and he knew well the punishment for treason.  Prescott's 
prophesy of a halter at Tyburn hill looked like it just might come true.24 
 As Allen approached his fate, American forces under Montgomery pried Montréal 
from the grasp of the British Empire.  In a reverse of the 1759 campaign that subdued 
New France, Canada's second most populous city surrendered before the capital was even 
attacked, exposing the Saint Lawrence valley to American incursions, and dooming 
Québec if not relieved by sea.  Along with the city and its 150 man garrison, 
Montgomery also captured the infamous Brigadier General Prescott.  The man who had 
ordered Allen in chains, Prescott was beneath Montgomery’s contempt.  He had violated 
the customary norms of war between "civilized" peoples by treating Allen, an officer in 
the American army, as a common criminal.  Montgomery described Prescott as a "cruel 
rascal" who deserved to be treated "with the sovereign contempt his inhumanity and 
barbarity merit[ed]."  His dislike of Prescott was such that he confessed to Schuyler that 
should anything happen to Allen, "I hope Prescott will fall a sacrifice to his manes."  
Despite this imprecation, Montgomery did little to punish Prescott beyond banishing the 
Briton from his dinner table.  Passing him on to Schuyler at Ticonderoga, Prescott was 
then sent into Connecticut with the other officers of his regiment.  Montgomery's actions, 
or inactions, should come as no surprise.  While outraged by Prescott's behavior, 
Montgomery could not punish Prescott without further escalating the conflict's violence 
and sullying his own honor and that of American arms.25   
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1775. Janet Montgomery Papers, Edward Livingston Collection, Mudd Mansucript Library, Princeton 
 98 
 For some of Montgomery's junior officers, less versed in contemporary European 
customs, his treatment of British prisoners looked more like weakness than humanity.  
Their only experience of war was the present conflict in which the British were not 
observing such niceties.  Why was Montgomery holding American troops to a higher 
standard?  Grumbling escalated to an official complaint in which Montgomery was 
accused of endangering "the publick safety" by allowing the British officers to remain at 
liberty in the city.  As Montgomery explained to Schuyler, "A number of officers 
presumed to remonstrate against the indulgence I had given some of the officers of the 
King's troops."  Schuyler, who was deeply concerned with maintaining the appearance of 
a professional army in the eyes of his antagonists and superiors alike, was concerned that 
"this turbulent and mutinous spirit will tend to the ruin of our cause" if Montgomery did 
not put a stop it at once.  Outraged by his officers' temerity and insubordination, 
Montgomery resigned on the spot.  Quickly realizing their mistake, the officers begged 
him to resume command.  Montgomery was the only senior officer in the northern army 
with substantive knowledge of European tactics and siege operations.  Though they 
disagreed with his policies, they were cognizant of his indispensability.  Montgomery had 
made his point; he immediately returned to his duties as the army's commander.  The 
officers would never again question Montgomery's vision of the proper conduct of war.26 
 The common soldiers of the northern army, however, were less easily mollified. 
Many viewed the captured Britons as spoils of war, and considered themselves entitled to 
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their possessions. In the aftermath of the capitulation of Montréal, New York soldiers 
pillaged British troops of their personal clothing and effects.  Not one to take his 
responsibility toward enemy prisoners lightly, Montgomery interceded for the prisoners 
and returned their clothing, much to the dissatisfaction of the New Yorkers.  The general 
explained to Schuyler, "I would not have sullied my own reputation nor disgraced the 
Continental arms by such a breach of Capitulation."  As an officer and a gentleman, as 
well as a representative of the Continental Congress, Montgomery was honor bound to 
protect his prisoners and maintain the terms of the articles of capitulation. That his men 
disagreed is a telling reminder of just how tenuous and elite-focused the European culture 
of war was on the other side of the Atlantic.27  
 News of the American victories in Canada electrified revolutionaries across the 
colonies.  As fort after fort fell, the press painted an image of an unstoppable American 
juggernaut in their readers' imaginations.  The manner in which the campaign was 
conducted was a point of particular pride. American troops had not adopted the "skulking 
way of war" so derided by British officers in the last conflict, and they were no longer 
hiding behind defensive works awaiting British assaults. Newspapers from Philadelphia 
to Boston printed the articles of capitulation for Chambly, St. John's, and Montréal, 
crafting a potent picture of the Continental army on the offensive: reducing Britain's 
northern bastions one by one according to conventional European modes.  Along with a 
copy of Marshal Maurice de Saxe's Reveries, Montgomery had brought with him a vision 
of "civilized" warfare, developed over years of experience and study, which induced him 
to humanely handle his captured enemies.  While not everyone in the northern army 
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shared this vision, Montgomery successfully imposed the European culture of war on his 
army of American volunteers.28   
 Away from the front, revolutionary Americans took pride that their army 
conducted itself with "humanity and benevolence."  When Benedict Arnold captured 
Crown Point in July, he received an address from the "principal Inhabitants" of the region 
complimenting him on his "tenderness and polite treatment" of British prisoners.  
Expressing a sentiment that was common throughout the colonies during the Canadian 
campaign, the inhabitants declared, "The humane and polite manner with which you 
treated your prisoners, insures to you the applause of all."  Montgomery, who looked the 
part of the virtuous and benevolent officer in the European mold, received even more 
adulation than the rustic Arnold.  Revolutionary Americans praised him as the paragon of 
martial glory and "civilized" sensibility.  After the capture of Montréal, John Hancock 
complimented Montgomery not just for his victory, but also for the manner in which it 
was achieved.  Commenting on his treatment of prisoners, Hancock applauded: "Nor are 
the humanity and politeness with which you have treated those in your power less 
illustrious instances of magnanimity than the valour by which you reduced them to it."  
Courage was inseparable from benevolence in the congressman's idealized European 
conception of war.  In his panegyric, Hancock promised that Congress, "utterly abhorrent 
from every species of cruelty to prisoners," would continue to support Montgomery's 
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vision of war and "ever applaud their officers for beautifully blending the Christian with 
the conqueror."29 
 
The Administration of the Canadian prisoners 
 While the northern army shifted its attention to the capital city of Québec, the 
British prisoners began their march southward.  Once at Fort Ticonderoga, General 
Schuyler made the decision to foist the prisoners from St. John's and Montréal upon the 
governments of New York and Connecticut. These were ideal locations: far enough from 
the enemy's main force in Boston that rescue was unlikely, but close enough to both 
Washington's and Schuyler's headquarters that orders could easily be relayed.  Both 
colonies also had experience housing French prisoners during the last war.  Because 
Connecticut was the only colony whose royal governor embraced the revolutionary 
effort, it still maintained many of its pre-war governmental institutions and was thus more 
prepared to receive large numbers of captives than New York.  After the capture of 
Ticonderoga, Ethan Allen had sent Captain Delaplace and his men to Hartford where they 
were provided for by a committee of the colonial assembly.  Informing Governor 
Trumbull of his newest wards, Schuyler instructed the governor that he could "dispose of 
them as your Honour shall direct."  Seeing that Congress had failed to make any 
provision for their confinement or support, the Connecticut Assembly asked the governor 
to write Congress inquiring "in what manner the officers and soldiers who are 
prisoners…shall be provided for and supported, and how and in what manner the expence 
[sic] incurred thereby shall be defrayed."  Until directions from Congress could be had, 
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the Assembly ordered that the prisoners be administered in the same manner as the 
garrison of Fort Ticonderoga.30 
 Unlike the British soldiers captured at Lexington and Concord who were often 
confined in crowded and cramped local jails, the Connecticut Assembly allowed the 
enlisted prisoners from Canada, along with the previously captured redcoats, the privilege 
of seeking employment among the local population.  This option was not only beneficial 
to the prisoners, who were allowed to keep their earnings, but also to the colony by 
successfully outsourcing the prisoners' lodging and provisioning.  Ezekiel Williams, a 
member of the committee appointed by the Connecticut Assembly to care for the 
prisoners from Chambly, reported that they were sent "out into the several Towns near 
about Hartford and hire[d]…[and] Boarded in Families in the best manner we could."  
Williams "appointed and engaged some of the respectable Men in the several towns to 
take care & have the oversight of them" because he lacked any "regulation of Congress 
concerning them." The British enlisted men captured at St. John's were "put out in like 
manner" in Litchfield County.31   
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  The hiring-out system, however, could not be used to accommodate officers 
whose status as gentlemen protected them from menial tasks.  Drawing upon the 
European customs for the treatment of enemy officers, the commissioned prisoners were 
granted their freedom of movement, within certain geographic parameters, upon signing a 
parole of honor neither to escape nor to oppose in word or deed the united colonies.  They 
were expected to live peaceably and quietly until Congress and the British government 
arranged a treaty of exchange, known as cartel, to release the men in return for American 
officers of equal rank in British custody.  Just as Captain Delaplace and Governor Skene 
before them, Prescott, Preston, and their officers readily acceded to the terms of the 
parole.  In return for their placidity, the officers could expect to be accorded all the 
privileges of their exalted status. After the fall of Ticonderoga, General Wooster, 
Montgomery's second in command, ordered the Wethersfield Committee of 
Correspondence to treat Governor Philip Skene "with that politeness & civility which is 
due to a Gentleman of his Rank," and Governor Trumbull saw to it that he was afforded 
"Lodgings & Entertainment" while in Hartford under "his Parole of Honor."32   
 The New York Provincial Congress followed Connecticut's lead in their treatment 
of the British prisoners captured in Canada.  The Congress ordered the Albany 
Committee of Correspondence to "provide them with Lodgings & Board at the public 
expense."  Although the officers could reasonably be expected to sustain themselves by 
drawing lines of credit, the Assemblymen considered it their "Duty to alleviate as much 
as possible the Evils of their Confinement" by furnishing them the necessities of life.  
                                                
 32 Major General David Wooster to Captain David Dimon. Camp near New York, July 10th, 1775 
and Jonathan Trumbull to the Committee Appointed to Take Care of Prisoners.  Hartford, CT.  July 22nd, 
1775. John C. Parsons, ed., Letters and Documents of Ezekiel Williams of Wethersfield, Connecticut 
(Hartford: Acorn Club, 1976), 43, 44. 
 104 
They even released two British enlisted men captured in Canada on their parole.  The 
men were "permitted to remain peaceable and unmolested in the City of New-York."  
Devoid of the innate honor that accompanied genteel status in eighteenth-century Europe, 
common soldiers should not have been paroled on the mere basis of their word to remain 
hors de combat until exchanged.  Such treatment was particularly generous considering 
one of the men had already escaped custody once before.  So concerned with treating 
their enemy captives with generosity, thereby performing their legitimacy as a 
governmental institution, the Albany Congress effectively released men who were 
unconstrained by the strictures of gentlemanly honor.  Novices in the conduct of war, the 
civilian Congressmen applied the European custom of parole further than it was ever 
intended.33 
 Not everyone agreed that British prisoners, especially common soldiers, should be 
allowed to roam freely.  During the summer of 1775, the Albany Committee requested to 
put prisoners from Canada "in close Confinement" because they believed the "prisoners 
from St Johns have it in their Power to be of disservice to the public Cause by having 
Liberty to intermix with the Soldiers of the Continental Army, and others."  In the 
opinion of the committee, the prisoners took "more Liberty than Consistent with the 
Station they were in."  Enlisted prisoners loitering about taverns and inns in relative 
freedom and luxury did little to motivate potential recruits or boost morale.  Their request 
was overruled, but their concerns did not disappear. 34   
                                                
 33 Albany Committee Minutes.  October 23rd, 1775.  James Sullivan, ed., Minutes of the Albany 
Committee of Correspondence, 1775-1778 (Albany: New York Division of Archives and History, 1923), 
276; The Cases of Neill McFall and William Elphinston.  New York Provincial Congress.  October 20th, 
1775. Force, American Archives, 4th series, 3:1299. 
 34 Albany Committee Minutes. August 24th, 1775. Sullivan, ed., Minutes of the Albany Committee, 
212. 
 105 
 The situation in Connecticut was little better.  The inhabitants of Farmington 
reported that some of the prisoners captured at Chambly were "turbulent and disorderly" 
and likely to escape.  Rather than imprison the men, the Connecticut Committee of Safety 
suggested that the townspeople keep "a special and vigilant watch over those persons, so 
as to prevent their escape, even if some extra expense should be incurred thereby."  The 
committee members knew that if they confined the soldiers, "they may complain of hard 
usage," a propaganda coup the British might use to justify their harsh treatment of 
American prisoners.  Connecticut's leaders were unwilling to throw away the moral high 
ground Montgomery had won in Canada.  Nevertheless, their patience for disorderly, 
prone to escape, and expensive prisoners was running out quickly.35    
 In the opinion of ordinary Americans, his majesty's captured officers were equally 
as wearisome. Although welcomed at first as gentlemen of refinement, erudition, and 
sensibility, as the fall of 1775 slipped into winter, the burden of the British officers began 
to take its toll on the communities that housed them.  Governor Skene apparently made 
himself quite unpopular in Hartford.  When news reached that community that General 
Gage refused to countenance an exchange of prisoners, one exasperated Hartford resident 
sardonically quipped, "In all Probability we shall have the Honour of his Excellency 
Governor Skeen's [sic] residence among us—God knows how long."  Gage's refusal 
surprised both townspeople and prisoners alike who assumed that the prisoners' 
confinement would be only temporary.  They believed that a formal cartel would be 
established between generals Washington and Howe specifying how and when they 
would be exchanged.   Such agreements had been commonplace in European warfare for 
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over a century.  General Howe, however, followed Gage's lead by refusing to negotiate 
with Washington.  The two men severed all communication in late August and did not 
resume contact until the end of December.  Without communication there could be no 
compromise and no exchange.  The officers would remain prisoners.36   
 While most were content to wile away their captivity at cards, in drink, or at play, 
some officers chaffed under the conditions of their paroles.  One particularly 
obstreperous officer, Major Christopher French, inundated Washington, Joseph Reed, and 
John Hancock with a litany of complaints and reproofs.  French, along with an ensign 
from the 47th regiment, had been captured when his ship arrived at the port of 
Philadelphia in early August.  Ignorant of the commencement of hostilities and distaining 
any authority not derived from the king's majesty, French refused to be considered a 
prisoner of war.  Rather than face the jail, however, he agreed to their terms until he 
could meet with the commander of the American forces.  Happy to be rid of the arrogant 
French, Benjamin Franklin and the committee sent him "by Stage" at their expense to 
General Washington in Cambridge.  The general, preoccupied with his siege of Boston 
and lacking the resources to adequately entertain a prisoner of field-grade rank, requested 
that the prisoners be sent to Connecticut under the care of Governor Trumbull where they 
would "be treated with kindness."  The officer instructed to convey French to Hartford 
was "enjoined to show [him] every mark of civility and respect."  Despite the promise of 
treatment appropriate to his rank as an officer and a gentleman, French was enraged at 
being pawned off on a civilian governor without even an interview with the commanding 
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general.  He wrote Washington insinuating that the American general had forgotten his 
sense of "Justice & knowledge of military Rules" by presuming to treat him as a prisoner 
of war.  French explained that he "objected to our being by any means consider'd as 
prisoners" because "the Custom of War allots a certain Period of the departure of the 
ships & Subjects of the inimicable [sic] Nation."  French implied that in warfare between 
"civilized" nations, military authorities granted foreign travelers, traders, and other 
visitors a period to evacuate the theatre of war before their property or persons could 
legitimately be seized.  Invoking European customs of war, French hoped to capitalize on 
Washington's status as former Provincial officer and fellow gentleman to obtain his 
release.37 
 Washington, no novice to the culture of war in Europe, knew that French's claim 
was groundless.  The major's argument was premised on the assertion that he had no 
hostile intent toward the colonies, having not been "taken in arms," but the truth of the 
matter was that he had come to America with uniforms and supplies much needed by the 
Boston garrison.  To Washington, French and his colleagues were "the voluntary 
Instruments of an Avaricious & vindictive Ministry" come to America to impose tyranny 
by force of arms.  Even in a European context, French's claim was dubious.  In his 
treatise on the law of nations, Vattel agreed with French that in wars between "civilized" 
peoples, enemy subjects must be allowed "a reasonable time for withdrawing with their 
effects," after the declaration of war, but this proviso applied only to "unarmed enemies."  
French and his colleagues were soldiers, and they had come into the colony bearing arms, 
though they were captured before they could employ them offensively.  According to 
                                                
 37 Samuel Hazard, ed., Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 1683–1800 (Philadelphia, 1852–53), 16 
vols., 10:302-6, 305; Col. Joseph Reed to French. October 3rd, 1775. Cambridge, MA. Force, American 
Archives, 4th series, 3:639; French to Washington. Framingham, MA. Sept 3rd, 1775. PGW. 
 108 
Vattel, French's claim of ignorance of the commencement of hostilities was insufficient 
to warrant his release because the colonies were engaged in a defensive war and were 
therefore under no obligation to formally declare war on Great Britain. As Vattel put it: 
"He who is attacked and only wages defensive war, needs not to make any hostile 
declaration."  Washington saw through French's ploy and ordered Joseph Reed to instruct 
French that his "Detention is both justifiable & proper."  Aware of General Gage's 
treatment of American officers in Boston, Reed reminded French that Gage had already 
severely breached the customs of war with the fallacious justification that "the 
Appellation of Rebel is supposed to Sanctify every Species of Perfidy & Cruelty towards 
the Inhabitants of America."  To release French under those circumstances "would be a 
Strange Missapplication [sic] of Military Rules."  Rather than simply rely on the timeless 
adage might makes right, American officers at this period insisted on the rigid adherence 
to the letter of European military law and custom38   
 With his status as a prisoner of war no longer in question, French found other 
means to pester his captors.  Paroled to Hartford, the major was at liberty to come and go 
as he pleased throughout the city.  According to the chairman of Hartford's committee of 
safety, Thomas Seymour, French spent his time haranguing every passerby "in high 
Tone" on the evils of rebellion and promised to "act vigorously against the Country, & do 
every thing in his Power to reduce it."  Seymour informed Washington that French "talkd 
[sic] in so high a Strain that the People veiwd [sic] him as a most determined Foe."  
Rather than confine French in Hartford's jail where he could do no harm, the committee 
merely forbade French the privilege of wearing his sword in public.  In Seymour's 
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opinion, the people of Hartford "would not bare with his wearing Arms at any Rate."  A 
seemingly innocuous punishment, this disarmament was no "mere Punctilio" to the 
European officer.39 
 The symbol of an officer, as much a badge of rank and status as a weapon, the 
sword was vested with dense meaning in Europe's culture of war.  For an eighteenth-
century European noble, the sword was not only a tool to defend his sovereign, as well as 
his honor; it was an inseparable part of his social and gender identity.  The wearing of a 
sword denoted gentlemanly status.  The common law of England even forbade the 
wearing of swords by any who were not entitled to do so by birth or military position.  
Although by 1775 swords had fallen out of fashion among gentlemen in England and her 
colonies, the tradition, and its meanings, remained strong with martial men.  In his 1772 
portrait by Charles Wilson Peale, Washington proudly sported a silver-hilted sword that 
he would continue to wear throughout his life.  Already deprived of his liberty by men he 
considered to be traitors and criminals, French was aghast that the committee sought to 
deprive him of the visible trappings of his martial identity as well.  In his remonstrance to 
Washington, the major disparaged the "lower Class of Townspeople [who] took umbrage 
at" his strolling about the city armed" and appealed to Washington as a brother officer.  
After all, in Europe "it was customary for Officers (& Volunteers, being Gentlemen,) on 
their Paroles to be allow'd to wear their Swords."  French was quite certain that 
Washington's "long Service & intimate acquaintance with Military Rules & Customs" 
would induce him to overrule the committee.   Washington would clearly understand that 
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a European officer should "not be insulted by being oblig'd to surrender [his 
sword]…merely to gratify the Populace."40   
 French failed to comprehend, however, the insult Gage had offered Washington 
over the treatment of captured American officers in Boston.  By refusing to treat the 
Americans according to their ranks, Gage nullified the American claim to the legitimate 
use of military force.  Beyond the pale of the customs of war in Europe, as well as the 
law, in the British imagination, Washington and the American army were not entitled to 
any of the courtesies customarily extended to enemy prisoners.  In his letters of protest, 
French had invoked the very European customs of war denied to American officers in 
British custody. Washington reminded the major of the principal of reciprocity: "the 
Benefit of those military Rules…can only be binding where they are mutual."  American 
officers were not only deprived of their swords, but very often their lives in the sordid 
conditions of Boston's jails.41   
 Nevertheless, Washington was unwilling to abandon his vision of "civilized" 
warfare.  He assured French that the Americans had "shewn on our Part the Strongest 
Disposition to observe" the European customs of war and that his "Disposition" did not 
allow him "to follow the unworthy Example set me by General Gage."  There would be 
no retaliation on the part of the Americans.  Rephrasing the golden rule of reciprocity in 
his response to the Hartford Committee of Safety, Washington recommended "a 
Gentleness even to Forbearance with Persons so intirely [sic] in our Power. We know not 
what the Chance of War may be—but let it be what it will the Duties of Humanity & 
                                                
 40 For the best discussion of the social, legal and cultural place of the smallsword in seventeenth 
and eighteenth-century England see J.D. Aylward, The Small-Sword in England: Its History, Its Forms, Its 
Makers, and Its Masters (London: Hutchinson's Scientific & Technical Publications, 1945);  French to 
Washington. Hartford. September 18th, 1775. PGW. 
 41 Washington to French. Hartford. September 26th, 1775. PGW. 
 111 
Kindness will demand from us such a Treatment as we Should expect from others the 
Case being reversed."  Washington was under no obligation, however, to exceed the 
customary European indulgences to prisoners.  After reviewing the military literature 
available to him, the general concluded that "the Rule with Regard to the Indulgence in 
Question is, that Prisoners do not wear their Swords. I therefore cannot approve of it."   
European military custom, not new world vengeance, dictated the case's outcome.  
Hardly mollified, French continued to badger Governor Trumbull and the Hartford 
Committee of Safety with a litany of complaints his captors deemed trivial.42 
 For Congress, the problems of prisoner management exceeded the cavils of 
nettlesome officers.  British prisoners were spread out in Connecticut, New York, and 
New Jersey, and the expense of their upkeep began to mount.  Committees of Safety, 
often the only local governmental bodies capable of administering the prisoners, 
petitioned Congress for instructions, regulations, and reimbursement.  Even Washington 
did not know how Congress wanted to proceed.  In late October, he put together a list of 
urgent questions for Congress, several having to do with prisoners of war.  "In what 
manner are prisoners to be treated?  What allowance made them and how are they to be 
Cloathed?"  In conference with delegates of the Continental Congress who travelled to 
Cambridge to meet with the general, Washington received his answer.  The Congressmen 
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concurred with Washington that captured enemy soldiers should "be treated as Prisoners 
of War but with Humanity."  They would be provided an "Allowance of Provisions" 
equal to that of the Continental army, and the "officers being in Pay should supply 
themselves with Cloathes."  The Congressmen also suggested that Washington attempt to 
establish a cartel of exchange with General Howe.  In an effort to discourage the British 
from arresting prominent civilian Bostonians in order to exchange them for the officers 
captured in Canada, Congress "agreed that the Exchange will be proper, Citizens for 
Citizens, but not Officers & Soldiers of the regular Army for Citizens."  Any exchange 
that might occur would be conducted according to customary European practice: officers 
for officers of equal rank, soldiers for soldiers of equal rank, and civilians for civilians.  
British sailors, soldiers, marines, merchant mariners, and civilians captured at sea were to 
"be deemed Prisoners at the Disposal of the General."  Washington finally had a set of 
guidelines for the administration of enemy prisoners. As an officer well-informed of the 
customs of war in Europe, none of these instructions would have been unfamiliar. But 
how could he apply them with little authority beyond his own army and even less ready 
capital?43 
 Washington's first suggestion was to move the prisoners farther from the seat of 
war.  In his opinion, Connecticut's exposed shores were too vulnerable to enemy raids.  
Britain's navy ruled the waves, and nothing was stopping Howe from sallying forth out of 
Boston and landing in striking distance of Hartford before Washington could mobilize 
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any sort of resistance.  The general submitted "to the Wisdom of Congress, whether, 
some convenient Inland Towns—remote from the Post Roads—ought not to be assign'd" 
for the reception of enemy prisoners.  General Schuyler agreed.  In a missive to the 
President of Congress, John Hancock, he wondered, "As the Ministry seem determined to 
carry on the war with spirit, would it not be advisable, as soon as there is good sledding, 
to remove all the prisoners from Connecticut to some of the interior Towns in 
Pennsylvania."  Such towns would be safe from British maritime incursions and likely 
better able to supply the prisoners than Connecticut or New York, both of which had the 
added responsibility of contributing provisions for the sustenance of the Continental army 
around Boston. 44  
 Realizing that the number of British prisoners was likely to increase, Washington 
also proposed that "a Commissary or Agent [be] appointed to see that justice is done both 
to [the prisoners] and to the publick."  He cautioned, "Without a mode of this sort is 
adopted, I fear there will be sad confusion hereafter."  Disorganization would lead only to 
graft and wastage in his opinion.  Well aware that European armies customarily 
established departments, or commissariats, to see to the provision, lodging, parole, and 
exchange of enemy prisoners, Washington impressed upon Congress the need for such a 
bureaucracy in the American army.  The general's entreaties went unanswered.  Congress 
was too preoccupied with the business of forming a government to systematically 
develop a prisoner-of-war policy.  Washington was on his own for the time being.45 
 Congress, however, did acquiesce to Washington's request to move the prisoners 
inland.  Facing mounting complaints from the Connecticut Assembly, Congress resolved 
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"that the prisoners taken at Chambly and St. John's, be sent to, and kept in, the towns of 
Reading, Lancaster, and York, in the colony of Pennsylvania."  These locations were both 
far enough from the primary theatre of operations in New England and close enough to 
each other that prisoners could be rotated relatively easily if any one community were 
overburdened and incapable of providing for the soldiers and their families.  Lancaster, 
with its large barracks complex built during the Seven Years' War, was an especially 
suitable location for prisoner detention.  All three communities also boasted thriving local 
economies and demonstrative zeal for the revolutionary effort.  Lancaster County alone 
provided eleven battalions to the war effort in the summer of 1775.  Surrounded by 
verdant farms, these communities would have no difficulty feeding the British prisoners.  
From the position of legislators in Philadelphia, the Pennsylvania interior appeared to be 
an ideal location to house the captured Britons while General Washington negotiated 
their exchange.46  
 Local officials were less certain. With most of the militarily-eligible men serving 
elsewhere, and a small but vocal loyalist community in their midst, the Committees of 
Safety of Lancaster, Reading, York, and Carlisle were unprepared to house and guard 
hundreds of ravenous, roughshod, and recalcitrant redcoats.  In the words of the 
Lancaster committee, "We are at a loss what kind of conduct to pursue."  Before the 
prisoners began their trek southward, John Hancock instructed the Continental 
Commissary General of Issues "to supply them agreeably to the Rations given to the 
Continental Army," but he made no provision for supplying the men once arrived.  The 
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force of prisoners approaching the colony of Pennsylvania was not inconsiderable.  The 
prisoners of the 7th Regiment included 242 officers and men as well as 60 women and 
children, while the 26th Regiment had 257 officers and soldiers and an additional 186 
women and children. Although the population of Lancaster at the time exceeded 3,000, 
the arrival of nearly 750 new mouths to feed and backs to clothe was not a welcome 
sight.  When the prisoners arrived in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania on their way to Lancaster 
in early December, the inhabitants "found much trouble to provide for and lodge them."47   
 Understandably, the Lancaster Committee of Safety was nonplussed to learn that 
the Continental officer commanding the prisoners, Egbert Dumont, had "no particular 
orders relative to them then than to conduct them to this place."  On behalf of Congress, 
the officer requested "the Committee to take such measures with respect to the said 
Prisoners as they may think most conducive to the Publick Service."  Dumont's advice 
was little comfort to the members of the committee who knew "of no person or persons 
here who are appointed to supply these people with Provisions." Much like the 
committees in Connecticut, the committees of safety in Lancaster, York, Reading, and 
Carlisle, were composed of civilians with little knowledge of military affairs.  They were 
utterly at a loss for what to do.  What was the customary subsistence for prisoners of war?  
Who would provide it?  The Reading Committee of Safety confessed that "they were 
much Surprised at so large a party [of prisoners] being ordered here, without any 
provision, notice, & without any person attending them to supply them with necessaries." 
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Beyond the simple necessity of feeding the men, the Lancaster committee wanted to 
know "whether it is expected [the prisoners] shall be kept constantly confined to the 
Barracks" and "whether the Officers…may be permitted to take private Lodgings in the 
Town."  If the men needed to be confined to the barracks, a guard would be necessary to 
secure them properly.  How would a guard be raised, who would pay their wages?  The 
committee wanted answers.48  
 With winter setting in, there was no time to wait for Congress's response. 
Fortuitously, Matthais Slough, a member of the committee and an innkeeper in Lancaster, 
volunteered "to furnish the necessary articles for the support of the prisoners" until 
Congress's orders on the matter could be known.  A similar temporary solution was hit 
upon by the committee in Reading.  Committeeman Henry Haller was asked "to provide 
Houses, Firewood & provisions for the party, who must have otherwise suffered much at 
this severe season."49   
 Throughout Pennsylvania, housing the prisoners proved difficult.  Unlike 
Reading, Lancaster was fortunate to possess a substantial barracks complex that was 
pressed into service to lodge the enlisted men. The accommodations were far too scanty 
for European officers so the Committee allowed the officers to take rooms "in a public 
House."  The barracks, however, were far from an ideal detention center for the common 
soldiers.  Built to house British and provincial troops not prisoners of war, the stone 
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edifices were not enclosed.  The committee members had no means of securing the 
prisoners unless funds could be acquired to fence in the barracks.  Emphasizing the 
tenuous situation to a subcommittee of Congress tasked with contracting for the 
prisoners' supply, the Lancaster Committee asserted: "The Peace of this Borough & good 
order of the Troops, we are firmly persuaded, would be much better preserved by such a 
Partition."  The only hope to prevent escape, or worse yet insurrection, was to ensure that 
the prisoners were entirely separated from the local populace.50  
 Given the lamentable condition of the common soldiers' clothing and quarters, 
keeping the pitiable prisoners away from locals inclined towards generosity was no small 
order.  To many members of the congregations and pious communities of central 
Pennsylvania, the prisoners appeared to be fitting subjects for Christian charity.  In 
Bethlehem, the Moravian community took pity on the "poor women & children" of the 
"Royal prisoners from Canada" by assisting them as best they could afford.  Having 
marched from Canada rather than traveled by sea, the common soldiers were in even 
greater need.  The men's uniforms were in utter disrepair, and they were almost entirely 
without winter clothing or heavy blankets.  The Lancaster Committee wrote Congress 
"that the Captive Soldiers here are in great Distress for want of Breeches, shoes & 
stockings…their other cloathing [sic] is bad."  The prisoners had endured a precipitous 
march of over five hundred miles without resupply.  The soles of their shoes and threads 
of their stockings would have worn thin. When confined at Trenton, New Jersey before 
being transferred to Pennsylvania, nineteen men of the 7th Regiment reported having lost 
eighteen pairs of breeches, 26 shirts, 30 pairs of shoes, and 33 pairs of stockings on the 
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march.  Because they left Canada before their 1776 issue clothing arrived from England, 
Major Stopford reported "there, is, likewise, a whole year's clothing lost."  Facing a 
Pennsylvania winter without resupply, the prisoners' fate looked bleak.  The Lancaster 
Committee reported to Congress that barracks only had "about 165 old Blankets, almost 
worn out."  Although they were able to scrounge "72 new ones" at the Public Expense, 
the committee assured Congress that "the whole serve as a scanty covering for the 
soldiers against the Rigours & Inclemency of the Season."  Apologizing for their 
"Importunity, and the Trouble we give you," the committee members pointed to the 
hardships of their "particular Situation."  Something had to be done, or the men and their 
families might not survive the winter.51 
 Pressed by committees of safety in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Connecticut 
for a standardized method to supply the prisoners, Congress looked to European 
precedent for guidance.  As Washington had earlier advised, European countries at war 
customarily established commissary officers and assistants to see to the provisioning and 
lodging of their captured enemies.  A statement of the expenses of their upkeep would 
then be presented to the enemy's commissary for reimbursement.  Very often, opposing 
armies would appoint contractors—usually successful merchants—to reside near 
detention sites in order to best victual the prisoners.  Much like the treatment of prisoners 
of war more broadly, this informal system was predicated upon the principal of 
reciprocity.  Shorting enemy prisoners of their allotted provisions and necessaries was not 
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only dishonorable, it was unwise.  Retaliation in kind would likely follow.  Armies 
insisted on fastidious record-keeping to guarantee equitability and prevent graft.  With no 
prospect of an exchange on the horizon, Congress resolved on December 1st to allow 
David Franks of Philadelphia "to supply the troops, who are prisoners in this Colony, 
with provisions and other necessaries, at the expence [sic] of the crown."  Franks had 
risen to prominence among Philadelphia merchants for his role in provisioning British 
and provincial troops during the Seven Years' War.  In light of his past experience 
working with British quartermaster officers, Franks was the logical choice.52   
 Washington was relieved to hear of Franks's appointment, noting "it will Save me 
much time & much trouble."  As commander in chief of the Continental forces, 
Washington was constantly petitioned by enemy prisoners with requests for indulgences, 
exchanges, and provisions.  Exasperated, he informed Hancock, "I am applied to and 
wearied by their repeated requests."  Without an established commissary of prisoners, 
however, all Washington could do was ask the various local committees overseeing 
prisoners to do their best to meet the prisoners' needs.  Franks's employment as agent 
contractor to the British prisoners was a step in the right direction, but one man could not 
superintend the growing numbers of prisoners in American hands.  The general once 
again strongly suggested that Congress adopt the European mode of appointing a 
commissary of prisoners.  This time Washington pointed out that such a commissary 
would reduce the expense of prisoner management by preventing "many exorbitant 
charges" and ensuring that greedy farmers or war profiteers did not take pecuniary 
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advantage of the prisoners' distressed situation.  Evincing a lack of foresight 
unremarkable for a collection of novices, Congress demurred.53 
 The British, on the other hand, were surprisingly cooperative.  Washington was 
not the only general who had received countless complaints and petitions for redress; 
Howe was equally perturbed by the prisoners.  The British general was under strict orders 
from Lord Germain not to "enter into any treaty or agreement with Rebels for a regular 
cartel for exchange of prisoners," but he was likewise requested "to procure the release of 
such of His Majesty's officers and loyal subjects as are in the disgraceful situation of 
being prisoners to the Rebels."  Provided he did not impugn "the King's dignity and 
honour" by invoking his name in communication with rebels, Howe was free to negotiate 
for the relief or release of British prisoners.  He acquiesced to Franks's appointment as 
contractor, and ordered his commissary-general of stores and provisions to issue 
instructions for the provisioning of the prisoners captured in Canada.  The arrival of 
British foodstuffs and other necessaries must have been a welcome sight in the 
Pennsylvania interior.54 
 Howe, however, did not make provision for the prisoners' families also in 
confinement.  His position surprised not only the American committees tasked with their 
care, but also the women and children who were customarily entitled to half-rations as 
civilians "on the strength" of their regiments.  In the eighteenth century, wherever the 
British army marched, women and children followed.  By 1775, soldiers' wives, known 
as camp followers, were an integral part of the British military machine, providing 
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essential support services and logistics.  In return for their labor as laundresses, 
seamstresses, sutlers, and nurses, these women and their children were entitled to join 
their husbands' messes and draw half-rations from the regiment.  Hardly the rowdy 
trollops of popular imagination, these women toiled side by side their uniformed 
husbands and were equally subject to martial law.  Quite rightly, they were appalled that 
Franks refused to feed them.  According to the Lancaster committee, Franks gave 
"express orders not to deliver out any allowance of meat or Bread to the soldiers['] wives 
or children for the future."  Franks's contract with the British quartermaster stipulated that 
he supply the prisoners of the 7th, and 26th regiments, as well those prisoners of the 
Royal Highland Emigrants and the Royal Artillery.  Strictly interpreting his orders, lest 
he should be stuck with a bill that the British government refused to reimburse, Franks 
denied the women's request for provisions.55  
 The Pennsylvania committees now had over two hundred women and children in 
custody entirely dependent upon their captors for sustenance.  In a letter to Congress 
justifying their decision to supply the soldiers' families "at the Expense of this country," 
the Lancaster committee invoked the European principle of humanity in warfare. "Being 
mindful that Humanity ought ever to distinguish the Sons of America & that Cruelty 
should find no admission amongst a free People, we could not avoid considering the 
situation of the Women & Children as pitiable indeed."  Positioning themselves as 
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humane, in stark contrast to the cruelty of British indifference, the Lancaster committee 
reaffirmed their commitment to conducting war with moderation and humanity.56  
 Their conduct met with the approbation of both Congress and the captured 
British officers.  The prisoners praised the committee's "humanity" for assisting the 
distressed women and children as well as "other civilities."  John Hancock fully approved 
"of those humane sentiments which induced [the committee] to provide for [the women 
and children] in their distress" and promised reimbursement.  Reiterating Congress's 
position on the treatment of prisoners of war, Hancock praised the committee for 
rendering "the situation of our prisoners as comfortable as possible…As men, they have a 
claim to all the rights of humanity; as countrymen, though enemies, they claim something 
more."  The rights of humanity, in Hancock's opinion, protected any "civilized" soldier 
from the cruelties of unrestrained warfare, but these prisoners were not French, Spanish, 
or Dutch, they were brother Englishmen.  Hancock was adamant that the revolutionaries 
should go out of their way to perform the customs of "civilized" warfare in order to 
prevent the conflict from devolving into the barbarism of civil war.  As long as the 
revolutionaries stridently maintained the appearance of legitimacy, the British would 
eventually see the justice of their grievances and a peaceful settlement would be within 
reach.  In Hancock's opinion, this required a rigorous attention to the customs of war.57 
 Many of the captive British officers, however, sought to exploit Congress's 
inexperience at war to their advantage.  Hoping to catch the civilian legislators unaware 
of the finer points of military capitulations, they asserted that the Pennsylvania 
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committees had violated the terms of surrender for Chambly, St. John's, and Montréal by 
billeting them away from their enlisted men. The Lancaster Committee reported to 
Congress that the officers "complain greatly of a Separation from their Soldiers as Breach 
of Genl. Schuyler's solemn Engagement."  As justification for their remonstrance, the 
officers argued that they had to remain in close proximity to their soldiers in order to 
superintend the distribution of clothing and salary.  They claimed that "Justice cannot be 
done to the Privates…unless the officers are upon the spot."  Lancaster, however, lacked 
suitable accommodations for all of the officers.  In order to ease the burden on the city's 
inhabitants, Congress resolved "That the officers be distributed in such places as are most 
agreeable to themselves…officers and privates be not stationed in the same places."58   
 This resolution was hardly agreeable to the officers, but not simply because of the 
reasons they outlined.  Ever since the prisoners had arrived in Pennsylvania, Continental 
army recruiters had covetously eyed the expertly drilled and disciplined redcoats.  Not at 
a loss for recruits that winter—Pennsylvania like her sister colonies was in the throes of 
what Charles Royster has called a rage militiare—the Continental army was in dire need 
of experienced non-commissioned officers who could transform farmers, apprentices, and 
shopkeepers into disciplined regulars.  Colonel Arthur Sinclair of the Continental army 
admitted to John Hancock that one of his officers had enlisted a Sergeant and a Drummer 
belonging to the 26th Regiment.  He explained that "It is rather my sentiment that the 
inlisting [sic] the prisoners is improper; but as we were much in want of sergeants and 
drums" the men were allowed to join the Continentals.  The officers of the 26th were 
furious.  They feared that if they were removed from their men, American recruiters 
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would abscond with their entire regiment.  Claiming that the articles of capitulation had 
been violated, the officers of both the 7th and the 26th regiments refused to sign their 
paroles.  By asserting that the Americans had violated the articles, the officers hoped to 
bully Congress into obtaining quarters for them close to their men in the comparatively 
more cosmopolitan Lancaster.59   
 Amateurs though they were, the American legislators were in the right.  Only the 
terms for the capitulation of Chambly included an article that stipulated that "The men 
not to be decoyed from their Regiment."  The soldiers of the 7th Regiment who 
surrendered with Major Stopford were thus off limits to American recruiters, but the men 
of the 26th and those soldiers of the Royal Artillery, Royal Highland Emigrants, and 
members of the 7th captured with General Prescott were all fair game.  None of the 
articles of capitulation for Chambly, St. John's, or Montréal guaranteed that the officers 
would remain with their men.  Perhaps unbeknownst to him, St. Clair had wisely 
recruited only members of the 26th regiment captured at St. John's.  Recruiting enemy 
prisoners was a commonplace practice in European warfare, and unless specifically 
forbidden in the articles of capitulation was condoned and expected.  Enlisting prisoners 
obviated the need to confine and subsist non-productive soldiers, swelled the ranks of 
one's army with trained and disciplined troops, and denied the enemy that manpower.  
Over one-fifth of the French and Bavarian prisoners captured at Blenheim in 1704 joined 
the British and allied forces in the aftermath of the battle.  Similarly, in 1756, Frederick 
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the Great recruited 18,000 Saxon troops into his army upon their defeat.  Knowing that 
their arguments were not based in European precedent, the British officers hoped that 
Congress would defer to their superior knowledge and experience in military affairs.60   
 Congress was not intimidated.  President Hancock informed the Lancaster 
committee that the officers' "complaint, that a separation from the soldiers is a breach of 
General Schuyler's solemn engagement, we apprehend not to be well-rounded."  While he 
agreed with the officers that "All stipulations of a capitulation ought, undoubtedly, to be 
held sacred, and faithfully fulfilled…no such stipulation is found in the capitulations 
upon which those gentlemen surrendered."  Had their complaints been legitimate, 
Congress would eagerly have complied with their requests, but the revolutionaries would 
not be browbeaten.  As in any "civilized" conflict, the articles of capitulation would be 
enforced.  Nevertheless, Hancock placated the prisoners by permitting "two or more of 
the officers to come, at proper times, from their places of residence to Lancaster, for the 
purpose of settling with, and paying, their soldiers."  Congress would hear of no further 
challenge to its authority.  If the officers did not want to submit to the terms of their 
parole, Congress "shall be extremely sorry to be reduced to the necessity of confining 
them in prison."  Predictably, the officers backed down.61   
 Cowed but not appeased, the officers remained dissatisfied. With few diversions 
other than food, drink, or amorous companionship, they quickly exhausted their ready 
cash in the pursuit of pleasure and began accruing ruinous debts.  Initially Congress 
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promised to reimburse the innkeepers and tavern owners for the officers' expenses, but 
the prisoners' "exceedingly extravagant" lifestyle quickly became untenable.  Shocked by 
the mounting bills, Congress resolved to allot the men two dollars per week to defray the 
costs of their room and board, on the condition that the sum was repaid upon their 
release.  Blaming the Americans for their financial woes, the officers complained that 
because they were quartered in taverns on their march to Pennsylvania, they were "under 
the necessity of living in a more expensive manner than they otherwise would have 
done."  Although they appreciated Congress's gesture, two dollars a week was "so 
inadequate to the manner which they, as gentlemen and British officers, have been 
accustomed to live in."62  
 Even in captivity, European officers were expected to maintain the trappings of 
gentility.  The prisoners entertained generously and frequently, each trying to outdo the 
other.  Such lavish lifestyles were unsustainable for many.  The more impecunious 
officers lived in fear "of being turned out of doors" by their creditors.  Although they 
agreed to draw bills of exchange in the hope that the British government would cover 
their expenses, they were not sanguine.  The Lancaster committee took pity on the 
poverty-stricken officers and induced "some of the inhabitants to afford them private 
lodgings…where they lodged and breakfasted."  Justifying their actions to Congress, the 
committee invoked the prisoners' status as fellow gentlemen: "To gentlemen in that 
delicate situation, though enemies, we could not avoid rendering every service in our 
power…We could not be idle spectators of the distresses these gentlemen were reduced 
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to."  Congress was unmoved.  The allotment was generous; the officers could "refuse it or 
add to it on their own account, as they please."63  
 Disgruntled, haughty, and expensive, the officers soon wore out their welcome.  
When British officers quartered in Connecticut outwardly celebrated an American defeat 
in late December, a crowd of townspeople gathered with the intention of punishing the 
officers who had "come there to make merry and rejoice at their Misfortune."  As the 
crowd grew more agitated, the officers, including the ever-aggrieved Major French, 
feared for the lives.  Thankfully, the officers' landlady was able to reason with the crowd, 
convincing them to disperse, "happily without blood Shed."  Later that winter, however, 
these officers and several townsmen exchanged "some Blows" because they refused to 
abandon their riotous singing and cavorting.  Fortunately, several American officers 
interceded and prevented the brawl from escalating.64   
Captured British officers were no more popular in Pennsylvania than they were in 
Connecticut.  Captain W. Home of the 7th regiment remembered that he was "frequently 
insulted" during the ten months of his confinement in Reading.  Upon being moved to 
Lebanon, he was "not only insulted but threatened."  When the officer complained of the 
illiberal usage he received from the townspeople, a member of the local committee 
apologized but admitted that he "durst not interfere, least he himself should be treated in 
the same manner."  Many Americans were unimpressed by the revolutionary leadership's 
vision of war.  Instead of seeing gentlemen officers who deserved to be accorded respect, 
                                                
 63 The Lancaster Committee of Safety to Hancock.  Lancaster, PA. April 11th, 1776. Force, 
American Archives, 4th series, 5:848; Officers of the 7th, 26th, and Royal Highland Emigrant regiments to 
John Hancock. Lancaster, PA. January 20th, 1776. Force, American Archives, 4th series, 4:801. See also 
Laura Becker, "Prisoners of War in the American Revolution: A Community Perspective," Military Affairs, 
vol. 46, no. 4 (Dec., 1982), 168-173 and the journal of Christopher French. Manuscript Division. CHS. 
64 The Journal of Christopher French, CHS. 
 128 
politeness, and deference during their captivity, they saw tangible evidence of British 
tyranny and corruption.  The longer the prisoners lingered in captivity, the greater the 
tensions grew.65 
 Although vexing, the officers posed little actual threat to the revolutionary effort 
or to the communities that housed them; the common soldiers, on the other hand, were 
dangerous.  Confined to their quarters, unable to work or drill, the idle soldiers were 
"active, restless, and uneasy" in the estimation of one Lancaster resident.  Were they to 
band together, even unarmed, the enlisted prisoners might easily overwhelm the county's 
meager collection of soldiers.  By early January 1776, the Lancaster Committee found it 
"absolutely impossible to preserve the Peace & good Order of this Borough" without the 
assistance of Congress in the form of more specific regulations for their management and 
security.  Lacking congressional instructions and fearing insurrection, they appointed "a 
Serjeant & 12 Privates to mount Guard at the public Magazine every Evening" to prevent 
powder and arms from falling into the hands of the prisoners.  The watchmen were 
instructed to patrol "the Street every two Hours in the Night to prevent Disorders."  
Despite their precautions, "disturbances" between the British prisoners and local civilians 
could not be avoided.  Congress had no troops or funds to spare for the Pennsylvania 
committees.  The best they could do was to authorize the committees to confine unruly 
prisoners in "in cases of gross misbehavior."66   
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 Without a stockade to enclose the barracks or well-armed guards, Congress's 
resolve lacked teeth.  The situation in Reading was even more serious because the town 
was devoid of suitable barracks; the prisoners were lodged in private homes.  Inhabitants 
of the town implored the Pennsylvania Assembly to remove their burden by constructing 
secure barracks.  They feared that "from the idleness of the said Prisoners' manner of 
living, they will probably become disorderly."  In a similar vein, the Pennsylvania 
Committee of Safety worried that "the kind Treatment given them [the prisoners] meets 
with a very improper & indecent Return."  The prisoners "often express themselves in 
most disrespectful & offensive Terms and openly threaten Revenge whenever 
opportunity shall present."  Drawing on both European precedent and the experience of 
the British prisoners during their captivity in Connecticut, the Pennsylvania committee 
suggested that the prisoners be "dispersed among the Farmers, in the Country where their 
opportunities of doing Mischief will less correspond with their inclinations." Spread out 
through the countryside and industriously engaged, the prisoners would be both 
neutralized as a threat and as a drain on Continental coffers. Congress concurred.67 
 Many of its constituents, however, balked at the liberal conditions of the Britons' 
confinement.  As lurid accounts of Ethan Allen's treatment at Carleton's hands circulated 
through the colonies, popular outrage began to focus on British prisoners.  Here were 
ready targets for retaliation, yet revolutionary American military and civilian authorities 
appeared unable to back up their threats with action.  Exasperated by Congress's torpor, 
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Governor Trumbull entreated General Schuyler: "They have carried off the unhappy 
prisoners, it is said, in irons. Is it not time to retaliate?"68   
 By December 1775, George Washington was inclined to agree with Trumbull.  
He warned General Howe "that whatever Treatment Colonel Allen receives—whatever 
fate he undergoes—such exactly shall be the treatment & Fate of Brigadier Prescot [sic], 
now in our hands."  Nevertheless, the American general had great respect for his British 
counterpart.  Howe's politics were known to lean decidedly whiggish, and his courage in 
combat at the siege of Louisbourg and the Plains of Abraham during the French and 
Indian War was the stuff of legend.  Appealing to Howe as "a man of Honour, Gentleman 
& Soldier," Washington was confident that Howe would relieve the prisoners who 
Carleton had "treated without regard to decency, humanity, or the rules of War."  If Howe 
ignored his pleas, Washington reiterated his intention to invoke "The Law of retaliation," 
which was "not only justifiable in the Eyes of God & man, but absolutely a duty which in 
our present circumstances we owe to our Relations Friends & fellow Citizens."  In the 
past, the British had ignored Washington's threats, which in turn had proved empty.69 
 With the tide of public opinion turning against the British prisoners, and ordinary 
revolutionaries demanding justice for Allen's torments, Congress reassured its 
constituents that "whenever retaliation may be necessary, or tend to their security, this 
Congress will undertake the disagreeable task."  Congress, however, cautioned "the 
inhabitants of these Colonies" from confusing retaliation with vengeance.  The law of 
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retaliation might justifiably be invoked to ease the sufferings of their captured comrades, 
but Americans must continue to be "mindful that humanity ought to distinguish the brave; 
that cruelty should find no admission among a free people."  The revolutionaries had 
entered the conflict under the assumption "that our enemy was brave and civilized" and 
thus would agree that "an enemy is an object of vengeance in arms and in the field only."  
But the previous year of escalating conflict had proven that British "enormities" in their 
conduct of the war were a reflection of that kingdom's "execrable barbarity."   Rather 
than stoop to their level, the revolutionaries must "take care that no page in the annals of 
America be stained by a recital of any action which justice or Christianity may condemn."  
Ever concerned with the opinion of posterity, and the still present possibility of 
reconciliation with Britain, the revolutionary leaders continued to insist upon justice and 
humanity toward enemy prisoners.  They hoped that the American conduct of the war 
would resound through the ages, proclaiming the righteousness of their cause.70  
 From his English prison cell in Pendennis castle awaiting the vengeance of the 
British crown, Ethan Allen must have been little concerned with the judgment of 
posterity.  Curious visitors to the prison were all of the opinion that he would soon be 
hanged.  Although his jail keeper "was very generous," he "was treated as a 
criminal…and continued in irons, together with those taken with me."  He wanted 
Congress to embrace retaliation on British prisoners, "not according to the smallness of 
my character in America, but in proportion to the importance of the cause for which I 
suffered."  Fortunately for Allen, because he was considered a criminal rather than a 
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prisoner of war, he was subject not only to the penalties of English civil law but also to 
the protections.  Several members of Parliament, inclined to the American cause, 
obtained a writ of habeas corpus demanding formal charges be levied against him.  
Uninterested in the expense, time, and negative publicity, of trying every American rebel 
who fell into their hands, the British ministry shipped Allen back across the Atlantic 
beyond the grasp of sympathetic lawyers.71   
 Allen's fortuitous escape from the hangman's noose did little to conciliate those 
revolutionaries who called for retribution.  If British prisoners were not brought to 
account for the transgressions of their government, what would prevent the British from 
continually violating the customs of war?  A petitioner to Congress, writing under the apt 
pseudonym "Justice," begged Congress to "retaliate for the barbarous injuries which any 
of your officers or men (who fell into the hands of the enemy) might receive in the 
present war."  Pointing to Allen's treatment by General Prescott, the petitioner suggested 
Congress "make retaliation on Prescot [sic] and others, that those Americans in their 
hands may be treated better by them."  Such a just retaliation would serve as "evidence 
that the American Congress holds faith with their people."  A columnist for the Essex 
Gazette enunciated the prevailing opinion among the radical revolutionaries:  
 
"How different the situation of ALLEN and Prescott;—the First, taken fighting 
for Life, Liberty and Property, is treated as a villain; while the other, taken 
fighting to support the cruel edicts of a tyrannical ministry, whose aim is to rob 
and enslave, is lodged at a first rate tavern in this city, and fed with the best the 
markets afford.—Oh! George! who is the savage?—After this, can any man 
blame the Americans should they retaliate? 
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Facing mounting pressure for decisive action, Congress had little choice but to 
investigate the charges of General Prescott's complicity in Allen's treatment.72 
 After a thorough inquiry by a committee tasked with discovering Prescott's 
involvement in the circumstances of Allen's captivity, Congress concluded that Prescott 
was guilty of "great Malevolence and bad Behavior to our People."  After a vote of eight 
colonies to two, Congress ordered him securely confined in the Philadelphia jail.  
Prescott's treatment of Allen and other prisoners violated the revolutionaries' conception 
of the legitimate practice of warfare.  The violence he employed against the Americans 
was unjustified cruelty that warranted punishment.  On January 29th, the British general 
was turned over to the custody of the keeper of Philadelphia's new jail.  With evident 
glee, a Philadelphia newspaper reported Prescott's removal "from his apartments in the 
city tavern" to the stark surroundings of the jail house.73 
 On the surface, Congress's resolve appeared to be just the sort of retaliation the 
hardliners called for; but in reality, Prescott's confinement was hardly stringent.  
Congress granted him "the attendance of his servant, and in case his health requires it, 
that he be allowed the attendance of a physician."  Although he was denied freedom of 
the jail yard, Prescott was permitted "to receive Visits from his Bror. Officers and to have 
Pen Ink and Paper."  On February 5th, after seven nights in confinement, Congress 
ordered Prescott removed "from the jail of this city to some private lodgings" on account 
of a recommendation from his surgeon that the jail was not conducive to his health.  
Congress "indulged" Prescott with the "Liberty to take Lodgings in the City Tavern" 
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among the company of several of his officers.  Upon recovering his health, Congress 
ordered Prescott to the Pennsylvania interior along with the rest of the Canadian 
prisoners.  The legislators had evidently lost their taste for retaliation; if they had ever 
had the stomach for it in the first place.74 
 Despite numerous allegations that Prescott had mistreated American prisoners, 
the British officer continued to enjoy a lenient captivity.  One of his former captives, 
Thomas Walker, journeyed to Philadelphia from Montréal for the express purpose of 
obtaining "some satisfaction for such inhuman violence" on Prescott's part.  Walker 
hoped to see Prescott pay for the "indiginity and sufferings" he had caused.  Instead of 
finding Prescott confined in irons in a dank cell, he witnessed "Mr. Prescott lodged in the 
best tavern of the place, walking or riding at large through Philadelphia and Bucks 
Counties…feasting with gentlemen of the first rank in the Province."  Congress offered 
Walker no redress. Prescott and several other officers rented a house in Berks County 
where they were allowed to stay despite orders to remove the British officers to Carlisle.  
The Lancaster committee did not want "to put them to any unnecessary hardship."75 
 Unsatisfied with the haphazard and generous treatment of British prisoners, many 
Americans pressed Congress for a formal policy that reflected British outrages.  They 
must have been displeased with Congress's response. On May 21st, 1776, Congress 
officially codified the practices of the Connecticut and Pennsylvania committees by 
establishing a formal set of regulations for the administration of enemy prisoners.  These 
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regulations, which were based on their knowledge of "the Custom in England and 
France" for the treatment of prisoners, would remain officially in force for the remainder 
of the conflict.  All captured enemy soldiers were "to be treated as prisoners-of-war, but 
with humanity."  While in captivity, common soldiers would be "allowed the same 
rations as the troops in the service of the United Colonies" and "permitted to exercise 
their trades, and to labour, in order to support themselves and families."  Officers, as 
gentlemen and men of honor, were entitled to "be put on their parole" and to draw two 
dollars a week for their subsistence and lodging.  In addition to the congressional loan, 
they were permitted to sell their bills of exchange so that they might live as comfortably 
as their credit would allow. Not keen to be stuck with a bill for the prisoners' support, 
Congress officially placed the responsibility for provisioning the soldiers on British 
contractor David Franks.  In the event of his refusal to comply, Congress made provision 
to supply both the men and "the women and children belonging to the prisoners" with 
"subsistence…and other things absolutely necessary for their support."  Surprisingly, 
Congress stipulated that "no prisoners be inlisted [sic] in the Continental Army."  Either 
out of deference to the articles of capitulation for Chambly or from the realization that 
British prisoners were more likely to abscond with their bounty money than face the very 
real chance of execution if they ever fell into their countrymen's custody, Congress 
officially forbade the army from indulging in the customary European practice of 
enlisting prisoners.76  
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 Perhaps most importantly, Congress empowered local authorities, in the form of 
assemblies, conventions, committees, or councils, to "remove such prisoners from place 
to place, within the same Colonies, as often as…it shall seem proper."  Here Congress 
diverged from customary European practice again.  Because the revolutionaries were 
ideologically constrained from establishing a centralized government with the power to 
raise revenue through taxation, Congress was forced to rely on individual colonies to 
supervise the prisoners.  Had the colonies been able to fund a highly developed military 
bureaucracy, such as Britain's War Office, they might have established permanent 
prisoner-of-war dentition facilities far from the seat of conflict.   As it was, Congress had 
to depend on the generosity and loyalty of small communities to support the prisoners.  
Given this reliance, Congress had little choice but to allow the individual colonies 
autonomy over the location of the prisoners' confinement.  If the prisoners became too 
burdensome on the people of Lancaster for instance, Pennsylvania could remove them to 
Carlisle or York provided they paid attention to the "former Resolutions of Congress 
concerning Prisoners" that guaranteed their humane and uniform treatment. This 
provision, though unavoidable in Congress's position, opened the door to infraction, 
neglect, and maltreatment.  Although Congress appointed a commissary for each of the 
three military departments "to superintend and take the Direction and supplying of such 
Prisoners…as nearly conformable as the Circumstances of this Country will admit of, to 
the custom of other civilized Nations," with the prisoners' management in the hands of 
the individual colonies, Congress was powerless to prevent local conditions from 
trumping national policy.  As the war progressed, these shortcomings had a profoundly 
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deleterious effect on the treatment of enemy prisoners.  The dictates of humanity did not 
always accord with individual liberty.77 
 
"A disgraceful capitulation": The Ordeal at the Cedars and the Failure of the 
Fourteenth Colony 
 
 Unlike the British prisoners who enjoyed warm bunks in the barracks, taverns, 
and dwelling houses of central Pennsylvania, the American northern army passed the 
winter of 1775-1776 in the ardent, and often futile, pursuit of survival.  After the initial 
victories over the British positions at Chambly, St. John's, and Montréal, the American 
juggernaut stalled in front of the gates of Québec.  In early December, Montgomery's 
army joined forces with the smaller force under Benedict Arnold that had advanced up 
the Kennebec and Chaudière rivers to descend on Québec from the east.  Carleton's 
position looked desperate.  Without reinforcements from England, his trifling force of 
remaining regulars and Canadian militia would soon share the fate of Montréal.  
Montgomery, however, was less confident.  Arnold's force had suffered severe losses on 
the trek northward, and many of his own soldiers' enlistments would expire at the end of 
the year.  Fearing the arrival of British troops in the spring and the disintegration of their 
own army, Montgomery and Arnold launched an abortive assault on the city on the snow-
covered evening of December 31st.  Before morning, Montgomery lay dead, Arnold was 
severely wounded, and over 400 American soldiers were killed or captured.  The 
remaining American troops fled to their encampments in disarray.  Stubborn to the point 
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of obstinacy, Arnold refused to abandon the quest for Canada.  The American forces 
continued a half-hearted and ineffectual siege of the city throughout the winter.78 
 While recovering from his wound, Arnold was gravely concerned about the fate 
of his captured men in Québec.  He had earlier attempted to establish formal 
communication with the Québec garrison to negotiate the exchange of prisoners of war.  
In mid-November, Arnold sent an officer to treat with Lieutenant-Governor Hector de 
Cramahé on the issue.  Assuming that his envoy would be protected by a flag of truce, 
Arnold dispatched the officer to the city's gates, according to European custom, with a 
drummer beating the parlay.  Cramahé scoffed at the rebels' show of martial etiquette and 
ordered his men to fire on the party who only "narrowly escaped being killed."  
Fulminating, Arnold declared Cramahé's actions "Contrary to humanity and the laws of 
nations" and demanded to know if his prisoners were being held in "irons."  He reminded 
the lieutenant-governor that he had several British prisoners, "who now feed at my own 
table," and threatened that they "will be treated in the same manner, in future, as you treat 
mine."  According to the laws of war in Europe, proportional retaliation was not only 
sanctioned but also required in such instances.  To Cramahé, Arnold and his men were 
rebels; negotiating with them would have legitimated that rebellion. There would be no 
further discussion.79 
 In the aftermath of the December 31st assault, Arnold could ill-afford to be so 
bold.  When the smoke of battle cleared, Carleton possessed "The Flower of the rebel 
army" in his custody.  How would the governor treat these men?  Would they be confined 
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in irons and shipped to England to suffer the judgment of British justice?  Perhaps 
remembering Montgomery and Arnold's former threats of retaliation, or moved by the 
sight of the poorly clothed, malnourished, and exhausted prisoners, the governor confined 
the men in the relative luxury of the capital's seminary.  The officers were quartered 
separately in the upper floor of the building, and the enlisted men were confined in the 
monastery.  Although "securely lodged," the men were well supplied by local merchants 
with bread, cheese, and even porter.  According to one prisoner, wounded Americans 
were placed under the care of British surgeons.  As he phrased it: "To the great honor of 
general Carleton, they were all, whether friends or enemies, treated with like attention 
and humanity."  Carleton even ordered those Americans who did not survive the assault 
to be buried with the honors of war.  General Montgomery, as befitting the commander of 
an opposing army and a former British officer, was interred in an elaborate ceremony 
following a formal procession through the city.  The soldiers of the 7th regiment, wearing 
black mourning bands on their arms, accompanied his casket adorned with crossed 
swords in solemn silence, their muskets reversed.  An American prisoner remembered 
shedding "tears of thankfulness, towards general Carleton" for his show of respect.  
Despite his continued insistence "that no message, nor shou'd any letters be receiv'd thro 
the Channel of the Rebels," Carleton did allow Arnold to send in five sleighs "loaden 
with baggage," winter clothing, personal effects, and "a little money for the Prisoners."  
Upon hearing of Montgomery's defeat, John Hancock took solace in the knowledge that 
"the prisoners are treated with humanity."80 
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 Notwithstanding Carleton's apparent kindness to the prisoners, their fate remained 
uncertain.  After all, he might have been preserving them for the gallows.  An American 
prisoner remembered that soon after their capture a Scottish officer informed them that 
the officers "may be sent to England, and there be tried for treason" because they were 
"in rebellion."  The Americans were well aware that Ethan Allen had been sent to 
England, and they were consumed by "doubt and uncertainty."  Fearing prosecution, 
ninety-four American prisoners enlisted in the loyalist regiment the Royal Highland 
Emigrants in return for exoneration.  Some of Carleton's officers were skeptical of the 
prisoners' change of heart.  Captain Thomas Ainslie reported that "Many wages were laid 
that the greatest part of them will take the very first opportunity to desert."  Their 
prognostications proved valid; desertions were incessant.81   
 Those unconvinced by British promises, and unable to desert, continued in their 
benevolent confinement until the evening of March 31st when British guards uncovered 
their plot to escape from the barracks.  Captain Ainslie reported that the enlisted prisoners 
had concocted "a plan to join their friends without the walls" by surprising the guards, 
seizing their arms, and opening the gates to Arnold's forces.  Carleton's kindness was 
betrayed; he would not make that mistake again. As Ainslie recorded, "The greatest part 
of those concern'd in this plot were put in irons; many of them behav'd very insolently on 
this occasion."  Although some of the prisoners surreptitiously removed their fetters, 
others spent the remainder of the winter chained to the floor "attached to a monstrous bar, 
the weight of which was above their strength to carry" in the "frigid weather."  Several 
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Americans officers, unbound by a parole of honor, plotted their own jailbreak in April.  
When discovered, Carleton ordered the men confined, as Allen had been, in the dank 
hold of a British warship.  Scurvy and "a violent diarhoea" soon appeared among the 
prisoners afloat and ashore.  Far from the leniency of their initial confinement, "wailings, 
groanings [sic] and death" characterized the experience of the prisoners after their escape 
attempts.82 
 Carleton's change of heart did not go unnoticed in the American camp, but Arnold 
had neither the time nor the means to effect the relief of the prisoners.  As the Canadian 
snows faded and the frozen Saint Lawrence thawed, both Carleton and the Americans 
awaited the inevitable: the arrival of British reinforcements.  On May 7th, American 
hopes were dashed when two ships were spotted approaching the city creating a "great 
joy in town."  With no prospect of capturing the reinforced garrison, the American forces 
began "their disorderly retreat."  Seeing that his prisoners posed little threat to the 
security of the city with the American army on the run, Carleton ordered their chains 
removed.  Nonetheless, one American officer reported that "we have been worse used 
since our people removed, than formerly…our situation [is] truly miserable."83 Although 
the American situation looked bleak, Arnold and the northern army still occupied 
Montréal.  If they could hold the city and its environs until reinforcements arrived, the 
quest for Canada might survive another season.  
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 The success of the American campaign now hinged on the actions, or inactions, of 
Canada's Indian groups.  The American forces had initially hoped for a profitable alliance 
with the native population of Canada, but the prospect of such an alliance was greatly 
hindered by the American decision to interdict the lucrative fur trade between the Saint 
Lawrence River valley and the Great Lakes.  American officials feared that the trade 
might support western British garrisons such as Detroit.  This policy alienated both 
Indians and French Canadian merchants alike.  Although Congress dispatched a 
delegation to appease the Canadian native and French populations, their arrival was too 
little, too late.  Only the Caughnawagas resisted the British call to arms.  In order to 
defend against Indian incursions from the west, the revolutionaries established a fortified 
stockade forty miles upriver from Montréal at a strategic point commanding the Saint 
Lawrence known as the Cedars (Les Cèdres).  By April 26th, Colonel Timothy Bedel 
with 400 troops and two pieces of field artillery occupied the site and began constructing 
the fort.  Arnold described the post as "well entrenched."  Montréal's western flank 
appeared secure. 84  
 British officials, however, knew the American position to be tenuous.  Short on 
supplies, reduced by death, disease, and desertion, and disheartened by the failure to 
capture Québec, the northern army was a shadow of its former force.  Recent 
reinforcements were poorly trained, and in the opinion of Zephaniah Shepardson, a 
private soldier at the Cedars, they were "not very well disciplined, being young in the 
military art."  Even General Arnold admitted that his men were "Raw Troops, badly 
cloathed and fed, & worse paid, & without Dicipline [sic]."  Their officers were not much 
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better.  Shepardson referred to his commanders as "ignorant of the art and policy of war."  
Colonel Bedel himself seemed to personify Shepardson's portrayal.  Uninterested in 
garrisoning a frontier outpost, he ventured into the countryside to recruit native allies, 
turning over responsibilities to his second-in-command, Major Isaac Butterfield.85 
 As the garrison idled, the British descended on their position.  A force of 36 
British regulars and 160 native warriors under the command of Captain George Forster 
surprised the post on May 18th.  Rather than assault Butterfield's entrenched artillery, 
Forster demanded the Americans' surrender.  He threatened Butterfield that if he did not 
surrender, "the savages could not be restrained."  Fearing a massacre, Butterfield 
capitulated after a perfunctory exchange of fire. In the opinion of one of the American 
prisoners confined in Québec, the paltry defense of the Cedars ensured "their eternal 
disgrace."  To Maryland Congressman John Carroll, Butterfield's surrender was "a 
disgraceful capitulation."86 
 Under the articles of the capitulation, the Americans were required to turn over 
their foodstuffs, powder, cannon, and small arms, but Captain Forster promised them 
their "lives and the clothes which you have on."  With the ceremony of surrender 
complete, Forster's native allies proceeded to strip the garrison of their knapsacks, 
watches, money, hats, and other personal effects.  Forster could do nothing to restrain his 
allies lest they decide to massacre the prisoners or turn on his own men.  Undoubtedly 
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against his will, Forster nonetheless violated the articles of capitulation much as 
Montcalm had twenty years earlier.  To their horror, the Americans realized that 
European customs of war were not easily upheld in the wilds of Canada.87 
 An American column under the command of Major Henry Sherburne sent to 
relieve Butterfield met a similar fate on May 20th.  Unlike Butterfield, Sherburne's 140 
men put up a staunch resistance, but when surrounded by Forster's warriors, the 
Americans agreed to lay down their arms.  As at the Cedars, but to a greater degree, the 
native warriors divested the Americans of the majority of their effects.  The wounded 
were not so fortunate.  Sherburne recalled that as soon as the guns fell silent, several 
warriors began "tomahawking and scalping my wounded men, some of whom were 
butchered in my presence."  Sherburne was immediately seized by a warrior who was on 
the point of scalping the American when a Canadian officer interceded.  According to the 
Canadian officer, the native warrior proposed sharing Sherburne's remains; the officer 
could have the American's body, the warrior only desired his scalp.  Well aware of the 
potential for retaliation, the Canadian forcibly interceded on Shelburne's behalf.  He later 
recalled that he grabbed the warrior by the neck and lectured him: "You Dog, you want to 
kill a man who could be the cause of the death of four of our own prisoners—on the 
contrary, we will exchange these prisoners so that we might see our friends again." The 
officer placated the warrior by allowing him to strip the major of his finery.  Devoid of 
his shirt and breeches, Sherburne must have been a pitiful sight. The Canadian officer 
                                                
 87 Parke, An Authentic Narrative, 25, 26. 
 145 
covered him with his cloak and succeeded in conveying the majority of the American 
prisoners back to the Cedars alive, if humiliated.88 
 As far as Captain Forster was concerned, Sherburne and his men had no cause for 
complaint.  They had surrendered to "savages" commanded by Canadians not British 
regulars, and they had done so "without any stipulation" for their treatment.  One of 
Forster's officers excused the abuse of Sherburne's command by pointing to the natives' 
culture of war: "savages ever deem their prisoners as the private property of those who 
take them, and have generally, in former wars, sacrificed their prisoners to the manes of 
their deceased friends."  In the officer's opinion, this practice, known to historians as 
"mourning war," was not to be condoned, but it was also impossible to avoid.  Forster 
could not impose his vision of war on the "savages," who "had been very unruly;" 
nevertheless he tirelessly cajoled, bribed, begged, and implored the warriors to spare the 
prisoners' lives.  Despite his best efforts, several Americans were hurried away into the 
Canadian interior to face certain torture followed by death or adoption.  His men were 
equally unable to prevent the warriors from entering the barracks and pillaging "the 
prisoners indiscriminately."  For hungry men in tattered uniforms, the pillaging must 
have been particularly burdensome.  In Sherburne's opinion, "The barbarity with which 
we were treated by the savages, together with our sufferings for want of provisions and 
clothes, is beyond anything which can be imagined or described."89 
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 Although pleased with his victories, Captain Forster was anxious to divest himself 
of his prisoners and return westward before American reinforcements could arrive.  He 
now possessed more than 500 American captives with only a handful of regulars to guard 
them.  Supplying the prisoners with anything resembling adequate provisions or shelter 
was out of the question.  The British marched the men to the village of Quinze Chênes 
where they were billeted in the open.  One prisoner remembered, "We lay on the ground 
for our bed…Nothing but mud and mire for our downy fearther'd beds; clouds to cover 
us, with wind, hail and rain.  We had no fires…nor meat to cook nor bread to eat."  In the 
still frigid and damp Canadian air, the men suffered grievously.  Forster had to act or his 
prisoners would perish.  He approached the captured Americans officers about signing a 
cartel of exchange.  In conference, both sides agreed to an equitable exchange of 
prisoners: officers for officers, soldiers for soldiers.  Forster demanded, however, that the 
American prisoners "shall not, on any pretext whatsoever, hereafter take up arms against 
the Government of Great Britain."  The British prisoners were not to be so constrained; 
upon their release, they were to rejoin their regiments in suppressing the rebellion.90  
 When word of the cartel reached Arnold, he was livid.  The general and a force of 
about six hundred men were advancing on Forster's position to rescue the prisoners and 
secure Montréal's flank.  Arnold dismissed the cartel of exchange out of hand, "on 
account of the inequality of the second article" forbidding American soldiers to serve 
once released.  Firing back a vehement response, Arnold demanded the "surrender of our 
prisoners" and warned that if "any of them were murdered, I would sacrifice every Indian 
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who fell into my hands."  Not satisfied with the threat of cold blooded murder, Arnold 
promised Forster that he "would follow [the warriors] to their towns, and destroy them by 
fire and sword."  To Arnold, the native warriors were savages who violated the norms of 
war as he understood them, and Forster was their accomplice.  The British officer was not 
easily rattled.  He threatened to "immediately kill every prisoner, and give no quarter to 
any who should fall" into his hands in the future if the Americans' attacked his position.  
Arnold had a difficult decision to make.  His troops were "raging for action" and "ample 
revenge," but their captured countrymen were "on the point of being sacrificed if our 
vengeance was not delayed." Arnold, who was "torn by conflicting passions of revenge 
and humanity," agreed to accept the articles of exchange provided that the offending 
stipulation was removed.  Forster was relieved.  He acceded to Arnold's conditions, "as 
the only means to avoid the destruction of the prisoners."91 
 The preamble to the exchange agreement proposed by Forster revealed his 
uneasiness with his native allies' culture of war.  In his opinion, "the Customs and 
manners of the Savages in War" were "opposite and contrary to the humane disposition 
of the British Government, and to all civilized Nations."  Induced by "the dictates of 
Humanity" to consider the prisoners' lamentable position, he "thought fit to enter into the 
following Articles of Agreement with General Arnold" for their exchange.  Under the 
terms of the articles of agreement between the two officers, the American prisoners were 
released immediately and permitted to "return to their own Country" on the condition that 
an equal number of British prisoners of the same rank were sent to Canada "within the 
space of two months."  Not wholly trusting his American adversaries, Forster demanded 
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that "Hostages be delivered for the performance of the Articles."  Arnold allowed four 
captains to "be sent to Québec as Hostages [to] remain there until the Prisoners are 
exchanged."92   
 Arnold had every intention of scrupulously maintaining the articles of agreement, 
but he did not forget his lust for vengeance.  Prior to the establishment of the cartel, 
Arnold's forces came upon five of the prisoners who had been left behind during Forster's 
precipitous retreat.  Arnold described the "five unhappy wretches" as "naked and almost 
starved."  They informed him that one or two of their fellow prisoners, "being unwell, 
were inhumanely butchered."  His indignation at the "base hypocritical conduct of the 
King's officers, their employing savages to screen them in their butcheries, their suffering 
their prisoners to be killed in cool blood," knew no bounds.  Nevertheless, Arnold was 
cognizant that his actions had weighty repercussions for the American war effort.  As a 
congressionally appointed officer, as well as a gentleman, he represented the justice and 
legitimacy of the American cause and was thus was bound to conduct himself with honor. 
On May 27th, he instructed Colonel John De Haas of Pennsylvania to "keep strick [sic] 
Discipline among the Troops you will be Governed by the Articles respecting an 
Exchange of Prisoners and Cessation of Hostilities which I have this day entered into 
with Captain Forster."  As long as the British upheld their end of the bargain, so would 
Arnold.93   
                                                
 92 The four hostages were Captains Theodore bliss, Ebenezer Sullivan, John Stevens, and 
Ebenezer Green all of Bedel's command.  Articles of Agreement between George Forster , Capt 
Commanding the King’s Troops and Brig-Gen Benedict Arnold, the Cedars. Vaudreuil.  May 27th, 1776. 
Carleton Papers. DLAR. Reel 2a, No. 192; Hatch, Thrust for Canada, 205. 
 93 Arnold to the Commissioners in Canada. St. Ann's. May 27th, 1776. Force, American Archives, 
4th series, 6:595; Arnold to De Haas. St. Ann's. May 27th, 1776. Orderly Book of the 1st Pennsylvania 
Battalion of Foot, November 26th to April 6th 1776, J. P. de Haas commanding. LSC. MSS L1988.190.337 
[Bound]. 
 149 
 De Haas had had the unenviable responsibility of ferrying the prisoners down the 
Saint Lawrence to Montréal under the suspicious glare of Forster's native allies.  High 
winds and the many wounded prisoners complicated the process and delayed the 
prisoners' embarkation. Watching the spoils of their victories slip away, the native 
warriors grew restless.  Forster warned De Haas that he must hurry because "it is Intirely 
[sic] out of my Power to put a stop to the Ravages the Savages committ [sic] against the 
prisoners."  As the prisoners were ferried back to the American position, a party of 
"savages amusing themselves by the water side, did fire several muskets" at the unarmed 
men, but their shots fell short.  A British witness maintained that the warriors did not 
have "the least intention to injure them, nor were any of them injured." From the 
perspective of a frightened American prisoner, the natives' intentions appeared less 
lighthearted.  Private Shepardson remembered "a host of Indians with all there [sic] 
weapons of cruelty and the most horrid noise of war" who appeared and "attempted to 
rush upon us but were hindered by there [sic] superiors."  In Shepardson's version of the 
events, the warriors "threaten'd us with there [sic] tomahawks, spears, knives and fire 
arms, showing the skalps [sic] they took off five of my mates, whom they killed after 
they were made prisoners."  Once the warriors commenced firing, the American troops 
no longer considered themselves "bound to perform our part of the Capitulation."94 
 In Arnold's opinion, the British were guilty of flagrant violations of the customs 
and norms of war.  Arnold felt that Captain Forster only "pretended it was not in his 
power" to command and restrain his native allies.  The American general could not be 
seen to tolerate such enormities without invaliding his own claim to the authority and 
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legitimacy of a professional solider.  His officers and men wanted revenge, and unlike 
Montgomery, Arnold, who was relatively inexperienced in European warfare, agreed 
with them.  Although he would not violate the terms of the cartel, Arnold fully intended 
"to take ample vengeance" on the "savages, and still more savage British troops."  
Forester's native allies were obvious choices for retaliation, but Arnold would not be 
sated by native blood alone.  Through their alleged inability to restrain the native warriors 
from molesting prisoners and violating the terms of the cartel, the British negated any 
innate civility they possessed.  Forgetting his instructions from General Washington at 
the outset of the campaign to restrain "not only your own Troops but the Indians from all 
Acts of Cruelty & Insult which will disgrace American Arms," Arnold ordered De Haas 
to attack the native village of Conosadaga "and give no Quarter to the Savages white or 
Brown."  He hoped to obtain justice "for the Cruel and inhuman murder of our unhappy 
Countrymen."  His instructions were chillingly simple: "Surround the Town at the Break 
of Day you will attack them and kill, Burn and Destroy, the whole, leave not one 
store…or give Quarter to any one."  For Arnold, burning the village and denying quarter 
to enemy combatants and noncombatants alike was "no more than a Just retaliation for 
the many murders they have Committed on our unhappy Countrymen (in cold Blood)."  
He intended to send Carleton, Forster, and their native allies a clear message: if the 
British wanted a barbarous war, they would get one.95 
 Colonel De Haas, however, was unready and unwilling to abandon the restraints 
of "civilized" warfare.  Indian warriors might legitimately be denied quarter, but their 
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women, children, and most importantly, white Britons and Canadians, could not be 
slaughtered out of hand.  In conference with his officers, De Haas decided to ignore 
Arnold's instructions.  He justified his insubordination by claiming "confident assurance 
of the Enemies [sic] being reinforced," but his British opponents were clear on his true 
motivation: mercy.  British Lieutenant Andrew Parke commended De Haas on his 
"honourable" and "manly" conduct in sparing the village.  He was also pleasantly 
surprised by the disciplined and restrained behavior of the common soldiers throughout 
the campaign, which was much more "than could reasonably have been expected from 
men under such unprincipled leaders."96  
 Arnold had little time to dispute the matter with De Haas; he now faced the 
advance of over eight thousand recently arrived British and German troops under the 
command of veteran general John Burgoyne.  In early June, Carleton, with Burgoyne's 
fresh troops in the van, began his advance toward Montréal.  Confronted by such an 
onslaught, the revolutionaries had no prospect of holding on to the city or to any of their 
Canadian possessions.  The best they could hope for was "an orderly retreat out of 
Canada."  Withdrawing southward on Lake Champlain to Crown Point, Arnold's army 
abandoned Canada to Carleton. On June 17th, British forces entered Montréal in triumph.  
The American quest for a fourteenth colony was over.97 
 With Canada no longer under siege, Governor Carleton eased the rigor of his 
prisoners' confinement.  No doubt moved by the sight of the "distorted, bloated, and 
blackened limbs" of the scurvy-ridden prisoners, Carleton gifted a fresh linen shirt to 
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each of the nearly naked men. The Americans were elated by the gift and by the promise 
of improved nourishment.  In June, the British commissaries, recently resupplied by sea, 
were finally able to provide the men with fruits and vegetables to combat the effects of 
the disease.  Satiating their "voracious appetite[s]" with "Scurvy grass, in many varieties, 
eschalots, small onions, onion tops and garlic," the prisoners began to regain their 
strength.  Those with the familial connections or social status necessary to establish lines 
of credit purchased "cheese, sugar, tea, coffee" and even tobacco.  In August, when the 
prisoners were healthy enough to travel, Carleton dispatched them to New York under 
parole "for the purpose of being exchanged."  The governor hoped that by releasing the 
prisoners he would "convince all His Majesty's unhappy subjects, that the King's mercy 
and Benevolence were still open to them."  Unfortunately for the American cause, 
Carleton was the only senior British commander to take such a benevolent stance.98 
 When news of the "unfortunate affair at the Cedars" reached Congress, the 
members were in no mood for benevolence.  Their campaign to conquer Canada was in 
ruins, and Carleton and Burgoyne appeared poised to strike south down Lake Champlain 
into New York.  Rumors abounded throughout Philadelphia that Sir William Howe and a 
host of Hessian and British troops were embarked for Manhattan.  If Burgoyne and Howe 
could consolidate their forces and seize control of the Hudson River, the colonies would 
effectively be cut in two: cooperation between Boston and Philadelphia would be at an 
end.  Howe's movements combined with open discussion of a declaration of 
independence induced Congress to frenzy.99    
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 As if these events were not enough to fan the flames of congressional fury, 
Congress now had to contend with Captain Forster's flagrant violation of the first official 
cartel of exchange of prisoners of the conflict. Allowing the article of exchange to stand 
would implicitly condone Forster's actions and Britain's decision to involve native 
warriors in their dispute.  Congress appointed a committee to consider "the Cartel 
between Brigadier-General Arnold and Captain Forster."  On July 10th, 1776, only six 
days after Congress voted for independence, the committee made their report.  They 
concluded, after perusing numerous eyewitness depositions and the correspondence 
between Forster and Arnold, that Forster had violated not only the cartel of exchange but 
also the articles of capitulation of the Cedars.  Forster was culpable for permitting his 
native allies to plunder the prisoners, failing to prevent the murder of several of their 
number, and allowing others to die of exposure and hunger while in captivity.  On the 
basis of this information, Congress resolved that Forster had acted "contrary to good 
faith, the laws of nature, [and] the customs of civilized nations."  They condemned "the 
murder of the prisoners of war" as a "gross and inhuman violation of the laws of nature 
and nations," and demanded that the perpetrators be brought to "condign punishment."  
Because Arnold was subject to congressional orders, any agreement he entered into with 
Forster was subject to their approval, which would never be granted unless the British 
turned over the perpetrators of the crimes and made proper indemnification for their 
plundering.  By attaching stipulations the British would never allow, Congress nullified 
the cartel.100   
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 In negating the cartel of exchange, Congress made their position on the treatment 
of prisoners of war abundantly clear.  The newly independent United States of America 
was a "civilized" nation that deserved and demanded the accordance of the customary 
protections of war between Europeans powers.  By violating the terms of the capitulation 
and the cartel, as well as the numerous instances of inhumanity toward other American 
captives, the British transgressed not only the law of nations but of nature as well.  
Through their prosecution of the war, the British demonstrated their barbarity and by 
extension the justice of the American cause. Reconciliation with the British crown, once 
longed for by many revolutionaries, was now impossible.  Revolutionary Americans 
could no longer envision themselves as subjects of an empire capable of such savagery.  
Irrevocable independency was the only option.  As Thomas Jefferson phrased it in the 
Declaration of Independence, Britain's conduct was "scarcely paralleled in the most 
barbarous Ages, and totally unworthy the Head of a civilized Nation.”  No longer subject 
to the crown, as citizens of an independent and sovereign nation, Jefferson and his 
compatriots in Congress believed it their duty to teach the British "to respect the violated 
rights of nations."  In future, Congress would inflict "punishments of the same kinds and 
degree…on an equal number of the captives from them in our possession" as the only 
means of "stopping the progress of human butchery."  The Americans had threatened 
retaliation in the past to no effect. The question still remained, however, would Congress 
carry through their threats.101  
.............................. 
                                                                                                                                            
horrified that his government would allow "the breach of a Treaty which even the Savages have ever held 
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 The revolutionary elite's quest to capture Canada was an unmitigated failure, but 
their commitment to their vision of Europe's culture of restrained warfare, and 
consequently the humane treatment of enemy prisoners, had endured.  As had been the 
case in Boston in spring and summer 1775, British officers in Canada had refused to 
consider the revolutionaries as legitimate combatants, deserving the humane treatment 
accorded prisoners of war in Europe.  When captured, American prisoners were 
consigned to confinement in deplorable conditions while British authorities debated their 
fate.  Even more egregious from the revolutionaries’ point of view, the British felt no 
compunction at enlisting the support of Indian warriors to crush the invaders.  Once 
mobilized against the revolutionaries, Native American groups waged war according to 
their own cultural norms; British authorities in Canada could do little to restrain their 
allies for fear of alienating them.  Outraged and despairing of any peaceful solution to 
their disagreements with the British crown, many Americans in the summer of 1776 were 
prepared to abandon their vision of "civilized" warfare and return British atrocities in 
kind.  The Pennsylvania propagandist, writing under the pseudonym "A Watchman," 
spoke for many when he declared that American "blood which was shed through 
wantonness, and without provocation, cries aloud for vengeance."  Novices no longer, 
Americans were prepared to fight British fire with fire.  Nevertheless, the revolutionary 
leadership in Congress and the Continental army knew that victory now turned on 
demonstrating the legitimacy of their state to foreign powers not the British king, 
Parliament, and people.  Were the revolutionaries to abandon the restraints of Europe's 
culture of war in the summer of 1776, they would place themselves beyond the pale of 
civilization and thus the aid of any European state.  Despite a tidal flood of provocations, 
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the revolutionary leadership continued to eschew calls for vengeance and maintained the 
"common usage and the practice of civilized nations in war."  For now.102
                                                
 102 "Address of "A Watchman to the People of Pennsylvania." Philadelphia. June 13th, 1776. 
Force, American Archives, 4th series, 6:835; Resolve of Congress. Wednesday, April 3rd, 1776. Force, 
American Archives, 4th series, 5:1443. 
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Chapter Three: 
The Realities of War 
 
 
 In the spring of 1776, General Philip Schuyler, reeling from the expectation of his 
Canadian campaign’s failure, dispatched a contingent of the Third New Jersey regiment 
into the Mohawk valley of New York for the express purpose of capturing loyalist Sir 
John Johnson and his supporters.  In Schuyler's opinion, Johnson had demonstrated "the 
most Hostile Intentions against the Country" and therefore deserved "to be made close 
prisoner."  Given Johnson's inveterate opposition to the American cause, and his active 
recruitment of Iroquois warriors and recent Scottish immigrants to the king's standard, 
Schuyler's orders were remarkably restrained.  He instructed Colonel Elias Dayton that 
upon capture, Johnson was "by no means to experience the least ill treatment in his own 
person, or those of his Family."  The colonel was "to be particularly careful that none of 
the Men under your Command, or any Persons whatever, destroy, or take away the most 
trifling Part of his Property."  For his part in the recruitment scheme, Johnson was "not so 
much as put under moderate Confinement" by the Continental army.  This was no mere 
courtesy to a fellow member of the New York elite. Schuyler issued the same orders for 
the treatment of Johnson's less lofty followers.  The American soldiers were under "the 
strictest Order that no abuse be given to the Persons of these People or their property."  
Johnson and his supporters were opponents to the revolution and therefore legitimate 
targets for arrest, but they were not "savages" beyond the pale of civilization.  Despite the 
violence of the British war effort in Massachusetts and Canada, Schuyler assured Johnson 
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that "American Commanders Engaged in the Cause of Liberty remain uninfluenced by 
the savage and Brutal Example which has been given by the british [sic] Officers."1   
 Less than a year and a half later, a similar contingent of American soldiers 
marched within five miles of British-occupied New York in the dead of night to capture 
staunch loyalist, and brigadier general in the crown forces, Oliver De Lancey.  Finding 
the master of the house absent with only his wife and female children at home in their 
beds, the soldiers proceeded to ransack the estate.  In the course of their depredations, one 
of the soldiers struck De Lancey's teenage daughter with the butt of his musket, and 
others began to torch the house while the inhabitants remained inside.  De Lancey's 
family was fortunate to escape the blaze, but they wandered aimlessly through the night, 
barefoot, and clad only in their nightclothes in the bitter late November air.  Their 
domestic servants were not so fortunate.  According to De Lancey, two juvenile servants, 
one white and one black, perished in the flames, while seventeen others were left 
homeless with only the clothing on their backs.  Dragging several male prisoners with 
them, the soldiers disappeared into the darkness.  Upon learning of the raid on the De 
Lancey home, one American officer was horrified: "Is not this warfare a most horrid 
business [and] sin?  I never desire to be concerned in distressing women and children."  
Nevertheless, the officer admitted that "If Oliver had been there instead of Mrs. De 
Lancey and children, it would have been a pretty affair."  Harming women and children 
was beneath the dignity of the American cause, but a vile traitor like De Lancey was fair 
game.  Congress had no such reservation.  The President of Congress, Henry Laurens, 
                                                
 1 Berkshire County Committees of Safety and Inspection to Washington. Pittsfield, MA. June 7th, 
1776. PGW; Philip Schuyler to Sir John Johnson. Saratoga, New York. May 14th, 1776 and Orders to 
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informed Brigadier General Samuel Parsons that the soldiers' conduct at the De Lancey 
homestead met with "general satisfaction" from that body.2   
 Both raids were conducted by regular American forces, not bandits, vigilantes, or 
criminals, and both enjoyed the sanction and commendation of revolutionary America's 
senior political and military leadership.  However, the results of the 1777 attack on 
General De Lancey's home—private property in flames, unarmed women and children 
beaten, homeless, and insulted, and servants murdered—would have been unthinkable in 
the summer of 1776 to those very types of men who were now so pleased.  From the 
vantage point of Oliver De Lancey's distressed family, warfare in America looked more 
like the desolation of the seventeenth-century religious wars than Emmerich von Vattel's 
idealized rendition of "civilized" combat.   
 This chapter investigates the transformation in the revolutionaries' conduct of the 
war by focusing on the New York campaign of 1776-1777.  Although concentrating on 
prisoner treatment during the crown’s efforts to capture and subdue New York City and 
its environs, this chapter ranges geographically from Georgia to Massachusetts—
wherever significant British or loyalist forces operated during the period.  Throughout, I 
argue that a combination of British atrocities, amplified and exaggerated by the prolific 
revolutionary press, large-scale armed loyalist opposition, and the limitations of 
                                                
 2 Memorial of Brig. Gen. Oliver De Lancey. New York. July 11th, 1778. AO13/3/282-332. 
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republican government unleashed a violent civil war between the revolutionaries and 
those still loyal to the crown that remained unchecked until the close of the conflict in 
1783.  In this internecine warfare, grim violence and suffering characterized the plight of 
those on both sides.  By the New York campaign's culmination, thousands of Americans 
wasted in noisome British prisons without hope of release or exchange, while thousands 
of others took up arms against the new nation.  The Continental Congress was powerless 
to prevent either.  Confronted by the threat of loyalist uprising at every turn and by the 
truly staggering mortality rate of American prisoners, revolutionaries from across the 
social spectrum began to conceive of the British as barbarians and their loyal American 
supporters as rebels and traitors.  Re-imagined in this way, the enemies of the revolution 
were no longer entitled to the protections of "civilized" warfare.  Rebels could be 
imprisoned at whim, tried as traitors, summarily executed, and treated as barbarians: 
brutalized, enchained, and denied quarter.  British decisions to employ foreign troops, 
confine captured Americans in floating prisons, and arm loyalists to oppose the 
revolutionary movement radicalized ordinary Americans, who took to arms in the quest 
for retribution.  This combustible combination, which occurred wherever British forces 
ranged, launched the conflict on a path of escalating violence, vengeance, and retaliation   
 
 Nevertheless, Americans' deeply engrained vision of "civilized" warfare was not 
so easily degraded or jettisoned.  Restraint in wartime violence had deep cultural 
resonance in early America, and much of the revolutionary leadership in 1777 continued 
to insist upon rigid adherence to the customs and practices of war among European 
powers.  Without a centralized government or military bureaucracy empowered to 
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organize, administer, and direct the war effort, however, standards for the treatment of 
captured enemies could not easily be enforced.  Thus the day-to-day operations of the 
conflict increasingly fell upon individual states, each of which conducted the conflict 
with varying degrees of severity; those states in closest proximity to the British army 
were most likely to react with greatest violence.  While the states waged their own terror 
campaigns, Washington continued to insist upon the restrained conduct of the Continental 
army, but the decentralized nature of the American war effort—in conjunction with the 
widespread dissemination of accounts of British misconduct in the public sphere, and the 
pervasive threat of loyalist insurrection, both real and imagined—ensured that much of 
the conflict's conduct was beyond his control.  As a consequence the Continental 
Commissary General of Prisoners, Elias Boudinot, could boast in the summer of 1777 
without the least insincerity that "humanity to Prisoners of War has ever been the peculiar 
Characteristic of the american [sic] Army," while simultaneously enemy prisoners in 
New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut suffered in squalor aboard 
American prison ships and overcrowded jails, and perished at the gallows for treason 
against a country they never claimed.3  
                                                
 3 Boudinot to James Wilson and Christian Forster. Morris Town, NJ. July 5th, 1777. Boyle, "Their 
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New York, Ruma Chopra, Unnatural Rebellion: Loyalists in New York City During the Revolution 
(Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2011) and Van Buskirk, Generous Enemies, have all but 
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"The doleful Story of their Captivity and Distress": American Prisoners in New 
York and the Formation of a British Detention Policy 
 
 Perched on the highest point on Manhattan Island overlooking the Hudson River 
in November 1776, Fort Washington was an impressive feat of military engineering.  
Named in honor of the American commander, the pentagonal fortification was the 
Continental army's last hope to prevent the island from falling into British hands.  Despite 
assiduous preparation the previous summer, American forces had been unable to stop a 
British armada from landing nearly 25,000 British and Hessian troops on Long Island in 
August.  The long feared "Armies of foreign Mercenaries" that Thomas Jefferson had 
decried in the Declaration of Independence had arrived.  Executing a virtually textbook 
example of envelopment, the Britons and their Germanic associates defeated 
Washington's men on 27 August at the Battle of Brooklyn, capturing over a thousand 
American prisoners.  Washington, who had bloodlessly driven the British from Boston in 
March, now fled in turn.  Fortunate to escape with any of his troops, Washington 
retreated the length of Manhattan, losing men, materiel, and most of his mettle at Kip's 
Bay, Harlem Heights, and White Plains.  The British were unimpressed with their 
adversary's haphazard and unsoldierly defense of New York.  One Hessian described the 
American officers as "nothing but mechanics, tailors, shoemakers, wig-makers, [and] 
                                                                                                                                            
ignored the phenomenon of armed loyalism and the experience of loyalist prisoners in American captivity.  
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barbers," hardly the stalwarts who had bloodied the British at Concord and Bunker Hill.  
Victory was almost too easy.  Perhaps the formidable entrenchments of Fort Washington 
would at last offer worthy opposition.4 
 Washington was not confident.  The fort was indeed well constructed, and its 
commanding position over the river appeared nearly unassailable.  Moreover, the fort was 
garrisoned by nearly 3,000 of Washington's best troops and armed with 34 cannon and 2 
howitzers.  One British officer, Captain Frederick Mackenzie, feared that the fort's 
"natural strength and situation of the ground" would hamper any attempt to reduce it by a 
conventional siege.  The fort would have to be taken by escalade.  With over eight 
thousand British and Hessian troops poised to attack, that is exactly what the British 
planned to do. Washington wanted to abandon the fort and save his men to fight another 
day, but he hesitated.  Knowing that to abandon Fort Washington was to abandon New 
York to the British indefinitely and under pressure from one of his most trusted 
subordinates, General Nathanael Greene, to support the garrison, Washington backed 
down.  The fort was entrusted to the capable care of Colonel Robert Magaw of 
Pennsylvania with orders from Greene to defend the post until he heard otherwise.5 
 The orders to abandon the fort never materialized.  Instead, General William 
Howe, Britain's senior military commander in America, sent an officer with a flag of 
truce on 15 November to demand Magaw's surrender.  Howe's terms were clinically 
clear: the garrison had the "alternative between surrendering at discretion, or every man 
                                                
 4 Armitage, The Declaration of Independence, 169; Fischer, Washington's Crossing, 111-113; 
Colonel von Heeringen quoted in Edward Jackson Lowell, The Hessians and the Other German Auxiliaries 
of Great Britain in the Revolutionary War (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1884), 66. 
 5 Mackenzie, Diary of Frederick Mackenzie, 1:109, 105; Ron Chernow, Washington: A Life (New 
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 164 
being put to the sword."  Confident in the strength of his position, Magaw was 
"determined to defend the post or die." In proffering such extreme terms without first 
allowing Magaw to display his martial acumen and gentlemanly honor by defending his 
fort, Howe had not only insulted the American army but also Magaw personally.  Were 
he to surrender without a fight, Magaw would earn the censure and opprobrium of his 
superiors, subordinates, contemporaries, and most importantly posterity.  Turning the 
table on Howe, Magaw accused the general of acting "a part so unworthy of himself and 
the British nation."  The American colonel rejected the British aristocrat's terms out of 
hand and prepared for the inexorable result.6  
 Shortly before dawn on the 16th, British land batteries and naval artillery erupted 
in "a violent Cannonade," engulfing Fort Washington in a haze of acrid smoke 
punctuated by blinding illumination.  Out of the fog emerged the leveled bayonets of the 
Hessian grenadiers, English light infantry, and Scottish highlanders.  In the face of such a 
martial onslaught, the American outer works were quickly abandoned, rendering Colonel 
Magaw's position desperate.  Should the enemy breach the fort's walls, there would be 
little hope for quarter.  According to a British officer present at the attack, General Howe 
insisted that Magaw "surrender immediately, without any other terms than a promise of 
their lives, and their baggage."  The American commander "pled for the Honors of War," 
but Howe would have none of it.  The fort would fall; only the defenders' fate was in 
question.7 
                                                
 6 Robert Magaw to Nathanael Greene.  Fort Washington, NY. November 15th, 1776. Force, 
American Archives, 5th series, 3:700; Robert Magaw to the Adjutant-General of the British Army. Fort 
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 7 Mackenzie, Diary of Frederick Mackenzie, 1:109; Independent Chronicle and the Universal 
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 Magaw's determination to hold the fort to the last withered at the sight of the 
oncoming Hessians.  The Americans were well aware of the Hessians' reputation for 
brutality.  In the aftermath of the Battle of Brooklyn, rumors abounded throughout the 
Continental army that the Hessians had refused to grant surrendering Americans quarter.  
One Pennsylvania officer recalled that he was determined "to run any risk rather than fall 
into their hands."  The rumors carried more than a shred of truth.  A Hessian officer 
admitted that the American riflemen killed in the battle "were mostly pitted to the trees 
with bayonets."  He attributed the actions of his countrymen not to any innate Germanic 
cruelty, but to the fact that "the English did not give much quarter, and constantly urged 
our people to do the like."  A Scottish officer corroborated his Hessian allies' explanation: 
"We took care to tell the Hessians that the Rebels had resolved to give no quarters to 
them in particular, which made them fight desperately, and put all to death that fell into 
their hands."  Because the Americans were rebels, and "vile enemies to their King and 
country," the Scot rejoiced that "The Hessians and our brave Highlanders gave no 
quarters; and it was a fine sight to see with what alacrity they dispatched the Rebels with 
their bayonets."  An unfortunate Royal navy midshipman at the Battle of Kip's Bay was 
less impressed with his allies.  After witnessing "a Hessian sever a rebel's head from his 
body and clap it on a pole," he himself became a victim of the Germans when they 
confused his navy blue frock for that of an American.  He and a fellow naval officer were 
knocked to the ground with muskets and beaten "unmercifully."  The midshipman 
believed "they would undoubtedly have put their bayonets through us" had a British 
officer not come to their aid.  Magaw's men knew that the British officers commanding 
the assault on Fort Washington were unlikely to intercede on the part of men they 
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considered to be "damned rebels."  They waited anxiously while the colonel and his 
subordinate officers considered the British proposition.8 
 Rather than consign his men to their death, Magaw capitulated.  By early 
afternoon, the guns fell silent and 2,837 American soldiers laid down their arms in 
surrender.  From across the Hudson river at Fort Lee, Washington watched "this unhappy 
Catastrophe" unfold.  The garrison marched out of the fort flanked on either side by the 
Hessian troops that had led the assault.  Exhausted and enraged at the carnage, the 
Hessians were in no mood for niceties.  A Hessian chaplain who witnessed the surrender 
admitted that "despite the strictest orders, the prisoners received a number of blows."  
Most of these were delivered with the butt end of a musket as the prisoners filed out of 
the works, but John Adlum, a Pennsylvania militiaman and survivor of the battle, 
remembered hearing "that some of our soldiers, was [sic] severely cut with the swords of 
the Hessians."  All suffered blistering insults and unabated plundering at the hands of 
their captors, the articles of capitulation guaranteeing their personal property 
notwithstanding.  British officers present at the scene did nothing to restrain their allies.  
At least one British officer, General Howe's adjutant Stephen Kemble, was shocked by 
the breach of the article of capitulation.  "To our shame, tho' they Capitulated for the 
Safety of their Baggage, they were stripped of their Wearing Apparel as they [were] 
Marched out by Hessians."9   
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 Other British officers were less than apologetic.  Captain Mackenzie thought the 
Americans "had no right to expect the mild treatment they met with."  After all, the men 
were "Rebels taken in arms" and thus "forfeit their lives by the laws of all Countries."  
Although he was pleased to boast that "Humanity is the characteristic of the British 
troops," Mackenzie expressed the prevailing opinion among the officers of the army that 
"we act with too much lenity and humanity towards the Rebels."  Fear of British 
retribution alone would bring the rebels to heel. 10   
 The Fort Washington prisoners had plenty to fear as they marched towards 
captivity. The specter of the hangman still loomed large in their imaginations.  According 
to one Connecticut soldier, William Slade, their guards referred to the Americans as 
"Yankee Rebbels [sic] a going to the gallows."  In the aftermath of the battle of Brooklyn, 
American captives had been similarly accosted by British "officers, soldiers and camp-
ladies" in "the most scurrilous and abusive language" demanding to know why they had 
not been "put to the bayonet or hanged."  No one knew what was in store for the 
prisoners once they reached New York.11 
 To compound their woes, the prisoners trudged southward with empty stomachs 
and bare backs.  The British failed to supply the prisoners with any provisions on their 
march and most had been plundered of what little warm clothing they owned.  William 
Slade spent the day after the battle "in sorrow and hunger, having no mercy showed."  In 
their affidavit to Congress, prisoners Samuel Young and William Houston reported that 
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"they had no victuals given them of any kind" for three days after the battle.  Far from 
eliciting the sympathy of their captors, these starving, exhausted, and dejected men 
"excited the laughter of our Soldiers," according to Captain Mackenzie.  Many Britons, 
protected from the cold by their watch coats, regimentals, and woolen breeches, appeared 
to delight in the suffering of their prisoners, who "were in general but very indifferently 
clothed; few of them appeared to have a Second shirt."  The prisoners were 
understandably less jocose.  William Slade aptly summarized their predicament: "These 
four days we spent in hunger and sorrow being decried by every one and calld [sic] 
Rebs."  Unless they were resupplied and properly quartered, they might have more to 
"dread than the common sufferings of prisoners of war."  Prayers for a speedy exchange 
were on everyone's lips.12 
 General Howe was equally anxious to divest himself of the prisoners.  When Fort 
Washington fell, the British lacked the infrastructure necessary to maintain the prisoners 
they already possessed.  The addition of almost three thousand more prisoners proved 
vexing to Howe. With winter approaching, Howe was responsible for quartering and 
provisioning a massive array of British and Hessian soldiers on an island devastated by 
warfare.  Most of the inhabitable buildings in lower Manhattan had been destroyed by 
fire shortly after the British arrived, and Howe was now greeted by an influx of loyalist 
refugees fleeing the rebel lines.  Most having lost their homes, businesses, and property 
for their support of the king, they justifiably demanded shelter and sustenance.  Under the 
circumstances, Howe had no intention of holding a ravenous and ill-clad army of 
                                                
 12 The Diary of William Slade of New Canaan Ct. November 18th, 1776 in Dandridge, American 
Prisoners, 495; Avadavat of Samuel Young and William Houston.  December 15th, 1776. PCC, Item 53, p. 
25; Mackenzie, The Diary of Frederick Mackenzie, 1:111-112; The Diary of William Slade of New Canaan 
Ct. November 18th, 1776 in Danske Dandridge, American Prisoners, 495; Mackenzie, The Diary of 
Frederick Mackenzie, 1:111, 112, 111. 
 169 
prisoners in captivity for long.  He appointed Massachusetts loyalist Joshua Loring as his 
commissary of prisoners to attend to the prisoners' wants and negotiate their release.  In 
early December, Howe informed Lord George Germain that although he was "under the 
necessity of detaining [the prisoners]…at a very great expence [sic] and inconvenience," 
he was confident he would soon be rid "of the remaining incumbrance [sic]."  Until then, 
Loring would see to their needs.13 
 Loring's task was not easy.  Despite almost a century of intermittent warfare with 
the great Catholic powers of Europe, the British army was surprisingly unprepared for 
such an influx of prisoners.  In prior conflicts, prisoners of war had been administered by 
a civilian commission under the auspices of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty 
known as the Commission for Sick and Hurt Seamen and the Exchange of Prisoners.  
Since 1740 this commission had become a permanent component of the British war 
machine tasked with not only the care of enemy prisoners, both terrestrial and maritime, 
but also their swift and efficient repatriation.  Prisoners awaiting exchange were housed 
in castles and local jails, and aboard decommissioned warships known as hulks.  While 
uncomfortable, their confinement was temporary. The key to the success of the British 
system was the rigid adherence to cartels of exchange established with their French and 
Spanish counterparts. Although there were certainly breakdowns in the system of 
exchange, and enemy prisoners undoubtedly suffered as a consequence, on the whole the 
system accomplished its intent: French soldiers and sailors were returned in exchange for 
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prisoners." Howe to Washington. York Island. September 21st, 1776. Force, American Archives, 5th series, 
2:437; Howe to Lord George Germaine. New York, December 3rd, 1776. The Parliamentary Register; Or, 
History of the Proceedings and Debates of the House of Commons (London: J. Almon, 1775-80), 17 vols., 
11:364. 
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an equal number of captured Britons.  In this conflict, however, General Howe was 
constrained by his political superiors from entering into any formal cartel of exchange 
that might legitimate the rebel cause.14 
 Unable and unwilling to formally negotiate with the United States, Howe 
appealed to Washington as a gentleman and brother officer to arrange a system of 
informal exchanges.  The two men had entered into negotiations in July when 
Washington suggested that an "exchange of prisoners will be attended with mutual 
convenience and pleasure to both parties."  Acting with congressional approval, 
Washington proposed that officers be exchanged for those of equal rank and soldiers, 
sailors, and civilians be exchanged equally for their respective counterparts.  Constantly 
pestered by captured British officers requesting preferential exchange, Howe was elated 
to learn that the Americans were willing to conduct informal exchanges. Not only would 
such an exchange rid him of the nuisance of constant petitions, he would also recoup 
valuable officers and veteran regiments captured in Canada for his subsequent campaigns 
in return for ill trained and hungry novices.  "Wishing sincerely to give Relief to the 
Distresses of all Prisoners," Howe informed Washington in August that he would "readily 
consent to the Mode of Exchange You are pleased to propose."15   
 Not all of Howe's subordinates agreed with their general.  Captain Mackenzie 
thought it "rather extraordinary that under the present circumstances we should treat with 
them as if on an equality."  The Americans were no better than criminals; even an 
                                                
 14 The position of Commissary General of Prisoners was a sinecure according to loyalist historian 
Thomas Jones.  Thomas Jones, History of New York During the Revolutionary War (New York: New-York 
Historical Society, 1879), E.F. De Lancey, ed., 2 vols., 1:1351; Sheldon S. Cohen, Yankee Sailors in British 
Gaols: Prisoners of War at Forton and Mill, 1777-1783 (Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, 
1995),18-22.  See also, Burrows, Forgotten Patriots, 9-10; Germain to Howe. Whitehall. February 1st, 
1776. Force, American Archives, 4th series, 4:902. 
 15 Washington to Howe. New York. July 20th, 1776. PGW; Howe to Washington. Staten Island. 
August 1st, 1776. PGW. 
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informal exchange would implicitly acknowledge that they were beyond the jurisdiction 
British civil law.  In his opinion, it was wiser to keep "all the Rebel prisoners taken in 
arms, without any immediate hope of release, and in a state of uncertainty with respect to 
their fate" in order to "strike great terror into their army."  Morale in Howe's army was 
high after the successes around New York, and many British officers felt that total 
victory was close at hand.  One more vigorous assault would "crush the Rebel Colonies" 
and ensure that all the king's men would "return covered with American laurels."16   
 Desirous and hopeful for reconciliation, however, Howe viewed the exchange as 
an opportunity to demonstrate the magnanimity and lenience of Great Britain.  The 
bayonets of his men had already given the rebels ample evidence of Britain's 
determination to stamp out the rebellion by force; now was the time for conciliation.  
Howe informed Washington in July that it was his "Disposition as a Man…to discourage 
and punish all Acts of Cruelty."  Unlike the American general who threatened retaliation 
for alleged British atrocities, Howe firmly believed that "Examples of Moderation will 
ever be the sharpest reproach to those who violate the Laws of Honor & Humanity."  
Despite the thinly veiled reproach, Howe knew Washington to be a man of honor.  In 
Washington, Howe saw a fellow gentleman with whom he could negotiate.  Provided the 
two men maintained a regular and honest conversation, peace must surely follow.  
Clearly skeptical of the likelihood of a negotiated end to the war, Elbridge Gerry told 
John Adams that "General Howe is desirous of keeping open a Communication with our 
                                                
 16 Mackenzie, Diary of Frederick Mackenzie, 1:39; Ira D. Gruber, The Howe Brothers and the 
American Revolution (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1972), 135; Extract of a letter from an officer in General 
Frazer's Battalion. September 3rd, 1776.  Force, American Archives, 5th series, 1:1259. 
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General and thinks he has made the first Advances to an Accomodation [sic]."  From 
Howe's perspective, that accommodation hinged on mutual trust between the two men.17  
 In the weeks following his victory at Brooklyn, Howe sought to establish that 
trust by orchestrating several high-level prisoner exchanges as a demonstration of his 
good faith.  The general was pleased to trade the popular American general John Sullivan 
for the irascible Brigadier Richard Prescott, who the Americans had accused of 
mistreating Ethan Allen at Montréal.  Although he could not acquiesce to Washington's 
request for the release of General William Alexander in exchange for brevet Brigadier 
Donald MacDonald because of the disparity between their commissioned ranks, Howe 
generously accepted the captured British governor of the Bahamas, Montfort Brown, 
instead.  Because Governor Brown had not been acting in a military capacity when an 
American naval force under the command of Esek Hopkins made him a prisoner, and he 
did not possess a commission in the regular army, Howe's proposal was exceedingly 
generous.  Under European conventions, Brown should have been exchanged only for a 
civilian prisoner of equal political stature.  The British general even ordered the 
immediate exchange of the prominent whig, and future member of the Continental 
Congress, James Lovell for Governor Philip Skene; an exchange that Howe had earlier 
refused on the grounds that Lovell had carried on "a prohibited Correspondence” during 
his captivity.  With New York in his hands, and empowered by His Majesty to seek a 
peaceful resolution to the conflict, Howe could now negotiate from a position of strength.  
                                                
 17 Howe to Washington. Staten Island. July 16th, 1776. PGW; Elbridge Gerry to Samuel and John 
Adams. Kings Bridge, NY. July 21st, 1776. The Adams Papers Digital Edition, ed. C. James Taylor. 
Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, Rotunda, 2008. 
http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/ADMS-06-04-02-0174 [accessed 04 Feb 2011], hereafter cited 
as Adams Papers. On August 11th, Nathan Rice informed Abigail Adams that "Mr. How[e], however was 
more [agreea]ble and wished a more free Intercourse with our [army?]." Adams Papers. 
 173 
Washington was in no position to haggle; he jumped at the opportunity to regain two of 
his most trusted lieutenants, as well as a respected, influential, and long suffering 
civilian.18 
 Word that the British were finally willing to conduct an exchange of prisoners 
reverberated throughout the states.  Newspapers sang the praises of an alteration in the 
British treatment of American prisoners.  While captured Americans such as Ethan Allen 
had been treated with "the utmost barbarity" in the past, they were now afforded the 
privileges of their rank and station.  British policy had "softened."   For British prisoners 
in American custody, the change in British policy seemed to presage their release.  Major 
Christopher French, the British officer who had so vexed Washington and Hancock 
through his constant petitions and imperious style, noted that all of the officers in 
Hartford, whose "Scituation [sic] (in close Goal) could not be…more irksome," took 
"great pleasure" in the news of an imminent exchange.  The ordeal of their captivity 
appeared to be coming to a close.  Howe's lenient approach to the formerly thorny issue 
of whether to treat the Americans as prisoners of war or rebels in arms also met with the 
approval of the authorities in London.  Lord Barrington, Britain's secretary at war, was 
pleased to learn "that an opportunity may offer for your getting those Officers and Men 
exchanged who were made Prisoners at Chamble [sic] & St John's."  The ministry's 
                                                
 18 McDonald had been brevetted a brigadier by North Carolina's royal governor Josiah Martin but 
he was only a commissioned major in the regular army and thus could not be equitably exchanged for a 
general in the congressional forces.  Howe to Washington. York Island. September 21st, 1776. PGW; Howe 
to Washington. Staten Island. August 1st, 1776. PGW; Howe to Washington. Boston. February 2nd, 1776. 
PGW; For the best account of Lord and General Howe's involvement in the British peace commission of 
1776, see Gruber, The Howe Brothers, 72-78. 
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experiment with holding Americans in perpetuity had proven cumbersome, expensive, 
and politically unsound; now all they hoped for was an equitable swap.19 
 A general exchange, however, remained elusive.  Congress had vested each of its 
departmental commanders-in-chief with the authority to conduct exchanges in July 1776, 
but unlike Howe who had sole custody of his prisoners, Washington had little actual 
authority over the captured Britons.  The prisoners from Canada were dispersed in 
isolated communities between Connecticut and Virginia, and even Massachusetts boasted 
a sizable number of Scottish prisoners who had mistakenly sailed into Boston harbor in 
June unaware that Howe had already evacuated the city.  All of these prisoners were 
technically under the jurisdiction and care of the newly created congressional Board of 
War headed by John Adams, but in reality they were in the hands of local committees of 
safety that were loathe to surrender them without any guarantee of reimbursement or the 
promise of preferential exchange for captured community members.  Despite numerous 
requests, the Board of War could not obtain accurate lists of the number and character of 
British prisoners in state custody.  Confusion reigned.20 
 Dispersing the prisoners had spared Washington the nuisance of their 
accommodation and had prevented the British from attempting any rescue operations, but 
                                                
 19 See for instance the Virginia Gazette, September 20th, 1776; The Massachusetts Spy, November 
27th, 1776; French and several of his officers had been in close confinement since late August for the crime 
of "Libell [sic] against the State of Connecticut." Cohen, ed., "The Connecticut Captivity of Major 
Christopher French," 183, 157; Barrington to Howe.  November 12th, 1776. Carleton Papers. Reel 3, No. 
325. DLAR. 
 20 Congress established their supremacy in all maters relating to the exchange of prisoners of war 
captured by congressional forces in May of 1776 but clarified the role of the army's commander in chief in 
these exchanges on July 22nd, 1776. JCC, 4:362, 5:599. John Hancock informed Washington that he was 
empowered to negotiate the exchange of prisoners on July 24th, 1776.  Hancock to Washington. 
Philadelphia. July 24th, 1776. PGW. Two British transports ships, the George and the Annabella were 
captured in Boston Harbor on June 16th, 1776 carrying two companies of the Second Battalion 71st 
Highland Regiment of Foot commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Campbell.  Major General 
Artemas Ward estimated their number at 210 officers and men.  Ward to Washington. Boston. June 16-
17th, 1776. PGW; The Board of War to the Maryland Convention. August 6th, 1776.  Philadelphia. LMCC, 
2:39-40. 
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now Washington wanted them back.  Desperately concerned with personal propriety and 
the appearance of professionalism, Washington worried to Hancock about "the difficulty 
that will attend the proposed exchange on account of the dispersed and scattered state of 
the prisoners in our Hands."  If he failed to uphold his end of the bargain, his personal 
honor and reputation, as well as that of the Continental army, would be at stake.  All he 
could do was urge Congress "more than once" to establish a European-style commissary 
of prisoners "to superintend & conduct in such instances" the exchange of the prisoners.  
His pleas fell on deaf ears.  In September, Washington explained his situation to Howe: 
“The exchange of privates, I shall take the earliest oppertunity [sic] in my power to carry 
into execution but they being greatly dispersed through the New England governments, in 
order to their better accomodation [sic], will prevent it for some time."21   
 Occupying a burned-out, pestilence-infested, ruin of a city bulging at the seams 
with soldiers, sailors, refugees, and the flotsam and jetsam of prostitutes, vagabonds, and 
ne'er–do–wells that thrived in the company of early modern armies, Howe did not have 
the luxury of time.  Where would he house these men, how would they be fed, who 
would tend their wounds?  Even before the capture of Fort Washington, Howe chastised 
Washington for his apparent torpor: "I beg Leave to take this Opportunity of 
remonstrating against the Delay on your Part in the Exchange of Prisoners."  Howe was 
particularly anxious because he had received reports that "many Officers in your Power 
are still exposed to the Confinement of common Goals."  Other more recent prisoners had 
been shuttled away to New Jersey instead of being immediately sent in for exchange.  
Given Washington's earlier acquiescence to their agreement for the exchange of 
                                                
 21 Washington to Hancock.  Harlem Heights.  September 25th, 1776. PGW; Washington to Howe. 
Harlem Heights. September 23rd, 1776. PGW. 
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prisoners, such behavior was contrary to "the Custom of War" in Howe’s mind.  Here the 
British general knew he had leverage over Washington.  By suggesting that the American 
general had violated European customs of war, Howe highlighted the American 
amateurism that Washington had tried so hard to efface.  Howe hoped that his reproof 
would prod the Americans to action before overcrowding and disease claimed the lives of 
his prisoners.22 
 Howe struck a nerve.  Washington was insulted, but any feeling of indignation 
was overcome by shame.  His British antagonist was in the right.  As the commanding 
general, Washington was responsible for the actions of his subordinates, and his inability 
to produce the prisoners in a timely fashion advertised his impotency to a man he highly 
esteemed.  In an apologetic letter to his adversary on November 9th, Washington 
regretted "that it has not been in my power to effect the proposed Exchange of Prisoners 
before this time" and he assured Howe that "it has not arisen Sir from any design on my 
part…their disperresed [sic] situation for their better acommodation [sic] has been the 
reason of the delay."  He would later confess to Hancock that he had felt "much 
embarrassed on the Subject of Exchanges."  Washington was not entirely forthcoming in 
his mea culpa however.  The truth of the matter was that the prisoners had become a 
valuable commodity to the communities that housed them.  With many of their 
agricultural laborers and tradesmen doing duty with the army or the militia, these 
communities desperately needed the prisoners to reap the harvest and to maintain their 
struggling economies.  Local committees of safety were also under tremendous pressure 
to obtain the release of their constituents captured during Howe's rush through New 
York.  If they simply handed the prisoners over to Washington, he would likely exchange 
                                                
 22 Howe to Washington. Dobbs Ferry, NY. November 8th, 1776. PGW. 
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them for men who had been longest in captivity rather than for their friends and 
relations.23   
 To complicate matters, Congress had also created a loophole in its prisoner 
exchange policy allowing individual states to conduct independent trades with the British.  
Although they were theoretically only allowed to exchange prisoners captured by their 
state forces or militia, the temptation to swap some congressional prisoners was real.  In 
the absence of a congressional commissary of prisoners to keep track of how many there 
were and under whose jurisdiction they belonged, state governments in Rhode Island, 
Connecticut, and Massachusetts regularly and eagerly bargained with the British without 
congressional oversight.24 
 Saddled with a Congress that was overburdened, ineffectual, untutored in the 
customs of war, and deeply suspicious of consolidated power, as well as state 
governments that appeared to be conducting their own personal wars with the British, 
Washington was forced to face the reality that this conflict was not living up to his 
expectations for restrained, efficient, and "civilized" warfare.  Nonetheless, he dashed off 
                                                
 23 On August 1st, Howe expressed his regret that the two men had never met in person.  
Washington replied on August 1st that he possessed "a high sense of the honor and satisfaction I should 
have received from your personal Acquaintance."  Howe to Washington.  Staten Island. August 1st, 1776; 
Washington to Howe. New York. August 17th, 1776. PGW; Washington to Howe. White Plains. November 
9th, 1776. PGW; Washington to Hancock. Morris Town. March 1st, 1777. PGW. 
 24 At this stage in the conflict, state-organized exchanges were widespread.  Other states, besides 
those listed, were almost certainly conducting independent exchanges at this time as well.  For a discussion 
of state-based exchanges see Dixon, "Divided Authority," 250-251. On July 22nd, 1776, Congress resolved 
"that each state hath a right to make any exchange they think proper for prisoners taken from them or by 
them." The Rhode Island Assembly authorized Capt. David Gifford on December 23rd, 1776, to procure 
"three prisoners of war to exchange for three soldiers lately belonging to his company, now detained as 
prisoners." John Russell Bartlett ed., Records of the Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations 
(Providence, RI: A.C. Green and Brothers, 1856), 10 vols., 8:72-73.  Connecticut empowered Nathaniel 
Shaw to "propose and negotiate an exchange of...prisoners" on December 13th, 1776.  Force, American 
Archives, 5th series, 3:1207.  On the same day, the Massachusetts Council wrote Governor Trumbull: "We 
understand there is a cartel now at New-London for the exchange of prisoners; and as we have a number of 
them in this State, we wish to be informed upon what terms the exchange is to be made."  Force, American 
Archives, 5th series, 3:1209.   
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numerous letters to the governors, committee members, and councilmen of the 
surrounding states imploring them "to have all the Continental prisoners of War, 
(belonging to the Land Service) in the different Towns in your State, collected and 
brought together to some convenient place, from whence they may be removed hither 
when a Cartel is fully settled."  Cajoling Connecticut's Governor Trumbull, Washington 
pleaded that the return of the "prisoners as early as possible will much oblige me."  
Although the governor was pleased to comply with the general's wishes, he wondered 
whether "such of the Privates as are Mechanicks, & some Others who have a strong 
Inclination to Abide & remain in the Country, must be forced & Obliged to return & be 
exchanged."  He also wanted some assurance "that the Charge & expence Attending the 
keeping [of] the prisoners" would be reimbursed.  Again, Washington was powerless to 
do anything other than request Congress's opinion on the matter.  Washington was aware 
that allowing some of the prisoners, the skilled tradesmen useful to the war effort and 
those disinclined to return to the drudgery of army life, to remain unexchanged was a 
breach of the articles of capitulation "on the part of General Montgomery for those that 
were taken in Canada," but the final decision lay with Congress.  While Congress 
procrastinated, all Washington could do was wait.  And that was exactly what the 
American prisoners in New York feared most.25  
                                                
 25 For the best account of Congress's lack of knowledge of military affairs see Kenneth Schaffel, 
"The American Board of War, 1776-1781" (Ph.D. diss., City University of New York, 1983), chapter 1; 
Washington to Trumbull. Harlem Heights.  September 26th, 1776. PGW.  See also Washington to the New 
Hampshire Council.  September 29th, 1776. Harlem Heights, NY. Nathaniel Bouton, et al., eds., 
Documents and Records Relating to New Hampshire, 1623-1800 (Concord, NH: Edward A. Jenks, 1874), 
40 vols., 8:367-368; Trumbull to Washington. Lebanon, CT. October 2nd, 1776 PGW; Washington to 
Trumbull.  Harlem Heights.  October 8th, 1776. PGW; On October 14th, 1776 Congress postponed a vote 
on a resolution that would have included all of the British prisoners, regardless of their skilled status, in the 
proposed exchange.  JCC, 6:870. 
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 When the Fort Washington prisoners arrived in lower Manhattan on November 
18th, they were immediately confined in the abandoned churches, meeting houses, and 
sugar refineries that dotted the tip of the island.  There they discovered the sunken faces 
and emaciated bodies of comrades captured at Brooklyn and Kip's Bay, as well as in 
Canada.  Imagine their horror at seeing the physical embodiment of the fate that awaited 
them.  British Captain Mackenzie found the prisoners' "desponding appearance enough to 
shock one."  Just days before the new prisoners arrived, captured colonels Samuel Miles 
and Samuel Atlee alerted Washington of the men's "truly deplorable" situation.  Although 
the British had accepted the American officers' parole and allowed them to draw lines of 
credit for their subsistence and suitable housing, the enlisted men were closely confined 
and inadequately provisioned.  In the colonels' dire appraisal of the men's circumstances, 
only "Death must relieeve [sic] them from their present misserable [sic] Situation."  The 
disparity between the officers' confinement and that of their men could not have been 
starker.  American General Charles Lee, a former officer in the British army, penned a 
concerned missive to Howe on November 26th in which he informed the Briton that "the 
Americans whom chance has thrown into your hands, are as We are assured, confined 
closely in Prison" and allowed only "short allowance," while "those of yours who fall into 
our hands have the full liberty of the Towns or villages allotted to em [sic] and credit for 
a comfortable and ample subsistence."  In disbelief, Lee remarked, "if this mode can be 
approved of by Mr. Howe, He is strangely altered. It is neither consonant to humanity nor 
the eternal rules of Justice."  Lee was hopeful that "the fact is exaggerated."26 
                                                
 26 According to Captain Samuel Richards of the Continental army, the sugar houses had been used 
to house British prisoners prior to the British occupation. Diary of Samuel Richards, Captain of the 
Connecticut Line (Philadelphia, 1909), 31; Berkshire County Committees of Safety and Inspection to 
Washington. Pittsfield, MA. June 7th, 1776. PGW; Mackenzie, Diary of Frederick Mackenzie, 1:104; Cols. 
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 The accounts were no exaggeration; the enlisted soldiers were starving.  General 
Nathanael Greene received intelligence of their condition on November 11th, and he 
immediately informed Washington that "our prisoners in the City are Perishing for want 
of sustinance [sic]—having only half allowance of bread and Water—They are reduced 
to the necessity to beg and instead of receiveing [sic] any Charity are called damn 
Rebbels [sic] and told their fare is good enough."  That fare officially consisted of a two-
thirds portion of the rations provided to British soldiers on active duty, but in actuality 
Greene's estimation was not far off.  William Slade's prison diary is a litany of hunger, 
"sorrow and sadness."  When lucky, Slade received three-fourths of a pound of pork and 
two pounds of bread intended to last two days: an amount well below the two-thirds 
allotment. At other times, he had only "1/2 lb of pork a man, 3/4 of bisd [hardtack 
biscuits], a little peas and rice, and butter" to carry him through three days of 
confinement.  On the second day he reported having "verry [sic] little to eat."  Day three 
was "spent in hunger."  Howe would later claim that "the Allowance of Provisions to 
prisoners, from the Beginning of my Command, has been equal in Quantity and Quality 
to what is given to our own Troops not on Service," but even he must have known that 
                                                                                                                                            
Samuel Miles and Samuel Atlee to Washington. New York.  Draft of an undated letter, but likely written on 
November 12th, 1776, enclosed within Washington to Hancock. Heckensec [sic], NJ, November 19th, 
1776. PGW. Unlike generals Gage and Carleton, who refused to acknowledge any rank that did not derive 
from a king's commission, Howe, likely animated by a desire for reconciliation, ordered Loring to treat the 
men according to their rank and station. Pennsylvania officer Daniel Broadhead heard that the American 
officers in New York were "well treated." Daniel Broadhead to Unknown recipient. September 5th, 1776. 
Pennsylvania Archives: Selected and Arranged from Original Documents in the Office of the Secretary of 
the Commonwealth, Samuel Hazard, ed., (Philadelphia: Joseph Severns & Co Publisher, 1853), Series I., 12 
vols., 5:23.  See also Burrows, Forgotten Patriots, 16; Cox, A Proper Sense of Honor, 218-19; Charles Lee 
to Howe. November 26th, 1776. Schoff Revolutionary War Collection. Box 2. The Clements Library. 
University of Michigan. 
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graft, thievery, and spoilage ensured that the men rarely, if ever, saw their entitled 
allotment.27   
 Contrary to what the Americans, and latter-day historians, alleged, the prisoners' 
deplorable situation was not the result of premeditated British cruelty; Howe was 
operating within customary parameters for the treatment of enemy prisoners in Britain.  
Regrettably for the captured Americans, the British army policy of allowing prisoners 
only two-thirds rations was predicated on faulty logic.  The policy makers presumed that 
a soldier could subsist on a diet of seven pounds of beef and seven pounds of bread a 
week, augmented by a smaller quantity of butter or cheese, oatmeal, and peas.  Soldiers 
who were expected to march upwards of fifteen miles a day carrying sixty pounds of 
arms, accoutrements, powder, and ball would not last for long on such a paltry portion.  
Even in peacetime, the British soldier's diet was notoriously inadequate.  The dearth of 
leafy greens and fresh citrus regularly resulted in cases of malnutrition and scurvy.  To 
counteract this predicament, the army permitted, and indeed expected, soldiers to 
augment their provisions either through independent labor in peacetime or foraging in 
times of war.  Pilfering civilian property was officially discouraged, and occasionally 
capitally punished, but British officers often turned a blind eye to a little creative 
procurement on the part of their men.  In garrison, officers actively encouraged their 
soldiers to tend their own gardens in order to provide the nutrients their bodies craved.  
Confined to their prisons, the American soldiers had no such opportunity for 
supplementation.  The men would have to make do with their allowance, which even 
Washington admitted was likely "as good as the situation of General How's [sic] Stores 
                                                
 27 Greene to Washington. Fort Lee, NJ. November 11th, 1776. PGW; The Diary of William Slade, 
November 18th, 1776, in Dandridge, American Prisoners, 495; Howe to Washington.  February 5th, 1778. 
Philadelphia. PGW. 
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will admit," until they could be exchanged.  Under these conditions, Edwin Burrows 
estimates that most of the prisoners would have lost a pound of body weight per week of 
captivity.28   
 By the time the Fort Washington prisoners arrived in the city, the situation in New 
York's jails had grown desperate.  British Captain Mackenzie described the prisoners as 
"very Sickly, owing to their want of Clothing and necessaries, salt provisions, 
confinement, foul air, & little exercise."  Evincing characteristic metropolitan disdain for 
all things provincial, Mackenzie described the prisoners as "such low spirited creatures, 
particularly the Americans, that if once they are taken sick they seldom recover."  The 
only anodyne for "their dirty, unhealthy, and desponding appearance" was a fresh supply 
of clothing and provisions.  Perhaps aware that his Hessian auxiliaries were at least partly 
responsible for the lamentable condition of the prisoners' wardrobes, Howe presented 
each man with a fresh linen shirt.  Much like Carleton's earlier gift to the Americans 
captured in Canada, the shirts were much appreciated, but a single layer of thin linen 
would do little to keep out the coming winter cold.  As Miles and Atlee apprized 
Washington, "unless a speedy exchange takes place, or some Method fall’n upon to 
furnish them with Cloathing [sic], Death must relieeve [sic] them from their present 
misserable [sic] Situation."  Had Howe been able to swiftly exchange the prisoners, as 
would have been the case in Europe, their nutritional and sartorial deficiencies, though 
                                                
 28 Danske Dandridge claimed that British provost martial Cunningham was responsible for 
starving the prisoners to death.  Dandridge, American Prisoners of the Revolution, 2.  More recently, Edwin 
Burrows has argued, "Although the British did not deliberately kill American prisoners in New York, they 
might as well have done."  Burrows, Forgotten Patriots, xi; Brumwell, Redcoats, 151-53.  See also Michael 
N. McConnell, Army & Empire, chapter 6. Cols. Atlee and Miles informed Washington that the prisoners 
"have no means of adding Vegitables [sic] or any other nourishing article for want of Cash." Washington to 
Hancock. Heckensec [sic], NJ. November 19th, 1776. PGW; Washington to Hancock. Heckensec [sic], NJ. 
November 19th, 1776. PGW.  According to Burrows, "prisoners of war should have received 1,640 calories 
per day.  Even if he always got every scrap allotted him, a completely sedentary prisoner weighing 160 
pounds would lose about one pound of body weight per week." Burrows, Forgotten Patriots, 19. 
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uncomfortable, would have been innocuous.  Instead, the men languished in the vain 
hope that Washington would expedite their release.29   
 Surprisingly, neither Washington nor the prisoners blamed Howe for their 
predicament; Congress was clearly not doing its part.  Washington, who possessed "too 
high an Opinion of his Humanity," was confident that Howe, as a gentleman and a man 
of honor, would never "willingly add the Calamity of Famine to that of Captivity."  As a 
professional soldier, Washington knew too well the challenges of feeding an army in a 
devastated environment while conducting an active campaign.  Howe was doing the best 
he could under the circumstances; Congress's inaction on the other hand was bordering 
on negligence.  Upon seeing "the horrid dismal situation of our poor privates in the 
Hospitals in Newyork [sic]," Joseph Webb of Connecticut expressed the common 
sentiment that "the Country does too much neglect something to be done for 'em."  After 
all, the British, through the auspices of David Franks, had provided their prisoners 
confined by Congress with "provisions and other necessaries" at the expense of the crown 
for nearly a year.  As was European custom, Howe expected the American commander to 
either supply the American prisoners or provide sufficient reimbursement.  On this point, 
Washington and Howe agreed, but without Congress's intervention, how could he 
provision these prisoners when he could barely afford to provide for his own army?  
Colonels Attlee and Miles had the solution.  Congress should appoint an agent, such as 
David Franks, to open a line of credit with British merchants in New York to furnish the 
prisoners with the necessary supplies.  The suggestion was consistent with Washington's 
                                                
 29 Mackenzie, Diary of Frederick Mackenzie, 1:103; Washington to Hancock. Heckensec [sic], NJ. 
November 19th, 1776. PGW. 
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understanding of European practice, and he dutifully forwarded it to Congress, insisting 
that "Humanity and the good of the service require it."  Congress predictably ignored it.30  
 Unlike Congress, Howe could not afford to remain aloof from his prisoners' 
suffering.  On December 8th, a group of American officers who were enjoying the 
freedom of their paroles alerted Howe that "the State of the Sick & wounded Prisoners is 
of too melancholy a kind for Recital; and the consequences of a General Contagion to be 
dreaded."  Both smallpox and typhus were present among the prisoners.  Fearing the 
spread of the diseases among his own troops in densely populated lower Manhattan, 
Howe dispatched Colonel Samuel Miles to Congress in order to "expedite the Exchange 
of prisoners."  Howe's adjutant assured Miles that "the General has every Disposition to 
promote" the exchange.  Perhaps an eyewitness to the effects of congressional 
indifference would persuade that body to act.31 
 In their defense, the members of the Board of War were doing everything in their 
limited power to collect the British prisoners from the various states for exchange, but 
their march north was hampered by delay after delay.  Contrary to congressional 
instructions, several states had already enlisted British prisoners and were unwilling to 
return the men to face execution for desertion.  Two such prisoners, Robert Colefox and 
Richards Williams, claimed to prefer "perpetual imprisonment, rather than to be 
exchanged & returned to the British Army or Navy."  Rowland Chambers hoped that 
                                                
 30 Washington to Atlee. Newark, NJ. November 25th, 1776. PGW; Joseph Webb to unknown 
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 31 Colonels Magaw, Miles, and Atlee to Howe. New York. December 8th, 1776. Carleton Papers. 
Reel 3 No. 341. DLAR; Capt. Robert Mackenzie to Colonels Magaw, Attlee, West, and Burd.  New York. 
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Governor William Livingston of New Jersey might be able to prevent their exchange on 
the grounds that they would "undoubtedly" join the American army, despite their being 
"considered as Continental Prisoners & Wholey [sic] at the disposal of the Congress."  
Livingston interceded with Congress and the men were not sent forward for exchange.  
Others were delayed by weather, impassable roads, or misunderstandings.32   
 With no immediate prospect of an exchange on the horizon, Howe opted to 
confine 750 prisoners on board the troop transport ships Whitby and Grosvenor in an 
effort to relieve the city's overcrowded prisons. The ships were emptied, cleaned, and 
prepared for the reception of the prisoners.  William Slade was among the Fort 
Washington prisoners who shivered in the cold while waiting to enter the Grosvenor in 
early December.  Slade reported "much confusion" as the over five hundred prisoners 
clamored to claim a berth below decks.  Once on board, Slade and his comrades spent a 
"verry [sic] long" night in hunger and sorrow.  This was just the beginning of his 
suffering.  While British officers and soldiers celebrated Christmas 1776 with fine repasts 
and orotund toasts, the Americans aboard the Whitby endured a night "spent in dying 
grones [sic] and cries."  By the time Slade was finally released, as many as two-thirds of 
his companions had perished from disease, exposure, and starvation.  Although Howe 
could never have imagined the repercussions of his actions, his decision to transform the 
transports into floating prisons set the precedent for a system of prisoner confinement that 
                                                
 32 Peters to Washington. Philadelphia, PA. November 19th, 1776. PGW; Rowland Chambers to 
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Edwin Burrows estimates claimed the lives of 18,000 American soldiers, sailors, and 
civilians: more than half of all Americans who fell into British hands.  According to 
Colonel Thomas Hartley of Pennsylvania, few survived to tell the "doleful Story of their 
Captivity and Distress."33 
 Prison ships were not novel examples of British sadism intended to punish 
refractory rebels; the crown had employed them to house French and Spanish prisoners in 
the past to great effect.  Although less salubrious than their land-based equivalents, the 
prison hulks anchored in the Thames and in the coastal towns of Portsmouth, Yarmouth, 
Plymouth, and Chatham during the Seven Years' War were well supplied, frequently 
cleaned, and rarely overcrowded.  Sheldon Cohen has suggested that the death rate of 
prisoners on board these ships only slightly exceeded that of conventional prisons. The 
conditions in the New York prison ships deteriorated so rapidly because the sheer 
numbers of prisoners the British possessed, over 4,500, was compounded by Congress's 
inaction.  When it came to dolling out Howe's few available resources, the cries and 
lamentations of the American prisoners were drowned out by those of the 14,000 soldiers 
and 11,000 civilians clamoring for the general's attention.  The prisoners were 
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Washington's problem.  Unfortunately for the British, that was not how most Americans 
viewed the situation.34 
 It did not take long for news of the prison ships, and the suffering men they 
contained, to spread beyond New York.  Timothy Parker of Connecticut managed to 
secret a letter out of the Whitby in early December to inform Governor Trumbull that 
"there are more than two Hundred and fifty prisoners of us on board this Ship (some of 
which are Sick & without the least assistance from Physician Drugg or Medicine) all fed 
on two thirds allowance of salt provisions and all Crowded promiscuously together 
without Distinction or Respect to person [,] office or Colour in the Small room of a Ship 
Between Decks."  In his opinion these "Miserable Circumstances" would lead to "a kind 
of lingering Inevitable death, Unless we obtain a timely and Sensible Release."  Not only 
had the British imperiled the men's health, but they had also undermined their racial and 
class identities by suffering gentlemen to share their confinement with those beneath 
them.  The Pennsylvania Evening Post quickly picked up the story and stunned its 
readers with an account of "Captains and Lieutenants in the Continental 
service…huddled together between decks in a prison-ship, with Indians, Mallattoes, 
Negroes, &c."  After enumerating a litany of abuses and insults, the article's author 
concluded that British "inhumanity has extended beyond this life, for the dead have been 
thrown out upon the highway and open fields, with this impious and horrid expression, 
"D——n the rebel, he's not worth a grave."  The moral of the story was apparent to all: 
the British considered Americans, even officers possessing commissions from Congress, 
to be rebels unworthy of the protections of "civilized" warfare.  A protracted and painful 
death from starvation, dehydration, or disease awaited all those who opposed their lawful 
                                                
 34 Cohen, Yankee Sailors in British Gaols, 18-22; Burrows, Forgotten Patriots, 277 n.15. 
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monarch.  By his decision to utilize prison ships, occasioned by the honest intention to 
relieve the overcrowded conditions of New York's improvised prisons until Congress and 
Washington could carryout their side of the exchange, Howe unwittingly assumed the 
culpability for a situation not of his making.35 
  Colonel Miles, who knew too well the true authors of the prisoners' misfortune, 
continued to maintain that Congress, not the British, was responsible for the prisoners' 
suffering.  Miles expressed his frustration to Elias Boudinot in July 1777: 
"Notwithstanding the reasonableness of the purposal [sic] I brought from Genl Howe for 
an exchange of Officers, & Genl Washington[']s sentiments concerning there with, the 
Congress have to my great surprise refused to comply with it."  He feared that "this mark 
of their injustice & want of common Humanity will…be a greater discouragement to the 
Army than they at Present apprehend."  Who would enlist in an army governed by 
civilians who were incapable of conducting a simple exchange of prisoners?  Were 
American soldiers to perish in captivity while Congress appointed yet another committee 
to consider their plight?  A veteran of the Seven Years' War, Miles believed that 
committees had no place in warfare.  He and his officers had been "treated as genteely 
[sic] by the Hessian & highland officers as we could expect or have wished" and General 
Howe had been "kind enough" to allow the men as much of their personal "Bagage [sic] 
as is necessary for our health & comfort."  The same could not be said for Congress.  
Despondent, Miles wondered to a friend in Pennsylvania: "God knows what your people 
in power [Congress] think of us if they think of us at all."  In a scathing critique of 
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Congress's management of the war, Miles raged: "I do believe that no prisoners ever were 
treated with more inhuman Cruelty than our's have been by their Employers."36   
 Miles' indictment of republican government's management of the war was 
muffled by the deluge of propagandistic accounts castigating the British as barbarians and 
butchers that inundated American newspapers, pamphlets, and periodicals that winter.  
By the spring of 1777, revolutionary Americans had seen enough of the realities of this 
war to know who their enemies were and what they were capable of.  New Jersey's 
governor William Livingston summarized the prevailing American opinion when, in a 
fiery fit of rhetorical hyperbole, he accused the British army of having "butchered the 
wounded, asking for quarter; mangled the dying, weltering in their blood; refused to the 
dead the rights of sepulture; suffered prisoners to perish for want of sustenance [and] 
violated the chastity of women."  In the war of words, the Americans held the high 
ground: a position that would have dire consequences for how revolutionary Americans 
came to envision the enemy in their hands.37   
 
“The rage of tory-hunting”: American Suppression of Loyalism, 1776-1777 
 Away from the fury of the fighting around New York and the frenetic debates of 
congressional committee rooms in Philadelphia, American communities from Georgia to 
                                                
 36 Miles did not fully absolve the British of blame, he noted that they could and should have done 
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Massachusetts grappled with their own local foes and struggled in their own "internal 
wars."  Revolutionary Americans were under no illusion that their cause enjoyed 
unanimous support.  Throughout the imperial crisis preceding the advent of open 
hostilities, revolutionary sympathizers confronted members of their communities who 
opposed the protests with violence.  Derogatively termed "tories" by their more radical 
neighbors, these men and women of all social orders sought stability above all else.  
From the vantage point of those targeted by revolutionary crowds brandishing clubs, 
dumping tea, burning effigies, and dolling out tar and feathers to those who opposed 
them, the quest for stasis in the face of entropy was not only reasonable, it was requisite.  
From the revolutionary perspective, however, the loyalists' rigid adherence to the reign of 
tyranny was deluded and dangerous; loyalists could not trade their own liberty for 
security without imperiling everyone else’s along the way.38  
 Nevertheless, when war came, the revolutionary leadership believed that the 
loyalists posed little imminent threat to the "glorious cause."  A decade of 
marginalization, insult, and abuse had degraded the probability of a cohesive loyalist 
community. There were of course certain prominent loyalists who, through their wealth 
and connections, might prove a corrupting influence in the community by eliciting 
support for the British ministry, but these were few and far between.  Offering violence to 
those deceived by corrupt ministers' promises and prevarications was cruelty not to be 
countenanced; war was no time for personal vendettas or petty scores.  The legitimacy of 
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the American cause rested upon the restrained conduct of those in its service.  Upon 
assuming the command of the army at Cambridge, Washington issued a proclamation 
making it criminal to "molest any of those people commonly called Tories."  Upon 
conviction, officers would forfeit their commissions and soldiers would "suffer corporeal 
punishment."  When John Lovell, the master of the Public Grammar School in Boston, 
was seized by American officers who, in his words, entered his house "with all the 
ravings of dogs just up with the game," Washington ordered him released, and Lovell 
was allowed to walk the streets of Boston "as a free subject of the King of Britain."  Even 
those loyalists who had held positions of authority in the British colonial bureaucracy 
before the war were protected.  In December 1775, General William Heath ordered 
Walter Logan, the former customs officer from New Jersey then residing in Needham, 
Massachusetts, to be conducted "without violence or Insult" to his headquarters for 
examination.  Once arrived, Heath granted Logan a lenient parole, and he was eventually 
allowed to depart for England with his family.  Far from fearing them as a fifth column, 
Washington and the revolutionary leadership conceived of the loyalists as objects of pity 
and protection in the opening stages of the conflict.39 
 Armed with muskets and on the march, loyalists looked less pitiable to the 
revolutionary governments of Virginia and North Carolina.  During the fall of 1775 and 
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winter of 1776, the royal governors John Murray, the Fourth Earl of Dunmore, and Josiah 
Martin erected the king's standard and called all loyal and able bodied men to arms.  By 
issuing a proclamation emancipating all slaves belonging to rebel masters who took arms 
for the king, Dunmore was able to assemble a force of liberated slaves—upon whom he 
bestowed grandiloquent moniker the Royal Ethiopian Regiment—as well as a small 
contingent of loyal Virginians, British regulars, and recent Scottish immigrants.  The 
outpouring of white loyalist support Dunmore hoped for never materialized however. 
When Virginia militia under the command of Colonel William Woodford delivered a 
well-executed volley devastating the loyalist forces at the Battle of Great Bridge on 9 
December, 1775, the earl was forced to decamp to a British warship in the Chesapeake 
Bay.  In the aftermath of the battle, several "disaffected persons and Negroes" fell into 
Woodford's hands.  Although his "Instructions Mention[d] proceeding against Slaves 
taken in arms, according to the rules of War," he and his officers were of the "Unanimous 
Opinion" that they should be summarily executed "to make an Immediate Example of 
them."  Accountable to the collective wisdom of the colony’s civilian leadership, 
Woodford requested new instructions. While awaiting the orders of the Committee of 
Safety, Woodford did order one Scottish loyalist named Hamilton "to be coupled to one 
of his Black Brother Soldiers with a pair of Handcuffs" as a punishment.  He proudly 
declared that such treatment "shall be the fate of all those Cattle" captured in the future.  
Virginia's revolutionary leadership, keen to expose Dunmore as the sole violator of "the 
practices of war among civilized nations," would not allow white men, no matter how 
misguided, to be shackled to slaves.  They overruled Woodford: ordering the exchange of 
the regulars and the loyalists and returning the slaves to their masters.  With Dunmore’s 
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threatened slave insurrection neutralized, his white followers could be pardoned, his 
black ones returned to their servile station, and the status quo reestablished.40 
 The situation was much the same in North Carolina.  Despite Governor Martin's 
confidence that loyal North Carolinians would rally to his assistance in droves, fewer 
than a thousand actually took up arms.  This meager force was easily defeated at the 
Battle of Moore's Creek Bridge in February 1776.  In the tense moments following the 
loyalists’ initial abortive assault, American officers promised the men that "they should 
meet with no bad treatment" provided they laid down their arms.  The revolutionaries 
were good for their word; for the most part.  One loyalist recorded that "our private men 
were all sett [sic] at liberty."  Upon taking an oath to "Bear true Allegiance to the State of 
North Carolina," the men were granted "free Pardon and Protection" from their captors.  
Their officers, whose influence was too great to be allowed to remain in the colony, were 
less fortunate.  Confined in Halifax's "cold dirty jail without fire or even a seat to rest 
upon," the men endured "almost all the inconveniences inseparable from the state of 
prison."  Within a few weeks, however, they were paroled within the Halifax town limits.  
Twenty-six of the principal officers were then dispatched to Philadelphia to prevent their 
involvement in any future disturbances, but all were eventually paroled and exchanged.  
The Provincial Congress assured their prisoners and their constituents alike "that every 
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indulgence which humanity and compassion can give, consistent with the duty which we 
owe to the inhabitants of these Colonies…shall be extended to those whom we have in 
our power." After their decisive defeat, the loyalists posed little threat to the stability of 
the colony.  The revolutionary leadership hoped that the overt demonstration of 
compassion and clemency would suffice to maintain loyalist docility in the future.41 
 Some loyalists, however, were past pardoning.  Acting under the October 6th, 
1775, congressional resolution allowing each colony to arrest anyone who might 
"endanger the safety of the colony, or the liberties of America," local committees and 
councils of safety imprisoned suspected spies and saboteurs at will.  From the outset of 
hostilities, Philadelphia's "old goal" was crowded with men and women who the 
Pennsylvania Council of Safety deemed too "dangerous" to stay at large.  Three such 
accused conspirators, John Connolly, Allen Cameron, and John Smyth, who were 
captured in November 1775 while attempting to raise loyalist forces on the Maryland 
frontier, suffered a particularly rigorous confinement.  In May 1776, Allen Cameron 
petitioned James Duane for release from his "disagreeable situation."  Because he was 
considered a flight risk, the city's jailer, Thomas Dewees, ordered Cameron "close shut 
up day and night within a damp Vaulted room."  Outraged at his treatment, John Smyth 
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castigated Congress: "An imprisonment like this cannot be intended merely as a 
confinement; it is much more: It is a punishment."  Congress disagreed.  The men were 
conspirators, acting under the secret orders of Lord Dunmore, and thus they were not 
entitled to the customary protections of prisoner-of-war status.  Their actions, not their 
loyalty to the king, necessitated their confinement.  Although "close confined," the men 
were not abused.  The austerity of their imprisonment was largely the result of their 
failure to remunerate Dewees for the expenses of their maintenance.  Jailers were not 
customarily responsible for provisioning their prisoners.  Gentlemen with ready cash or 
lines of credit could enjoy the comforts of home while in captivity, while their 
impecunious cellmates subsisted on the bare minimum allotted by the community.  With 
more than a touch of hyperbole, Allen Cameron summarized the dilemma: the prisoners 
could either "pay as far as either our money or credit went, or starve." 42  
 The case of Connolly, Smith, and Cameron was extraordinary however; most 
loyalists enjoyed a far more benign imprisonment in the first year of the war.  William 
Judd recorded being "Treated very Civilly by the Magistrates" in Philadelphia and 
"Kindly used by the Sheriff" in October 1775.  In early January, Judd even accompanied 
Dewees "to the City Tavern" where the two men "drank plentifully of Excellent wine at 
his Expense" before being returned "back to the Goal."  As long as all Americans were 
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nominally "loyal" to the king, the simple expression of that loyalty was not a crime.  
Those who opposed the American war effort could be considered "disaffected" or 
"inimical" to the cause of liberty, but until Congress declared America free and 
independent of Great Britain, the revolutionary elite did not perceive its loyalist 
opposition as traitors, insurrectionists, or worse yet, rebels.  Some were certainly 
"dangerous" and deserving of "close confinement," but none posed an existential threat to 
the American cause.43 
 The revolutionaries' lenient response to armed loyalism in 1775 and early 1776 
would likely have endured had the loyalist challenge remained unsupported and 
attenuated; but the British had other plans.  Based on inflated estimates of loyalist support 
in the Carolinas, the British dispatched a major expeditionary force to the south with 
10,000 muskets to arm those southern Americans who had not forsaken their rightful 
sovereign.  The loyalist host never materialized, and the British fleet was battered and 
repulsed at Charleston in June 1776, but British policy did not change.  When General 
Howe arrived at New York in late June, he brought arms, munitions, and the promise of 
royal commissions to those who could rally loyalist support. Throughout the war, the 
British continually overestimated that support, but unfortunately for the loyalists, so too 
did the Americans.44   
 Given the results of the Charleston expedition, the revolutionaries might have 
breathed a sigh of relief.  What little loyalist mobilization had materialized was easily 
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swept aside.  Instead, they panicked.  Girded with British bayonets, the loyalists came to 
occupy a place of prominence within the revolutionary consciousness after Charleston.  
Treachery and conspiracy seemed to lurk in every part of the continent.  Aware that New 
York was the intended target of Howe's armada, crowds of alarmed New Yorkers took to 
the street to locate and punish suspected loyalists.  One Continental officer in the city was 
"disagreeably surprised" by the "very tumultuous noise" of a "mob" dragging a man to 
jail merely "on suspicion of being a Tory."  His commanding officer, General Israel 
Putnam, complained "of the riotous and disorderly conduct of numbers of the 
inhabitants" that led to "acts of violence towards some disaffected persons."  Fearing 
unchecked vigilante justice and not content to rely on crowd action alone, the New York 
Provincial Congress established a "secret committee" in mid June for the purpose of 
uncovering the loyalists involved in "dangerous Designs and treasonable Conspiracies."  
Under orders from the committee, a detachment of General Nathanael Greene's brigade 
roused David Matthews, the city's mayor, from his slumber and made him a prisoner.  
The secret committee had received intelligence that Matthews and several other 
"dangerous persons" were involved in a plot to enlist Continental soldiers in the British 
army.  A search of his papers revealed no evidence of a loyalist conspiracy.  Hardly 
placated, the Provincial Council locked the mayor in the city's jail for two month before 
sending him to Connecticut for confinement.  His alleged co-conspirator Thomas Hickey, 
a soldier in Washington's body guard, was less fortunate.  Unshielded by social status and 
subject to martial law, he was found guilty of "Sedition and mutiny, and also of holding 
treach'rous [sic] correspondence with the enemy."  On June 28th, 1776 Private Hickey 
was executed for betraying a country that would not exist for six more days.45 
                                                
 45 In May of 1776, the Fairfield, CT, committee of inspection believed it had uncovered "a horrid 
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 With rumors of loyalist plots circulating widely, and the British army on the cusp 
of capturing New York, Congress acted to criminalize loyalism.  Even without a formal 
declaration of independence, Congress resolved on June 24th that anyone "abiding within 
any of the United Colonies" who professed allegiance "to the king of Great Britain" was 
"guilty of treason."  Although Congress could not legislate for any of the individual 
colonies, it was hoped that each would "pass laws for punishing" the king's friends.  
Without the power or authority to legislate for all, Congress was constrained from 
enunciating an overarching rubric for how treason was to be determined and punished, 
thus opening the door for tremendous variation in response ranging from laxity to 
extreme violence.  Believing the threat too great to be checked on the local level, Joseph 
Hawley implored Elbridge Gerry for a continental treason law: "Did any state ever 
subsist without exterminating traitors?…It is amazingly wonderful, that having no capital 
punishment for our intestine enemies, we have not been utterly ruined before now.  For 
God's sake, let us not run such risks a day longer…High treason ought to be the same in 
all the United States."  Hawley did not get his way, but soon after the Declaration of 
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Independence, each state did enact its own version of a treason law and began to 
prosecute the offenders.  By 1778, every state had established "tests" to determine the 
loyalties of its inhabitants.46 
 Because of its proximity to the British army in New York, Connecticut was 
among the first to try loyalists for treason.  Loyalists in the colony had long suffered the 
malicious caprice of mob violence, but with a congressional resolution in hand, 
Connecticut authorities began rounding up suspected persons in earnest.  Josepha Hait of 
Fairfield reported that he was "taken by a mob and Cruelly used and closely confined in 
Fairfield Goal" for thirteen months before he managed to effect his escape.  Similarly, 
Joel Stone suffered, "every Rigor that Rebel Malice could suggest, in close Confinement" 
at Fairfield.  Hartford's jail was equally crowded with accused traitors in the summer of 
1776.47 
 Though they did not realize it, men like Hait and Stone were fortunate.  On July 
7th, Major Christopher French, still a prisoner in Hartford, received word that Mr. 
M.cNeal[,] Mr. Seaman & Mr. Fairchild were committed to Simsbury Mines for two 
years…having been found guilty of being Friends to Government—and good order."  
These men were sent to an abandoned copper mine in Simsbury known as Newgate, 
                                                
 46 JCC, 5:475; Joseph Hawley to Elbridge Gerry. July 17th, 1775, in James T. Austin, The Life of 
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 47 James Shepard, "The Tories of Connecticut," The Connecticut Quarterly, Vol.1, No.2, (Spring, 
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which had been converted into a subterranean prison.  The prisoners were kept in 
makeshift cells nearly 70 feet below ground.  Connecticut loyalist, Rev. Samuel Peters, 
described the prisoners' ordeal: they were "let down on a windlass into this dismal cavern, 
through a hole which answers the triple purpose of conveying them food, air and—I was 
going to say light, but that scarcely reaches them."  Often crowded with over a hundred 
prisoners, the prison’s sanitary conditions deteriorated precipitously.  Peters claimed that 
"in a few months the prisoners are released by death and the colony rejoices in her great 
humanity and the mildness of her laws."  Although Peters was certainly inclined to think 
the worst of Connecticut's revolutionary leadership, his depiction is corroborated by a 
contemporaneous etching of the cavernous prison (Fig. 2) and an early nineteenth-century 
account of the trial and confinement of Edward Huntington.  At his trial, Huntington 
claimed to be "a British subject" and "prisoner of war" who deserved "such treatment as 
the laws of civilized warfare dictate."  His protestations were ignored.  Bowing to 
pressure from members of the crowd who cried, "Away with the traitor—to the mines 
with the tory," the court found him guilty of high treason and condemned him to 
"perpetual imprisonment in the Mines."  Confined in the "dark abyss" where "at noon 
only a gloomy twilight" illuminated "the squalid forms of the miserable wretches here 
incarcerated," Huntington languished "in the midst of sorrow."  Months before the British 
ever housed an American soldier on board a prison ship, the revolutionary government of 
Connecticut banished men beneath the earth for defending what had been their lawful 
government just the previous year.48 
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 All of the states agreed that the overt act of "leveling war" against the United 
States constituted treason, but there was much variance about less overt acts of treason.  
Radical revolutionaries in Pennsylvania pushed for a catholic definition of treason: 
loyalty to the king was disloyalty to the United States.  The state's new convention 
charged with creating a constitution did not go so far however.  In September, the 
convention passed an ordinance defining treason as armed opposition and anything less 
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as "misprision of treason."  Both crimes carried sentences of imprisonment "not 
exceeding the duration of the present war," but only convicted traitors suffered forfeiture 
of all of their lands and property.  In December 1776, Joseph Stansbury, a merchant from 
Philadelphia, was "made prisoner in [his] dwelling house, by some armed men."  He was 
accused of having "sung God save the King, or joined in the chorus."  After a brief 
examination, he was thrown in the city's new jail "without the least shadow of Reason 
whatever."  In a petition to the Council of Safety, Stansbury appealed to the English Bill 
of Rights and demanded to know why he was "wantonly deprived of his Liberty."  
Congress's July 24th resolution had nullified English law, and as a suspected loyalist, 
Stansbury had no claim for redress.  He remained in prison until the British occupied the 
city in 1777 and was not cleared of the charge until June 1779.49 
 New Yorkers were not so lenient.  With the British fleet anchored off Staten 
Island, the New York Convention resolved unanimously to declare any "adherent to the 
King" within their borders guilty of treason and punishable by the "pains and penalties of 
DEATH!" The proclamation was ordered to be read aloud throughout the city so that no 
one might claim ignorance.  To add teeth to their resolution, the Convention established a 
committee for "detecting and defeating the designs of the internal enemies of this State." 
The Convention members feared that with British support, the loyalists would launch an 
armed "insurrection" against the revolutionary government in the state.  To combat the 
                                                
 49 The Statues at Large of Pennsylvania from 1682 to 1801 (Philadelphia: Wm. Stanley Ray, 
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perceived threat, they authorized the formation of a company of 220 officers and men for 
the expressed purpose of policing the loyalists and crushing any insurrection.  
Washington even dispatched elements of his own army to Staten Island to arrest all "Such 
persons as from their Conduct had shewn themselves inimical" or "gave just Cause of 
Suspicion."   He confided to General William Livingston, "I would suggest to you that 
my Tenderness has been often abused & I have had Reason to repent the Indulgences 
shewn them [the loyalists]."  The time had come for severity.50 
 For New York loyalists, the moment for patient endurance in the face of insult 
and injury was equally at an end.  With British troops securely ensconced by October 
1776, Manhattan had become a haven for the king's friends who flocked to the island: 
some for relief, others for revenge.  Aware that the loyalists were facing increased 
persecution, both legal and extralegal, New York's royal governor William Tryon was 
confident that "a great number would join the King's troops as soon as they saw them 
land."  He was not to be disappointed.  Loyal subjects of the king from across the social, 
religious, ethnic, and racial spectrum volunteered to suppress the rebellion in droves.  In 
early September, Howe authorized Oliver De Lancey, the New York grandee and veteran 
of the Seven Years' War, "to raise a Brigade of Provincials…to reestablish Order, and 
Government…[and] to Apprehend or drive all Concealed Rebels from among his 
Majesties well Affected Subjects."  In short order De Lancey succeeded in fielding three 
battalions of loyalist infantry, uniformed and equipped by the crown.  His counterpart in 
                                                
 50 JPC, 1:527, 638. Fearing that the Staten Island loyalists would take advantage of the army's 
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New Jersey, Cortland Skinner, was even more successful.  In early winter 1776, the New 
Jersey Volunteers boasted six battalions numbering over 2,500 men in arms.  Despite 
their impressive turnout, British officers scoffed at the raw American recruits and 
relegated the loyalists to foraging, guarding, and policing.  In this capacity, the loyalist 
troops soon earned a reputation for rampage and rapine.  Operating "between the lines of 
the two armies," loyalist troops committed "every kind of crime—robbery, house 
burning, murder &c" according to one Connecticut officer.51 
Keen to exploit any chink in the crown’s armor, American newspapers circulated 
exaggerated accounts of loyalist conspiracies and crimes that compounded stories of 
Hessian atrocities and British malevolence—fueling animosity and eliciting demands for 
retaliation.  American troops were hardly innocent of plunder and worse, but the loyalist 
press had yet to organize an effective counteroffensive.  To the American reading public, 
the British army, aided by "the internal enemies of America," was engaged in 
"indiscriminately murdering, plundering, and ravishing" without concern for "humanity 
and the practices of civilized nations."  Someone had to pay.52 
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Enraged Americans began to vent their frustrations on the closest surrogates: 
British prisoners of war. Captured British officers confined in Pennsylvania claimed to 
have suffered "cruel treatment" at the hands of troops on the way to the front in August.  
As they informed the Committee of Inspection and Observation of Cumberland County: 
"We have been insulted in the most gross terms, pelted with stones, hatchets have been 
brandish'd over our heads, fire Arms presented at us, nay fir'd and more than one plan 
concerted for way-laying and murdering us."  Despite the best efforts of the local 
revolutionary leadership to exert "themselves to the utmost to provide for our Safety," the 
officers received "a treatment we had no reason to expect in a civiliz'd Country."  Hardly 
the "brotherly Affection" to which they had become accustomed, the prisoners attributed 
the alteration in their treatment to the "defamatory papers spread about the town to render 
us odious to the people."  Major Christopher French feared that the townspeople of 
Hartford would take matters into their own hands.  After the battle of Brooklyn, he was 
informed by a local that "the people would put us all to Death" before the British army 
could liberate the men.  Happily for French, the committee had already decided to 
confine him behind bars, beyond the reach of vigilantes.53 
 The loyalists had no intention of going down without a fight.  Sensing the 
weakness of the revolutionary movement after the defeats in the battles around New 
York, loyalists throughout the continent began to organize to oppose their oppressors.  In 
the opinion of a Connecticut committee, word of "the late successes of the british [sic] 
arms…elated the prisoners & Tories: & some of them in consequence thereof are grown 
saucy & troublesome."  Lacking the "power to command any civil or military assistance" 
                                                
 53 British Prisoners of War at Carlisle to the Committee of Inspection and Observation of 
Cumberland County. August 1st, 1776.  Boudinot Papers. LOC; Cohen, The Connecticut Captivity of 
Christopher French, 159. 
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the committee could not "punish their insolence" which served to "dishearten our own 
people."  Seeing confessed loyalists at large was bad for morale.  In Westchester county 
New York, Thaddeaus Crane found "the present situation of our enemy has so spirited up 
our Tories," that only the immediate arrest and banishment of "those insulting villains" 
would save the revolutionary movement from ruin.  The situation was even more extreme 
in northern New Jersey where Hessian plundering had induced local revolutionaries to 
retaliate on their loyalist neighbors.  Eager for revenge, loyalists took to arms to 
overthrow their tormentors.  Only days after the fall of Fort Washington, the "danger of 
an Insurrection of Tories in the County of Monmouth" forced Washington to dispatch a 
regiment of continentals "to apprehend all such persons…concerned in any plot or design 
against the liberty of safety of the United States."54  
 In the opinion of many revolutionaries, those Americans who denied Congress's 
right to declare independence were no longer misguided malcontents or rowdy 
reactionaries; they were rebels against their country.  Evincing absolutely no sense of 
irony, the revolutionaries began to envision any homegrown opposition as rebellion.  For 
an infant nation like the United States, rebellion could not be tolerated.  Tasked with 
putting down the loyalist insurrection in New Jersey by force, General George Clinton 
boasted to William Heath in early January 1777, "Had I only a couple of field pieces, I 
flatter myself I shou'd be able to drive the Rebels out of this Quarter of the Country."  
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Some artillery was all that prevented Clinton from attacking "those Parricides with 
Success."  The New York Committee of Safety had burdened Clinton with the 
responsibility of "Overawing and Curbing the disaffected or Revolted Subjects of that 
State" in December, and the general had every intention of living up to his responsibility. 
Rebellion would be crushed.  The President Pro Tempore of New York, Leonard 
Gansevoort, pithily summarized the shift in American opinion: "The Disaffected or rather 
the Rebels throughout America have hitherto been treated with a Degree of Indulgence 
which neither the Regard due to the Country or their merits can justify—without Vigour, 
firmness and Decision few Revolutions succeed."55 
 Firmness and vigor was precisely how numerous communities confronted the 
loyalists in the spring and summer of 1777.  New Jersey Quaker, Margaret Morris, 
described what she termed "the rage of tory-hunting" that gripped her community.  
"Parties of armed men rudely entered the town, and diligent search was made for tories."  
Sympathetic to the loyalist plight, Morris successfully concealed a loyalist "refugee" 
from the "tory hunters," but many were not so fortunate.  Archibald Kennedy, a retired 
Royal navy officer living in New Jersey, was "dragged out of his Bed in the Night & 
carried a Prisoner to Morris Town" where he endured a three-year confinement.  Every 
state abounds with similar accounts of suspected loyalists who were plucked from their 
beds at night and banished to an indefinite imprisonment.  In New England, the jails 
rapidly became overcrowded and unsanitary.  The jail keeper in Fairfield complained of 
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having "17 prisoners in close confinement," most for being "inimical to the states."  With 
no prospect of release, the prisoners soon became "very unwell" in the "cold weather."  
The condition of Pennsylvania's jails was no better.  Richard Stockton, an officer in the 
First Battalion of the New Jersey Volunteers, was confined in the jail at Carlisle, "which 
really surpasses every thing that was ever heard of in a Christian Land, we are mixt with 
ruffians and criminals who are thrown into goal, sick and well all together."  Sarah 
O'Bryan, "a languishing Prisoner in the New-Goal" for "many Months past" was "in a 
most distressed way having the Flux" in March 1777.  Notwithstanding her "helpless 
Infant suffering for want of her Mother," the Pennsylvania Council of Safety did nothing 
to alleviate her plight.  Arrested in August 1776, James White was confined in the 
Lancaster jail for "about 14 months [a] great part of which time was in the Dungeon with 
heavy irons on his leggs [sic] and without any sustenance save bread and Water."  
Despite numerous petitions, "he could never obtain any tryal."  These were the lucky 
ones.56 
 Those loyalists who received a court hearing often wished they had not.  By 
criminalizing loyalty to the king, the revolutionaries removed any claim on the part of the 
defendants to the protections of prisoner-of-war status.  Conceived of as "rebels" and 
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"traitors," loyalist prisoners throughout the continent were put on trial for their lives.  
Men and women, soldiers and civilians, were all subject to revolutionary tribunals.  Mary 
Quin and Elisabeth Brewer were tried by a Continental army "Court of inquiry" for 
"suspicion of being an Enemy to their country."  Quin was released on the grounds of 
insufficient evidence, but Brewer did not get off so easy.  She was sentenced "to be 
confined during the war."  Because Congress did not provide for any continental 
detention facilities, the burden of confining prisoners like Elisabeth Brewer fell to the 
states.57  
 Overwhelmed with convicted “traitors,” officials in New York were reduced to 
the necessity of fitting-out three prison ships in the Hudson River in early May 1777.  
Anchored off Kingston, the state's new capital, these floating prisons, known collectively 
as the Fleet prison, were fetid cesspits of disease, suffering, and privation.  Within days 
of their establishment, there were already 175 loyalists confined on the ships, with more 
pouring in all summer.  Unlike the Americans aboard the prison ships in New York 
harbor, who were at least nominally provided with two-thirds rations, the loyalists in 
Kingston were required to pay for their own provisions.  As if to add insult to injury, the 
Council of Safety soon decided that the provisions being sold to the prisoners were "too 
great," and they ordered their daily intake reduced to "one quarter of a pound of beef, 
pork or mutton…and one pound and a half of flour" per day, a ration considerably less 
than that American prisoners in New York were entitled to receive.  In the opinion of 
contemporary loyalist historian Thomas Jones, the prisoners' treatment was "an instance 
of that rebel humanity of which they made such a boast during the war, while they were 
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perpetually taxing the British with carrying it on with a barbarity peculiar to savages 
only."  From a position below decks at the Fleet prison, American "humanity" must have 
looked more like American hypocrisy.58   
 For many convicted loyalists, confinement aboard a prison ship would have been 
an attractive option; the alternative was the hangman's noose.  In April 1777, New York 
tried nine men by court martial for either "being Enlisted as Soldiers in the Service of the 
King of Great Britain" or simply "adhering to the King of Great Britain."  Even those 
who had enlisted in the British army were denied prisoner-of-war status; their British 
uniforms could not hide their American birth.  Condemned, the men went to their death 
in early May.  Though officially a state matter, the responsibility for executing convicted 
traitors occasionally fell on the Continental army; much to the chagrin of officers who 
imagined themselves as gentlemen and men of sensibility.  Captain Samuel Richards was 
given the "unpleasant and mournfull" order to execute Robert Thomson of Newtown, 
Connecticut, a man convicted of having encouraged others to join the British army.  
Although repulsed by the role of hangman, Richards knew that "the orders being positive 
                                                
 58 According to prisoners confined in the Kingston jail, the conditions of the prison were "Both 
fulsome & Nauceous [sic]." Public Papers of George Clinton, 2:339. The crowded and unhealthful 
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Day Bradly, "Friends in the Fleet Prison at Esopus," Quaker History, vol. 55, no. 2, (Autumn, 1966), 114-
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I could do no other than to execute it."  Thompson's body was left hanging for an hour in 
front of a large crowd, "among which were his own family."59   
 Although the trial and execution of loyalists was often haphazard, in states 
threatened with British invasion, the persecution of loyalists became routine.  Gripped by 
fear of British and Hessian incursions in the fall of 1777, revolutionaries in New Jersey 
launched a campaign to terrorize local insurgents.  State forces conducted wide-ranging 
patrols to root out loyalist supporters in areas that even staunch loyalists admitted were 
"Ripe for Insurrection & Revolt."  On one such expedition, New Jersey militia engaged a 
recruiting party of the British provincial regiment, the New Jersey Volunteers.  James 
Iliff, a commissioned lieutenant, along with numerous recruits, was captured in the fight.  
All were put on trial for their lives and convicted of treason against the state of New 
Jersey.  While the enlisted men were pardoned, "on the Express Condition of their 
Inlisting [sic] in the Continental Army," their officer was sentenced to death.  According 
to Peter Dubois, who witnessed the execution, Iliff "behaved with Great Calmness and 
fortitude, Declaring that He had Acted from a principle of Duty to His King."  He and 
John Mee, a former British soldier who had taken an oath of allegiance to the state to 
avoid imprisonment only to be captured with Iliff's loyalist volunteers, were executed on 
December 2nd, 1777.  Dubois informed British General Sir Henry Clinton that "the 
Corps[es] of ILIFF & MEE were drawn on a Sled from under the Gallows & thrown Into 
the Room in which [other loyalists] are confined in Irons. And the Gallows was placed 
                                                
 59 Public Papers of George Clinton, 1:749, 761, 762.  The men were William McGinnis, John Van 
Vliet, Cornelius Furler, Coenradt Mysener, Andries Keyser, John Rapalje, Silvester Vandermark, Jacob 
Middagh, and Jacob Longyore.  They were sentenced to suffer "the Pains and Penalties of Death by being 
hanged by the neck until they are dead."; Diary of Samuel Richards, 46. 
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before their prison window."  The revolutionaries hoped to make an example of Iliff: 
treason would not be tolerated.60 
 Moses Dunbar of Connecticut suffered a similar fate.  Captured while attempting 
to enlist men for his regiment in January 1777, Dunbar was put on trial for holding a 
captain’s commission from General Howe.  As an officer of the British army, Dunbar 
should have been paroled to await exchange.  Instead, the superior court of Connecticut 
sentenced him "to suffer death" for holding a commission that in a European context 
would have guaranteed his safety and benign treatment while in captivity.  Connecticut 
revolutionaries were so blinded by the dual threat of external invasion and internal 
rebellion that the very document intended to invest his conduct with cultural legitimacy 
and legality had become evidence of the unpardonable crime of treason.  With no legal 
recourse, Dunbar took solace that he would "soon be delivered from all the pains and 
troubles of this wicked mortal state."  He did not have long to wait.  Captain Moses 
Dunbar of Colonel Fanning's Regiment was hanged at Hartford in front of "a prodigious 
concourse of people" on March 19th, 1777.61   
 Because the loyalists were “rebels” against their country, the revolutionaries 
increasingly came to imagine them as beyond the jurisdiction of civil law.  Death rather 
                                                
 60 Robert Morris to William Livingston.  Morristown, NJ. November 12th, 1777. The Papers of 
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than capture was the likely fate for armed loyalists in areas threatened by British forces.  
Without even the pretence of legal due process, the New York Convention instructed the 
state's militia in May, 1777 to uncover all "Emissaries of the Enemy" and "immediately 
execute them in Terrorem."  In an effort to "prevent [,] suppress & quell all Insurrections 
Revolts & Disaffection within their respective Counties," all who opposed the militia 
were to be "destroyed." Apparently the New York militia was successful.  An officer with 
the Continental army at Morristown reported in May 1777 that "a number of Tory traitors 
have been hanged in these States southward of New England."  Expressing the opinion of 
many, he hoped such tactics would "clear the land of such pests to human society."62 
 Similar terror campaigns occurred wherever rumors of an impending British 
attack circulated. When a British fleet threatened the Chesapeake in winter 1777, the 
Maryland General Assembly ordered James Campbell to apprehend loyalists and "all 
other suspected persons.”  He warned Maryland loyalists that he would "imideatly [sic] 
hang up every person that I Catch holding any Correspondence with or giving succor to 
the enemy."  The loyalists' plight was no better in Pennsylvania, which would soon be the 
target of British designs.  In April 1777, Sarah Shepherd notified her husband, who had 
fled the state because of his loyalists beliefs, that an acquaintance of theirs was "no more 
[,] he was hanged on the Commons last Monday."  She feared that she might be next.  
Revolutionary forces had ransacked her house in a futile attempt to locate her husband.  
In a furtive letter to him, Shepherd confessed, "I never met with so hard [a] Tryal as this 
Unhappy Affair has been…God knows what I have suffer'd."  Like countless other 
loyalists, the revolution had turned the Shepherds's life upside down for the sole crime of 
                                                
 62 Resolution of the Convention of New York.  Kingston, NY. May 11th, 1777. PCC, Item 67, 
Vol. 2, p. 55; Resolution of the Convention of New York.  Kingston, NY. May 5th, 1777. PCC, Item 67, 
Vol 2, p. 57; Freeman's Journal, May 31st, 1777. 
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following the laws under which they were born. Speaking for all loyalists who suffered 
under the heavy hand of revolutionary justice, the New-York Gazette enunciated the 
prevailing loyalist reaction to their treatment: "Instead of Humanity, which the News-
papers are filled with…[the prisoners] have barely enough to keep Life and Soul together 
in Goals, and many left to shift for themselves or starve.  Men, Women, and Children, 
suffer the same Fate…what Services they do are at the Risque of their Lives and 
Fortunes."  For many, loyalty came at far too heavy a cost.63 
 By the autumn of 1777, American civil and military forces were embattled in a 
sanguinary and vicious internecine conflict that bore little resemblance to their pre-war 
vision of "civilized warfare."  That violence was most widespread in areas where the 
British army was in close enough proximity to support, or at least threaten, a loyalist 
insurrection.  Bands of armed loyalists, some wearing the uniform of the king and others 
not, committed outrages and murders on a scale roughly equal to that of their 
revolutionary counterparts; but unlike the revolutionaries, who often relied on the 
preexisting legal mechanism of the court system to persecute loyalists, the "king's 
friends" acted without official sanction.  With the stability and future of their infant state 
on the line, few revolutionaries had any scruples about using every means at their 
disposal to suppress loyalist insurgencies.   
  Some Americans did maintain, however, that the violence of the conflict could 
be restrained and the revolutionary cause preserved unsullied.  In their opinion, 
Americans did not have to stoop to their enemy's level.  When Maryland continental 
                                                
 63 James Campbell to William Smallwood.  February 28th, 1777. Enterprize ship of war. Hooper's 
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troops captured, tried, and executed a loyalist "by Hanging the Poor fellow from a Limb 
of a Sycamore Bush," Washington was disheartened.  This was not how professional 
soldiers were supposed to conduct war between “civilized” peoples.  Though he admitted 
that the man's treason "was heinous enough to deserve the fate he met with," Washington 
lectured the offending officer that "the whole proceeding was irregular and illegal, and 
will have a tendency to excite discontent, jealousy and murmurs among the people."  The 
Maryland troops had only emulated the practices of countless state militias, but 
Washington insisted that the Marylanders, as continentals, represented the Continental 
Congress and were subject to "our articles of war," which did not "justify your inflicting a 
capital punishment, even on a soldier much less on a citizen."  Revealing his belief that 
America's legitimacy as a sovereign nation rested on her national army's scrupulous 
attention to the customs of war among "civilized nations," and his hope that Americans 
would rise above British barbarism, Washington concluded, "The temper of the 
Americans and the principles on which the present contest turns will not countenance 
proceedings of this nature."64   
 Washington overestimated the American peoples' patience for treason.  The 
imprisonment and execution of loyalists continued throughout the war, notwithstanding 
the grim irony that the British never tried a single American for treason, sedition, or 
rebellion.  Taking up arms for their king had transformed the loyalists into rebels in the 
eyes of their neighbors; and as General Gage had warned Washington in 1775, rebels 
were "destined to the cord.”  While the revolutionary American persecution of the 
loyalists never approached that committed by the French revolutionaries during the 
                                                
 64 "Journal of Capt. William Beatty, 1776-1781," Maryland Historical Magazine (June, 1908), 
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Terror, the feelings of fear and insecurity that ignited the violence of the latter were 
present in the former.  By arming the loyalists, the British had unwittingly opened the 
door to civil war, escalating the violence of the conflict precipitously.  Only total victory 
or utter defeat would close it again.65 
 
"This most auspicious event": The Battle of Trenton and the Failure of the Cartel of 
1777 
 
 In December 1776, while state forces throughout the former colonies were mired 
in increasingly violent and chaotic internal conflicts, Washington and the remnants of his 
army faced a British force entrenched in New York and poised to occupy all of New 
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Jersey.  Come spring, Howe would march south, capture Philadelphia, arrest the 
Congress, and declare the rebellion at an end.  The only thing standing in his way was a 
threadbare contingent of continentals whose enlistments were soon to expire.  For those 
adherents to the revolutionary cause in New Jersey, the situation was dire.  British and 
Hessian forces occupied posts as far south as Trenton and Bordentown on the 
Delaware—within striking distance of Philadelphia.  In what many historians consider to 
be his greatest, if not his only, strategic coup, Washington surprised Colonel Johann 
Rall's brigade of Hessian troops at Trenton on the morning of December 26th, 1776.  
Surrounded and stunned, more than eight hundred Hessians surrendered in defeat, but not 
before Colonel Rall and twenty-one of his men suffered mortal wounds.  James Thatcher, 
a surgeon with the Continental army, hoped "that this most auspicious event will be 
productive of the happiest effects, by inspiriting our dejected army, and dispelling that 
panic of despair into which the people have been plunged."  He could not have been more 
prophetic.66  
 News of the resounding success at Trenton leapfrogged the length of the 
continent, elating revolutionary sympathizers and demoralizing loyalists.  A letter 
published in the Independent Chronicle boasted that "three Regiments of Hessians…were 
obliged to throw down their Arms, and are now harmless two-legged Animals in the back 
Counties of Pennsylvania."  The once menacing minions of a despotic prince sent to 
deprive peaceful Americans of their liberties were transformed overnight into objects of 
derision, mockery, and amusement.  Revolutionaries everywhere could hardly contain 
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their jubilation.  Imprisoned in Boston, loyalist John Lovell noted that the defeat of the 
Hessians "electricized [sic] the drooping hearts of the whole Continent."  Another loyalist 
who managed to get a copy of a New York paper by way of "Antigua or Grenada," was 
aghast at how word of the victory induced "some of the violent scoundrels in the City, 
stilling [sic] themselves patriots [to] hold up their Heads."  The revolutionary cause, 
which a month ago had appeared to be at the end of its tether, was rejuvenated.  Any 
success would have been welcomed, but the crowning achievement of Washington's bold 
stroke was the capture of so many enemy soldiers.  Visible evidence of American 
triumph, the prisoners were more than just spoils of war, they were symbols of 
revolutionary endurance.67 
 Washington was keen to exploit the men for all their propagandistic potential.  
After hurriedly shuttling the prisoners across the Delaware to prevent their rescue, 
Washington triumphantly paraded the men through the streets of Philadelphia on 
December 30th.  According to one eyewitness, the Hessians "made a poor, despicable 
appearance."  Envisioning superhuman myrmidons, many Americans were shocked by 
their prisoners' fallible forms.  After having "the pleasure to see the Hessian prisoners 
paraded in Front Street," members of the Executive Committee of Congress informed 
John Hancock that "most people seemed very angry they should ever think of running 
away from such a set of vagabonds."  Nonetheless, crowds turned out in droves to 
witness the parade of the prisoners.  Sara Fisher, a Philadelphia loyalist, observed "a 
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multitude of people going to see the Hessian prisoners."  In her opinion, they "looked 
poorly clad…their outside clothes appeared to be dirty."  As one Hessian prisoner 
phrased it, the Americans "had come to see strange animals and found in their disgust, 
that we looked like human beings.  It seems comical, but it is true, that they had formed 
such an idea of the Hessians."  Hardly the bogymen of their nightmares, the Hessians 
were humans after all.68 
 While loyalists like Fischer empathized with the prisoners, other Americans 
called for vengeance.  After all, these Hessians were the very men who had plundered 
and burned their way through New York and New Jersey.  According to one English 
officer, there was little love lost between the two groups: "Ever since their first landing 
on Long-Island, the Provincials have borne them [the Hessians] a grudge, and they in 
return have not been backward in showing their dislike."  Those feelings now manifested 
themselves in the form of taunts, insults, and abuses.  A Hessian officer, Lieutenant Jakob 
Piel, reported being greeted in Philadelphia by "a great confluence of people whose 
catcalls were not complimentary."  As they were marched through the streets, "old 
women who were present screamed and scolded at us in a terrible manner and wanted to 
strangle us because we had come to America to steal their freedom," according to 
Johannes Reuber, a Hessian grenadier.  In his evaluation of the situation, "the people 
were so angry and so threatening toward us" that they "nearly overpowered the guard."  
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For many Americans, justice required that these Hessian prisoners be punished for their 
crimes.69 
 Washington had other plans.  With neither commitment to parliamentary 
supremacy nor vested interest in the outcome of the conflict, the Hessians were not only 
potential recruits for the Continental army but also potent political weapons.  Once 
exchanged, the Hessian prisoners, provided they were civilly treated and shown the 
benefits of American citizenship, might destabilize the British war machine by spreading 
disaffection among their comrades.  Were Howe's Hessian host to be significantly 
depleted by desertion, the British treasury would suffer and Howe's offensive capability 
would diminish.  In the aftermath of the battle, Washington ordered that "the [Hessian] 
Officers and Men should be separated. I wish the former may be well treated, and that the 
latter may have such principles instilled into them during their Confinement, that when 
they return, they may open the Eyes of their Countrymen."  Washington had earlier 
concocted a plan to spread disloyalty and dissension among the Hessians.  A Hessian 
prisoner had apprised the general in October that much of the Hessian force had been 
recruited by threat of violence or worse, and that if assured of good treatment by the 
Americans, they "would all lay down their Arms—[they] have no desire to return to thier 
[sic] Ridgments [Regiments] again."70   Hoping to capitalize on the Hessians' distressed 
situation, Congress offered "all such foreigners" who agreed to become citizens of the 
United States "the rights, privileges and immunities of natives."  To sweeten the deal, 
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Congress promised to "provide, for every such person, fifty acres of unappropriated lands 
in some of these States, to be held by him and his heirs in absolute property."  
Washington hoped that this enticing offer would ensure that the Hessians' release would 
"be attended with many salutary consequences."  Material advantage thus amplified 
Washington's commitment to the European tradition of humane treatment of prisoners.  
He must have been pleased that Congress acquiesced to his suggestion, advising that 
"both the officers & men shou'd be well treated."  Washington's subordinates listened as 
well.  Hessian Lieutenant Piel gratefully recorded the "friendly treatment" he received 
from Colonel George Weedon in the wake of the battle.  With his army convinced, 
Washington now had the unenviable task of changing the American people's opinion of 
the Hessian prisoners.71 
 By marching the poorly clad and dejected men through Philadelphia, Washington 
and the revolutionary leadership in Congress hoped that the populace might come to pity 
the prisoners and treat them with kindness.  Not confident that the sight of the miserable 
prisoners was enough to elicit compassion from hardened revolutionaries, the 
Pennsylvania Council of Safety circulated an address repeating Washington's 
instructions.  They hoped that the prisoners "may be well treated, and have such 
principles instilled into them, whilst they remain prisoners, that when they return on 
being exchanged, they may fully open the Eyes of their Countrymen."  In addition to 
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spelling out the advantages of this policy, the Council hoped that revolutionary 
Americans would come to re-imagine their Hessian enemies.  Instead of bloodthirsty 
mercenaries, "these miserable creatures now justly excite our compassion—They have no 
Enmity with us."  In an attempt to erase the memory of the Hessians' earlier depredations, 
the Council explained that "their pay [is] a mere pittance, they were necessitated and 
encouraged to plunder.  It is therefore nothing strange that they have been guilty of great 
irregularities, tho inferior to the brutal behaviour of the British Troops."  According to the 
Council, it was the British, not the Hessians who were responsible for the atrocious 
conduct of the war around New York.  Summarizing the desired alteration in American 
opinion, the Council argued, "We ought no longer to regard them as our Enemies…'Tis 
Britain alone that is our Enemy."  Apparently the Council's missive had the desired 
effect.  One Hessian prisoner recorded that "everyday people came from the city with 
food for us. Old, young, rich and poor, and all treated us in a friendly manner."  While 
not everyone agreed with the Council, Washington's propaganda campaign, combined 
with actual experience with the prisoners, served to expose the Hessians for what they 
really were: mere pawns in the British imperial project.72   
 Washington knew, however, that compassion would become revulsion if the 
prisoners were not properly supplied and quartered in short order.  He ordered his Deputy 
Quartermaster General, Clement Biddle, to forward the men to Lancaster, where they 
could be more easily housed and fed.  In a letter to the Council of Safety in Philadelphia, 
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Biddle suggested that the state appoint a commissary of prisoners "to furnish Provisions 
[and] have Charge of them."  In the absence of a commissary, the Lancaster Committee 
of Safety ordered "that the Barracks here may be put-in a Condition to receive them [the 
Hessians] immediately."  Lancaster had already housed British prisoners, and the 
barracks in the city were well appointed to receive the men.  To that end, the enlisted 
soldiers marched out of Philadelphia on January 8th, 1777, "under escort of an American 
detachment."  During their march, the prisoners were quartered in churches "for 
security."73   
 Once arrived in the town, the men were housed in the barracks where "everything 
was peaceful and calm," according to one prisoner.  The stone building had seventy-six 
rooms of approximately 263 square feet, with a fireplace and windows.  Surrounded by a 
fifteen foot high wooden palisade, the barracks were thus a secure and commodious place 
of confinement.  Because Washington hoped to lure the rank-and-file prisoners away 
from the British, he ordered the officers sent to Baltimore where they could do little to 
enforce the loyalty of their men.  The officers were not pleased.  As one Hessian 
lieutenant phrased it, "As much as we would like to remain with our troops, Congress 
would not allow it."  The enlisted prisoners do not seem to have regretted the lack of 
supervision.  There was no dearth of provisions—Grenadier Reuber noted that he 
"received one pound of bread and as much meat and such wood as necessary for cooking 
and heating, and everything which we needed for conducting our households was 
delivered to us"—and the men were soon allowed to hire themselves out to local farmers 
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or tradesmen.  Welcomed by the prisoners, this practice had the added benefit of relieving 
"the public of the burthern [sic] of maintaining them."  According to Reuber, prospective 
employers were required to "provide food and drink and pay a wage of fifteen stiver 
daily" for their services.  Apparently some prisoners received quite a bit more for their 
work. Hessian prisoners working in the public buildings near Lancaster earned two 
shillings, or twenty-four pence, a day for their labor in August, 1777; an extraordinary 
sum when compared to the eight pence a day British soldiers received for serving the 
crown.  The Hessians had little cause for complaint.  As Grenadier Reuber put it, "So far 
so good."74 
 British prisoners, however, did not share their Hessian colleagues' good fortune.  
In the past, they had proven obstinately loyal to their king and country, so there was little 
for the revolutionaries to gain by codling them.  Congress made no provision to offer land 
to British deserters, and the British soldiers who were captured at Princeton in early 
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January were not shielded from the anger of the populace.  While the Hessian prisoners 
were immediately dispatched to Lancaster, the "British Prisoners and Tories" were "sent 
to the State Prison" in Philadelphia.  Only overcrowding and fear of jailbreak persuaded 
their captors to send the Britons to the backcountry.  Unsurprisingly, the British prisoners 
grew restive.  Local officials at inland detention centers reported that the recently arrived 
prisoners "behav'd execeding[ly] bad coming from Philadelphia," and continued to 
"behave Ill here," in contrast to the Hessian prisoners who "behave well."  Consequently, 
instead of being permitted to hire out their services, the captured Britons were confined to 
the barracks or the local jail.  A party of twenty-seven British dragoons begged the 
Philadelphia Committee of Safety for "the liberty of walking about to take a little fresh 
air" because they were "in a very indifferent state of health, three of them being very ill."  
The committee did nothing to relieve their suffering.  Despondent, several British 
prisoners in early May, 1777, asked the Committee of Safety why they were "Confin'd to 
goal as Criminals?"  Although there is no record of an official response to their petition, 
the prisoners must have known that unlike their Hessian comrades, in the eyes of their 
American captors, they no longer deserved humane and mild treatment.  Lancaster 
residents were well aware of the deplorable conditions of American prisoners, many of 
them from their own community, confined aboard British prison ships in New York.  In 
light of the reports coming from New York, a cramped and damp jail cell was more than 
the British enlisted men deserved.  Even if Congress had wanted to relieve their plight, 
the prisoners were in the hands of the local committee of safety, and without a 
Continental Commissary of Prisoners to enforce national policy, Congress's hands were 
tied.75 
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 The British prisoners' confinement in Lancaster was mild when compared to the 
plight of African-Americans captured in opposition to the revolutionary cause.  A "Negro 
man nam'd Tom," who had fled enslavement to enlist with the Hessian troops in the fall 
of 1776, was dragged from his confinement as a prisoner of war and returned to his 
master Samuel Henry of Trenton in February, 1777.  Hessian regiments actively recruited 
runaway slaves as musicians, and Tom was likely serving in that capacity when he was 
captured at the Battle of Trenton.  Though he was initially treated as a prisoner of war, 
his captors reported that "he was not in Arms."  Nonetheless, under European 
conventions, field musicians were entitled to the same privileges as their armed 
comrades.  Both Hessian and British prisoners could be confident of their eventual 
release, if not by exchange then at the end of the war, but Tom had no such prospect; 
unless the British army marched near his master's abode once more, he would likely 
remain a slave for the rest of his life.  Unfortunately, Tom's case was not unique.  
Throughout the war, blacks in Hessian and British service were denied the protections of 
prisoner-of-war status.  Either returned to their masters, or forced to serve as privateers or 
laborers for the revolutionary forces, black soldiers were segregated from their white 
comrades and deemed ineligible for the "many indulgences" their white comrades 
received.76  
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 Although temporary confinement in Lancaster was preferable to the state of 
perpetual slavery, Tom was fortunate to have been absent from the barracks in early June 
when British prisoners staged a riot.  Seeing Hessian prisoners free to ply their trades and 
travel about the countryside effectively unfettered must have galled the British prisoners.  
The men had earlier been confined to the barracks for their "unruly & threatening 
conduct," which made the inhabitants of the town "uneasy."  Celebrating the king's 
birthday on June 4th with a bonfire in the barrack's courtyard, the inebriated prisoners 
became raucous.  According to Reuber, who was an eyewitness, the Britons' revelry 
"created such a disturbance."  When American troops tried to put an end to the 
proceedings, the British captives "attacked the fifteen men of the American guard, took 
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their weapons, broke them into pieces, and threw them into the fire."  Panicked by their 
prisoners' insubordination, the guards called for reinforcements.  From Reuber's vantage 
point, it looked as if "an entire regiment with two cannon marched into the barracks 
courtyard."  Presenting their muskets, the Americans "delivered a fire against the English.  
Some were initially killed and some wounded."  The surviving ringleaders were 
identified and sent to the city's jail in irons.  American authorities were pleased that the 
Hessians had not taken part in the riot and rewarded them accordingly.  In Reuber's 
words, the Hessian prisoners "received much better treatment than the English;" they 
were "prospering."77 
 The ability of the prisoners to launch a riot, and the extreme violence of the local 
authorities' reaction to it, however, highlighted to Congress the deficiencies in the 
decentralized American system of prisoner administration, as well as the pressing need 
for an expedited exchange.  Even prior to the riot, the secretary of the Board of War, 
Richard Peters, lamented that "there have been many Enormities committed both by the 
Persons having the Care of them [the prisoners] and the Prisoners themselves."  He 
explained: "Sometimes the Comittees [sic] have been unreasonably rigorous & other 
Times so culpably lax & inattentive that the most flagrant & dangerous Abuses & 
treasonable Practices have been committed & carried on by Prisoners."  Congress had 
attempted to rectify the problem by permitting Washington to appoint a Continental 
Commissary General in April 1777, but as the events of the June riot suggest, simply 
creating the position was no solution.  Nonetheless, Washington was hopeful that all 
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prisoner affairs could be centralized and an official cartel established.  Failing to secure 
his first choice for the post—Colonel Cornelius Cox of Pennsylvania thought a desk job 
inglorious—Washington hit upon the thirty-seven year old New Jersey lawyer Elias 
Boudinot.  The prominent attorney was no soldier, but he had clout in Congress and a 
predilection for lists, ledgers, and letters. After some hesitation, Boudinot accepted the 
post of Commissary General and began the monumental task of administering enemy 
prisoners and relieving the distress of Americans in British custody.  He had his work cut 
out for him.  Boudinot would later recall that "soon after I had entered on my department, 
the applications of the Prisoners were so numerous [,] and their distress [was] so urgent," 
that he did not know where to begin.  As the pleading letters from prisoners on both sides 
began to pour in, Boudinot must have had second thoughts about accepting so much 
responsibility with so little power.78 
 From the outset, Boudinot was at a distinct disadvantage.  Unlike his British 
counterpart, Joshua Loring, Boudinot did not have the authority to direct individual state 
officials in matters of prisoner administration. Congress had already permitted each state 
to establish its own commissariat of prisoners to oversee the care and management of 
both prisoners of war, and so-called "state" prisoners, or loyalists.  Boudinot confessed 
his frustration to Secretary Peters in mid June: "I have lately rec'd from the Clerk of the 
Congress, Copies of the Resolutions made since the Commencement of the War relating 
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to my department, among wch. is one requesting each State to appoint a Commissary of 
Prisoners of War—This resolution militates directly agt. my Appointment."  Already 
aware that individual state interests would invariably clash with continental ones, 
Boudinot was firmly of the opinion "that the Office should finally center in one Man."  
Congress could not easily undo its own resolutions, however, and the states jealously 
guarded their prerogatives.  To mollify Boudinot, the Board of War ordered that he be 
allowed "to appoint three Deputies under him" and instructed "that all Commissaries…be 
obliged at any time when required by the Commissary General of Prisoners…to deliver 
over to him…all such Prisoners of war as are or shall be in their care" for the purpose of 
exchange.  Notwithstanding the official expansion of his powers, Boudinot was vexed 
that "no clear chain of authority was outlined."  He could not issue any orders, only 
recommendations, concerning the lodging, provisioning, or financing of prisoners in state 
custody.  Moreover, he was financially constrained by a congress with more pressing 
concerns—paying, feeding, lodging, supplying, and arming the continental army and 
navy.  Hoping to build additional barracks to house prisoners, Boudinot failed time and 
again to obtain sufficient funds from Congress.79  
 Boudinot was more successful, however at investigating and relieving the 
distressed conditions of American prisoners in British hands.  Deluged with "complaints 
of the cruel Treatment of a number of our Prisoners, taken by the Enemy & confined in 
the Goals of the City of New York," he conducted "an Inquiry into the Truth of the Facts 
alleged."  Communicating with not only the American commissary residing in New 
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York, Lewis Pintard, but also with the British commissary Joshua Loring, Boudinot 
concluded that "there is Evidence of the greatest Cruelty being used towards several of 
our unhappy Prisoners.”  He was informed that "several of our Officers who have lately 
had the small Pox in the Goals, have been suffered to languish (one of whom died) with 
out the least aid either as to Physick [sic], Provision or other necessaries—That in general 
the daily Rations are not sufficient more than barely to keep the Prisoners from starving.”  
To combat their privation, Boudinot worked with Pintard to supply the men out of his 
own pocket.  When Congress finally acquiesced to his repeated requests for funds, they 
provided him with a meager £600, hardly enough to reimburse the British for the 
expenses the prisoners had already incurred.  Although Boudinot would later describe his 
efforts as "very small & very indifferent," to the prisoners, the supply of clothing and 
provisions he provided was often the difference between life and death.  Despite 
Boudinot' best efforts, Pintard reported that the prisoners "all want more Exceedingly and 
are very pressing for it."80 
 The only thing that would have effectively relieved the prisoners' distress was 
beyond Boudinot's control: an exchange.  Although Howe had neither changed his mind 
nor abandoned his earlier desire to effect an exchange, Washington was determined to 
"send in no more prisoners" until Howe agreed to exchange prisoners in the order of their 
capture.  Concerned with the equity of the cartel, Washington wanted those prisoners 
who had been longest in British custody, such as Ethan Allen, released first.  Howe, on 
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the other hand, maintained that the cartel stipulated only that the exchange be conducted 
on the basis of equity of rank, not length of captivity.  He did not have the time, ability, 
or inclination to search the city for the specific prisoners Washington had requested.  The 
American general, however, was determined to stand his ground.  As he informed 
Governor Trumbull, "General Howe, without paying any regard to my request, sent out 
such [prisoners] as best pleased him."  Unless Howe agreed "to send out such only as I 
name," Washington would "not send any more of his prisoners in."81 
 To complicate matters, in late December British forces captured American Major 
General Charles Lee and immediately conveyed him to confinement in New York.  
Congress's darling, Lee was everything Washington was not: brash, mercurial, unkempt, 
radical, and most importantly, an experienced European officer.  Both men had seen 
battle under General Braddock in 1755, but Lee, born in Cheshire as the son of a British 
officer, had possessed a king's commission.  A veteran of both the American and 
European theatres of the war, Lee immigrated to Virginia on the eve of the revolution 
after alienating most of his former colleagues and resigning his commission.  Not one to 
eschew the limelight or shirk the quest for glory, Lee offered his services to Congress in 
1775 and was one of the first generals commissioned.82   Although Washington referred to 
him as "the first officer in Military knowledge and experience we have in the whole 
army," there was little camaraderie between the two men, and more than little envy and 
competition on both sides.  Many in Congress believed that Lee, not Washington, should 
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be in command of the continental forces.  In July 1775, Abigail Adams notified her 
husband that Lee's appointment to the army gave "universal satisfaction. The people have 
the highest opinion of Lees [sic] abilities."  In contrast to Washington's meticulous 
attention to dress and decorum, Lee looked to Mrs. Adams "like a careless hardy 
Veteran" who conjured images of Sweden's warrior king, Charles XII.  With the loss of 
Richard Montgomery in the Canadian campaign, many in Congress agreed with Adams, 
seeing Lee as an invaluably experienced officer who they could not afford to lose.  When 
word of his capture reached Philadelphia, John Hancock instructed Washington to send 
an officer under flag of truce "to Genl Howe to know in what Manner Genl Lee is 
treated."  Congress even managed to appropriate "one Hundred Half Johannes…to render 
the Situation of that Gentleman as easy as possible during his Captivity."  Hancock 
echoed most revolutionaries when he confided to Washington that Lee's "loss must be 
extremely regretted by every Friend to this Country."83 
 To General Howe, Lee was no friend to his country, he was a deserter.  For a man 
who had been born and bred in England, and honored with a commission from his king, 
to command a parcel of rebels was not only disgraceful but also treasonous.  In the 
opinion of one British officer, Lee was an "atrocious Monster" who was "as perfect in 
Treachery as if he had been an American born."  Cries of treason resounded across the 
Atlantic.  One English lyricist recorded his disdain for Lee by imagining the general's 
execution in verse: "On the bare earth Charles Lee shall kneel, Young Harcourt [the 
arresting officer] draws the shining steel, and bids the party—fire!"  From the vantage 
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point of many Britons, Lee, even more so than Ethan Allen, looked like a suitable subject 
for summary justice.84 
 Although Lee informed Howe that he had resigned his commission, the British 
general was unsure of how to proceed.  The hardliners in his army and at home were 
calling for Lee's head; were Howe to release the man on parole, he would appear weak 
and soft on rebellion and treason.  Aware that many of his junior officers were suspicious 
of his Whig politics, his connections to America, and his apparent inability to isolate and 
destroy Washington's army, Howe could not afford to be seen as overly generous toward 
Lee.  Consequently, Howe denied Lee parole and ordered the American general confined 
in the city hall while he awaited orders from London.  Hardly the stark surroundings of 
the improvised jails, sugar houses, or prison ships that other American prisoners endured, 
Lee's cell was "one of the genteelest [sic] public rooms in the City," according to loyalist 
historian Thomas Jones.  But, however luxurious his quarters, Lee was still a man in 
limbo.  One word from the British ministry, which had no reason to look favorably upon 
him, would send Lee to the gallows.85 
 American printers soon took up the story of Lee's capture and disseminated 
inflated and exaggerated accounts of his treatment.  The American reading pubic, who by 
now had little reason to doubt accounts of British atrocity, were outraged to learn that Lee 
was treated "with every other Marks of Indignity" and confined "in a small mean looking 
house."  Congress received word in early February that "General Lee hath, since his 
captivity, been committed to custody of the provost, instead of being enlarged upon his 
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parole, according to the humane practice that has taken place with officers of the enemy 
who have fallen into the hands of the American troops."  Sharing their countrymen's 
indignation, Congress invoked "the principles of retaliation."  Should Howe refuse to 
accept the immediate exchange for Lee of "six Hessian field officers" who had been 
captured at Trenton, "the same treatment which General Lee shall receive, may be exactly 
inflicted upon" those men.  In case Howe was immune to threats against foreign officers, 
Congress substituted Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Campbell for one of the Hessian field 
officers.  The Council of Massachusetts was ordered "to detain Lieutenant Colonel 
Campbell," who had been enjoying a lenient parole, until Howe had the opportunity to 
respond.86 
 Without orders from his superiors, Howe could do little to appease Congress in 
the matter of General Lee; he could, however, release other American prisoners under the 
terms of the cartel.  Early in the new year, Commissary Loring, at Howe's behest, opened 
the doors of the makeshift prisons and hatches of the hulks to send many of the Fort 
Washington prisoners on their way.  While Howe did not release all of his prisoners, 
historians estimate that over 1,800 of the men who had been captured during the New 
York campaign were released during the winter of 1776-1777.  The gesture was not 
simply a mark of Howe's humanity, however; he was aware that smallpox and typhus 
were rampant in his prisons, and most of the men would not survive the winter.  By 
returning the prisoners before disease could claim their lives, Howe could demand an 
equal number of healthy British prisoners in return under the conditions of the cartel.  Not 
surprisingly, on their trek homeward the men perished in droves.  The effects of 
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malnutrition, close confinement, and disease took their toll.  One American officer was 
horrified by "the miserable emaciated Countenances of those poor Creatures who have 
lately been released."  Those who made it home alive were perfect vectors for the 
pestilence.  Governor Trumbull feared that "our returning Soldiers have spread the 
Infection into almost every Town in the State."  A New Yorker claimed that "General 
Howe has discharg'd all the privates, who were prisoners in New York, one half he sent 
to the world of spirits for want of food—the other he hath sent to warn their countrymen 
of the danger of falling into his hands."  If Howe had hoped that releasing the men would 
guarantee the good treatment Lieutenant Colonel Campbell and the Hessian field officers, 
he was to be disappointed.87  
 On February 20th, 1777, Congress directed the Board of War "to order the five 
Hessian field officers and Lieutenant Colonel Campbell into safe and close custody; it 
being the unalterable resolution of Congress to retaliate on them the same punishment as 
may be inflicted on the person of General Lee."  This was not a decision that was taken 
lightly.  Cognizant that their actions were scrutinized by foreign powers, and aware of the 
judgmental glare of posterity, Congress nevertheless believed the measure necessary and 
justified to "teach our cruel enemies to regard the laws of nations and the rights of 
humanity."  The Board of War did not delay in carrying out Congress's orders.  
Lieutenant Jakob Piel, now confined in Baltimore, recorded that the local committee of 
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safety "notified our staff officers of their arrest and placed sentries before their quarters" 
in early March.  Although he had already been committed to "the common goal of 
Concord" on February 1st, when Congress's order reached the Massachusetts Council, 
Colonel Campbell was "lodged in a dungeon of about 12 or 13 feet square whose sides 
are black with the grease and Litter of successive Criminals.  Two doors with double 
locks and Bolts shut me up from the yard."  His cell contained only "two small windows 
strongly grated with Iron," which only served to let in the "frost and snow" of the 
Massachusetts winter.88  
 Campbell was at a loss to explain his treatment.  He informed Howe that upon his 
capture he had received "every mark of humanity, and treatment suitable to my Rank" 
from "the Controlling Power at Boston."  He now found himself "striped of half my 
private property[,] the very necessaries of life" in "a lothsome [sic] black Hole" still 
redolent of the "very excrement" of the prior occupant.  Campbell's only companions 
were his "little friends the mice."  He wished the "Yankees were so honest & humane as 
those little urchins."  If this was Congress's idea of "humanity and kindness," then those 
once lauded virtues were now "crimes more atrocious than oppression and cruelty."  
While General Lee slept warm in his bed, attended by an Italian servant and with his 
beloved dog as company, Campbell wasted away in a stone prison, open to the elements, 
without heat, and accompanied only by the prison rats who shared his meager meals.89   
                                                
 88 This was not exactly the proportional retaliation allowed by Vattel as a means of enforcing the 
laws of nations.  Instead of retaliating on one prisoner, Congress ordered six men into confinement.  The 
conditions of their confinement were also considerably harsher than that General Lee experienced. JCC, 
7:135; Diary of Hessian Lieutenant Jakob Piel from 1776 to 1783. Hessian Papers. George Bancroft 
Collection. Translations by Bruce Burgoyne. No. 28. NYPL. 
 89 Lt. Col. Archibald Campbell to Howe. Concord Jail. February 14th, 1777. Ms. N-801. James 
Murray Robins Papers. MHS; Campbell to Mrs. Inman. Concord, MA. May 14th, 1777. Ms. N-801. James 
Murray Robins Papers. MHS.  Thomas Jones compared Lee and Campbell's confinement thusly: "General 
Lee was confined in the Council Chamber in the City Hal, one of the genteelest public rooms in the City, 
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 Washington and many of his officers were ill at ease with Congress's heavy hand.  
He had received intelligence that Lee's confinement was considerably milder than 
Congress imagined.  Even if the reports of Lee's mistreatment were true, to retaliate on 
six men for the hardships endured by one seemed to be a flagrant misuse of the lex 
talionis and a violation of the laws of nations and customs of war.  Washington had been 
prepared to exact "the most severe and adequate Retaliation" when rumors of Lee's 
rigorous confinement and impending trial for desertion and treason seemed valid, but 
with fresh intelligence in hand, he believed Congress had erred.  Always deferential to his 
civilian masters, Washington nonetheless informed Hancock that Congress's resolutions 
were "founded in impolicy, and will, if adhered to, produce consequences of an 
extensive, and melancholy nature."  He believed that retaliation, though "just & 
sometimes necessary…should be avoided."  Lecturing Hancock on Congress's lack of 
foresight, Washington argued that retaliation would only lead to the escalation of 
violence on the part of the British.  "Can we imagine that our Enemies will not mete the 
same punishments—the same indignities—the same cruelties to those belonging to us in 
their possession, that we impose on theirs in our power?  Why should we suppose them to 
possess more Humanity than we have ourselves[?]"  Congress's decision to retaliate 
primarily on Hessian officers would only serve to undo the effects of the propaganda 
campaign to seduce Hessian soldiers away from British service.  In short, Washington 
                                                                                                                                            
square compact tight, and warm… He had directions to order a dinner every day from a public house, 
sufficient for six people, with what liquor he wanted... He had the privilege of asking any five friends he 
thought proper, to dine with him each day.  This was all furnished at the Expense of the nation… His 
servant had free access to him at all times.  Yet by way of retaliation (as it was pretended) Colonel 
Campbell…was taken up, lodged in a dungeon, without a bed, allowed nothing but bread and water, denied 
the use of pen, ink, and paper, his servant refused admittance, and in this unhappy situation did he continue 
many moths, while Lee was wallowing in luxury at the expense of the Crown.  Yet these were the people, 
who upon every occasion boasted of their lenity and humanity to British prisoners, while they publically 
and openly taxed the British army with acts of barbarity to such American prisoners as had the misfortune 
to fall into their hands." Jones, History of New York, 1:173-4; Burrows, Forgotten Patriots, 71. 
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felt that "the mischeifs [sic] which may & must innevitably [sic] flow from the execution 
of the Resolves, appear to be endless & innumerable."  General Nathanael Greene was 
equally frank in his remonstrance to the president of the Board of War, John Adams: "I 
cannot help thinking the sacrafice [sic] you are makeing [sic] for General Lee is 
impolitick as it respects the Hessians, and unjust as it respects our prisoners with General 
How[e]."  Notwithstanding the logic of their commanders' arguments, Congress refused 
to budge.  As long as Lee remained in close custody with the specter of execution 
looming over head, so too would Campbell and the Hessians.90 
 Congress did, however, empower Washington to negotiate with Howe for Lee's 
release.  If the British agreed to treat Lee as a prisoner of war, Washington was free to 
carry out the general cartel of exchange.  On 10 March 1777, envoys sent by Howe and 
Washington, Lieutenant Colonels William Walcott and Henry Harrison respectively, met 
at Brunswick, New Jersey, to negotiate the exchange.  On behalf of Howe, Walcott 
demanded that Washington return an equal number of British prisoners for the sickly men 
the British had released.  For his part, Harrison refused to consider any proposal until the 
British agreed to treat Lee as a gentleman officer eligible for parole and exchange.  
Walcott believed it his duty to "adhere strictly & literally to the Terms of the Original 
Agreement," and he declined comment on Lee's status.  Harrison could not exchange 
healthy British soldiers for the ghosts of "many of [the prisoners who] died on their 
Return to the place of the intended Destination immediately after their Arrival, and [the] 
                                                
 90 Washington to Hancock. Morris Town. January 12th, 1777. PGW; Washington to Hancock. 
Morris Town. March 1st, 1777. PGW. Growing frustrated, Washington told Robert Morris, "The resolve to 
put into close confinement Lt Colo. Campbell and the Hessian Field Officers in order to retaliate Genl Lees 
punishment upon them, is, in my opinion, injudicious in every point of view; and must, I conceive, have 
been entered into without due attention to Circumstances, & Consequences." Washington to Morris. 
Morristown, NJ. March 2nd, 1777. PGW; Greene to Adams. Baskenridge [sic], NJ. March 3rd, 1777. 
Adams Papers; JCC, 7:179; Hancock to Washington. Philadelphia, PA. March 17th, 1777. PGW. 
 240 
many since owing to their close & rigorous Confinement."  They were at an impasse.  
After a nine hour meeting, negotiations broke down and both sides returned to their 
commanders empty handed.91   
 Although informal negations continued all summer, no agreement was reached.  
In September 1777, Lord Germain instructed Howe "to put an immediate end to a 
fruitless Negotiation."  In the absence of a cartel, American prisoners continued to suffer 
aboard British prison hulks and makeshift jails in New York, and the tide of American 
popular resentment continued to turn against British and loyalists prisoners in American 
custody. An easy target for retribution, Colonel Campbell endured "the Infamous insults 
of the lower class of people which daily mob about him.”  The time for negotiation was 
over.  Only a reversal in the fortunes of war would bring both parties to the table again.92 
 
.............................. 
 On the surface, the New York campaign looks like a textbook example of 
eighteenth-century European warfare.  British forces engaged and defeated their foes in 
several pitched battles, occupied one of the enemy's most populous and prosperous cities, 
and opened peace negotiations with representatives of their opponent's government.  
Only a brilliant tactical coup de main on the part of the enemy's commander-in-chief 
forestalled a resounding British victory.  Viewing the campaign from this angle, as its 
                                                
 91 JCC, 7:197; William Walcott to Howe.  Brunswick, NJ. March 11th, 1777. Reel 3. No. 435. 
Carleton Papers. DLAR; "Minutes of the Meeting between Lieut. Colos. Harrison and Walcott. March 
10th, 1777. Brunswick, NJ. Reel 3. No. 436. Carleton Papers. DLAR; Dixon, "'Divided Authority,'" 255-
259. 
 92 Germain to Howe. Whitehall. Reel 3. No. 661. Carleton Papers. DLAR. In a letter to a Mrs. 
Inman, Lieutenant and Regimental Adjutant of the 71st Highlanders, Archibald Campbell, informed her 
that Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Campbell (his commanding officer then confined in the Concord Jail) 
"has Experienced shameful Instances of the Infamous insults of the lower class of people which daily mob 
about him.”  Reading, PA. March 28th, 1777. Ms. N-801. James Murray Robins Papers. MHS. 
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principal historians have done, obscures the very real transition in the nature of the 
conflict that took place during the campaign: the advent of civil war.  In order to capture 
and pacify New York, the British relied on hired Hessians and armed loyalists to bolster 
their forces.  Over the course of the campaign, the Hessian penchant for plunder and the 
loyalist quest for revenge resulted in very real crimes and atrocities that the American 
press wasted no time in exploiting.  In this context, the revolutionaries came to envision 
loyalists not simply as deluded neighbors, but rather as armed rebels against the United 
States.  To most revolutionary Americans, who previously had little experience with war, 
the realities of this conflict looked nothing like their idealized vision of "civilized" 
combat.  When reports of the "poor, sick, dying prisoners" in New York circulated, 
Americans had little trouble believing their enemies responsible for willful murder.  
Notwithstanding the prisoners' complaints that Congress, in its inability to provide for the 
imprisoned men and to uphold the conditions of the cartel, was the true author of their 
misfortune, Americans could see only British barbarity.  In the popular American 
opinion, rebels and barbarians should deserve and receive little sympathy.  While matters 
of policy ensured the generous treatment of the Hessians captured at Trenton, Congress 
embraced retaliation against enemy prisoners for the first time and communities under 
British threat sought vengeance for the mistreatment of their citizens in British custody.  
Although Washington remained critical of the war's escalating violence, he came to 
realize that in this conflict the mere threat of retaliatory violence was not always enough. 
As he told Admiral Howe, "You may call us Rebels and say that we deserve no better 
treatment. But remember my Lord that supposing us Rebels we still have feelings equally 
as keen & sensible as Loyalists and will if forced to it most assuredly retaliate upon those 
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upon whom we look as the unjust invaders of our Rights Liberties and properties."  This 
time he was in earnest.93
                                                
 93 Connecticut Journal, January 30th, 1777; Washington to Admiral Lord Howe. Morristown, 
January 13, 1777. PGW. 
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Chapter Four: 
The Fortune of War 
 
In the mid-morning hours of October 13th, 1777, a fifty-five year old playwright, 
sometime actor, gambler, socialite, bon vivant, and major general in the British army, 
recited what must have been the most agonizing lines of his storied career: “The fortune 
of war, General Gates, has made me your prisoner.”  Dapperly clad in his finest gold 
embroidered scarlet coat, with a profusion of feathers protruding from his elegantly laced 
cocked hat, General John Burgoyne, known as “Gentleman Johnny” to his friends and 
foes alike, proffered his sword to the diminutive, bespectacled, and balding American 
General Horatio Gates.  In contrast to the British peacock standing before him, Gates, 
whose own soldiers called him "Granny," looked the part of the ascetic republican, 
clothed in a plain blue frock.  The two men's respective appearances, however, belied 
their similarities.  Both were native-born Englishmen, and both had held a king's 
commission.  Unsurprising for men who had belonged to the exclusive fraternity that was 
the eighteenth-century British officer corps, Gates and Burgoyne had known each other 
for thirty-two years.  Each had begun his military career as a lieutenant in the 20th 
Regiment of Foot.  Although privilege, patronage, and more than a fair share of luck, had 
catapulted Burgoyne to the highest echelons of Britain's military and civil society while 
Gates had languished in obscurity, both men were products of Europe's culture of war, 
and both knew exactly how the surrender would play out.1 
Over the past few days, Burgoyne and Gates, through their respective 
                                                
 1 James Wilkinson, Memories of My Own Times (Philadelphia: Abraham Small, 1816), 2 vols., 
1:321. According to a Brunswick officer with Burgoyne, the British general said: "General, the caprice of 
war has made me your prisoner."  Manuscript Brunswick Journal transcribed in William L. Stone, ed., 
Memories, and Letters and Journals of Major General Riedesel during his Residence in America (Albany: 
J. Munsell, 1868), 2 vols., 1:190; Ferling, Almost a Miracle, 232. 
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intermediaries, had hammered out the details of an agreement that would bring the 
hostilities in the northern theatre to a close.  Taking a ritualistic form that would have 
been well known to William of Orange and Marshal Turenne in the last century, or to 
Maurice de Saxe and the Duke of Cumberland in the last major European war, the 
negotiations proceeded from Gates' initial demand for an unconditional surrender to his 
eventual offer of the "the honors of war:" the officers were to keep their swords, the men 
their personal effects.  Influenced both by his regard for Burgoyne, as well as intelligence 
of an approaching British relief column, Gates agreed to allow the British general and his 
army of over five thousand men to march to Boston, the nearest major American port, 
and take ship home to England with the only proscription that they not bear arms in North 
America for the remainder of the war.  Most importantly, under the terms of the accord, 
the men were not to be considered prisoners of war.  Gates even consented to term the 
surrender a “convention” rather than a “capitulation.”  In contemporary European 
warfare, a convention was a negotiated treaty for a cessation of hostilities not a surrender 
agreement.  Victorious generals would offer these generous terms as a demonstration of 
respect for an enemy that had conducted itself with honor. That is exactly how 
Burgoyne's officers interpreted the convention.  According to Ensign Thomas Anburey, 
General Gates was "fully sensible of the mortification attending our reverse of fortune," 
and he had no wish "to add any circumstance that might aggravate our present calamity."  
Anburey was pleased that the Americans agreed to uphold "the authorized maxims and 
practices of war" by behaving with "civil deportment to a captured enemy."  Burgoyne's 
defeated men had every reason to expect that their adversaries would abide by European 
customs and uphold their end of the bargain.2 
                                                
 2 The number of troops who surrendered at Saratoga remains disputed.  The British provided two 
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When Burgoyne's proud troops filed out of their entrenchments to pile their arms, 
accompanied by the martial strains of the "Grenadiers March," no one on either side 
could have known that the army would spend the next five and a half years in captivity: 
longer than any other contingent of British prisoners.  By the time their ordeal was over, 
the soldiers and their civilian followers, who became known as the Convention army, had 
marched over 1,100 miles, enduring confinement in overcrowded and rotting barracks, 
jails, and prison ships in eight different states and losing roughly eighty-five percent of 
their number to disease, desertion, starvation, and fatigue.  Theirs is a painful story to tell.  
At one of the army's bleakest hours, Ensign Anburey took comfort in the belief that "from 
the cruelty and ill usage they have continually experienced, since they became prisoners," 
the Convention troops would prove the bravest in the British army, willing to "fight to 
desperation" to avenge their mistreatment.  Few among them would ever get that chance.3 
 This chapter investigates the revocation of the Convention of Saratoga and the 
subsequent experience of the Convention army in captivity.  I argue that by nullifying the 
                                                                                                                                            
conflicting returns, one suggesting that 6,350 officers and men surrendered, while the other gives the total 
as 5,871.   In Gates' official return to Congress, he claimed that 5,863 officers and men surrendered of 
whom 2,522 were British, 2,444 were German, and 897 were Canadian. Under the articles of the 
Convention, Burgoyne's Canadian auxiliaries were allowed to return home, and thus not included in the 
Convention army.  It seems that neither Gates' return nor the second British return accounted for the sick 
and wounded prisoners.  The most accurate return appears to be the one completed by Burgoyne's deputy 
Adjutant General Robert Kingston, which puts the total number of surrendered officers and men at 6,350.  
Of these, 2,442 were healthy British officers and enlisted men, 2,198 were healthy Germans, and 1,100 
were Canadians.  In addition, there were 12 staff officers and 598 sick and wounded.  Subtracting the 
Canadians, the total number of men actually encompassed by the Convention was 5,250. If we divide the 
number of staff officers and sick evenly, that would add an additional 305 men to both the British and 
German contingent.  By this calculation, the total number of British soldiers was 2,747 and the total 
number of Germans was 2,503.  I believe this return is the most accurate, and I have used it for the 
purposes of my calculations throughout this study.  George W. Knepper, “The Convention Army, 1777-
1783” (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1954), 12-13, 273. Regrettably, we do not know how many 
camp followers and children accompanied the army into captivity.  At war's end, roughly 800 men, or 15% 
of those who surrendered under the terms of the Convention remained with the army; Thomas Anburey, 
Travels Through the Interior parts of America (London: William Lane, 1789), 2 vols., 2:2-4. 
 3 James P. Baxter, ed., The British Invasion From the North: Digby’s Journal of the Campaigns of 
Generals Carleton and Burgoyne From Canada, 1776-1777 (New York: De Capo Press, 1970), 320; 
Anburey, Travels, 2:438. 
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compact, Congress openly flouted the norms of the European culture of war that the 
revolutionary leadership had held sacrosanct since the commencement of hostilities.  
Unlike prior acts of congressional retaliation, which were aimed at redressing specific 
examples of prisoner abuse on the part of the British and improving the plight of 
American prisoners in British hands, Congress's decision to invalidate the Convention 
was instead an acknowledgement that the rules by which the revolutionaries had 
conducted the war had changed.  The time had come for a new policy: a policy of 
retribution.   
 In resolving to suspend the Convention indefinitely, the delegates had not 
foreseen, nor desired, the absolute destruction of the Convention army.  These were not 
sadists motivated by bloodlust; but they were deeply troubled by the treaty's 
ramifications.  Gates' victory had electrified the revolutionary movement at a moment 
when it was approaching its nadir, but by agreeing to such generous terms, the general 
had squandered the revolutionaries' best chance to not only turn the tide of the conflict 
militarily but also symbolically.  Many Americans, aggrieved by British abuses and 
loyalist insurrections, hoped to make an example of Burgoyne's army.  Hewing closely to 
the norms of "civilized" warfare as they understood them had done the revolutionaries 
precious little good in the past.  To the British, they were still rebels, no matter how 
decorous their behavior.  Unless the British could be persuaded that their actions had 
severe consequences, the cycle of abuse would never end.  Congress had to make a stand. 
 From the perspective of the Convention prisoners, Congress's motivation for 
negating the Convention did not matter; the results were the same.  By refusing to 
exchange the prisoners, even when it would have been militarily advantageous, while 
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simultaneously failing to provide for their support and subsistence, Congress set the 
Convention army on a march to its demise.  Once the decision to suspend the 
embarkation was made, Congress had little option but to foist the prisoners upon state 
officials and local communities that were either incapable or unwilling to provide for the 
men.  Time after time, the prisoners exhausted the resources and welcome of the 
communities that housed them. As the prisoners learned too well, ongoing neglect can be 
just as devastating as deliberate cruelty.  Rather than reassessing its obdurate stance, 
however, Congress only entrenched further.  To parole the men to England or release 
them through exchange would be to repudiate its hard-line stance, destroying 
congressional creditability with the majority of Americans, who after years of hearing 
and reading about British atrocities, thirsted for retribution.  By negating the Convention, 
and relegating the prisoners to indefinite confinement, Congress sent both the British and 
its constituents a powerful message: Americans would turn the other cheek no longer.4 
                                                
 4 Although the Convention army remains the best studied contingent of British and allied prisoners 
during the war, its story has not been properly contextualized within the larger history of prisoner-of-war 
treatment.  By failing to see Congress's decision to nullify the agreement in light of British mistreatment of 
American prisoners, George Knepper has claimed that "the treatment of British and German troops was, on 
the whole, relatively generous." William Dabney was even more sanguine about the prisoners' experience.  
He claimed that "the relation[ship] between the Americans and the British and German Conventioners was 
an enriching and enlightening experience for both sides."  It is hard to imagine what aspect of marching 
over 1,100 miles through snow and ice from New England to Virginia and back again, only to endure years 
of captivity in overcrowded, poorly-constructed, and disease-infested barracks, the prisoners found 
"enriching and enlightening."  Martha Dixon's primary interest in the story of the Convention army was to 
assess the increasing influence of Congress in the management of prisoner affairs after the Convention, and 
thus she made no effort to analyze their treatment in American custody.  In his largely solid study of the 
Convention prisoners, Richard Sampson was principally interested in the experience of escape, but he also 
claimed that Congress negated the Convention in order to elicit the formal recognition of the United States 
from the Court of Great Britain. By claiming this, Sampson failed to appreciate that Congress was under no 
illusion of receiving such recognition.  Treated as a cabal of rebels from the beginning of the conflict, 
Congress knew that the king would never formally endorse the Convention and that is precisely what the 
revolutionary leaders wanted.  In their eyes, the Convention army was not a political tool with which to 
leverage international recognition, but instead an ideal object of revenge. Congress had learned well the 
lessons of the British war effort by 1778 and had witnessed proportional retaliation fail time and again to 
improve the plight of its prisoners in British hands.  Knepper, "The Convention Army," 270; William M. 
Dabney, After Saratoga: The Story of the Convention Army (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico 
Press, 1954), 79; Dixon, "Divided Authority," 201-243; Richard Sampson, Escape in America: The British 
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"The Continuance of the Troops of the Convention here will be but short": The 
Convention Army in Cambridge, Massachusetts 
 
 Before Congress could receive official confirmation of Gates' victory, rumors of 
Burgoyne's surrender permeated the American press.  Sitting at York in Pennsylvania, 
because a British army under General Howe had occupied Philadelphia, Congress was 
abuzz with speculation.  Word of Burgoyne's repulse at the second battle of Freeman's 
Farm had reached the members in early October, but as the month drew to a close, no one 
had heard from General Gates.  Because they had received no official notice, 
Congressman Henry Laurens lamented that "some people begin to doubt the truth of the 
accounts" of Burgoyne's defeat.  Colonel James Wilkinson, who Gates had tasked with 
informing Congress of his victory, was in no hurry.  He relished being the bearer of good 
news and took full advantage of the many open tables and bottomless glasses along his 
route to which the welcome word afforded him.  By the time he finally reached York on 
October 31st, the vague reports of Burgoyne's surrender had already been confirmed.  A 
week earlier, the Massachusetts Spy reported that "Gen. Burgoyne had delivered himself 
and army prisoners of war into the hands of General Gates."  The news exhilarated the 
population of Worcester, many of whom rushed to the common to see "thirteen 
discharges of cannon" and to drink thirteen toasts to the success of American arms.  
Camped at White Marsh on the outskirts of Philadelphia, Washington informed his army 
on the 18th that "G. Burgoyne and his whole Army surrendered prisoners of war."  He 
                                                                                                                                            
Convention Prisoners, 1777-1783 (Wiltshire, UK: Picton Publishing, 1995), xii, 85.  For an early narrative 
of the Conventioners experience that seeks to assess whether or not Congress should have abided by the 
terms of the Convention, see Charles R. Lindsey, "The Treatment of Burgoyne's Troops under the 
Convention of Saratoga," Political Science Quarterly (1907), vol. 22, 441-459. 
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hoped that "every heart [would] expand with grateful joy to the supreme disposer of all 
events who has granted us this signal success.”  Congress went even further: designating 
December 18th as a day "for solemn thanksgiving and praise" and ordering "a medal of 
gold be struck" to be given to General Gates in commemoration of "this great event."  
The revolutionaries had much to be thankful for—never before had their forces captured 
an entire army of European regulars.5   
 Americans throughout the continent rejoiced that the proud and pompous 
Burgoyne was now their prisoner.  With Philadelphia, New York, and Newport in British 
hands, the revolution was teetering on the edge of extinction when the two armies joined 
battle at Saratoga. Unsurprisingly, word of Gates' conquest exhilarated ardent 
revolutionaries.  Aware from the initial reports that Burgoyne's position was untenable—
he was surrounded with his line of retreat cut off— most Americans expected a total 
victory.  In their opinion, Burgoyne deserved no better terms then those offered to the 
American garrison at Fort Washington: unconditional surrender.  Even members of 
Gates' own army who witnessed the surrender thought the Britons were now prisoners of 
war.  Ralph Cross, a soldier under Gates, reported that "the Grand Army of Gen Burgoin 
[sic] Capittelated [sic] & agreed to bee [sic] all Prisoners of Warr [sic]."  One of Cross's 
superiors, Henry Dearborn recorded that "Mister Burgouyn [sic] with his whole army 
surrendered themselves as Prisoners of War."  He called Gates' victory the "greatest 
Conquest ever known."6  
                                                
 5 Henry Laurens to Robert Howe. October 25th, 1777.  Frank Moore, ed., Correspondence of 
Henry Laurens (New York: The Zenger Club, 1861), 58; Wilkinson, Memories, 1:323-332; Massachusetts 
Spy, October 23rd, 1777; Kirkwood Orderly Book. Peter Force Papers. Series 7E. Shelf No. 19, 061. Reel 
16, Item 67. Library of Congress; JCC, 9:854-55, 861-62.  
 6 "The Journal of Ralph Cross of Newburyport," in Historical Magazine: And Notes and Queries 
Concerning the Antiquities, History, and Biography of America Vol. VII, Second Series (Morrisania, New 
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 Although Congress initially shared Dearborn's enthusiasm, when Wilkinson's 
copy of the articles of Convention began to circulate, the mood in the room quickly 
soured.  Wilkinson remembered that several congressmen began to "derogate from Gen. 
Gates's triumph."  As Gates' representative, Wilkinson was subjected to a barrage of 
caustic questions.  How had Gates allowed Burgoyne to talk himself out of unconditional 
surrender?  Would it not have been preferable to allow Burgoyne to retreat to Canada 
where his battered army could do little harm?  Wilkinson did his best to defend his 
general, but the tenor of the conversation was decidedly critical of Gates and his 
convention.7 
 The congressional debate was fruitless; under the terms of the Convention, 
Burgoyne and his army were not prisoners.  Although they could not serve in America 
unless exchanged, nothing in the agreement prohibited the troops' service elsewhere.  The 
return of the troops to Britain under the articles of the Convention of Saratoga would free 
regiments tasked with garrison duty in Europe for the fight in America.  Rather than 
exchanging the men for American prisoners suffering in New York and Philadelphia, 
Gates had simply let them go: ensuring an army of fresh British troops would arrive on 
American shores in the spring.  Unwilling to sacrifice the popular enthusiasm for the 
victory, Congress publically praised Gates, but many members remained privately 
skeptical of his motivations.8 
 To some Americans, Gates' generosity verged on treachery.  The Reverend 
Samuel Cooper, a fiery Congressionalist minister in Boston, confided in John Adams that 
                                                                                                                                            
York: Henry B. Dawson, 1870), 10; Lloyd Brown and Howard Peckham, eds., Revolutionary War Journals 
of Henry Dearborn, 1775-1783 (New York, 1971), 111. 
 7 Wilkinson, Memories, 1:332; Dabney, After Saratoga, 15-16. 
 8 Sampson, Escape in America, 43-44.  
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his "Joy is damp’d by the Concessions G[ates] has made, considering how totally 
Burgoyne was in our Power."  Cooper attributed the terms of "this unaccountable 
Treaty," to Gates' "Infatuation" with Burgoyne and his old employers, "or something 
worse."  Cooper's critique was one that Gates should have seen coming.  The general's 
admiration for Burgoyne was well known.  In a public and widely circulated letter to the 
British general before the capitulation, Gates had complimented "the famous Lieutenant-
general Burgoyne, in whom the fine gentleman is united with the soldier and the scholar."  
Cooper, like many zealous revolutionaries, feared that perhaps Gates, who after all was 
an Englishman by birth, had traded his adopted country for British favor.  Even if he was 
not guilty of treason, it was easy to imagine his prior connections clouding his judgment.  
The newly elected president of Congress, Henry Laurens, thought Gates had been "a little 
captivated" by Burgoyne's flattery and "too polite" in his terms.  Benedict Arnold, who 
bore little love for his former commander, apparently referred to Gates as "the greatest 
paltroon [sic] in the world," for his unwillingness to capitalize on Burgoyne's 
misfortune.9  
 Washington shared his colleagues' dismay over the terms of Burgoyne’s 
capitulation.  The Commander-in-Chief could not “help complaining, most bitterly” to 
Richard Henry Lee “that this event will not equal our expectations; and that, without 
great precaution, and very delicate management, we shall have all these men, if not the 
                                                
 9 Samuel Cooper to John Adams.  Boston, October 22nd, 1777. Adams Papers; Gates to 
Burgoyne. September 2nd, 1777. Pennsylvania Evening Post, September 19th, 1777; Laurens quoted in 
David Duncan Wallace, The Life of Henry Laurens: With a Sketch of the Life of Lieutenant-Colonel John 
Laurens (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1915), 247.  Upon receiving confirmation of the terms of the 
Convention of Saratoga, former Congressman John Rutledge of South Carolina wrote Henry Laurens, "I 
dislike the terms of the Convention much." John Rutledge to Henry Laurens. Charles Town. November 7th, 
1777. David R. Chestnutt, C. James Taylor, Peggy J. Clark, and David Fischer, eds., The Papers of Henry 
Laurens (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1968-2002), 16 vols., 12:36, hereafter cited as 
PHL; Lafayette to Henry Laurens. Albany, NY. February 19th, 1778.  See also, Martin, Benedict Arnold, 
406. 
 252 
officers, opposed to us in the spring.”  Experienced with British chicanery, Washington 
imagined that the British ministry might “justify, a breach of the Covenant on their part” 
on the grounds that “that no faith is to be held with Rebels.”  Washington was not alone 
in his concerns.  One of his aides, Colonel Samuel Webb, noted the mood of the army 
upon learning of Gates' terms: “We have this day the articles of treaty between Lt. Genl. 
Burgoyne and Major Genl. Gates, & ‘tis the general opinion that Gates has given him 
much better terms than he need have done, which causes much uneasiness.”10 
 Revolutionary Americans found the Convention particularly galling because of 
the methods Burgoyne had used in his invasion of New York.  Rev. Cooper decried the 
terms as "large and generous considering…the manner in which they have carried on the 
War."  Cooper's claim was not mere republican bombast.  In July 1777, Burgoyne had 
promised the American people that he would bring "the vengeance of the state" against 
any one who opposed him by spreading "devastation, famine, and every concomitant 
horror."  He kept his word.  British forces, and their loyalist and Native American allies, 
felt little compunction at pillaging, plundering, and burning rebel property on their march 
southward.  Colonel Wilkinson claimed that "the hostile Indians" who "were let loose by 
the British commander" were guilty of "committing murders and spreading terror over 
the country."  Although Burgoyne had not ordered nor condoned willful murder, he had 
done little to restrain his loyalist and Native American auxiliaries.  When a scouting party 
of British-allied Native warriors scalped and murdered Jane McCrea, a young loyalist 
woman who was engaged to be married to one of Burgoyne's officers, Burgoyne issued a 
"very severe" reproach but was dissuaded from punishing the culprits for fear of losing 
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his allies.  This incident instantly became a propaganda sensation for the revolutionary 
cause.  The American press painted Jane McCrea as the virtuous victim of British 
depravity.  So enraged by stories of "unmanly acts of murder upon women & Children," 
Henry Laurens claimed that had he been in Burgoyne's position, he would "have 
Surrendered my Self to a pistol Ball in preference to becoming the prisoner of those 
people whom I had reviled by the Epithet of Rebels."11 
 As exaggerated accounts of her murder proliferated, American animosity soared.  
Notwithstanding the common American practice of turning over loyalist prisoners to 
American-allied Native warriors to be "treated according to their custom," the 
revolutionaries denounced Burgoyne as "the chief director of the King of Great Britain's 
band of thieves, robers [sic], cut throats, scalpers, and murders."  In the opinion of one 
concerned citizen, Burgoyne was a latter-day Duke of Cumberland, willing to "put to 
death in cold blood, without form of trial" all who opposed him.  Upon reviewing the 
terms of the Convention, the New York Council of Safety petitioned Congress 
demanding that Burgoyne's army be kept as "valuable Hostages for the future good 
Behavior of the Enemy."  Because the British had evinced "barbarian Inhumanity" by 
violating "those Rules according to which civilized nations usually prosecute Wars," 
Congress had a duty to its citizens, who were "already ruined by their Ravages," to 
"retard the Embarkation" of the troops.  In the opinion of the councilmen, from the 
beginning of the war the British armed forces had consistently violated every custom of 
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"civilized" warfare while assuming that the Americans would uphold them.  Enough was 
enough.  A Massachusetts columnist captured the prevailing opinion when he declared: 
"The blood of our brethren crieth from the ground for vengeance."  With a sizable British 
army in American custody for the first time, the long awaited opportunity for retribution 
on a grand scale had at last arrived.  As the New York Council of Safety phrased it: "we 
have long borne with their Inhumanity—Our Threats of Retaliation have hitherto been 
considered as Safe Words—it is Time to give them Efficacy—the Juncture is favorable.  
A brave People should dare to execute what they have thought it just to Threaten."12 
 Fear of retaliation was the last thing on the minds of Burgoyne's ragged and 
weary men as they trudged toward Boston; the troops were amazed by the generous terms 
of the accord and by the kind treatment they received from their erstwhile foes.  Gates 
was adamant that from the moment they laid down their arms, the troops would be treated 
with civility and respect.  Under the articles of the Convention, the surrendered soldiers' 
personal baggage could not be searched and the Americans were responsible for 
provisioning them, "at the same rate of rations as the troops" of Gates' own army until 
British transports arrived to carry them to Europe.  Their experience could not have been 
more different from that of the American garrison of Fort Washington.  No mention of 
insults, taunts, or robberies in the aftermath of the surrender can be found in the journals 
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kept by British and German soldiers of the Convention army.  On the contrary, they 
abound with appreciation.  British Lieutenant William Digby was so impressed by the 
Americans' "decent behaviour" that he felt they "merited the utmost approbation and 
praise."  The Germans were even more complimentary of their captors.  According to one 
officer from the Specht regiment, the Americans "competed with each other to show us 
all possible niceties."  While the captive officers dined with their American counterparts, 
the ravenous enlisted men enjoyed "good wheat flour and fresh meat" from American 
supplies, while their wounded countrymen received "tea, sugar, chocolate and wine" to 
ease their suffering.  One of Burgoyne's German surgeons, who had been captured prior 
to the Convention, was so impressed with his treatment that he admonished his 
countrymen to "learn to treat your friends as well as the inhabitants of New England treat 
their enemies!"  In her postwar history, Mercy Otis Warren summarized the initial 
American response to the Convention troops: "They were every where treated with such 
humanity, and even delicacy, that they were overwhelmed with astonishment and 
gratitude.  Not one insult was offered, not an opprobrious reflection cast."  The captured 
men could take comfort that though defeated, they were entitled to all the privileges due 
to an army that had acquitted itself honorably.13 
 Despite Gates' best efforts to facilitate the march of the Convention troops, 
Boston, and the prospect of a speedy passage home, lay at the end of an arduous three-
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week trek of over two hundred miles across the Green Mountains.  The men were 
exhausted.  They had endured a grueling summer campaign, cutting their way through the 
New York forests from Canada while constantly pestered by American forces, and at 
times more vexing, American mosquitoes.  Because revolutionary privateers had 
intercepted the army's 1777 clothing issue, their threadbare uniforms were literally 
disintegrating.  To add to their distress, the weather turned colder as soon as they began 
their march.  One German officer reported that the "the weather at night" was "so 
disagreeable" that they experienced "not only rain but also snow and hail."  Another 
complained that "our wet clothes froze as stiff as iron."  When the column of troops 
reached the Green Mountains, "the roads across them were almost impassible."  Ensign 
Anburey described the bedlam that ensued: "carts breaking down, others sticking fast, 
some oversetting, horses tumbling with their loads of baggage, men cursing, women 
shrieking, and children squalling!"  In the laconic understatement of a German officer, 
"we made a very troublesome march."14 
 The trip was not nearly so arduous for General Burgoyne and his senior officers.  
Gates, and his subordinate General Philip Schuyler, delighted in showing their European 
adversaries every courtesy and comfort.  The Baroness Frederika von Riedesel, the wife 
of the commander of Burgoyne's German allies, observed that Gates and Burgoyne "were 
on very friendly terms" with one another.  Schuyler invited Burgoyne and his entourage 
to join him in Albany where they were welcomed "not as enemies, but in the friendliest 
manner possible."  Travelling by coach, Burgoyne and his staff stopped frequently to sate 
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the curiosity of American onlookers and to enjoy their hospitality.  While the enlisted 
men and junior officers regularly bivouacked in the open, exposed to the elements, 
Burgoyne, Reidesel, and the other senior officers and their families were housed by elite 
American families along their route or in local inns and taverns.  Closely mimicking 
European custom, Burgoyne and his staff were feted and feasted all the way to Boston.15 
 When news of the impending arrival of Burgoyne's army reached Boston, the 
celebratory atmosphere soon subsided.  The prospect of providing provisions and quarters 
for five thousand ravenous and bone-chilled men plus their dependents sent the people of 
Boston into a frenzy.  Where would they obtain flour, firewood, and beef in sufficient 
quantity at such a time of year?  With a substantial British army and fleet ensconced at 
Newport, trade into and out of Boston was severely curtailed.  Scarcity combined with 
the escalating depreciation of Continental currency had driven the price of household 
necessities through the roof.  Flour was in particularly short supply.  To compound 
matters, Boston had yet to recover from Washington's protracted siege of the city.  The 
surrounding area had been completely deforested by Washington's troops, forcing local 
inhabitants to depend on spotty and insufficient imports of fuel from Maine.  Even before 
the troops arrived in town the price of wood was fourteen dollars per cord.  Hannah 
Winthrop, a resident of Cambridge, estimated that the Convention army would consume 
more than 250 cords per week.  She wondered rhetorically to Mercy Otis Warren: "Is 
there not a degree of unkindness in loading poor Cambridge, almost ruined before this 
great army seemed to be let loose upon us?"  The President of the Massachusetts Council, 
Jeremiah Powell, echoed her sentiments when he informed John Hancock that "it will be 
                                                
 15 Marvin L. Brown, trans., Baroness von Riedesel and the American Revolution: Journal and 
Correspondence of a Tour of Duty, 1776-1783 (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1965), 64, 65; Stone, ed., 
Memories, and Letters, 1:214-6. 
 258 
very distressing to us, under our present Circumstances, as well as dangerous to the 
United States to have those Troops Continued here for any time."  He worried that the 
presence of such a large body of enemy troops would serve "to poison the minds of our 
People and to divide them."  Powell hoped that Congress would use its "Authority & 
Influence" to see that the troops were dispatched to England "with all possible 
Expedition."16 
 Fortunately for the government of Massachusetts, the Convention troops were at 
least nominally wards of the Continental army, and thus their immediate direction fell to 
the military commander of the Eastern District: Major General William Heath.  More 
farmer than soldier, the Massachusetts native had failed to capture British-occupied Fort 
Independence in January 1777, staining his military reputation.  Viewed by Washington 
as more suited for an administrative rather than a combat role, Heath was transferred to 
Boston and out of harm's way.  Rising to the command of the Eastern Department when 
General Artemas Ward retired in March 1777, Heath was utterly unprepared for the 
myriad challenges before him.  Gates had forwarded enough provisions to get the 
Conventioners to Boston, but once arrived, they were Heath's problem.  The general 
bemoaned to Washington the "wide and difficult Field" he faced: “to provide Quarters, 
provisions, Fuel &c. for Five or Six Thousand Men will be no small Task.”  Although he 
was determined to "treat them with politeness & humanity and on the other with 
precaution and strict Order," Heath begged Washington "to facilitate their removal as 
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soon as possible, as their continuance for any considerable time will greatly distress the 
Inhabitants both as to provisions and Fuel."  In the meantime, he appealed to the civilian 
authorities in the Massachusetts Assembly for whatever assistance they could provide.17 
 Inclined to help, but loathe to accept any added responsibility, the Assembly, in 
characteristic republican form, appointed a committee "to consider what Provision etc. is 
necessary to be made for the Reception of the Prisoners."  The committee concluded that 
Burgoyne's army could not be properly subsisted in Boston.  The city simply lacked the 
necessary infrastructure to house and feed so many people.  Aware that the fourth article 
of the Convention required the men to be quartered "in, near, or as convenient as possible 
to Boston," the Assembly could not disperse the troops throughout the countryside to 
work for their subsistence, as was the standard procedure for prisoners of war at the time.  
Compromising, the Assembly allowed Heath to house the prisoners in barracks on 
Prospect and Winter hills outside of town.  These barracks had the added benefit of being 
sufficiently isolated from the bulk of the city's population to discourage fraternization.  
Only the senior officers, who presumably were less likely to escape, were to be quartered 
in Cambridge.  Even they were debarred from visiting Boston.  Isolated on their hilltop 
barracks, the conquered troops could be more easily provisioned and supervised, and 
Boston would be spared the invariable disorder that would result from soldiers roaming 
the streets at will.  To enforce their orders, the assemblymen authorized General Heath, 
who possessed only a skeleton garrison of Continentals, to raise "one thousand men, 
including officers…from such parts of the militia of this State" to serve as guards under 
Heath's direct command.  Heath requested 1,200, but even finding a thousand men to do 
                                                
 17 The government of Massachusetts, known as the Massachusetts Assembly, was composed of the 
Council and the House of Representatives.  Without a governor, the Council served as the executive of the 
state.  Heath to Washington. October 25th, 1777. PGW. 
 260 
guard duty proved difficult because the people of Boston were in no mood to be 
cooperative.18 
 The arrival in their midst of throngs of filthy and malodorous enemy soldiers—
men who the revolutionary press had portrayed as wanton murderers, plunderers, and 
rapists—incensed the city's residents.  To the wary whigs of Boston, these men were not 
only godless mercenaries who had pillaged and plagued the frontiers of New England, as 
vectors of the twin contagions of smallpox and royalism, they were a direct threat to the 
health, economy, and political stability of the Boston-area.  Winthrop described the 
November 7th arrival of Burgoyne's German troops at Winter Hill, about a mile and a 
half outside of Cambridge, as "truly astonishing."  She could not believe that "creation 
produced such a sordid set of creatures in human figure—poor, dirty, emaciated men" 
accompanied by "great numbers of women, who seemed to be beasts of 
burden…barefoot, clothed in dirty rags."  The stench must have been arresting.  
According to Hannah Winthrop, "effluvia filled the air while they were passing."  Only 
their constant smoking allayed her fears of being contaminated.  At least the Germans 
looked like prisoners and objects of pity. The British were proudly "prancing and 
patrolling in every corner of the town, ornamented with their glittering side-arms—
weapons of destruction," even insisting that "we ought not to look on them as Prisoners."  
Winthrop feared that Burgoyne's officers, who lived in "the most Luxurious manner 
possible, rioting on the Fat of the Land, Stalking at Large with the Self-importance of 
Lords of the Soil,” would prove a corrupting influence on the city's population.  Her 
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concerns must have been commonplace.  Roger Lamb, a corporal in the Convention 
army, remembered "the general unwillingness of the people [of Cambridge] to administer 
the least civility" to the troops.  In his opinion, "the people of New England appeared to 
indulge a deadly hatred against the British prisoners."  A far cry from the kindness and 
civility they had received from Gates and his officers, the Convention troops encountered 
only antipathy from the Bostonians who, like Winthrop, believed the Convention army 
would leave only "insults, famine, and a train of evils" in their wake.  Conventioners and 
Bostonians alike agreed that the transport ships that would carry the soldiers to England 
could not arrive soon enough.19 
 The ships were nowhere to be seen when the Convention army marched into the 
dilapidated ruins of barracks that dotted the barren and exposed hills outside of Boston.  
These makeshift shelters had been constructed in the summer of 1775 to house 
Washington's troops, but no one had bothered to see to their upkeep after the army 
departed for New York in spring 1776.  Briefly used to house smallpox victims who were 
beyond hope of recovery, the bulk of the buildings were now entirely unsuitable for 
human habitation.  As one of Burgoyne's Brunswick grenadiers, Johann Bense, described, 
"the barracks were only put together with boards.  The gables were open; there were no 
windows but just open holes.  We had neither wood nor straw to lie on…in short, we 
were the most wretched people."  Each "small, miserable, open hut" housed "thirty, or 
forty persons, men, women and children…indiscriminately crowded together" according 
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to Corporal Lamb.  All endured "the chill peltings" of the November rain and snow 
"which the wind drifted" into the open barracks.  Gnawing hunger occasioned by food 
shortages compounded their predicament.  In late November, Heath's adjutant reported 
that the troops on Winter Hill were "entirely destitute of vegetables, Poultry, Roots &c."  
The results were predictable: disease and malnutrition began to take a toll on the troops.  
Grenadier Bense noted that "many died of scurvy" during their confinement at Winter 
Hill.  At least the soldiers could take solace in the knowledge that their confinement was 
temporary.  Surely, the transports would arrive before the Massachusetts' winter made the 
army's embarkation impracticable.20 
 Barracks' life was little better for Burgoyne's officers.  Ensign Anburey was 
horrified by his quarters.  In his opinion they were "in the worst condition imaginable for 
the reception of troops, being so much out of repair."  According to one of Anburey's 
German colleagues, "the barracks are without foundations, and built of boards, through 
which the rain and snow penetrate from all sides…our people have to endure a great deal 
of hardship while in them, as they afford not the least protection against the cold."  The 
officers, who were accustomed to a certain level of comfort and privacy even while on 
active duty, were disgusted to learn that they would live six to a room "not twelve feet 
square" inside the barracks.  Sharing common bunks that a German officer characterized 
as "holes in which it is impossible to turn one's self" at night, the men struggled to keep 
warm.  With threadbare blankets and no wood for the fireplaces, shared body heat alone 
prevented the onset of hypothermia. The colonel commanding the American guards, 
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William Raymond Lee, informed Heath that he discovered "Field Officers & some 
Others walking by their Barracks to keep themselves from perishing with cold; not one 
stick of Wood to put into the Fire."  Lee was of the opinion that "if some other method 
cannot be found to supply them they must either perish or burn all the Publick buildings."  
One forlorn German officer summarized the prevailing mood in the barracks: "we are 
now living in misery."21  
 The officers had every right to grumble.  Heath was well aware that under the 
seventh article of the Convention, they were entitled to be "quartered according to rank."  
As the officer in command, it was Heath's responsibility to see to the comfort and 
entertainment of the captured officers and the health and provision of the enlisted men.  
When their quarters and provisions failed to live up to their expectations, Heath became 
the object of the officers' indignation.  Attempting to ameliorate their plight, he dashed 
off a frenetic series of letters to the Massachusetts Council, the governors of neighboring 
states, Congress, and General Washington: all no avail.  Even the Continental 
Commissary General, Joseph Trumbull, refused to supply the troops with flour without a 
direct order from Congress, which he knew would not be forthcoming.  Incensed by the 
terms of the Convention, Congress was not about to share valuable provisions, which 
were so badly needed by its own soldiers, with an enemy army on the verge of 
embarkation.   
 The people of Cambridge proved equally obdurate.  Landlords banded together to 
refuse housing to Burgoyne's senior officers unless the men paid ruinous rates, well 
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beyond the means of all but Burgoyne himself.  From their perspective, they had not been 
party to the negotiations between Gates and Burgoyne and therefore had no qualms about 
profiting from them.  Unsurprisingly, the city's merchants were also keen to exploit the 
captive consumers.  Prices soared.  Anburey recorded that "every species of provisions 
was very dear."  He regularly traversed over a mile in the snow to procure enough milk 
for his breakfast. This was hardly the lap of luxury that Hannah Winthrop had feared 
would erode the virtuous republican spirit of Boston.22 
 Witnessing his army's distress, Burgoyne fumed.  Gates had led him to expect that 
Bostonians would accord his army the respect due to honorable foes.  He could not sit 
idly by and submit to such indignities, which not only sullied the royal cause but also his 
personal honor.  Upon inspecting the officers' barracks, and noting that "the quarters 
allotted to them would be held unfit for gentlemen in their situation in any part of the 
world," Burgoyne informed Heath that he and his army believed "that the Convention 
[was] infringed in several circumstances."  He was aghast that neither Heath nor the 
members of the Massachusetts Council were willing to impress private property for the 
officers' use, as was the custom in European conflicts.  Not fully grasping the limitations 
of republican government, the British general suspected that their intransigence stemmed 
from a sinister plan to break the Convention and consign his army to indefinite captivity.  
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In protest, Burgoyne instructed his officers to refuse signing their paroles until their 
grievances were redressed.23 
 In his public letters to Burgoyne, Heath denied any infraction of the Convention, 
but privately he worried that his inability to properly quarter the troops might besmirch 
the "Honor and Dignity of Congress and of the United States."  He sought guidance from 
Congress, reminding President Laurens that the Convention was "the first made by these 
rising States which will be nicely review'd by all the polite States in Europe, and the 
World."  Heath knew that according to Vattel, "all promises made to an enemy in the 
course of a war are obligatory."  If he could not enforce the terms of the Convention, the 
reputation of the United States would suffer, as would their quest for European allies.  
Heath needed money, or at least direct orders from Congress granting him permission to 
bypass the Council and requisition the supplies and buildings he so desperately needed.  
While awaiting instructions, all the general could do was assure Burgoyne that "no 
Endeavors of mine shall be wanting to fulfill the Convention."24 
 Heath's best efforts were simply not good enough.  Congress had saddled him 
with the thankless task of upholding Gates' agreement without the funds, manpower, or 
authority to do so.  The people of Boston had made it abundantly clear that they either 
wanted nothing to do with the Convention troops or intended to profit from their distress, 
and the Massachusetts Council had refused to deviate from the desires of its constituents.  
In a desperate letter to the Council, Heath exclaimed: "Every principle of interest and 
policy calls for our attention to the fulfillment of the Convention."  But no one listened.  
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Heath had done everything in his limited purview to prevent any infraction of the 
Convention that might reflect poorly on the honor of his country and person, but without 
a sizeable influx of capital, all was for naught. On November 23rd, an exasperated Heath 
confessed to Washington that he was "not a little embarrassed in obtaining Quarters for 
the Officers" and "much embarrassed in the Commissary's Department."  Determined to 
play the part of the professional officer in the European mold, Heath could not help but 
take this failure personally.25 
 As the weeks passed, and the oft-promised support failed to materialize, both 
Heath and his captive guests anxiously awaited the only viable solution to their problems: 
the embarkation of the troops for Britain.  Although sailing to Boston so late in the year 
was precarious at best, and Congress had refused to change the departure point to the 
more easily accessible British-occupied Newport, both parties held out hope that the 
transports would arrive before the new year.  As far as Heath was concerned, the sooner 
the Conventioners departed the better.  He informed Laurens that they were consuming 
nearly 20,000 dollars of provisions and fuel a week just to maintain basic subsistence, 
and they were deserting in droves.  Because Congress had failed to provide him with a 
suitable supply of sufficiently-trained guards, Heath could do little to stem the tide.  By 
Christmas, the situation had grown untenable.  Heath reported that "my situation [is] truly 
disagreeable."  Word of the arrival of the British transport ships at Newport lifted his 
spirits however.  As he told Laurens, with any luck, "the Continuance of the Troops of 
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the Convention here will be but short."  Regrettably for Burgoyne's ill-fated army, 
Congress had other plans.26 
 
 
"An act never excusable": Congressional Retaliation and the Nullification of the 
Convention of Saratoga 
 
 When Burgoyne sat down at his rented desk in a Cambridge tavern to apprise his 
former colleague turned capturer, Horatio Gates, of his army's predicament, he could 
never have imagined the ramifications of his prose.  In what General Heath would later 
call "a very serious entanglement," Burgoyne complained of the "very unexpected 
treatment" he and his army had received from the people of Cambridge.  While acquitting 
General Heath and his officers of any wrongdoing, Burgoyne alleged that the 
Massachusetts Council's inability, or unwillingness, to provide adequate quarters for his 
soldiers constituted a violation of the Convention.  As he informed Gates, "the public 
faith is broke; & we are the immediate sufferers."  Gates did not dispute his old 
colleague's critique.  General John Glover, the American officer who had overseen the 
march of the Convention troops to Boston, had already informed him of the housing 
crisis.  Gates was mortified.  The two men had pledged their word of honor as gentlemen 
to uphold all of the articles of the accord.  Gates had no proof of any violation on 
Burgoyne's part, and the evidence of American infractions was voluminous.  But Gates 
                                                
 26 Knepper, "The Convention Army," 53, 197; Heath to Laurens.  January 5th, 1778. Boston, MA. 
Heath Papers. MHS. Vol. 8, p. 36. 
 268 
was no longer in charge of the army's fate.  All the "Hero of Saratoga" could do was 
forward Burgoyne's concerns to Congress.27 
 Far from serving its intended purpose of improving his army's plight, Burgoyne's 
remonstrance convinced President Laurens that the British general intended to violate the 
Convention himself.  He reasoned that by alleging an American breach of faith, 
Burgoyne might justify repudiating the agreement as soon as he and his army were safely 
aboard British ships. Laurens had already suspected that Burgoyne had not been entirely 
straightforward in his dealings with Gates.  A committee of Congress had reported in late 
November that Burgoyne had turned over an insufficient quantity of arms and military 
stores.  What had happened to the regimental flags and the army's pay chest?  Why had 
these not been relinquished as well?  In the opinion of Congress, "the whole return seems 
very inadequate to a well appointed army."  In the committee's estimation, the British 
troops likely destroyed much of their arms and ammunition and secreted away their 
currency and colors prior to their march to Boston.  Given this apparent disingenuous 
behavior, Laurens could not believe Burgoyne's audacity in insinuating that Congress had 
violated the Convention.  Fulminating, the president advised Heath that "it will be 
impossible to part with [Burgoyne] before an eclaircissement is had on this important 
charge."  Congress had previously resolved that the investigation would in no way delay 
the embarkation of the troops, but in the aftermath of Burgoyne's letter to Gates, Laurens 
had no intention of allowing the general to depart until he retracted his allegation and 
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allowed Heath to conduct a full accounting of the army's strength and remaining military 
stores.28   
 Although he lacked substantive evidence, there was some truth to Laurens' 
suspicions.  At the time of the Convention, Burgoyne had assured Gates that he had 
deliberately left his regimental flags in Canada and thus could not surrender them.  Gates 
had accepted Burgoyne's word of honor as a gentleman and had pursued the issue no 
further.  Despite Burgoyne's protestations to the contrary, the army had in fact marched 
south with its colors, and the British general had had no intention of giving them up.  
Surrendering the flags that his men had carried throughout the campaign would have 
destroyed the morale of his army and obviated his claim that his troops were not in fact 
prisoners.  What happened to the flags, however, is not entirely clear.  Once the 
Convention was agreed upon, Burgoyne's German troops burned their flagstaffs but 
saved their colors by sewing them into Baroness von Riedesel's mattress.  These "badges 
of honor" were later smuggled into New York and eventually returned to the regiments 
stationed in Canada.  One bold British officer was so determined to preserve his 
regiment's colors that he risked carrying them throughout his captivity in his personal 
baggage.  When he later presented them to the king, his bravery was rewarded with a 
colonel's commission.  As for the other British flags, presumably they were either 
similarly preserved or at the very least destroyed.  None of Burgoyne's colors were 
surrendered as trophies of war to be hung on the walls of Congress.29   
 Notwithstanding Burgoyne's duplicity concerning the flags, Congress's other 
critiques were unsubstantiated.  In his letter to Laurens, Gates assured the president that 
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he possessed no evidence "to justify our Charge of their having violated the Convention."  
If there were fewer muskets and bayonets than might be expected for such a large army, 
the only culprits were "Our own Men" who augmented their paltry supply from the pile 
of weapons the Britons left behind.  As for the money and medical supplies, Burgoyne 
had exhausted both prior to the Convention.  Gates did admit that he should have 
stipulated that the troops surrender their cartridge pouches, but he had not included this 
proviso in the terms of the Convention and to do so now would constitute a severe breach 
of faith.  Given his knowledge of Burgoyne's actions, Gates was unwilling to placate the 
president by adding his voice to the growing number of revolutionaries calling for a 
suspension of the compact.  This was not the answer that Laurens had hoped for.30   
 In spite of the general's objections, Laurens was undeterred.  Even if Burgoyne 
had not directly infringed the Convention, his charge that the "public faith is broke" was 
too serious to ignore.  If Burgoyne already considered the agreement violated, what was 
stopping him from overcoming Heath's meager detachment of guards and decamping to 
Rhode Island?   Laurens appointed a committee to investigate the claim and to determine 
a suitable response.  On December 27th, the committee concluded that "the 
apprehensions of General Burgoyne's future intentions" to disregard the accord were 
warranted, and that the general's "personal honor is hereby destroyed."  It was the 
committee's recommendation to delay the army's departure until the "King of Great 
Britain shall on his part cause his ratification of the said agreement to be properly notified 
to these States."  The committee knew all too well that the king would never ratify a 
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formal agreement with rebels; to do so would be to acknowledge the United States as a 
sovereign power.31 
  The recommendation was a bold departure from previous congressional policy.  
It is true that Congress had overturned the treaty of capitulation of the Cedars, as well as 
Arnold's cartel of exchange with Captain Forster in the summer of 1776, but not before 
conducting extensive eyewitness interviews and concluding that the British had openly 
violated the treaty by abusing American prisoners.  Burgoyne had done no such thing.  If 
the members of Congress voted to approve the committee's resolution, they would be 
openly invalidating the first international accord in which a congressional representative 
pledged the honor and faith of the United States.  Doing so would be a clear violation of 
the laws of war and nations as enunciated by Vattel and an absolute rejection of the 
norms of Europe's culture of limited warfare.  Richard Henry Lee feared that the British 
would use even "the appearance of infraction on our part" to "totally ruin the reputation" 
of the young nation in the eyes of the world.  Unsurprisingly, the mood in the room was 
tense.  Rather than make a hasty decision, Congress resolved to suspend discussion until 
a later date.32 
 Almost a week elapsed before Congress again addressed the issue of the 
Convention.  The members had had plenty of time to consider the committee's 
recommendations and to imagine the implications of their actions.  Looking out at his 
colleagues from the president's chair, Laurens must have sensed their uncertainty.  
Everyone in the room knew where the president stood on the issue, but did he have 
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enough votes to suspend the embarkation?  Before the vote was called, a portly delegate 
from New Jersey, the Scottish Presbyterian cleric John Witherspoon, addressed the 
assembled delegates.  As Congress's chaplain, Witherspoon was a highly visible figure.  
Although hardly a moderate, as a well-respected member of the Board of War, 
Witherspoon was an ideal advocate for Laurens' position.  Calming the more conservative 
members of Congress, Witherspoon began his speech by openly admitting that "the 
convention is not so broken, on the part of General Burgoyne, as to entitle us to refuse 
compliance with it on ours, and detain him and his army as prisoners of war."  He agreed 
that it was absolutely imperative for an infant state like theirs to "preserve its faith and 
honour in solemn contracts."  Yet, he suggested, it was also the "indispensable duty" of 
every member to see that "justice be done to the American States."  The issue at hand was 
not Burgoyne's flags or unaccounted for military stores, the issue was Burgoyne himself.  
Witherspoon eschewed recourse to the scholarly works on the laws of nations; instead he 
asked his colleagues to use their powers of reason.  Burgoyne's letter of November 14th 
was "of the most alarming nature" because by alleging "that the convention is broken on 
our part, he will not hold to it on his."  To this logic, Witherspoon added a discourse on 
Burgoyne's character and career.  As one of the British commanders during the siege of 
Boston, Burgoyne had called the burning of Charlestown "a glorious light."  During his 
march from Canada, he had issued a "lofty and sonorous proclamation" promising 
violence and destruction to all who opposed him.  By his actions, Burgoyne had shown 
himself to be "showy, vain, impetuous, and rash."  In short, he was not to be trusted.  On 
these grounds, and these grounds alone, Congress should impede his departure until it 
was clear he could do the people of the United States no more harm.33 
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 Debate ensued for several more days, but Witherspoon had been convincing.  On 
January 8th, 1778, after what Laurens characterized as "a long time on the Anvil," he 
called for a vote on the recommendation to suspend the embarkation of the troops until 
the Convention was ratified by the court of Great Britain.  Enraged by alleged British 
atrocities and duplicities, fourteen members chose to forsake the norms of "civilized" 
warfare that they had so assiduously guarded since the conflict began.  Only four dared 
raise their hand in opposition to the measure.  Lacking any legitimate evidence of 
wrongdoing on Burgoyne's part, or even the pretense of proportional retaliation, Congress 
resolved to hold the Conventioners for the foreseeable future.  Clearly satisfied, Laurens 
sent orders to Heath "to detain the said Lieutenant General Burgoyne[,] his Officers[,] 
Troops[,] and other persons and to suspend their intended embarkation until you shall be 
further Instructed."34 
 Little did Laurens know, but his assessment of Burgoyne's intentions was correct.  
On November 16th, Howe had written Burgoyne in secret with a plan to free the 
Convention troops from their American captors.  The previous winter, Howe had released 
nearly two thousand American prisoners from captivity under an agreement with 
Washington that an equal number of captured Britons would be returned in their stead.  
The insalubrious conditions of the British prison hulks in New York, however, had taken 
a toll on these men, and consequently very few of them had returned to their regiments.  
Washington was not about to release thousands of largely healthy British and German 
soldiers in exchange for the specters Howe had sent him.  In the Convention troops, 
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Howe saw an opportunity to recoup his losses.  He instructed Burgoyne that when the 
troops were "embarked, he is to proceed with the British Artillery men and Infantry to 
New York, my Design being to exchange the officers for those of the Rebels in my 
Possession, and the soldiers for the 2,220 Prisoners of the Enemy, that I sent in last 
Winter."  He justified his decision by assuring Burgoyne that he intended "only to repair 
an Injury in which Mr. Washington so obstinately persists."  Knowing that Congress and 
Washington would not agree with his logic, he ordered Burgoyne "to use every possible 
Precaution to keep the Enemy ignorant of my Intentions, as on the least suspicion the 
Troops…[will] be infallibly stopt [sic]." Without ever learning of Howe's plan, Laurens 
and his followers thwarted the British general, leaving the Convention troops in limbo: 
not quite prisoners, but certainly not free.35 
 When news of the resolution leaked, fervent revolutionaries everywhere rejoiced.  
President Laurens was pleased to learn that his diligent efforts "for effecting the 
determination of Congress for suspending the embarkation of Mr. Burgoyne" met with 
the approbation of "the most sensible [civilians] and by all the officers in the Army."  
John Thaxter, one of Congress's clerks, was convinced that it was Burgoyne, not 
Congress, who had violated the agreement.  He assured Abigail Adams that "the treaty 
has not been violated by us," and therefore Congress was "determined not to recede from 
their resolution of 8th of Jany."  For many revolutionaries, the issue of who had violated 
the Convention first mattered not at all. The British had long since demonstrated their 
cruelty and perfidy.  Scarcely a day went by without an account of another British 
atrocity in the newspapers.  To irate whigs everywhere, it looked as if Congress had 
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finally acted to obtain justice for the long suffering American prisoners in New York.  
New Jersey's governor William Livingston, writing in the New-Jersey Gazette under the 
pseudonym Adolphus, proudly proclaimed: "The detention of Burgoyne and his army, 
until the Convention of Saratoga is ratified by the Court of Great Britain, is a measure 
founded on the truest policy and strictest justice."  His rationale had nothing to do with 
missing munitions or hidden standards, but was instead predicated upon Britain's 
repeated mistreatment of American prisoners.  Reminding his readers of the plight of the 
Fort Washington prisoners, Livingston asked how they could trust the British to uphold 
the Convention when "three thousand freemen capitulate on condition of being treated as 
prisoners of war—but the moment their arms are out of their hands, they are treated as 
rebels, crowded together in the holds of transports, or amidst the unwholesome damps of 
churches, and suffered to perish with hunger and cold"?  The answer was simple. They 
could not.  From the outset of the conflict, he argued, Americans had treated British 
prisoners "generously while they [the British] violated every principle of justice—we 
treated them kindly while they outraged every sentiment of humanity…we have born 
their cruelty and frauds with a patience unparalleled in history."  The only recourse 
Americans now possessed was to treat the British like they deserved, "as robbers and 
murderers when they presume to treat us as rebels."36 
 Some revolutionaries, however, were less inclined to discard their vision of the 
normative practice of warfare between "civilized" peoples.  To them, the resolution 
compromised the reputation of the United States and insulted General Gates.  Alexander 
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Hamilton, who aspired to be the very model of a European gentleman officer, was 
horrified.  He accused Congress of having "embraced a system of infidelity."  As he 
complained to the governor of New York, George Clinton, "they have violated the 
convention of Saratoga; and I have reason to believe the ostensible motives for it were 
little better than pretences, that had no foundation."  Even President Laurens' own son 
John, an officer in the Continental army who supported the resolution, cautioned his 
father: "It might have been better perhaps if a little more republican laconism had been 
used in explaining the reasons for it.”  In his opinion, it would have been preferable to 
offer no justification at all.  The evidence of bad faith on Burgoyne's part was simply not 
there.  James Wilkinson, the officer who had been tasked by Gates to inform Congress of 
the Convention, felt "equally hurt and alarmed" by the news.  He confessed to Gates, "I 
consider [the Conventioners'] detention inadmissible in the spirit of the treaty.  I fear a 
timorous circumspection has sullied our reputation, and injured our cause."  Years later, 
long after victory in the war was assured, Wilkinson still maintained that Congress's 
actions were "unworthy [of] the representatives of a free people."  He would gladly have 
"fought over the campaign again, sooner than suffer the national honour to be 
tarnished."37 
 Surprisingly, Washington was silent on the issue.  Given his oft-repeated 
insistence on the humane treatment of prisoners of war, and his prior diligent observance 
of the laws of nations, Congress's resolution could not have sat easily with him.  By the 
winter of 1778, Washington was no stranger to proportional retaliation, but to suspend a 
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treaty agreed upon by two senior officers on the mere pretence of a violation was 
something else all together.  On January 9th, Washington notified Laurens that the 
resolution would undoubtedly much "chagrine" [sic] Burgoyne, but he passed no 
judgment on the proceedings of Congress.  Washington imagined himself as Congress's 
servant, and although he did not always agree with its actions, he could not publically 
criticize his civilian masters.  He was also cognizant of the manifold benefits of delaying 
the troops' embarkation.  Howe had had the better of his army during the previous 
campaign, and the remnants of his tattered force were suffering in the cold at Valley 
Forge.  With Philadelphia, New York, and Newport in British hands, the addition of six 
thousand fresh British troops in the spring might be enough to annihilate the decimated 
Continental army, and with it, the revolution.  Above all, Washington, like most of his 
countrymen, was furious about the frequent accounts of British mistreatment of American 
prisoners.  Only twelve days after the resolution passed, and long before his British 
counterpart had learned of the suspension of Burgoyne's embarkation, Washington 
warned Howe that "Americans have the feelings of Sympathy, as well as Other men—A 
series of injuries may exhaust their patience—and it is natural that the Sufferings of their 
Friends in captivity should at length irritate them into resentment and to acts of 
retaliation."  It seems probable that even Washington, the exemplar of revolutionary 
America's commitment to the European culture of war, had simply had enough.  On 
Laurens' advice, Washington agreed to keep the resolution secret until General Burgoyne 
could be officially notified, and Heath's garrison strengthened lest the British general 
attempt to liberate his troops by force.  Despite the best efforts of Congress to conceal the 
 278 
resolution, it did not take long for the news to reach Boston.  Even before the final 
resolution was approved, Burgoyne had heard of Congress's intentions.38   
 Congress's resolution was the last thing that Heath and his beleaguered garrison of 
guards needed that winter.  Tensions between the British troops and their American 
captors were already elevated before the rumors circulated.  According to a German 
officer, "there is tremendous animosity between the American and the English soldiers, 
and there have been many vexatious occurrences."  British resentment escalated 
precipitously when rumors of the suspension reached Prospect Hill.  The American 
commandant of the British barracks, Colonel David Henley, who Heath would later 
characterize as "warm and quick in his natural temper," reported that "the prisoners have 
been mutinous, their Behavior insolent and outrageous" since learning of the impending 
resolve.  One British prisoner threw a stone at an American sentry, "which deprived him 
of his reason and near his life."  Others "arm'd themselves with clubs &c," daring the 
American guards to fire.  The guards were able to disperse the mob "with firelocks 
club'd," but the next day a larger contingent of furious Britons opposed the sentries.  
Henley assembled his guards, leading them with sword in hand against the rioters.  
Seeing the futility of opposing a battalion of armed men, the prisoners began to disperse, 
but not with enough alacrity to placate Henley.  His temper soaring, Henley ran "a British 
soldier through the body [with his sword] and push[ed] with such force" that it proved 
fatal.  Standing over the body of the dying man, Henley had no regrets.  He firmly 
believed that "lenity is often constru'd as timidity and thought more vigorous exertions 
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necessary."  Rounding up about forty Conventioners who had participated in the riot, 
Henley sent them under guard to a prison ship in Boston harbor.39 
 Unlike the British prison ships in New York and Newport, which were the only 
viable option for housing enemy prisoners on those densely populated occupied islands, 
the prison ships in Boston existed solely for the purpose of retaliation.  Although hardly a 
new weapon in the revolutionary arsenal, by the winter of 1777-1778 retaliation had 
come to dominate the American discourse on prisoner treatment.  Through the tireless 
efforts of the revolutionary press, Americans throughout the continent were exposed to a 
barrage of articles enumerating British abuses of American prisoners, many of them New 
England privateers, in New York, Newport, and Philadelphia.  One New England 
columnist contrasted the fate of "our countrymen perishing with cold or hunger in the 
goals [sic] of our enemies" to the experience of "the British and Hessian soldiers now 
among us, [who] enjoy plenty, warm fires, and the benefits arising from their labour." 
Why were these enemy captives allowed to roam about Cambridge seemingly at will, 
when American prisoners were dying by the day?  The correspondent enjoined his 
countrymen: "Do not heaven and earth call upon us to put a stop to this pitiful milk and 
water kind of humanity, and to comepll [sic] our enemies to act justly, by Retaliation?"  
Like many of his colleagues, Connecticut General Israel Putnam thought "the Treatment 
which the Enemy have [sic] given to the unfortunate officers and soldiers of our Army 
who have fallen into their hands makes some step for Retaliation absolutely necessary."  
He believed all British prisoners should be exiled to the subterranean prison at the 
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Simsbury mines.  Massachusetts-born Major Jonathan Rice had a more practical solution.  
If the British were going to use prison ships, so too should the Americans.  As he 
confided to one of Heath's aides, "I wish every Briton now on Prospect-Hill was on board 
ye Guard-Ship."40   
 Although unwilling to consign the entire Convention army to nautical 
confinement, in the winter of 1777-1778, Continental Commissary General of Prisoners 
Elias Boudinot authorized his deputy commissaries in Connecticut and Boston to outfit 
prison ships in their states for the purpose of retaliation.  Prisoners not protected by the 
Convention were to be the first targets, but in the likely event some of Burgoyne's men 
proved rowdy or felonious, they too should face imprisonment aboard a hulk.  The 
instructions came as no surprise to the commissary of prisoners for Massachusetts, 
Robert Pierpont; he had already been confining enemy prisoners on board a prison ship in 
Boston harbor for months.  When captured Ensign Thomas Hughes arrived in Boston in 
early October, he and six fellow officers reported to the prison ship where they "were 
crowded into a hole, honour'd with the name of Cabin (hardly large enough to swing a 
cat), without bedding, knives, forks, plates, or the least conveniencies [sic]…as an 
addition to our distress, every crevice is full of vermin."  In addition to the officers, 
Massachusetts' authorities relegated over two hundred enlisted prisoners, "with 
countenances the pictures of famine," to the ship's hold.  As a result of congestion, poor 
sanitation, and insufficient rations, disease was rampant.  Hughes suffered from "violent 
dysentery," while his captain was afflicted by "fever."  Several hundred Canadian 
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loyalists and Brunswick troops, who had been captured at Bennington and thus not 
included in the Convention, experienced a similar fate aboard the prison ships.  In 
November, the captives petitioned Commissary Pierpont, explaining "that our situation is 
too disagreeable to continue long, the farther we go the worse we are; being reduced to 
lay one upon the other, the vermin devouring us."  When their cries fell on deaf ears, they 
begged Burgoyne to intercede on their behalf, for if he did not, "more than half will never 
live to see spring."  Burgoyne could do little to help the men without compromising his 
argument that a firm distinction be made between traditional prisoners of war and the 
troops of the Convention.  He knew that if Henley had his way, his entire army might be 
destined for the prison ships.41 
 When Burgoyne received intelligence of the riot, and its violent suppression, it 
looked as if his fears had come to fruition.  He was indignant.  Under the terms of the 
Convention, his men were not prisoners, and thus were not subject to American military 
justice.  If his soldiers were guilty of misbehavior, it was his prerogative, not Henley's, to 
discipline them.  On January 9th, Burgoyne admonished Heath for allowing Henley's 
"heinously criminal" behavior to go unpunished.  In his strongly worded reproach, 
Burgoyne accused Henley "of the most indecent, violent, vindictive severity against 
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unarmed men, and of intentional murder."  Not only did Burgoyne demand that Heath 
release the Conventioners aboard the prison ships, he called for "a proper tribunal" to try 
Henley for murder.  Only "prompt and satisfactory justice" would suffice.42 
 Heath was in a difficult position.  He knew of the rumors that Congress intended 
to delay the troops' departure, but he remained under orders to uphold the terms of Gates' 
convention to the best of his abilities.  Unwilling to abandon the charade without positive 
instructions from Laurens to the contrary, Heath politely acknowledged Burgoyne's letter 
and promptly removed Henley from his post, pending investigation.  Heath was 
unwilling, however, to deny the right of American authorities to punish disorderly or 
criminal members of the Convention army.  He assured Burgoyne that "it is my fixed 
Determination, to Enquire into all abuses, whether Committed by my own Troops or 
those of the Convention."  While Heath's assertion of absolute American authority over 
the Conventioners likely irked Burgoyne, the British general was mollified by Heath's 
swift response to his complaint.  Heath even allowed Burgoyne to act as de-facto 
prosecutor in Henley's trial.43   
 No stranger to the public stage, Burgoyne, who possessed both the legal erudition 
of a longstanding member of Parliament and the dramatic flair of a passionate devotee of 
the theatrical arts, thrived during the proceedings.  He was so persuasive in his 
denunciation of Henley that the American Judge-Advocate, whose duty it was to 
prosecute the case, took on the mantle of defense attorney so as to give Henley a fighting 
chance.  As it turned out, Henley had little to fear from the court itself.  Were the judges 
to rule in Burgoyne's favor, they would be repudiating Heath's, and by extension 
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Congress's, claim of jurisdiction over the Convention troops.  Predictably, Henley was 
cleared of all wrong doing.  He was officially reinstated to his post, but Heath soon 
transferred the colonel back to his regiment and away from Burgoyne: an 
acknowledgement of the general's herculean defense of his soldiers.44 
 Although he did not know it at the time, Burgoyne's performance at the trial of 
Colonel Henley was the final act in his American saga.  On February 4th, 1778, Heath 
formally notified the general of Congress's resolution to suspend the troops' embarkation.  
Burgoyne was despondent; sadness rather than outrage characterized his response.  
Upholding the Convention, and thereby returning his men to active service, was the only 
means of repairing his shattered reputation in England.  With this prospect extinguished, 
Burgoyne finally surrendered.  The vim and vigor that once characterized his 
correspondence were gone.  Fearing that Burgoyne would attempt to escape, Washington 
had authorized Heath to increase his garrison of guards, but the measure was entirely 
unnecessary.  The formerly fortunate gamester had played his last card, and now all he 
desired was to retire to England on his parole.  With Washington's support, Congress 
resolved in March to allow the general to proceed home by way of Rhode Island.  He 
sailed for England in April, never again to return to the continent that he had aspired to 
conquer.45 
Not all of the Conventioners shared their commander's quiet resignation.  
Burgoyne's officers believed that Congress had no right to suspend the terms of the 
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Convention.  After all, the Convention had been established between two military officers 
on the basis of their own honor and reputations.  To an eighteenth-century European 
officer, such contracts were inviolate.  Ensign Anburey believed that only Americans 
could “be base enough to evade and break the articles of capitulation.”  In his opinion, 
“the Conduct of Congress upon this extraordinary transaction, is extremely visible.”  
Anburey and his fellow officers indicted Congress for doing the unthinkable, failing to 
honor the norms of European warfare.  For Anburey, the Americans had chosen “to 
sacrifice their faith and reputation…by an act never excusable.”  In his estimation, 
Congress had obliterated any legitimacy America had as a state in the eyes of European 
powers.  France and other potential allies would finally see the Americans for who they 
really were: rebels and rank amateurs.46 
With their embarkation suspended indefinitely, enlisted Conventioners no longer 
felt obligated to uphold their end of the bargain.  In the opinion of Corporal Lamb, he and 
his comrades were “under no tie of honour,” considering “that Congress had no intention 
of allowing the British troops to return to England.”  In light of Congress's duplicity, 
Lamb believed it was his duty to escape to New York to rejoin the fight.  British officers, 
who had previously discouraged desertion when the troops were slated for departure, now 
agreed with Lamb and openly encouraged their men to flee.  Deputy Commissary 
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General of Prisoners Joshua Mersereau reported that "above 200" escaped to New York 
that winter.  He blamed the desertions on poor discipline among the guards and the illicit 
American practice of recruiting Conventioners whose sole motive for enlisting was "to 
get away" and return to British service.  Heath was embarrassed, but he could do nothing 
"to prevent the troops from dispersing" except appeal to Congress and the Massachusetts 
Council for more men and more money: neither of which were forthcoming.47 
 For General Heath, Congress's decision to detain the Convention troops proved an 
onerous burden.  The resolution had not been accompanied by a vast influx of capital or 
the authority to requisition civilian property.  He had begged and borrowed enough 
foodstuffs and necessities to keep the men from starving that winter, but by spring the 
general was absolutely at the end of his tether.  In March, Heath explained to Laurens that 
the "troops of the Convention [are] suffering for fuel" and the "creditors will supply us no 
longer."  From Congress's perspective, provisioning the troops' was the British army's 
problem.  Under the terms of the Convention, the British were supposed to repay or 
replenish the supplies consumed by the Convention prisoners.  Heath had received some 
support from General Howe that winter, but Congress had resolved in December that the 
British repay their debts in specie, rather than continental dollars, on the grounds that the 
British were guilty of counterfeiting continentals for the purpose of devaluing the 
currency.  Burgoyne managed to repay most of his debt with a combination of coin and 
provisions before he departed, but after the January 8th resolution to suspend the troops' 
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embarkation, the British were in no hurry to continue funneling money into the rebel 
coffers.  One British officer in Rhode Island even believed the Americans were detaining 
the Conventioners for the purpose of draining the royal treasury and reinvigorating their 
stagnant economy.  When Congress requested that American merchants be granted 
passage into and out of Boston free of molestation by the Royal navy for the purpose of 
supplying the troops, General Howe refused.  He hoped that if the Americans could not 
feed the men, they would be forced to release them.48   
 Exacerbating Heath's predicament, General Burgoyne's successor in command, 
the irascible Major General of Artillery William Phillips, was determined to oppose him 
at every turn.  From the beginning of his tenure as commander of the Conventioners, 
Phillips refused to acknowledge that for all intents and purposes his men were prisoners 
of war.  After the promulgation of Congress's January 8th resolution, many Americans, as 
well as the revolutionary press, began to refer to the Conventioners as prisoners.  As 
Phillips explained to British general Sir Henry Clinton, "the American Congress, as well 
as many others of the Americans have industriously use[d] the word 'prisoner,'" while 
"we have considered ourselves as passengers under the sanction and virtue of a treaty, not 
as prisoners."  There was some truth to Phillips' claim; after all, the Convention itself was 
not suspended, only the embarkation of the troops for England.  But by the spring of 
1778, Phillips' insistence on the distinction had begun to grate on Heath.  When Phillips 
pedantically lectured the American general on "the customs of Armies" in May 1778, 
Heath fired back, "notwithstanding your Knowledge and age in soldiering[,] you are 
much mistaken"  Although Heath had been a farmer when Phillips had learned the 
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soldier's trade on the battlefields of Europe during the Seven Years' War, Congress had 
entrusted him to superintend the Convention troops, and he would brook no 
insubordination from one of his wards, no matter how exalted the man's rank, status, or 
experience.49 
  The tension between the two men detonated in June 1778 when one of Heath's 
sentries killed a Convention officer.  Lieutenant Richard Brown of the 21st Regiment was 
on a carriage ride around Prospect Hill, accompanied by two young ladies, when he was 
challenged by a fourteen year-old American soldier.  Having difficulty controlling his 
chaise, the lieutenant failed to stop when hailed by the sentry—prompting the young 
American to discharge his firelock.  Brown did not survive his wound.  Possessed of all 
of Burgoyne's pomposity but none of his charm, Phillips accused the sentry of deliberate 
murder and the American people of possessing a "Bloody disposition which has joined 
itself to Rebellion."  Excoriating Heath, Phillips raged: "I do not ask for Justice for I 
believe every principle of it is fled from this Province."  Heath realized at once that the 
British general intended to capitalize on the horrible accident for propagandistic purposes 
by linking Brown's death to Congress's continued detention of the army.  Heath would 
not allow such blatant opportunism.  Heath refused Phillips' request to send an officer 
with the news to the British commander in New York, and he placed Phillips under house 
arrest.  While apprising Laurens of his actions, Heath noted the mood of the people of 
Boston after the incident.  In his opinion, Phillips had "given almost universal disgust 
here[,] and I am happy to say that the steps which I have taken meet a general 
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approbation."  Surrounded by American guards, and unable to visit his troops, even 
Phillips was forced to admit that he was finally a prisoner.50 
 Phillips' confinement did not go far enough for most Bostonians however; they 
wanted the British gone.  While Boston merchants and Cambridge landlords had 
prospered from the British presence, most Bostonians resented the hauteur of the 
Convention officers and the relatively lax confinement of the enlisted men.  Cavorting 
about the taverns of Cambridge, the paroled British officers offended the piety and 
probity of many Bostonians, and enlisted Conventioners escaped from the barracks were 
a constant source of frustration for American magistrates.  As their detention dragged on, 
the soldiers suffered from the twin plagues of early modern armies: boredom and alcohol 
abuse.  Vice, indiscipline, and malefaction were the invariable result. Typifying the 
infractions committed by the Conventioners, George Gilbert was confined on board a 
prison ship for "drinking damnation to the Congress."  At his trial, Gilbert was contrite.  
He confessed "he was so much disguised with Liquour that he is not able to give any 
acct. of the matter himself."  More seriously, James Fill Gerald stood trial for "a general 
abuse to the Inhabitants, threatening to Kill men and women & children and burn their 
houses."  Though no witnesses stepped forward, the Court of Inquiry ordered him 
"confined in the Guard house."51  
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 Even law-abiding Conventioners could be a threat to the civilian population.  
Small pox and typhus were present among the troop; the former disease claimed the lives 
of over 300 Conventioners in the spring of 1778 and the latter took an additional forty-
eight that summer.  Cambridge authorities were so concerned about the potential for an 
outbreak that they cancelled Harvard College's commencement exercises.  With Boston's 
jails and prison ships overflowing with unruly redcoats, and its hospitals crowded with 
contagious men, it is little wonder that James Warren felt it was "a misfortune to us that 
this State was pitched upon as the place of their captivity, especially as they were 
detained here so much longer than was at first expected."  The Conventioners had worn 
out their welcome.52   
 Washington, Heath, and the Massachusetts Council all agreed that the obvious 
solution to the problem was to exchange the Convention troops for Americans in British 
captivity.  Article three of the Convention clearly stipulated that the troops were eligible 
for exchange under a general cartel.  Washington had been in negotiations with Howe on 
the subject of a large-scale prisoner exchange throughout the winter, and ever since it had 
become clear that Congress intended to retard the troops' embarkation, his British 
counterpart had been eager to settle an accord.  Congress, however, refused to budge on 
its insistence that the prisoners' accounts be discharged in solid coin.  Fearing that the 
British might agree to the proposition, Congress further resolved that any American 
loyalist captured in arms against the United States would be sent to his respective state to 
be tried as a traitor.  The penalty for treason in most states was death by hanging.  With a 
significant part of his army composed of uniformed loyalist troops, this was a stipulation 
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to which Howe would never agree.  Congress's intransigence stemmed not from 
insensitivity to the plight of the American prisoners in British hands, but from an acute 
realization that the detention of the Convention troops was a symbolic gesture: a very 
visible protest against the enemy's continued policy of atrocity and abuse.   
 Moreover, Congress was aware that any large-scale exchange of prisoners was 
simply not in the national interest at the time.  While Howe primarily possessed 
American officers and sailors, having already released most of the enlisted men captured 
during the New York campaign, Congress now had an entire British army in its custody.  
Were Congress to exchange those troops for the American officers in the customary 
proportion based on rank, the British would instantly recoup a veteran field army for the 
ensuing campaign.  Washington was not immune to this logic, but he had pledged "the 
public, as well as my own personal Honor and faith" to General Howe.  If he were to 
rescind the offer, "it would be difficult to prevent our being generally accused with a 
Breach of good Faith."  Congress had heard that indictment before, and Washington was 
no more persuasive than Burgoyne had been.  With Congress unwilling to countenance 
the slightest compromise, the exchange negotiations, like those that preceded them, ended 
in stalemate.  The best the negotiators could arrange was a partial exchange of fewer than 
one hundred prisoners, including the long-suffering Ethan Allen who was exchanged for 
the equally misfortunate Archibald Campbell, and the pampered Charles Lee for the once 
again captured Richard Prescott.53 
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 Unwilling either to release the prisoners according to the terms of the Convention 
or to exchange them, and aware that Heath could no longer maintain the men in 
Massachusetts, Congress proposed its own solution to the problems posed by the 
Convention army: relocation.  To better accommodate the troops, Congress had earlier 
authorized Heath to transport several hundred Conventioners from the British light 
infantry and artillery, fifty-five miles further inland to the town of Rutland.  Though a 
minor infraction of the Convention, which stipulated that the troops be quartered "as 
convenient as possible" to Boston, neither Burgoyne nor Phillips had protested the move 
because they were hopeful that Rutland would provide more commodious quarters for the 
soldiers.  Unfortunately for the troops, the housing situation in Rutland proved just as 
problematic as that at Cambridge.  Landlords demanded exorbitant rates and the local 
committee of safety refused either manpower or material support to the American 
commissaries struggling to erect barracks.  In September, Commissary Isaac Tuckerman 
pleaded with Heath's aide Jonathan Chase to stem the tide of relocation.  "I have not the 
least prospect of procuring Quarters for the officers[,] it was with grate [sic] difficulty 
that the officers already here is [sic] quartered."  Town officials had ignored Heath's pleas 
for assistance, and Tuckerman feared if any more Conventioners were to arrive, "we shall 
be in grate [sic] confusion as we have not Barracks to receive them."  Another of Heath's 
commissaries, a Mr. Speakman of Brookfield, was horrified by the caprice of the local 
committees.  He reported that two innocent Conventioners were "taken up by the 
Committee" and flogged "with an [sic] Horsewhip…in direct opposition to all Law."  In 
light of this "Shameful sketch of Power," it is little wonder that Ensign Anburey believed 
that the troops were "treated with great severity, [and] very badly supplied with 
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provisions" by the committee at Rutland.  In his opinion, both officers and soldiers were 
"treated worse at Rutland" than in Cambridge.  Despite his best efforts, Rutland was not 
the solution Heath had hoped for.  Thankfully for the exhausted general, Congress had a 
more ambitious plan.54 
 On September 11th, 1778, Congress resolved to send Sir Henry Clinton, who had 
replaced Howe as the crown's commander-in-chief in America, an ultimatum.  If the 
British general did not immediately discharge his debt in hard currency, Congress would 
relocate the Convention troops to a place of its choosing, negating the Convention in all 
but name.  By Congress's reckoning, the British government owed the people of the 
United States £103,000 for the troops' upkeep since March.  A British officer in New 
York estimated that at that rate, the crown would be in arrears "upwards of £200,000 
sterling for the year."  Naturally, neither Phillips nor Clinton agreed with Congress's 
calculation of the "pretended debt."  Jonathan Clarke, the assistant Commissary General 
of the Convention army, warned Clinton that "upon refusing the Payment of the 
Accounts…the Congress will declare the Convention at an end, and the Army Prisoners 
of War."  Given that "the prospect of their release [was] so distant," Clarke suggested that 
Clinton should consider giving up on the Convention altogether.  Phillips agreed.  If 
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Congress intended to infringe the Convention, then Congress should pay for the army's 
upkeep.  Emboldened by Phillips' advice, Clinton ignored Congress's demand.55 
 At long last, Congress had its smoking gun.  By refusing to pay Burgoyne's debt, 
Clinton provided Congress with just enough justification to shirk their obligations to the 
Convention once and for all.  Since receiving word of Gates' negotiations, the mood in 
Congress had been against the Convention, and now with the French alliance secured, the 
assembled members voted on October 16th, 1778 to nullify it, consigning the 
Conventioners to indefinite confinement in Albemarle County, Virginia: one year and 
three days after they had laid down their arms in a field near Saratoga.  Largely spared 
from the ravages of war, far removed from any British army, and already utilized to 
detain loyalist and Hessian prisoners, the interior of Virginia seemed to Congress to be an 
ideal location to confine and supply the Conventioners.  There, Congress reasoned, the 
men could be held until the British reformed their barbaric ways or a favorable 
opportunity for exchange presented itself.  If the Convention troops still harbored any 
doubts about the status of their captivity, they could now rest assured that they were in 
fact Congress's prisoners.56 
 
"More Dead than Alive": Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and the Destruction of 
the Convention Army 
 
 When he received Congress's orders, General Heath was wracked by competing 
emotions.  On the one hand, he was relieved to be rid of the onerous burden.  The 
                                                
 55 JCC, 12:901-02; William Eden to Sir Henry Clinton. November 7th, 1778. Vol. 45. Fol. 22. 
Clinton Papers. Clements Library; Clinton to Germain. October 25th, 1778. Quoted in Knepper, "The 
Convention Army," 129; Jonathan Clarke. c. October 25th, 1778. Vol. 44, Fol. 14. Clinton Papers. 
Clements Library; Phillips to Richard Prescott. October or November, 1778. Vol. 44, Fol. 44. Clinton 
Papers. Clements Library. 
 56 JCC, 12:1016; Knepper, "The Convention Army," 137, and Sampson, Escape, 105-106. 
 294 
Contention prisoners and all of their complaints, peccadilloes, and misdemeanors, were 
now somebody else's problem.  "The trouble & difficulty which I have had with the 
troops of the Convention," he told Washington, "are almost inconceivable."  Yet, he 
could not hide his surprise at Congress's decision.  It was one thing to delay the troops' 
embarkation; it was another thing altogether to dismiss the Convention outright, sending 
the men on an arduous trek of over six hundred miles so late in the year.  Heath knew that 
many of the Conventioners would not survive the march.  Moreover, despite his dislike of 
Phillips, Heath had grown fond of many of the senior officers of the Convention army.  
They had treated the Roxbury farmer with the respect due to his rank.  He may have 
failed as a battlefield commander, but Heath had managed to keep Burgoyne's army 
largely intact with very little support from either local or congressional authorities.  In 
one stroke, Congress's had erased the greatest achievement of Heath's military career.  
But his was not to reason why.  Like so many good soldiers before and since, Heath 
followed his orders.57 
 The officers and soldiers of the Convention army were equally shocked by the 
news.  According to Ensign Anburey, "when this resolve of Congress was made known, 
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everyone one was struck with amazement."  Corporal Lamb believed the orders for 
relocation were "universally considered by the privates as a very great hardship, and by 
the officers as a shameful violation of the articles of capitulation."  Not only had the 
Americans abandoned any pretence of upholding the terms of the Convention, Anburey 
thought that they intended to destroy the army by "marching the men eight hundred miles 
in the depth of winter."  The senior officers pleaded with Heath to delay the march until 
the weather improved, or at least until they had had an opportunity to convey their 
desperation to General Clinton in New York.  All Heath could do, however, was pass on 
their lamentations to his superiors.  He apprised Laurens that "they appear much affected 
at this order to remove so great a distance…the Germans in particular appear much 
dejected."  Compounding their distress, the men had still not received their yearly issue 
of clothing.  In the late fall of 1778, the prisoners were still wearing the threadbare, 
patched, and cut-down jackets of 1776.  As if to torment the prisoners further, a cartel 
ship from New York arrived just as the men prepared to march carrying a fresh supply of 
clothing.  Under strict orders not to delay the march, Heath had no choice but to deny the 
prisoners' request to re-clothe.  The uniforms would have to be sent to Virginia by sea.  
One German officer despaired, "we shall have to make this wearisome march in our rags 
and find our uniforms in a climate where on account of the heat we may make little use of 
them."  Grasping for a silver lining, Anburey consoled himself, "after the cruelties and 
barbarities the troops have experienced since our arrival, that we are quitting such an 
inhospitable country."58 
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 On November 9th, 1778, 2,263 British and 1,882 German troops departed the 
Boston-area on a march that proved every bit as arduous as the prisoners' had feared.  
Having lost, or left behind, over eleven hundred men from desertion, disease, or death at 
the hands of American guards during its captivity in Massachusetts, the Convention army 
was a shell of its former self when the march began.  As the prisoners progressed 
southward toward British-occupied New York at the blistering pace of twenty-seven 
miles per day, the "siren call" of freedom pulled many Conventioners away from their 
regiments.  Because Washington could spare few Continental troops to serve as guards, 
Congress was forced to rely on the individual states through which the prisoners passed 
to provide security.  Unsurprisingly, the men who reported for guard duty were seldom 
the most fervent or fit revolutionaries, and those prisoners bent on escape rarely had any 
difficulty accomplishing their ends.  Corporal Lamb was among the 579 British and 
German troops who decamped along the line of march to Virginia in November and 
December 1778.  In making good his escape to New York, Lamb evaded a harrowing 
ordeal.  Those who remained with the army were not so lucky.  Alexander King, a 
Connecticut man who witnessed the prisoners cross the Connecticut River in mid-
November, noted that "they lost 2 of theirs on passing the River[,] the wind being high 
drove them over the falls."  Those who survived, "suffered terribly from the cold and, 
what was even worse, from lack of food," according to the Baroness von Riedesel.  When 
they were fortunate, the prisoners spent the evenings "in goals or Churchers [sic]," but the 
bulk of the time they bivouacked under the stars.  Soon after beginning their journey, the 
snow set in, covering the soldiers as they slept, "1/2 yd deep."  Braving the snow, the 
prisoners pressed on, with the first division arriving in Charlottesville in early January in 
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the midst of what Thomas Jefferson referred to as “the worst spell of weather ever known 
within the memory of man.”  By mid-February, roughly three months after they had 
commenced the journey, the remnants of Burgoyne's army had all arrived, footsore and 
shivering, in Virginia.59  
 Despite ample time between the prisoners' departure and their arrival in 
Charlottesville, revolutionary officials in Virginia were entirely unprepared to house and 
feed the weary troops. In settling on Albemarle County, Congress had listened to one of 
the Virginia delegates, John Harvie, who had offered to allow the prisoners the use of his 
personal property rent free.  Hardly a philanthropist—he was actually in dire financial 
straits—Harvie realized that the prisoners would undoubtedly improve the land, thus 
increasing its resale value after their departure. Congress jumped on the opportunity.  
Dispatching Virginia-born commissary officer Captain George Rice with $23,000 to 
build barracks on Harvie’s land, Congress thought it had solved the problem of 
accommodating the men.  With congressional cash already lining his pockets, Rice 
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departed for Charlottesville in little hurry to begin construction.  To their horror, "instead 
of comfortable barracks," the prisoners found "a few log huts [that] were just begun to be 
built, the most part not covered over, and all of them full of snow."  According to 
Brunswick Grenadier Johann Bense, he and his comrades had survived a "long, difficult 
march" only to discover that the barracks "were not even half finished…All walls were 
open; there were neither fire places nor sleeping places, no door and a miserable roof."  
"In order to protect ourselves against rain, snow, and cold," the men immediately began 
improving the shanties into something resembling habitable quarters.  Corporal George 
Fox reported that their progress was impeded because Rice had failed to supply them 
with a sufficient supply of nails.60   
Of even greater concern, the Continental commissary officers in Virginia had 
failed to provide the prisoners with adequate provisions upon their arrival.  When 
Congress ordered the Convention army to Charlottesville, the Board of War had allotted 
an extra $7,000 over the cost of constructing the barracks to cover the immediate needs of 
the men upon their arrival, but the phantom provisions were nowhere to be seen.  
Anburey blamed Harvie, suggesting that the Virginia congressman “misguided and 
duped” Congress and absconded with the money.  In reality, the Continental deputy 
Commissary General for Purchases, Colonel William Aylett, had misjudged the speed at 
which the prisoners marched and allowed the provisions he purchased to spoil.  The 
results were the same however.  According to Anburey, "for Six days they [the 
Conventioners] subsisted on the meal of Indian corn made into cakes."  If the prisoners 
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had hoped that their relocation would bring improved provisions and accommodation, 
they could not have been more disappointed.  Although the commander of the American 
guards, Colonel Theodorick Bland, had assured General Phillips in December, "as I ever 
feel for the misfortunes of the brave, so shall it always be my study to alleviate their 
distress when in my power," it was simply not in his power to feed the men once they 
arrived at Charlottesville.  He had done his job, now it was Virginia's turn to provide for 
the prisoners.61 
 Predictably, Governor Patrick Henry of Virginia was dismayed by the prisoners' 
arrival. Deeply embroiled in his own war against British Lieutenant Governor Henry 
Hamilton on the frontier, Henry had neither the resources nor the manpower to support 
the prisoners.  Congress, through its delegation of responsibilities to Harvie, Rice, and 
Aylett, had evidently botched the job, and Henry feared that he would have to pick up the 
pieces.  Moreover, the governor believed that Charlottesville was entirely unsuited for the 
reception of prisoners of war.  The inland hamlet was over seventy miles away from the 
nearest navigable river, thus impeding the prisoners' supply from the coast.  Upon visiting 
the camp in late January 1779, the governor's deputy quartermaster William Finnie 
observed that the barracks were "Ill provided, and but very little Water near them."  The 
supply wagons were easily bogged down on the dirt roads in wet weather, and the "troops 
cannot be regularly supplied."  Finnie also believed that the price of grain in the region 
was "enormous!"  Apprised of this information, the governor concluded that "the Troops 
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cannot, by any Means, be supported in that Part of the Country."  Thomas Jefferson 
disagreed.  Seeking to maintain the influx of capital and consumers into his beloved 
Albemarle country, Jefferson reasoned that Congress had already spent close to $25,000 
building and guarding the barracks, to abandon them now would be wasteful.  
Furthermore, which state was better suited to provide for the prisoners?  Away from the 
fury of the battlefield, Virginia was the ideal location.  A more efficient commissary 
officer was all that was required to improve the prisoners' predicament.  Jefferson's 
friends in Congress agreed with their former colleague.  The Conventioners would stay 
put, and Virginia would pay for them.62 
 Although the confinement of the senior officers improved with time—many of 
them enjoyed frequent visits to Monticello—the situation in the barracks continued to 
deteriorate.  Through their labor, the troops had rendered the barracks habitable, but food 
remained scarce.  According to Anburey, "the men have been exceedingly ill supplied 
with provisions in general, having meat only twice or thrice a week, and for some weeks 
none, what they get is scarcely wholesome, this is at present what the poor fellows term a 
fast."  Despite the hopes of Phillips and his officers, the winter thaw did not bring much 
improvement at the barracks.  It was not long before the pleasant spring air turned sultry 
and heavy with the heat.  Insects, snakes, rats, and bats descended on the camp, 
tormenting the prisoners.  Termites and grubs began demolishing their wooden barracks 
and decimating the gardens the soldiers' had planted to supplement their diets and prevent 
the onset of scurvy.  Provisions remained inadequate throughout the summer.  "For the 
greatest part of the summer they have been thirty and forty days, at different periods, 
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without any other provision delivered to them than the meal of Indian corn," according to 
Anburey.  Even the salted provisions were tainted in his estimation.  Attempting to save a 
quantity of salted meat, the American commissary buried the food "in the earth for a few 
days" before serving it to the troops "swarming with vermin."  Predictably, a new wave 
of desertion, disease, and death inundated the camp.  Corporal Fox recalled helping to 
fence in an acre of land "to prevent the wild beasts from breaking in" and devouring the 
bodies of his deceased comrades.  According to a British return compiled in August 1779, 
only 1,495 British and 1,533 German prisoners remained alive in Charlottesville.  Since 
leaving Massachusetts, the British and Germans had lost 34% and 18.5% of their number 
to death and desertion respectively. Hardly one for hyperbole, Baroness von Riedesel 
enunciated the prevailing sentiment in the barracks when she confessed feeling "more 
dead than alive" that summer.63 
 Back in Massachusetts, roughly 150 infirmed and diseased Convention prisoners, 
along with their comrades who had been captured before the Convention was signed, 
were in equally dire straights.  Congress had completely forgotten about them after the 
bulk of the prisoners had marched southward.  Upon turning over command of the 
Eastern Department to General Gates in November 1778, Heath informed his successor 
that the prisoners at Rutland were "in great distress."  Without assistance from Congress, 
however, Gates could do little to ameliorate their plight.  The next April, Commissary 
Mersereau pleaded with Heath to exert his influence in the prisoners' favor.  "We are in a 
Deplorable situation here—the flour almost gone…I shall not know how to provide for 
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the prisoners, I cannot make bricks without straw."  By the end of May, Mersereau 
assured Heath that "many of the prisoners have not had a mouthful of Bread, this 3 days."  
Describing the result of their starvation diet, he wrote only: "Women and children crying, 
prisoners murmuring for Bread."  If adequate provisions could not be had, Mersereau 
suggested the obvious solution: an equitable exchange.  As he told Heath, "I think it 
would be best to rid the Country of all the British [prisoners]."  Gates' had other plans 
however.  Afraid of being seen by Congress as overly lenient to the Convention 
prisoners, Gates instructed Heath to "order every one of the Conventioners now in 
Confinement [at Rutland]…to be brought to Boston, where it will undoubtedly be right to 
secure them in the Prison ship."  There they would languish until Congress saw fit to 
exchange them.64 
 While Congress had acquiesced to the exchange of numerous Convention officers 
for their American counterparts in British custody throughout 1778 and 1779, 
revolutionary America's political leadership remained unwilling to countenance a general 
cartel of exchange.  Despite Phillips' best efforts at negotiating first with Gates and then 
with Washington on the basis of their individual honor "as Gentlem[e]n," both American 
commanders refused to infringe upon Congress's prerogative.  Washington hoped, 
however, that Congress would consent to an exchange that included all of the Convention 
prisoners.  After all, desertion and death were depleting the Convention army at an 
alarming rate.  If a cartel were not soon agreed upon, there would be no one left to 
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exchange.  Notwithstanding Washington's ardent desire for compromise, an attempt to 
negotiate a cartel in the spring of 1779 failed for the same reasons as prior efforts; 
Congress was unwilling to part with the Convention troops.  As both the physical 
embodiment of the revolution's greatest triumph and the most suitable subjects for 
congressional retaliation, the Convention army was far more valuable to the revolutionary 
effort than the parcel of privateers and Continental officers Clinton held in New York.  
Disappointed, but unsurprised, the British high command concluded that Congress was 
guilty of its usual "chicane."  Phillips took the news the hardest. Convinced that he had 
done his best to obtain his army's release, the British general, like his predecessor 
Burgoyne, finally gave up.  Pleased to be rid of him, Congress granted his request to go 
to New York on parole in June 1779.65 
 Abandoned by many of their officers who chose the comforts of parole in New 
York or England over the miseries of life at the barracks and debarred from exchange by 
Congress, the rank and file of the Convention army continued to suffer in silence 
throughout the spring and summer of 1780.  Anburey believed "the soldiers fare little 
better than on their first arrival."  The Continental commissary officer charged with 
provisioning the troops, Francis Tate, described the difficult task he faced in March 1780: 
"Description falls short of my distressful situation[,] some of the Convention troops have 
been without bread fourteen days, their melancholy complaints & pleys [sic] (although an 
enemy) makes me perfectly Miserable."  He begged his superior in Philadelphia, Major 
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Robert Forsyth, to "have such steps taken as will prevent our being quite starved."  It was 
not long before the prisoners exhibited “violent symptoms of scurvy,” according to the 
new Continental commander of the barracks Colonel James Wood.  In late August 1780, 
the prisoners had not received any meat for seventy days.  Realizing that the situation was 
untenable, Wood appealed to the Assembly of Virginia for aid.  Despite "frequent 
Representations to the Governour of their want of supplies…[he had been] furnished in a 
very disproportionate manner."  Wood requested any assistance the Assembly could grant 
him, reminding the legislators that "Congress had made a resolution to the Executive of 
the State of Virginia to supply the said Troops in future."  The Assemblymen 
sympathized with Wood, but they could not help.  The prisoners were the governor's 
problem.66 
 Replacing Patrick Henry as governor of Virginia in June 1779, Thomas Jefferson 
had reversed his stance on the continuance of the Convention prisoners in his state since 
coming to office.  The prospect of feeding and guarding so many enemy troops without 
any support from Congress, while threatened by British raids on the coast and by 
invasion from the south, was too much for any state to bear.  Jefferson wanted the 
prisoners gone.  When British General Cornwallis defeated General Gates and the 
American southern army in August 1780 at Camden, South Carolina—thus destroying 
the latter's reputation won at Saratoga—Jefferson panicked.  Nothing but a handful of 
Continental guards and some militia stood between Cornwallis and the Convention 
prisoners.  Were Cornwallis to liberate the men, he would significantly augment his force 
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with veteran troops, and Jefferson would not be able to stop him from overrunning the 
state.  In September 1780, Congress answered Jefferson's pleas by resolving "to march 
the Convention troops from Albemarle barracks, by way of Winchester, to fort Frederick, 
in the state of Maryland."  The governor's enthusiasm was tempered, however, by the 
added proviso that Virginia and Maryland split the expense of provisioning the prisoners 
equally. The resolution was a bitter pill for Jefferson to swallow, but at least Virginia 
would be free of the troublesome prisoners.67   
 Relocation to Maryland was even more alarming to the Conventioners.  The 
British prisoners had worked tirelessly to make their quarters at Charlottesville habitable, 
while the Germans, who the revolutionaries deemed less of a flight risk, had enjoyed the 
freedom of working and lodging with local farmers.  The officers, who were required to 
pay for all of their own expenses, were particularly aggrieved by the prospect of another 
removal.  Anburey observed that "the murmurs of the officers were great…many had laid 
out considerable sums to render their log huts comfortable against the approaching 
winter."  Compounding their concerns, the officers had little ready cash to remunerate 
their creditors and pay travel expenses.  Several German officers pleaded with General 
Clinton to provide them with a moving stipend because they had "experienced in the 
painful course of three years captivity considerable losses of different kinds, occasioned 
particularly by expensive removals from place to place at our own expense."  The British 
government disagreed on the grounds that refunding such expenses would set a bad 
precedent for other prisoners of war.  The officers would have to make do with what 
Congress provided.  Despite their grievances, the Convention prisoners began their march 
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northward in November 1780— the third winter march since their captivity began—once 
again hopeful that new environs would bring a reversal of their fortunes.68 
 Regrettably for the Conventioneers, Maryland was hardly a panacea.  With a 
much smaller tax base than its neighbor to the south, the state did not have the resources 
or infrastructure in place to absorb the prisoners.  The new commander of the Convention 
army, Brigadier General James Hamilton, reported to Clinton in December that the troops 
"were with much difficulty received by the States of this Province."  His laconic 
description belied the horrors the men endured in the state.  When they arrived at Fort 
Frederick, a ruin of a Seven Years' War-era frontier post, there were not enough barracks 
to even house the British prisoners.  Thankfully, Jefferson was willing to keep the 
German prisoners, who he believed were less truculent, at Winchester while Maryland 
authorities scrambled to find quarters for the army.  In early December, Maryland's 
commissary of prisoners, Lieutenant Colonel Moses Rawlings, told the governor of 
Maryland, Thomas Sim Lee, that "my Situation here is Truly alarming, for the prisoners 
realy [sic] suffer for water as well as meat, for the wells Both in & out of the fort are 
Dry."  Unsurprisingly, the prisoners grew restive.  Rawlings had had to resort to force to 
quell an insurrection of the starving prisoners who nearly overpowered his guards.  
Sending a contingent of British prisoners to the barracks in the town of Frederick eased 
Rawlings predicament somewhat, but he still lacked the means to adequately feed the 
men.  In late January 1781, General Hamilton, exasperated by Rawlings' empty promises, 
lodged a formal complaint with Governor Lee in favor of his beleaguered soldiers.  "The 
Troops have received no Meat for these five Days past this Day included, & that the 
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ration in that Specie has been considerably diminished of late."  In addition, Hamilton 
complained "of the irregular & scanty manner that fuel is served out" and of the dearth of 
nails and boards with which to improve their barracks.  The Council of Maryland 
responded by promising boards and nails, but they could do little about provisions 
because Jefferson had not been forthcoming with Virginia's share.  In Jefferson's opinion, 
the necessity of feeding the American southern army superseded his responsibility to the 
Conventioners.  Unable to meet Congress's demands, Jefferson appealed to the Board of 
War for "a revisal of this requisition."69  
 With neither Virginia nor Maryland capable of sustaining the prisoners, Congress 
was forced to reevaluate its stance on the Convention army.  The initial decision was just 
more of the same: relocation.  On March 3rd, 1781, Congress resolved to march the 
remaining 819 British officers and men to the prisoner-of-war depot at York, 
Pennsylvania.  The Germans would be interned in Lancaster.  The executive of 
Pennsylvania was ordered to "make the necessary preparations for the reception of the 
prisoners," but he was promised that once the prisoners arrived, the congressional Board 
of War would "take order for their future security and supply."  Many in Congress, 
however, realized that moving the prisoners to Pennsylvania would not solve the root 
problem: holding the Convention prisoners was too expensive. The prisoners' march was 
suspended while Congress debated a more comprehensive solution.  Reviewing the 
history of the Convention prisoners, a congressional committee concluded that for years 
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the troops had been subsisted, at least in theory, at the same rate of rations as Continental 
soldiers according to the fifth article of the Convention while other British prisoners of 
war received only a two-thirds allotment.  Under the Convention, the British government 
should have reimbursed the Americans for all of the expenses incurred by the troops, but 
General Clinton had no intention of paying for their upkeep as long as they were de-facto 
prisoners.  If Congress would have to foot the bill either way, the committee reasoned, 
why not declare the Convention at an end and reduce the prisoners' rations?70   
 To a cash-strapped Congress, the logic was irresistible.  The committee's report 
was amended so as to maintain a nominal distinction between the Convention prisoners 
and other prisoners of war, but the results were the same.  The Conventioners were now 
prisoners of war in name as well as status.  According to the resolve, the officers would 
be separated from their men, sent on their parole to Simsbury in Connecticut, and the 
enlisted soldiers would be closely confined and reduced to two-thirds rations.  Congress's 
resolve had little immediate effect, however, because the prisoners had not been receiving 
anything close to two-thirds provisions for months and there were not enough jails in all 
of Maryland to confine the whole army.  Expressing what must have been a common 
question among the prisoners, Moses Rawlings despaired in May, "what will become 
with the guard and prisoners[,] God only knows."  The one thing that Rawlings could be 
assured of was that Maryland could not continue to support them. According to a 
Conventioner escaped from Frederick, the prisoners were "treated with the greatest 
severity—being ill off for provisions—one pound of coarse Indian Meal & 1- ounces of 
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Lt. Col. Jonathan Hill of the 9th Regiment compiled a return of the British prisoners at Frederick Town.  At 
that time, there were 610 rank and file prisoners and 209 officers, noncommissioned officers, musicians, 
and supernumeraries present. Archives of Maryland, 47:147; JCC, 19:299-302. 
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flour is allowed them as a Ration."  Now that the men were considered prisoners of war, 
the escapee reported that they would likely be "close confined."  Ensign Anburey feared 
that his men would be "forced from us into a prison, where experiencing every severity, 
perhaps famishing for want of food, and ready to perish with cold," they would have no 
one to advocate in their favor.  He had learned well over the years that British prisoners 
had "little to expect from the humanity of Americans."  Unfortunately for the enlisted 
Conventioners, Anburey proved prophetic.71 
 In the summer of 1781, after a series of conflicting orders from Congress, the 
Convention prisoners marched for Pennsylvania where they would endure their most 
trying confinement yet.  By the time the British prisoners arrived at Lancaster in early 
June 1781, there were scarcely six hundred Britons remaining with the army, but because 
the troops were accompanied by "near five hundred Women & children"—many of the 
prisoners had married American women during their captivity in Virginia and 
Maryland—the commissary of prisoners in the city, William Atlee, could not find 
suitable housing for them.  The hastily constructed stockade at Lancaster could barely 
contain the single men alone.  Atlee had little option but to allow the married men and 
their families, whom he believed less prone to escape than their unattached comrades, to 
encamp outside of the prison's walls.  But without a roof over their head, these prisoners 
were "badly shelter'd from the weather."  Exacerbating an already perilous state of 
affairs, the barracks at Lancaster had recently been used to house "near eight hundred 
Prisoners of War…among them a great number sick of a putrid fever."  Within days of 
their arrival, Atlee informed the state's executive, President Joseph Reed, that "this fatal 
                                                
 71 Moses Rawlings to James Wood. May 24th, 1781. Quoted in Sampson, Escape, 166; Deposition 
of James Kidd. May 20th, 1781. Clinton Papers. Clements Library. Vol. 156, Fol. 6; Anburey, Travels, 
2:509. 
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disorder has gained ground & there are now at least a hundred & fifty sick in these 
greatly crouded [sic] Barracks without a prospect of its abating."  Corporal Fox believed 
that the Conventioners suffered from "yellow fever" introduced by other prisoners 
recently arrived from Philadelphia's notorious New Jail.  Disease was certainly present in 
the jails of Philadelphia that summer. An escapee reported in April that "our Prisoners [in 
Philadelphia] are very sickly and many of them have died."  Whatever its source or 
typology, the epidemic was virulent.  "Not less than 4 to 6 are daily buried owing to their 
crowded situation," according to American Colonel Adam Hubley.  From the vantage 
point of Corporal Fox inside the barracks, it looked as if his comrades "died like rotten 
Sheep."72   
 Attempting to stem the contagion, Pennsylvania authorities moved the prisoners 
to York in mid-August, but their health continued to deteriorate.  Neither Congress nor 
Pennsylvania's revolutionary government had allocated any resources to refurbishing the 
town's barracks or to stockpiling provisions for the troops.  Upon their arrival, they were 
forced to once more construct their own prison.  As soon as their "huts" were constructed, 
the healthy prisoners began laying out a cemetery and digging graves.  Before the month 
was out, the prisoners had "Buried upwards of forty Men[,] women, and children."  
Although an attempt was made to build a hospital, British Surgeon's Mate Benjamin 
Shield noted that the prisoners were "falling Sick so fast there was not Men enough to 
                                                
 72 An escaped Conventioner reported in February, that the prisoners' health and treatment had 
improved during their stay in Maryland.  According to the prisoner, the troops "were in general very 
healthy and were served with much better Provisions then they had been for some considerable Time 
before they left Virginia." William Campbell to William Phillips. February 7th, 1781. Clinton Papers. 
Clements Library. Vol. 145, Fol. 23; William Atlee to President Reed. June 13th, 1781. Lancaster, PA.  
Pennsylvania Archives, Series 1, 9:203-05; Sampson, Escape, 170; Deposition of Hugh Torence. April 
16th, 1781. Clinton Papers. Clements Library. Vol. 152, Fol. 34; Col. Adam Hubley to Pres. Reed. July 
13th, 1781. Lancaster, PA. Pennsylvania Archives, Series 1, 9:279; Houlding and Yates, "Corporal Fox's 
Memoir of Service," 165. 
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attend the Sick."  Reporting on the camp's conditions to General Hamilton, Shield 
bemoaned, "I have often been at a loss to distinguish which most deserv'd to be lamented 
by their Country in whose cause they have and are still hourly suffering, the sickening, 
the dying, or the Dead."  The entire army, in his opinion, was "at the very jaws of Death."  
Without fresh clothing, blankets, and medicines, the army would never survive "the 
severity of a long Winter."  By his accounting, 196 men were suffering from the 
"Jailfever:" fully one third of the remaining British prisoners.  In August, Sir Henry 
Clinton was informed by an escaped prisoner that the Conventioners at Lancaster "die 
three or four a day."  Nonetheless, Clinton, like Congress, was unwilling to sacrifice any 
political capital by appropriately supplying the men.  If Congress intended to keep the 
Convention troops as prisoners, Congress would have to pay for them.73   
 The plight of the German Conventioners was little better.  Once they arrived in 
Pennsylvania in summer 1781, the men were forced to camp "on a meadow in the open 
air for 8 weeks and were plagued by the great heat during the day and by rain and cold 
during the night," because local authorities had nowhere to house them.  When they were 
finally moved to Reading in mid-June, the American commissary in town ordered the 
men to construct barracks.  Frustrated by the prospect of building another set of barracks 
that in all likelihood they would soon be forced to abandon, the German prisoners 
refused.  According to Grenadier Bense, they insisted on building straw huts instead.  For 
their noncompliance, the prisoners were "treated very severely" by the American guards, 
                                                
 73 General William Irvine informed Reed in early August that "no person has as yet undertaken to 
supply the Post at York with provisions."  Irvine to Joseph Reed. August 9th, 1781. Pennsylvania Archives, 
Series 1, 9:346; Houlding and Yates, "Corporal Fox's Memoir of Service," 166; Horace W. Sellers, ed., 
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Magazine of History and Biography, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1895), 116-118; Deposition of Richard Bradshaw and 
William Simmons. August 13th, 1781. Clinton Papers. Clements Library. Vol. 170, Fol. 14. 
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and eventually forced to build more permanent housing.  The prisoners were equally 
frustrated by the paucity of their rations.  President Reed refused to supply the men on the 
grounds that "the Prisoners are brought into Pennsylv. [sic] by order of Gen. Washington 
& Congress."  In his opinion, it was "the superintending Continental officer" and the 
congressionally-appointed contractor's responsibility to "keep good order" and "to supply 
them with Provisions."  Though ostensibly agreeing with Reed, the Board of War had 
poorly calculated "the Numbers of Rations necessary" for both the German and British 
prisoners, and thus had not provided a sufficient supply.  When Colonel Wood, still the 
Continental officer in charge of the Convention prisoners, appealed to Pennsylvania 
Commissary William Scott for supplies, President Reed responded in no uncertain terms. 
"We do not conceive it incumbent on us to provide" provisions for the prisoners.  While 
Congress, the Board of War, and the Council of Pennsylvania tried to sort out the issue of 
who was responsible for feeding the men, the prisoners went hungry.  Only Congress's 
decision to allow the Germans to hire themselves to local farmers, as had been the 
congressional policy for the Hessian prisoners captured at Trenton, prevented the men 
from starving.74 
 While the Convention prisoners suffered and died in overcrowded and disease-
infested camps in Maryland and Pennsylvania, Congress remained steadfast in its refusal 
to exchange them.  Even after the fall of Charleston in May 1780, when for the first time 
since Saratoga the British held more prisoners than Congress, the American legislators 
                                                
 74 Doblin and Lynn, trans., "A Brunswick Grenadier," 442; Pres. Reed to William Scott. [Summer, 
1781]. Pennsylvania Archives, Series 1, 9:302; Board of War to Pres. Reed. July 17th, 1781. Pennsylvania 
Archives, Series 1, 9:290; Reed to Col. William Scott [Summer, 1781]. Pennsylvania Archives, Series 1, 
9:350. Grenadier Bense recorded that the prisoners' "situation was pretty good" after they allowed "some 
freedom to go into the country and work." Doblin and Lynn, trans., "A Brunswick Grenadier," 442; Krebs, 
"Approaching the Enemy," 351. 
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refused Clinton's proposition for a cartel that would include the Convention troops.  The 
Convention army remained symbolically, financially, and politically too valuable to 
Congress to be traded for captured Americans whose enlistments were about to expire.  
Forlorn, Germain complained to Phillips: "It is not easy to imagine upon what grounds 
the Congress attempted to justify their refusal to exchange the privates of the Convention 
Troops in the same manner with other prisoners of war."  He could not fathom why 
Congress would not only deny them the "benefit of [the] Convention" but also treat them 
"with more severity than" other prisoners of war.  The Americans were not following 
"any rules of reason."  For Congress, reason had nothing to do with it.  After years of 
British violations of the customary norms of "civilized" warfare, Congress had made a 
stand.  The indefinite detention of the Convention prisoners was an act of retaliation, not 
for any specific British misdeed, but for all of them.  Long accused by its constituents of 
turning a blind eye to British atrocities, Congress had finally taken a strong stance against 
the British bully.  The miseries experienced by the Convention prisoners would never 
make up for those endured by American captives, but the gesture was spectacularly 
popular among revolutionary Americans who no longer sought justice, only revenge.  
Prisoner exchange negotiations continued for the remainder of the war, but Congress had 
made its decision.  As long as British troops sought to conquer America, the Convention 
army would remain in captivity.75  
 When the preliminary articles of peace arrived in New York in 1783, the 
Convention prisoners were exactly where Congress had left them two year earlier: either 
confined in the jails and prison camps of Pennsylvania or at work with local inhabitants.  
                                                
 75 Knight, Exchange, 209-10; Sampson, Escape, 143; Germain to Phillips quoted in Sampson, 
Escape, 143. 
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There were not many left.  In the fall of 1782, Sergeant Major Samuel Vaupel of the 
Hesse Hanau Regiment reported to his commander that only three hundred Hessian and 
Brunswick Conventioners remained with the army: dispersed between the barracks and 
jails of Reading and Lancaster.  Grenadier Bense was one of the forty-two unfortunate 
prisoners confined "in the dungeon" of Lancaster.  He described the remnants of the 
German contingent as "the most wretched and most miserable men."  When he witnessed 
the arrival of the German Conventioners in New York, Hessian officer Johann Ewald 
observed that “they were not half clad, and misery and hunger could be read in their 
faces.”  He believed that “on the whole, the Brunswick troops [of the Convention army] 
have endured the most misfortune of all the Germans” who served in the war.  With the 
British prisoners at York, Corporal George Fox was confined in a fenced in barrack when 
he received news of the peace.  Fox was one of only 511 British Conventioners, including 
large numbers of re-captured escapees, still in American custody that May.  Of the over 
five thousand British and German soldiers who surrendered their arms under the 
protection of the Convention of Saratoga in 1777, fewer than eight hundred marched for 
New York at war's end.  Many of the prisoners had already escaped to British lines, and 
others had found new homes among the Americans.  Both American and British 
observers noted that desertion was widespread, especially during the army's frequent 
marches to new places of confinement.  We know of the identities of least 315 British 
Conventioners who either escaped or attempted to escape their confinement, and there 
were certainly far more escapees than have been revealed in the historical record.  
Although we will never know exactly how many Convention prisoners escaped or how 
many perished in American hands, those who reached British lines in the spring and 
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summer of 1783 were just thankful to be alive.  None of the enlisted Convention 
prisoners who left journals or memoirs of their experience in confinement recorded their 
emotions upon finally gaining their freedom after nearly six years of captivity, but Ensign 
Anburey must have spoken for all when he recorded: "It is impossible to describe the 
emotions of joy depicted in the countenance of every one; when…we felt ourselves once 
more at liberty and safe out of the hands of barbarians."76 
 
.............................. 
 Saratoga is commonly known as the turning point of the war, but it was also a 
point of no return.  Americans went to war in 1775 strong in the conviction that their 
cause was righteous, even providentially sanctioned, and they were adamant that their 
conduct during the conflict would reflect the nobility of their cause.  When confronted by 
British violations of their vision of "civilized" warfare, they painted a picture in their 
print, prose, and oratory of stark contrast between the depravity and barbarity of their 
British enemy and the humanity and generosity of their own troops.  This dichotomy was 
unsustainable. The British repeatedly demonstrated that the rules that governed their 
actions in a European war were not applicable in the American rebellion.  If that was true, 
then why should the revolutionaries hold themselves to a higher standard?  Continually 
confronted by British transgressions of the norms of war as they understood them, and 
frustrated in their attempts to stem the war's violence through proportional retaliation, a 
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growing number of revolutionary Americans came to demand retribution on a grand 
scale.  When the fortune of war placed General Burgoyne's army in their hands, they 
finally had an opportunity to exact the vengeance they so desired.  To relinquish that 
opportunity for the purpose of upholding abstract notions, such as a general's honor or the 
public faith, was insufferable.  Viewed from this angle, Congress's nullification of the 
Convention of Saratoga was not a unilateral decision grounded in rational calculation of 
national self-interest, but instead a reflection of a pervasive shift in popular American 
conceptions of the conduct of war.  As one New England columnist phrased it, 
Americans were "fired with the resentment of accumulated injuries" and "wearied with 
the long exercise of a humane conduct, which has only been rewarded with barbarity and 
insult." They demanded a radical act of unforgiving retaliation.  In suspending the 
Convention, Congress heeded their request: officially confirming that the rules of the 
game had changed.  Yet neither Congress nor the American populace at large was 
prepared for the violent ramifications of these changes.  By inaugurating a war of 
retribution, Congress had launched its constituents on a path of escalating violence and 
destruction unimaginable to even the most radical revolutionary in 1778.  Once opened, 
the Pandora's box of vengeance would not be so easily closed.77
                                                




The Vengeance of War 
 
 
 Surveying the besieged city of Charleston, South Carolina in early May 1780, 
British General Sir Henry Clinton was in the mood to be magnanimous. For weeks his 
army had slowly, methodically, but inexorably invested the rebel stronghold. An ardent 
student of the art of war and a veteran of the European theatre of the Seven Years' War, 
Clinton, unlike his predecessor and rival Sir William Howe, was determined to conduct 
his operations by the book; he would not risk battle, even with rebels, if it could be 
avoided.  Despite mutterings from many in his army critical of the torpidity of his 
advance on the city, Clinton's gradual and deliberate siege had worked. With their line of 
retreat now cut off, and their food supply dwindling, the Americans had no choice but to 
give up the town.  When he received word on May 11 that the American commander, the 
jocular and rotund Massachusetts militiaman turned major general Benjamin Lincoln, 
sought to surrender his army of nearly six thousand men, Clinton was relieved.  He would 
not have to hurl his battalions of British and Hessian troops at the city's defenses.  For the 
price of fewer than eighty British lives, Clinton would seize the most populous and 
prosperous city south of Philadelphia, capture the only American army between him and 
Washington, and erase the shame of his abortive 1776 attack on the city. If his superiors 
in London were correct, Clinton's victory would pave the way for the complete 
subordination of the southern colonies to the king's will.  Deprived of the wealth and 
resources of the south, the revolutionary cause would wither on the vine.  With total 
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victory in sight, now was not the time for pettiness or punishment, now was the time to 
demonstrate British benevolence.1 
 Magnanimity was the last thing the American garrison expected from their British 
besiegers.  Lincoln, with the advice of his officers and the political leadership of the city, 
had twice rejected Clinton's offers to negotiate Charleston's surrender, declaring in early 
April that he would defend the town "to the last Extremity."  Aware of the British 
treatment of the garrison of Fort Washington in 1776 and of the horrors endured by 
American soldiers and sailors aboard British prison hulks, many in the garrison agreed 
with Lincoln's determination.  South Carolina's lieutenant governor, Christopher 
Gadsden, proudly boasted that the "the Militia[men] were willing to Live upon Rice 
alone rather than give up the Town upon any Terms."2   
 Incessant British bombardment and meager rations soon persuaded many 
defenders to abandon their former resolve.  Hundreds of citizens and militiamen 
petitioned Lincoln to end their misery by seeking whatever terms for surrender he could 
obtain.  From the standpoint of the exhausted defenders, indefinite confinement on a 
prison ship looked preferable to starvation amid the bombed-out ruins of their once 
vibrant city.  Saddled with a citizen militia that had "thrown down their Arms," Lincoln 
had little choice but to throw himself on the mercy of the British conqueror.  Having 
                                                
 1 Most scholars who have examined Clinton's siege of Charleston have suggested that he treated 
the garrison with severity.  Andrew O'Shaughnessy in his recent study claimed that "Clinton humiliated his 
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Hough, The Siege of Charleston…(Albany: J. Munsell, 1867), 89; Lilla Mills Hawes, ed., Lachlan 
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already rejected Clinton's very generous terms for capitulation on 10 April and 8 May, 
Lincoln could hope to save little besides the lives of his soldiers.  He sent a messenger 
towards the British lines requesting to surrender the city under the terms Clinton had 
earlier offered, but he was not optimistic.  This was no longer a negotiation.  Clinton 
could demand and receive whatever he wanted.3 
 Much to the relief of the beleaguered city's garrison, the British general 
acquiesced to Lincoln's request.  Instead of demanding unconditional surrender, Clinton 
allowed the Continental soldiers and sailors, "with their Baggage," to remain "Prisoners 
of War until exchanged."  The officers were even permitted to keep and wear their 
swords.  Unlike General Howe who had denied the garrison of Fort Washington prisoner-
of-war status, preferring to treat them as rebels in arms, Clinton promised that the 
American regulars would be afforded all of the customary European protections of that 
status.  They would be "supplied with good and wholesome Provisions, in such Quantity 
as is served out to the Troops of his Britannic Majesty" while they awaited exchange for 
the soldiers of the Convention army in American captivity.  Lincoln's militia posed a 
thornier problem for the British commander.  As citizens in arms they were not protected 
under the contemporary European laws of war.  Nonetheless, in an unprecedented gesture 
of leniency for a British general during the American war, Clinton agreed to allow the 
militiamen "to return to their respective Homes, as Prisoners upon Parole."  By agreeing 
not to bear arms against the British government until exchanged, the militia was free to 
leave.  Clinton even promised that their paroles would "secure them from being molested 
                                                
 3 Carl P. Borick, A Gallant Defense: The Siege of Charleston, 1780 (Columbia: University of 
South Carolina Press, 2003), 216; David B. Mattern, Benjamin Lincoln and the American Revolution 
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995), 107; Lincoln to Washington. August 11th, 1780. 
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http://founders.archives.gov/, hereafter cited as Founders Online.  
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in their property by the British Troops."  Unprepared for such generosity from an enemy 
that had consistently refused to treat Americans as legitimate combatants in the past, the 
former president of the Continental Congress, Henry Laurens, whose own son was a 
prisoner in the city, was perplexed by the apparent British volte-face. The surrender 
agreement, which Laurens called "a strange kind of Capitulation," seemed too good to be 
true.  Given Congress's continued detention of the Convention army, and Lincoln's 
obstinate refusal to surrender even after the town had been completely surrounded, why 
would Clinton grant terms that were "full as good" as Laurens could ever have hoped?4  
 Clinton's actions were not merely the merciful caprice of a conqueror; they 
reflected his hope that the war in the south would be different. Believing most 
southerners were war-weary and open to reconciliation with Britain, Clinton was 
determined to wage the campaign with benevolence rather than brutality. As he explained 
to Lord George Germain, "Whatever severe justice might dictate on such an occasion, we 
resolved not to press to unconditional submission a reduced army, whom we hoped 
clemency might yet reconcile to us."  He enjoined his subordinates "from offering 
violence to innocent and inoffensive people," and ordered them to "protect the aged, 
infirm, the women, and children of every denomination from insult and outrage."  The 
British general had no desire to repeat Howe's mistakes. He would not abandon his 
loyalist supporters, but neither would he allow their petty grudges to interfere with his 
plans to bring peace to the province.  Empowered by the king to offer a "free and general 
Pardon" to all former rebels, Clinton set out to pacify the south not conquer it.  Clinton's 
                                                
 4 Hough, The Siege of Charleston, 99, 105; Laurens to the S.C. Delegates in Congress. 
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vision for the war in the south was nothing short of a repudiation of the policy and 
practice of his predecessor.5 
 Less than a year later in February 1781, Moses Hall, a twenty-one year old 
militiaman, witnessed the murder of six loyalist prisoners of war in the North Carolina 
interior.  The men, who had been captured by Continental troops earlier in the day, were 
"hewed to pieces with broadswords" by Hall's fellow militiamen.  Although not officially 
sanctioned by the revolutionary government, the militiamen's actions were consonant 
with the October 17th, 1780 standing orders of the North Carolina Board of War to "treat 
them [loyalists] with the Severity they deserve."  The sanguinary scene initially horrified 
Hall, who recalled feeling "overcome and unmanned by a distressing gloom" as he 
contemplated "the cruelties of war." Feelings of shock and regret "for the slaughter of the 
Tories" were soon subsumed by desire for vengeance when Hall came upon the body of 
"a youth about sixteen" who had been bayoneted by loyalist troops and left for dead.  
Radicalized by the violence of civil war, Hall "desired nothing so much as the 
opportunity of participating in their [the loyalists'] destruction."  Far from unique, Hall's 
recollections of his military service during the campaigns of 1780 and 1781 are 
emblematic of the vehemence and violence with which both sides prosecuted the war in 
the south after the fall of Charleston. Hardly the restrained conflict Clinton had 
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envisioned, the years 1780-82 witnessed some of the most horrific acts of cruelty 
perpetrated during the war.6  
 Noting the violence of this era is hardly novel, historians and Hollywood have 
long recognized the destructiveness of this phase of the war. Seeing it as an aberration, a 
peculiarly violent coda to an otherwise restrained conflict, scholars have pointed to the 
ethnic composition of the southern colonies, long standing political disputes between the 
eastern planter elite and the backcountry yeomanry, the inherent violence of a social 
system predicated upon human bondage, the widespread use of Native American tactical 
practices, and even the cultural legitimacy of retributive justice to explain why the war in 
the south, to borrow Wayne Lee's phrase, "spiraled out of control."  While not denying 
the importance of these factors in escalating the violence of the southern campaigns, this 
chapter stresses continuity not disjuncture.  By examining the treatment of enemy 
prisoners during these years within the context of prior British and American practice, the 
war in the south emerges not as a drastic departure from a limited European-style conflict 
but as the intense culmination of a process of escalating violence that had begun in the 
summer of 1776.  Years of British abuses, exaggerated by the revolutionary press and 
exacerbated by civil war, had galvanized popular support for a war of vengeance.  While 
some members of the revolutionary elite, such as George Washington and Nathanael 
Greene, strove to temper popular outrage, they were few and far between in the last years 
of the war.  By the summer of 1782, many Americans had come to agree with the Boston 
                                                
 6 North Carolina Board of War to Colonel John Lutrell. October 17th, 1780. CSRNC,14:427; 
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Evening-Post's declaration that "Humanity to an Englishman is treason against 
America."7 
 This chapter begins by examining the breakdown of Clinton's policy to pacify the 
south.  British violations of the capitulation of Charleston, combined with both real and 
imagined British atrocities, enraged the formerly passive population of the backcountry 
of North and South Carolina, inducing them to take up arms against their loyalist 
neighbors and British forces alike.  The internecine conflict that developed in the 
southern backcountry looked nothing like the revolutionaries' earlier vision of virtuous 
and limited war waged in defense of abstract principles.  Revenge not proportional 
retaliation was the order of the day.  The horrors of the southern campaigns were not 
limited to the work of backcountry ruffians possessed of malleable loyalties and a 
penchant for plunder. Continental and British regular army units were also marred by the 
murder and mistreatment of enemy prisoners. While officially discouraged, British and 
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American military officials turned a blind eye to violations that would have elicited 
severe reproach at the war's commencement.  The arrival of Washington and the French 
army of the Count de Rochambeau in Virginia in fall 1781 reintroduced a veneer of 
restraint to the conflict.  The allies granted General Charles Cornwallis's army terms for 
capitulation at Yorktown that were every bit as generous as those Clinton proffered 
Lincoln at Charleston.  These terms proved instantly unpopular with revolutionary 
Southerners who were fixated on revenge.  With the forces of France removed, Congress 
responded to its constituents' call and consigned the Yorktown prisoners to an arduous 
confinement in the Pennsylvania interior where they suffered from deprivation, disease, 
and exposure for the remainder of the war.  As with General Burgoyne's army, Congress 
remained unwilling to consider an exchange.  The prisoners' cries went unanswered.  By 
war's end, Congress, like an anonymous correspondent in the Boston Evening-Post, had 
come to believe that "towards the nation of Britain, as citizens of America, you owe 
nothing but revenge."8  
 
"Nothing will serve these people but fire and sword": Tarleton's "Quarter" and the 
Failure of the British Policy to Pacify the South 
 
 When Lincoln's Continental regiments filed out of their entrenchments on 12 May 
to lay down their arms and surrender their colors, their captors were shocked by the 
Americans' appearance.  Their faces gaunt from months of deprivation, and their 
uniforms soiled, threadbare, and torn, the prisoners nonetheless evinced "more 
appearance of discipline than" one of Clinton's Scottish officers had "seen formerly" from 
American troops.  These men were not the ill-disciplined rabble the British had 
                                                
 8 Boston Evening-Post, July 27, 1782. 
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confronted in the first years of the war; they were professionals who deserved to be 
treated as such.  Though defeated, the Continentals had much for which to be proud.  
Having skillfully fortified the city and defended it against the combined might of Britain's 
army and navy for months, the soldiers could rest assured that they had done their duty 
and had surrendered with honor.  General Moultrie remembered that the British officers 
congratulated their prisoners on having "made a gallant defence [sic]."  Instead of the 
jeers and jabs endured by the garrison of Fort Washington, Charleston's defenders 
marched out unmolested, accompanied only by the shrill melodies of their field 
musicians playing a "Turkish march."  Impressed by the respectful silence of their 
adversaries, the troops returned to their barracks, and the officers to their quarters, 
prepared to enter captivity.9 
 Once his troops occupied the city, General Clinton had to decide what to do with 
the prisoners.  He could allow the Continental soldiers to remain in their barracks under a 
lax confinement or he could order them aboard troop transports bound for New York.  
The articles of capitulation had not specified the mode or location of their confinement.  
Were Clinton to send the men to New York, the city's commander, General Knyphausen, 
would have no choice but to confine the men aboard prison ships.  Clinton was well 
aware of the insalubrious conditions on board the hulks, and he had no intention of 
sending his recent captives to their deaths; the prisoners were far too valuable.  For years 
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Congress had denied to exchange the men of the Convention army for American 
privateers in British custody, but now Clinton had enough American troops to redeem the 
survivors of Burgoyne's unfortunate force.  The timing could not be better.  After 
France's entry into the war in 1778, Lord Germain had required Clinton to shift a sizable 
percentage of his forces to the West Indies to protect Britain's lucrative sugar islands.  
Reinforcements were promised, but London had not been forthcoming.  Clinton needed 
more soldiers.  Augmenting his southern army with the Convention troops would allow 
him to shift a significant portion of his command to New York, where he could begin 
operations against Washington.  While he prepared to negotiate the Continental prisoners' 
exchange, Clinton allowed them to remain in the comfort of their barracks.  True to his 
word in the articles of capitulation, Clinton ordered the men provided with wholesome 
rations.  After the war, an American surgeon with the prisoners, Dr. Peter Fayssoux, 
claimed that the troops had no "material cause of complaint."  No one in Charleston 
expected them to remain in confinement for long.10 
 Soon after the Continental troops surrendered, Clinton's officers began the 
arduous process of administering paroles to the city's militia.  Comprising over half of the 
garrison, the militia did not present as martial an appearance as their Continental 
brethren.  One British officer described them as "poor Creatures" who "began to creep 
out of their Holes" following the surrender.  Eager to safeguard their property, thousands 
of civilians, both those who had been in arms and those who had refused to defend the 
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city, came forward to claim their paroles.  American General William Moultrie recalled 
seeing "the aged, the timid, the disaffected, and the infirm, many of them who had never 
appeared during the whole siege" come forward "to enrol [sic] on a conqueror's list."  
Moultrie believed that the people were "tired of war" and keen to accept Clinton's 
"pleasing offers, in hopes they would have been suffered to remain peaceably and quietly 
at home with their families, and to have gone on with their business undisturbed, as 
before." It was a very tempting offer, and thousands of Charlestonians came forward.  
Clinton was overjoyed by the turnout.  He informed Germain, "with the greatest 
pleasure," that "there are few men in South Carolina who are not either our prisoners or in 
arms with us.”  It looked as if his policy of benevolence had worked. With their paroles 
in hand, most of the militiamen departed the city, pleased to be rid of war.11  
 Possessed of Charleston, the British general now sought to expand his reach into 
the countryside.  Fearing that his "success at Charles Town—unless followed in the Back 
Country—will be of little avail,"  Clinton ordered his second in command, Lieutenant 
General Charles Earl of Cornwallis, to consolidate royal authority in the colony by 
establishing fortified positions in the backcountry and by administering oaths of 
allegiance to the populace.  Armed with promises of pardon, Cornwallis's troops fanned 
out in the South Carolina hinterlands.  Clinton was confident that South Carolinians were 
"not only friendly to Government" but willing "to take up arms in its support."12 
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 Clinton was not wholly mistaken.  In the weeks following Charleston's fall, 
thousands of loyalists flocked to his troops for protection and for the opportunity to 
chastise their rebel neighbors.  For years they had endured persecution at the hands of the 
rebel government, but now the time had come for revenge.  As one of Clinton's aides 
informed him, the loyalists were "clamorous for retributive Justice" and they would not 
rest "until those People whose persecuting spirit hath caused such calamities to their 
fellow subjects shall receive the punishment their Inequities deserve."  Seizing the 
opportunity, many loyalists took matters into their own hands.  According to an officer in 
Clinton's army, a party of "friends to Government" rounded up "forty odd Rebels" in 
retaliation for seventy of their own who had been "condemned to be hanged" in 1779.  
The loyalists, who had been "obliged to hide in Swamps & Caves to keep from Prison 
themselves," now gladly embraced "the opportunity to retaliate."  Their quest for 
retribution hindered by Clinton's orders "to restrain the militia" from acts of wanton 
violence.  His entire plan for pacifying the south rested on forgiveness for past 
transgressions.  But clemency was not what South Carolina loyalists had in mind.  The 
sight of unrepentant rebels, going about their daily routines protected in their person and 
property by British paroles, galled the loyalists.  In their opinion, vengeance should be 
swift.13  
 The loyalists could take comfort at least from the knowledge that many in 
Clinton's army disagreed with their commander's policy of benevolent pacification. 
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Paroling rebel officers was bad enough, but permitting common militiamen to return 
home on the bare promise of neutrality was egregious.  These were not gentlemen who 
could be depended upon to keep their word.  Scottish Captain John Peebles worried that 
there would be few prisoners left to exchange because "all the Militia &ca. get their 
parole & the inhabitants of the Town their property."  Constrained only by their promise, 
the militia would be prime subjects for rebel recruiters should Washington send another 
army southward.  Hessian officer Johann Ewald believed Clinton's decision to parole the 
militia would "cost the English dear, because I am convinced that most of these people 
will have guns in their hands within a short time."  Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Innes 
simply referred to Clinton's terms as "the cursed capitulation of Charles Town."  To these 
men, the rebellion had to be crushed not conciliated.14 
 One such hardliner was the twenty-six year old lieutenant colonel Banastre 
Tarleton.  Probably the ablest, and certainly the most dashing, cavalry commander of the 
war, Tarleton was already known for his fearlessness and ferocity in battle, but it was in 
the south that he gained a reputation for brutality.  The seeds of that reputation were 
planted at the end of May when Tarleton and the green-jacketed troops of the loyalist 
British Legion caught up with the last remaining American force in the Carolinas in the 
border region between the two states known as the Waxhaws.  The British force had 
advanced over a hundred miles in just over two days in order to intercept the Virginia 
Continentals.  Confident in his superior numbers, the American commander, Colonel 
Abraham Buford, refused Tarleton's summons to surrender under the terms offered 
Charleston's garrison.  What happened next remains clouded in controversy.  Sources on 
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both sides agree that upon Buford's refusal, Tarleton's mounted troopers advanced swiftly 
on the line of 350 American infantrymen.  The Virginians withheld their fire until it was 
too late; the dragoons were soon among them.  Some of Buford's men fled while others 
begged for their lives.  As one of Buford's officers rode forward with a white flag of 
surrender, Tarleton was thrown from his horse.  Years following the battle, Tarleton 
claimed that his men believed "they had lost their commanding officer, which stimulated 
the soldiers to a vindictive asperity not easily restrained."  One of Buford's officers, 
Colonel H. Boyer remembered the events differently.  In his account, American musketry 
dismounted Tarleton during the surrender negotiations.  Furious, the British colonel 
ordered his men to continue the assault.  As Boyer phrased it, "the rage of the British 
soldiers, excited by the continued fire of the Americans while a negotiation was offered 
by the flag, impelled them to acts of vengeance that knew no limits."  Whatever the 
cause, the results were the same.  In Tarleton's words, "slaughter was commenced."  One 
hundred and thirteen Americans were killed outright and a further one hundred and fifty 
were wounded.15   
 To the British, Buford's defeat was a "complete success," but to the Americans it 
was a "massacre."  Rumors that Tarleton's men had cut down the Virginians after they 
had surrendered soon began to circulate.  North Carolina Councilman Thomas Person 
informed Congressman Thomas Burke that "'tis Said [the British Legion] killed at least 
200 men in a most Cruel & Inhumane Manner, after piling their Arms" in surrender.  It 
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was not long before American newspapers picked up the story. The Providence, Rhode 
Island American Journal claimed that "instead of meeting with that reception which the 
feelings of humanity dictates, or that clemency which our conquered foes have ever 
received at our hands, no quarter was given" to Buford's surrendering soldiers.  The 
Massachusetts Spy accused Tarleton of "the most inhuman acts of cruelty that were ever 
heard of, viz. in the massacre of the gallant, amiable Col. Buford and 170 of his corps."  
Although British accounts did not use the term "massacre," Tarleton's official report of 
the action, which was widely published, seemed to confirm the revolutionaries' version of 
events.  "He had come up with the Remains of the Rebel Force to the Southward…and 
had attacked and cut them to Pieces."  The American reading public knew exactly how to 
interpret Tarleton's words; the British had not reformed their barbarous ways, and their 
promises of conciliation and generous treatment were not to be trusted.  Appalled by the 
violence, sixteen-year old Eliza Wilkinson of Charleston decried British "cruelties and 
oppressions," believing that her countrymen would be roused by "the spirit of 
resentment" to oppose the occupiers.  She could not have been more prophetic.  
Throughout the backcountry settlements militia companies began to organize. Observing 
the effects of revolutionary propaganda first hand, a British officer lamented: "It is 
inconceivable the damage such reports has done."  Back in Charleston, Clinton was 
blissfully unaware of the Carolinians' rising resentment of the British occupation.  Intent 
on savoring his victory, Clinton decided to return to New York, but not before making a 
decision that would fundamentally alter the course and character of the war in the south.16   
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  On June 3, 1780, believing he had pacified South Carolina, Clinton issued a 
proclamation invalidating article four of the treaty of capitulation of Charleston, which 
had paroled the militia to their homes.  From henceforth all who had surrendered under 
the terms of the treaty were "freed and exempted from all such Paroles."  With their 
paroles removed, the men were "restored to all the Rights and Duties belonging to 
Citizens and Inhabitants" of Great Britain.  Acting on spurious intelligence of the strength 
of loyalist support in the Carolinas, Clinton abrogated the militiamen's paroles in the 
belief that they would rally to the royal standard and provide the nucleus of a new royal 
militia that would maintain the peace he had won with his victory at Charleston.  With 
the defense of the province in the hands of the militia, Clinton could ferry the majority of 
his army back to New York.  To further encourage the militia to do their duty, Clinton 
added a not so thinly veiled threat to his proclamation.  All South Carolinians "who shall 
afterwards neglect to return to his Allegiance and to his Majesty's Government, will be 
considered as Enemies and Rebels to the same, and treated accordingly."  By 1780, South 
Carolinians were well aware of how the British treated rebels.  Although it had not been 
his intent, Clinton had drawn a line in the sand; the opportunity for passive neutrality had 
passed. Cornwallis realized at once the error of his commander's actions.  As he told one 
of his officers, Lieutenant Colonel Nesbit Balfour, "they are not just what I should have 
dictated."  He feared the proclamation would excite neutrals into armed opposition 
against the crown.  Nonetheless, Clinton's proclamation freed the earl to take a more 
aggressive stance against those who opposed British rule in the south. Soon after issuing 
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his proclamation, Clinton returned to New York, leaving Cornwallis in command of the 
southern theatre. Cornwallis promptly informed his inspector of militia, Major Patrick 
Ferguson, of his intentions to pursue a "plan of imprisoning those who have rendered 
themselves obnoxious by their cruelty and persecution of our friends [loyalists]."  The 
time for conciliation was over.17  
 Predictably, South Carolinians were outraged.  Clinton had promised them peace 
and neutrality, but by reneging on his word, he now forced them back into the war.   John 
Weldon is typical of a South Carolina militiaman who had seen enough of war and just 
wanted to go home.  He had been "so much injured" in earlier campaigns that he was 
rendered "unfit for service."  Nevertheless, when Clinton besieged Charleston, he had 
rushed to defend the beleaguered capital.  He was too late, the city had fallen.  Arrested 
but "dismissed on parole and permitted to return home," he had no intention of violating 
his parole and returning to arms. But after the June 3rd proclamation, loyalist troops gave 
Weldon a choice: "he must deliver himself up [for loyalist militia service] or join the 
Enemy."  For a man who had fought and bled for the revolutionary cause, the choice was 
simple.  "He broke his parole…and marched to and joined" a band of revolutionary 
militia under the command of General Thomas Sumter.  Enraged by Clinton's duplicity 
and Tarleton's brutality, South Carolinians like Weldon took up arms in droves. These 
loosely organized bands of militia wasted no time before attacking British and loyalist 
forces: first at Ramsour's Mill on 20 June and then at Williamson's Plantation on 12 July.  
In both actions the revolutionaries inflicted devastating defeats on the colony's embryonic 
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loyalist militia. Cornwallis feared that the defeats would "much encourage the enemy."  If 
he did not take action soon, the entire countryside would be in open rebellion.18 
 Lord Cornwallis was not an immoderate man, but he was a man of action.  Like 
both Howe and Clinton, Cornwallis had not been enthusiastic about the war in America, 
but a strict sense of duty and more than a modicum of ambition had compelled him to 
defend the king's claim to the colonies.  First under Howe and later Clinton, Cornwallis 
had pursued the revolutionary forces in the north with a sense of doggedness and alacrity 
unparalleled by any of Britain's senior officers in America. Believing he alone was 
capable of ending the rebellion, Cornwallis wanted Clinton's job. Since the beginning of 
the southern campaign, he had been critical of Clinton's approach to command.  In the 
earl's opinion, compassion and generosity had failed to quell the rebellion; the time had 
come to "punish severely" those who continued to advocate rebellion after Charleston's 
surrender.  Now in independent command of the southern army, Cornwallis's first step 
was to "seize all violent and persecuting rebels and send them directly on parole" to the 
remote Sea Islands of South Carolina where they could do little harm to the royal cause.  
Dozens of Charlestonians were dragged from their homes and forced into exile.  Those 
who were "very notorious for acts of cruelty" were sent under guard to the Provost's 
prison in Charleston.  To further deter rebellion, Cornwallis made it known that in future 
any rebel who broke his parole would "instantly be hanged without any form of trial."19  
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 The general's orders were music to the ears of a hardliner like Tarleton.  From his 
point of view, "the insurgents, having taken certificates and paroles, don't deserve lenity" 
and "none shall they experience."   In a statement that has forever cloaked the British 
soldier in infamy, Tarleton boasted, "I shall give these disturbers of the peace no quarter."  
From then on, "Tarleton's Quarter" was used by the revolutionaries, and their historians, 
to justify horrific acts of brutality against their loyalist and British foes.  Although the 
atrocities committed by Tarleton and his legion have been exaggerated over the years, 
while those of their opponents downplayed or denied, there can be no doubt that Tarleton 
was prepared to use violence, and more importantly the threat of violence, to crush the 
rebellion.  Citing "ancient scripture" as precedent, Tarleton intended to utterly devastate 
the south.  If some loyal subjects or neutrals were plundered or punished in the process, 
so be it.  As he informed Cornwallis, he would "discriminate with severity."  Francis 
Marion, a revolutionary militia commander who was no stranger to violence, was 
horrified that "Colonel Tarleton has behaved to the poor Women, he has distressed, with 
Great Barbarity…he spares neither Whig nor Tory."  For Tarleton, the path to victory 
was clear: "Nothing will serve these people but fire and sword."  The British cavalier 
intended to be true to his word.  With Tarleton in the vanguard of his army, Cornwallis 
confidently ignored both the lackluster loyalist turnout and the growing antipathy of the 
South Carolinians and pressed on with his campaign to subdue the south by force of 
arms.20  
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 Contesting Cornwallis's advance northward was none other than General Horatio 
Gates: the American "hero of Saratoga."  Against Washington's wishes, Congress had 
dispatched the veteran commander southward with a small contingent of Continental 
regulars to arrest the British juggernaut.  By early August, Gates had succeeded in 
molding his mixed force of regulars and militia into a coherent army, but he blundered in 
his pursuit of Cornwallis.  The two armies literally collided in darkness on the morning of 
August 16 near Camden, South Carolina.  The resulting battle was a disastrous defeat for 
Gates, who fled the field in ignominy.  Tarleton, whose dragoons played a critical role in 
cutting off the enemy's retreat, remembered that "rout and slaughter ensued in every 
quarter."  Over seven hundred American soldiers fell into British hands that day.  A 
British soldier with Cornwallis claimed that the American prisoners were "treated with 
civility" and forwarded to "Charleston under guard," but once arrived, they posed a 
significant problem for the British commandant of the city, Nesbit Balfour.21  
 Before Cornwallis had launched his invasion of the South Carolina backcountry, 
the earl had charged Balfour with overseeing the administration of the American 
prisoners in the city.  Cornwallis had been confident that the men would soon be released 
through a general cartel of exchange, or at the very least provisioned by the American 
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commissary Captain George Turner.  Regrettably for the American captives, by August, 
Congress had still not acquiesced to an exchange of Charleston's captive garrison for the 
Convention army and the oft-promised supplies had not been forthcoming.  
Overwhelmed with enemy prisoners, and unable to provide them with the provisions, 
quarters, and medicines they sorely needed, Balfour despaired to Cornwallis that he 
found "the prisoners by no means an easy load."  With "sickness and mortality" spreading 
among the garrison, Balfour had little choice but to confine the prisoners on board prison 
ships.  He ordered six transport ships converted into floating prisons.  The vessels soon 
became cesspools of filth and disease.  A militiaman captured at Camden reported that 
"small pocks" [sic] was present on board the ships, taking the lives of "a Number of brave 
men."  Without resupply from either London or Philadelphia, Balfour could do little to 
ease the prisoners' misery.  Clearly pained by the prisoners' plight, Balfour lamented that 
"the rebell [sic] prisoners die faster than ever they used to desert.”22 
 As had been the case during the New York campaign, revolutionary 
propagandists laid blame for the prisoners' suffering not on Congress for its 
unwillingness to exchange the men or its inability to provide for them, but upon 
Cornwallis.  A South Carolinian writing for the Pennsylvania Packet urged his fellow 
statesmen "to take vengeance" on the "perfidious foe…Cornwallis" for the "cruelties 
committed throughout your once flourishing state."  Another correspondent, this time 
purporting to be an escapee from "a most cruel captivity, in Charlestown, South 
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Carolina," enumerated "the many cruelties and enormities that have been, and are now 
put in practice on our suffering brethren in South Carolina."  Referring to Cornwallis as 
"the British NERO," he accused the general of the "direct violation of the most solemn 
articles of capitulation" by confining American prisoners with "British deserters, fellows 
under sentence of death, loaded with chains, Negroes, and every species of villainy, who 
hourly insulted them, with the epithet of dammed rebels" in a "a hellish dungeon" where 
"the smallpox, yellow fever, camp fever, and [the] itch" raged.  In closing, he warned all 
Americans to "never expect lenity, nor even common humanity, at their [the British] 
hands."  By this period in the war, revolutionaries everywhere had little cause to doubt 
his accusations or question his reasoning.  Summarizing the temper of backcountry South 
Carolinians, an aide to General Gates claimed, "They breathe nothing but revenge, for the 
unheard-of cruelties committed upon our distressed people."  Clinton's plan to pacify the 
south had failed.  Southern loyalists, and their British protectors, would soon know the 
wrath of American vengeance.23 
 
 
"With little less than savage fury:" Prisoner Abuse in the Southern Backcountry  
 
 Having routed Gates and the American Southern army at Camden, Cornwallis 
concluded that the best way of securing his gains in South Carolina was to invade North 
Carolina, where he hoped to overawe the people with the celerity and ferocity of his 
advance.  Cornwallis believed that with both Carolinas in British hands, the rebels would 
surely see that further resistance was futile.  Before marching northward, Cornwallis 
informed Clinton in New York of his intention "to hang up all those militia men" who 
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had deserted to the enemy."  No mere threat, Cornwallis admitted that he personally 
ordered "several militia men to be executed."  Many of his more zealous subordinates 
jumped at the opportunity to punish recalcitrant rebels as well.  Loyalist Lieutenant 
Colonel John Harris Cruger delighted in "sending out parties of horse to pick up the 
traiterous [sic] rebels…who will be roughly handled, some very probably suspended 
[hanged]" for their crimes.  Another loyalist officer noted that "twenty seven of them 
[American prisoners] were hanged at Augusta, & twenty seven brought to Ninety Six [in 
South Carolina] to share the same fate."  North Carolinians rightly feared that such 
punishments would be in store for them should they oppose the British invader.24 
 In contrast to his general's uncompromising approach, Major Ferguson still 
believed that restraint not retaliation was the best anodyne for the disease of rebellion 
infecting the southern countryside.  Tasked with the dual responsibility of subduing rebel 
partisan groups and drumming up recruits for his loyalist militia, Ferguson took a small 
contingent of uniformed loyalists into the backcountry borderlands in the hopes of 
convincing "the deluded inhabitants of the revolted American provinces" of the king's 
mercy.  Hardly the parcel of bloodthirsty bandits often depicted, Ferguson's forces were 
under strict orders "to offer no injury to the persons or propertys [sic] of those men that 
have been on the rebel side" in the past.  He warned his soldiers that "those who by 
plunder and outrage disgrace the name of loyalists" would "be punished even to death."  
Rather than rampaging through the backcountry, Ferguson's troops advanced cautiously 
and with moderation. Their restrained conduct shocked civilian onlookers who were 
expecting little less than "Tarleton's Quarter" from the armed loyalists.  One of 
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Ferguson's officers, Surgeon Uzal Johnson, recorded meeting "one Poor Woman [who] 
expressed great surprise at seeing our Men so mild."  Having heard "of the Cruelty of the 
English," the woman asked Uzal "if there was not Heathens in our Army that eat 
Children" because "she had been told there was."  Notwithstanding the restraint shown by 
the loyalist column, most backcountry settlers still believed Ferguson's mission was 
nefarious; the stories of British atrocities were just too credible.  In their minds, Ferguson 
and his Tory minions had to be stopped before they could "lay their country waste with 
fire and sword."25 
 In early October, revolutionary militias from both the Carolinas, and from across 
the Blue Ridge Mountains in what is today Tennessee, poured into the backcountry to 
oppose Ferguson's march. Acting independently of either state or congressional orders, 
the militiamen were unbound by rules and regulations. These "backwater men" did not 
shy away from using violence to obtain intelligence about Ferguson's movements.  After 
an attack on four unsuspecting loyalists in which "two young men" were killed, the 
survivors, who were "most barbarously maim'd," informed Ferguson that one of the 
American officers, Colonel Benjamin Cleveland, had given "orders for such cowardly 
acts of cruelty."  Ferguson was incensed.  He immediately issued a proclamation to the 
surrounding communities decrying the "shocking cruelties and irregularities" committed 
by the "Backwater men."  He warned the loyalists that unless they wished "to be 
pinioned, robbed, and murdered, and see your wives and daughters, in four days, abused 
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by the dregs of mankind," they must arm themselves "in a moment and run to camp."  
Ferguson's warning had an immediate effect; he was able to assemble nearly a thousand 
North and South Carolina loyalist militia under his command.  Believing his men capable 
of fending of the "inundation of barbarians," Ferguson chose to occupy the heights of 
King's Mountain in South Carolina to await the enemy's attack.26 
 The assault came in the afternoon of 7 October.  A roughly equal force of 
American militia surrounded the mountain and assailed Ferguson's command on all sides.  
It was bloody, desperate work.  Within an hour Ferguson was dead and the loyalists' line 
of retreat was cutoff.  Sensing the inevitable, Ferguson's second in command, Captain 
Abraham de Peyster, "thought proper to surrender as the only means of saving the lives" 
of his soldiers.  De Peyester ordered a white flag raised in submission.  Evidently, the 
American militiamen had not yet had enough of fighting.  Militiaman Charles Bowen 
admitted in his pension application that he "shot the first man who hoisted the flag among 
the enemy."  The flag was then passed on to others "who hoisted the flag" but "were 
twice shot."  While the American commanders, colonels William Campbell, Isaac 
Shelby, and Benjamin Cleveland, claimed in their official report that when "a flag was 
immediately hoisted by Capt. DePeyster…Our fire immediately ceased," numerous 
American and loyalist reports suggest that firing continued for some time.  While several 
accounts point to the lack of centralized command during the battle as the cause of the 
continued firing, others suggest it was the Americans' desire for vengeance.  In his 
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pension application, militiaman Joseph Hewes claimed "we killed near a hundred of them 
[loyalists] after the surrender…[we] could hardly be restrained from killing the whole of 
them."  Years after the battle, Colonel Shelby abandoned his earlier stance that he had 
immediately accepted de Peyster's surrender.  In his words, "it was some time before a 
complete cessation of the firing, on our part, could be effected."  He attributed the cause 
to both the confusion of battle and to revenge.  "Some [of his men], who had heard that at 
Buford's defeat the British had refused quarters to many who asked it, were willing to 
follow that bad example."  The militia had gone into the battle with the countersign 
"Buford" and the intention to avenge the "massacre" at the Waxhaws.  In his journal, 
Loyalist Lieutenant Alexander Chesney noted that he feared the militia "would not give 
quarter" to his soldiers, and he was not surprised that "the Americans resumed firing" 
well after the initial surrender.  Chesney reported that "a dreadful havoc took place until 
the flag was sent out a second time when the work of destruction ceased."  Believing their 
ordeal at an end, Chesney and his fellow survivors threw down their arms, thankful to be 
alive.27 
 With the battle finally over, the American commanders found themselves in 
possession of some seven hundred loyalist prisoners without a plan or protocol for what 
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to do with them. Only a fraction of the prisoners were uniformed regulars, the remainder 
being Carolina loyalists.  Were these men prisoners of war and thus eligible for exchange 
or were they state prisoners that should be tried for treason?  No one in the American 
camp seemed to know the answer.  While the American commanders considered their 
next step, the prisoners and their captors camped on the battlefield "amidst the dead and 
groans of dying [loyalists], who had not surgical aid or water to quench their thirst."  One 
American militiaman recalled that during that horrible night, "the groans of the wounded 
and dying on the mountain were truly affecting—begging piteously for a little water," 
only to be ignored by the American guards.  Receiving news in the morning that Tarleton 
and a British relief column were on the way, the militiamen rounded up their prisoners 
and marched them northward under orders "to fire on, and destroy the prisoners" should 
Tarleton catch up with them.  The militia commanders reasoned that their best hope of 
avoiding the British pursuers, and of divesting themselves of their prisoners, was to link 
up with the remainder of Gates' army in North Carolina.  Perhaps the general would 
know what to do with the loyalists.28 
 The exhausted prisoners' march of over twenty miles a day was impeded by abuse 
from their militia guards and poor provisions.  Chesney recorded that in order to prod 
their advance, the guards were continually "cutting and striking us by the road in a savage 
manner."  Several prisoners must have perished under this ill-treatment because Colonel 
Campbell issued an order on October 11th requesting "the officers of all ranks in the 
army to endeavor to restrain the disorderly manner of slaughtering and disturbing the 
prisoners."  Those prisoners who survived attack by the guards suffered from lack of 
sustenance on their arduous trek.  If the American militia had food to spare, they did not 
                                                
 28 Edgar, Partisans and Redcoats, 119; Jones, The Journal of Captain Alexander Chesney, 18.  
 344 
share it with the prisoners who "were worn out with fatigue and fasting…having no bread 
or meat for two days."  It was not until the column reached Gilbertown, North Carolina 
on 13 October that the prisoners finally received "an ear of corn" and some old clothing 
in remuneration for that the militia had stolen from them after the battle.  Unfortunately 
for the prisoners, these tokens of American "liberality" merely masked their captors' real 
intentions.29 
 To their horror, the prisoners awoke on the morning of the 14th to learn that their 
commanders would stand trial for their lives.  Grumblings among the militiamen for 
harsher measures had escalated overnight into demands for a drumhead tribunal to try the 
principal loyalist officers.  As one militiaman remembered, he and his colleagues hoped 
to make an example of men who had "committed cool and deliberate murder and other 
enormities alike atrocious."  Acquiescing to the demands of their troops, the militia's 
officers organized a kangaroo court under the pretence of a North Carolina law 
authorizing two magistrates to convene a trial.  Loyalist Surgeon Johnson, who witnessed 
the proceedings, claimed that the prisoners were tried "for treason" against the state.  A 
contemporaneous account from an unknown loyalist prisoner describes what happened 
next.  "After a short hearing, thirty gentlemen, some of the most respectable characters in 
that country, had sentences of death passed on them; and at six o'clock of the same day 
they began to execute" the men.  The condemned prisoners, who included socially 
prominent loyalists such as Colonel Ambrose Mills of Green River, were hanged three at 
a time in front of the other prisoners who "were compelled to attend at the execution of 
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their brave but unfortunate men."  Surgeon Johnson recorded that the men "died like 
Romans saying they died for their King & his Laws."30 After the execution of the first 
nine prisoners, the grisly affair came to an abrupt halt.  In his post-war narrative, Colonel 
Shelby claimed that he "interfered, and proposed to stop it."  In a contemporary account, 
Alexander Chesney maintained the Americans only suspended the executions because 
they received news of the impending arrival of Tarleton's British Legion.   
 Whatever the cause for discontinuing the executions, the motive that animated the 
militiamen to begin them in the first place is clear: revenge.  Shelby insisted that the 
"cruel and justifiable acts" of the British "required retaliatory measures."  In a similar 
vein, Colonel William Hill, who was with the Gates' army at the time, justified the 
execution of the prisoners because the militiamen had been "provoked to this by the 
severity of the British who had lately hanged a great number of americans [sic]." Despite 
its legal varnish, this was not a case of proportional retaliation.  The prisoners were not 
executed in retaliation for any particular act of British or loyalist aggression.  They were 
hanged as traitors to their country.  Far from appalled by the militia's rash actions, 
Governor John Rutledge of South Carolina rejoiced that the militia had executed "8 or 10 
of the most noted horse Thieves & Tories" in the Carolinas.  The tidewater planter and 
politician agreed wholeheartedly with his backwoods constituents: Tory traitors deserved 
nothing less than the hangman's noose.31 
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 Having witnessed the murder of nine of their fellows, and fearing that a similar 
fate was in store for them, many of the King's Mountain prisoners resolved to escape.  As 
the prisoners trudged northward, escape became a viable option when more and more of 
the American militiamen, fed up with poor rations and monotonous marching, deserted.  
When their remaining guards were not looking, numerous prisoners slipped away.  Others 
were not so lucky.  Surgeon Johnson noted that "three Prisoners endeavouring to make 
their escape, one got shot through the Body."  The wounded prisoner was hanged the next 
morning.  Despite this exemplary punishment, prisoners continued to escape at a 
significant rate. Chesney, who Colonel Cleveland had ordered executed for his refusal to 
train the American militia in Ferguson's innovative light infantry tactics, managed to flee 
when the column approached Winston-Salem.32  
 Those not agile enough to escape risked falling victim to their captors' fury.  
According to Loyalist lieutenants William Stevenson and John Taylor, the prisoners were 
"so wearied that many of them were obliged to give out on the road."  Unable or 
unwilling to spare a guard for these men, the Americans murdered the exhausted 
prisoners.  When Surgeon Johnson tried to tend to wounded stragglers, he was accosted 
by Colonel Cleveland who called Johnson "a Damnd [sic] Villain" who "deserved the 
Gallows."  For the act of aiding the injured men, Cleveland struck Johnson "over the 
Head with his Sword, and levil'd [sic]" him.  Repeating his stroke, Cleveland "cut his 
hand with his sword."  When Johnson demanded to know his crime, all Cleveland could 
                                                                                                                                            
Congress.  November 20th, 1780. Salisbury, NC. Joseph W. Barnwell, ed., "Letters of John Rutledge," The 
South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Oct., 1916), 131-146,  143-144. For 
an account that stresses the restraint of the militia in the aftermath of the battle see Lee, Crowds and 
Soldiers, 186-191.  See also Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists, 138-146 and Edgar, Partisans and 
Redcoats, 116-121. 
 32 Kolb and Weir, eds., Captured at Kings Mountain, 33; Jones, The Journal of Alexander 
Chesney, 19. 
 347 
say was that Johnson was "a Damn'd Traitor to [his] Country."  The American 
commander, who would be known to posterity as "the Terror of the Tories," was 
determined to see all the prisoners tried and executed for betraying a country they had 
never claimed.  Believing their lives endangered because the Americans "seem'd 
determined to murder" them, Stevenson and Taylor succeeded in making their escape.  
Johnson was not far behind; disguising his identity because he knew many backcountry 
southerners "would not stick at murdering me if they found out I belonged to the 
British."33 
 Those survivors who failed to escape faced a grim choice: abandon their 
principles and enlist in the American army or face civil prosecution for treason. Although 
General Washington was vehemently opposed to enlisting British or loyalist prisoners 
into the Continental army, local recruiters were in dire need of trained men who could 
withstand the discipline and rigors of campaigning.  For many prisoners, the choice was 
simple; they enlisted rather than face the hangman or a slow death in an American prison. 
In early November, Surgeon Johnson recorded that "most of them enlisted in the 
Continental Service rather than suffer Death by inches Starving with cold & hunger." 
Aware of the likely outcome of a treason trial, Johnson could not blame his fellow 
prisoners for their desperate acts of self-preservation.  Once the prisoners reached 
Salisbury, North Carolina Colonel Martin Armstrong reported that "One hundred & 
Eighty Eight" prisoners were "taken out of my Hands by the Civil power, & bound over 
to ye law."  William Gist was one loyalist prisoner who refused to join the revolutionary 
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effort.  In his post-war claim for compensation from the crown, Gist related his ordeal.  
Tried for his life, he was "handcuffed and marched two hundred miles," passed from jail 
to jail, "with little or nothing to Eat" for two months until he finally managed to escape.  
When Cornwallis liberated the Salisbury jail in the winter of 1781, the British general 
was appalled.  The remaining King's Mountain prisoners were "almost starved to death."  
Very few of them remained in American custody. Of the survivors, nearly three hundred 
had escaped, while the rest had "enlisted in to the Continental Service."34  
 Both Continental and state authorities were furious that the militia had allowed so 
many of the prisoners to abscond or enlist. General Gates, who had hoped to exchange 
the prisoners for those held by the British, reprimanded Armstrong.  In his opinion, "we 
have already suffered too much, from the Treachery, and Baseness of the Tories" to ever 
trust them again.  "These prisoners ought to have been carefully kept confined, to be tried 
by the Laws of the State, to which they belong…or exchanged for our Militia Prisoners of 
War."  Embarrassed, Armstrong assured his general that had he not enlisted the men, "the 
officers from The other Side of the Mountain" would have "Kill[ed] every one of Them."  
Armstrong had done what he thought best under the circumstances.  The North Carolina 
Board of War was unimpressed.  The members demanded to know why Armstrong had 
issued such "Indulgences" to loyalist "Villains," while American prisoners suffered in 
Charleston under constant threat of being sent to "the West Indies, out of our power, there 
to rot and die in Gaols."  Armstrong would not make the mistake again; the North 
Carolina Legislature suspended him indefinitely. As the colonel learned all too well, 
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enemy prisoners were the state's property, and the governments of the southern states 
were determined to exact retaliation for British atrocities.  If Cornwallis denied American 
soldiers quarter, abused American prisoners on prison ships, and executed American 
civilians for supposed violations of their paroles, British and loyalist prisoners would pay 
the price for his cruelty.35 
 When he received news of the King's Mountain prisoners' treatment, Cornwallis 
was livid.  He immediately dashed off a letter of protest to the American militia 
commander, Brigadier General William Smallwood.  In his remonstrance, Cornwallis 
raged against "the cruelty exercised on the prisoners taken under major Ferguson."  Such 
treatment was "shocking to humanity."  To the British general, the executions of Colonel 
Mills, "who was always a fair and open enemy" to the American cause, and his eight 
fellow prisoners, was "an act of the most savage barbarity."  Threatening to allow "the 
suffering loyalists to retaliate on the unfortunate persons now in my power," Cornwallis 
demanded that Smallwood use his "authority to stop this bloody scene."36   
 Rather than engage in a cycle of retaliation, Cornwallis proposed a solution: a 
partial exchange.  He was willing to "exchange any of the North or South Carolina militia 
who may be prisoners with us for those who were taken on King's Mountain."  
Cornwallis had earlier hoped to establish a general cartel of exchange, but he was now 
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willing to accept a far more limited swap in order to preserve the morale of southern 
loyalists and rid himself of the burden of provisioning and confining captured Americans.  
Unfortunately, the American general had no prisoners to exchange; the militia had killed 
some and had permitted the remainder to enlist or escape.  Even if Smallwood still 
possessed the King's Mountain prisoners, Congress had not yet acquiesced to General 
Gates' request to engage in exchange negotiations with Cornwallis. Speaking for many 
revolutionary southerners, Governor Rutledge feared that "many, if not all of 'em [King's 
Mountain prisoners] will return to the Enemy" without redeeming a single American 
captive.37   
 The potential for a future exchange was not wholly out of the question.  Replacing 
Gates as the American commander in the southern theatre, Rhode Island Major General 
Nathanael Greene came south in the fall of 1780 armed with a secret weapon: 
congressional permission to arrange a large-scale exchange of prisoners.  The President 
of the Continental Congress, Samuel Huntington, instructed Greene, a former Quaker 
who had distinguished himself as one Washington's most able lieutenants, that he was 
"expressly authorized to negotiate from Time to Time an Exchange of Prisoners with the 
Commanding Officer of the British Army in that Department."  Nonetheless, as 
Washington would later clarify, Congress remained unwilling to exchange the 
Convention army.  As subjects of congressional retaliation, Burgoyne's defeated soldiers 
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were worth more in custody than Lincoln's army would ever be free.  If Greene wanted to 
redeem the Charleston prisoners, he would have to capture a British army of his own.38 
 This was a tall order given the meager force of Continental regulars Washington 
had been able to spare for the southern department, but the Rhode Islander had a plan to 
recoup the captive Continentals.  Rather than condescend to the numerous militia and 
partisan commanders in the south as Gates had done, Greene would aggressively employ 
them to interdict British supply and communication lines and cow the local loyalists: 
picking up prisoners along the way.  He was pleased by the work of Francis Marion and 
his fellow partisans, informing Marion that "we must endeavour to keep up a Partizan 
War."  Anticipating a flood of enemy captives, Greene ordered Captain Joseph Marbury 
to establish a depot in Salisbury, North Carolina "for the safe Custody of the Prisoners of 
War" he intended to capture.  The camp, enclosed by an eighteen foot stockade, would 
boast a secure jail for recalcitrant prisoners, a "Scaffold" that would allow the guards to 
"Watch or fire upon the Prisoners," and "Hutts [sic] within the Pickets for them [the 
prisoners] to cook and sleep in."  While innovative, Greene's plan was overly ambitious.  
Salisbury's civilian leaders had little interest in spending their finite resources on building 
a prison for a congressionally appointed general.  Marbury regretted that he did not have 
the tools or the "fatigue Men to use them" to build the prison.  Local craftsmen refused to 
work for nearly worthless Continental dollars, and his soldiers were "naked and sickly."  
The prison was a pipe dream.39   
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Papers of General Nathanael Greene (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1976-), 13 vols., 
6:451, hereafter cited as Greene Papers; Washington to Greene. November 8th, 1780. Passaic Falls, NJ. 
Greene Papers, 6:469.  
 39 Greene to Marion. December 4th, 1780. Charlotte, NC. Greene Papers, 6:519.  For more on 
Greene and his opinions on partisan warfare see John Buchanan, "We must endeavor to keep up a Partizan 
War," in Gregory D. Massey and Jim Piecuch, eds., General Nathanael Greene and the American 
 352 
 As it turned out, Greene would have little need for a prison depot because few 
American militiamen had any intention of taking prisoners in the first place. With 
Ferguson and his loyalist minions defeated and dispersed, militiamen like John 
Clemmons "wished to take vengeance on them who had cruelly used him."  Desiring 
revenge, American militia bands, sometimes with authorization from their respective 
states but often acting on their own recognizance, plundered, tortured, and murdered 
loyalists throughout the Carolinas at will. After having served at King's Mountain, John 
Waddill enlisted in Colonel Elijah Clarke's militia company for the purpose of 
suppressing loyalists.  Waddill remembered that during the winter of 1780-1781, he and 
his comrades "killed several Tories in the course of this expedition, and destroyed their 
property."  Explaining his conduct, Waddill argued that his fellow militiamen, "who had 
been driven from their homes and whose families and relations had been murdered by the 
Tories and their property destroyed, were so much exasperated, that they could not be 
restrained from retaliation."  Similarly enraged, George Parks, a militiaman who served 
under Colonel Benjamin Cleveland of King's Mountain fame, recalled surprising a party 
of loyalists and capturing seven of them.  Instead of turning them over to the Continental 
army or to civilian authorities for trial, Parks' "party of Minute Men hung two of them" 
before "whipping the rest nearly to death."  In this case, the militiamen were not acting 
out proportional retaliation for a specific loyalist misdeed but were engaging in what 
became known in the south as "Lynch's law."40 
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 Purportedly named for the Virginia militia colonel Charles Lynch, who along 
with Benjamin Cleveland had ordered the execution of a loyalist in the summer of 1780 
without any other due process than "the joint consent of near three hundred men," the 
"lynching" of loyalists became all too quotidian throughout the southern states until the 
end of the war.  Nathaniel Smith admitted that while employed in "keeping down Tories," 
he "administered Lynch's law" to his captives.  Men who appeared "suspicious" to Smith 
and his colleagues were summarily executed by hanging.  The North Carolina Senate 
officially approved the "lynching" of loyalists on July 27th, 1781, when it passed a bill 
"to indemnify all such persons as have put to death any of the subjects of this State, being 
known & notorious Enemies & Opponents of the Government thereof."  Provided the 
victim could be identified as a loyalist, the "lyncher" had nothing to fear from the state's 
revolutionary government.  Predictably, the license to kill terrified both ardent and 
lukewarm loyalists alike.  Nesbit Balfour warned Cornwallis that the Americans had 
"adopted the System of murdering every militia officer of ours as well as every man 
(although unarmed) who is known to be a loyalist.  The terror this mode of conduct has 
struck you will easily suppose."41 
 Though not required by law, occasionally militia companies would convene mock 
tribunals before passing summary judgment in order to give their actions an air of 
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legitimacy.  With the law on their side, the revolutionaries were keen to invoke it.  
Militiaman John Copeland remembered that having captured Colonel John Moore, "a 
Tory who had commanded the Tory troops at [the battle of] Ramsour's Mills," General 
Thomas Sumter presided over his "trial."  Despite the pretence to legality, the verdict was 
preordained.  "Moore was condemned & executed at a Cross roads not far from the place 
of his trial.”  In what is the most famous and most lurid account of such a "Court 
Marital," William Gibson related that a loyalist named "McPherson was condemned & 
shot" and another by the name of Campbell "was condemned to be spicketed, that is, he 
was placed with one foote [sic] upon a sharp pin drove in a bloc[k], and was turned 
round…until the pin run through his foot."  Gibson confessed that "he viewed the 
punishment of those two men with no little satisfaction."  With the sentence carried out, 
Gibson and his party released Campbell, no doubt to spread the word among local 
loyalists of the fate in store for those who defied the revolution.  Releasing loyalist 
prisoners after torture was relatively common. With neither the funds nor facilities to feed 
and house enemy prisoners, revolutionary militias regularly flogged, branded, beat, or 
otherwise physically disfigured southern loyalists and suspected loyalists.  More than just 
revenge, these punishments served the added purpose of spreading terror and visibly 
marking the offenders as enemies of the revolution. 42  
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 Spicketing and other forms of torture were not unique to the southern campaigns; 
similar acts of violence and vengeance were committed by militia forces operating in the 
north.  General Clinton received numerous petitions from northern loyalists and British 
prisoners who had suffered at the hands of revolutionary committees and militias.  The 
case of Henry Dyer, "a Loyal Refugee from Orange County in the Province of New 
York," is uncomfortably typical.  He pleaded with Clinton in July 1780 to arrange for his 
release from American captivity, which he had endured for over a year.  During his 
imprisonment, Dyer was "hanged up by the Rebels three different times to extort 
Confession or gratify their cruelty."  When not being tortured, he languished for "a long 
Time in Irons."  Regrettably for Dyer and his fellow sufferers, Continental authorities 
could do little to prevent such abuse.  In January 1781, a Continental army officer in New 
York reported that "a set of Lawless Ruffians who under the Sanction of being Friends to 
their Country disgrace the Name, by Conduct which the most savage Barbarians would 
condemn," were engaged in "beating, burning, [and] hanging" loyalists and neutral 
civilians "untill [sic] the miserable Wreches [sic] are almost Lifeless."  Because their 
actions were sanctioned by the laws of New York, "no Redress can be obtained [f]or the 
Inhabitants for the most part are excluded from the Privileges of civil Law."  General 
Heath admitted to Washington that he could do nothing to protect the loyalists because 
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"if any Officer interferes, he subjects himself to a civil prosecution."  The states had 
criminalized loyalism, making any suspected tory a suitable target for plunder and 
persecution.43 
 Retaliatory violence was not only the purview of revolutionary militias; 
Continental army units were also complicit in the murder and mistreatment of loyalist 
prisoners.  In December 1780, Colonel William Washington, the second cousin of the 
American commanding general, led his Third Continental Light Dragoons against 
Georgia loyalists under the command of Colonel Thomas Waters near Hammond's Store, 
South Caronia.  Seeing the approach of the American cavalry, the loyalists broke 
formation and ran for their lives.  They were no match for Washington's horsemen, who 
soon caught up with the fleeing men.  Within minutes, 150 loyalists lay dead, dying, or 
maimed on the field without a single American casualty.  Continual army Captain John 
Davidson explained the carnage. "Washington[']s men had in remembrance some of Mr. 
Tarltons [sic] former Acts and Acted accordingly."  The following day, Washington's 
troopers tried and hanged a loyalist prisoner they accused of aiding hostile Native 
American groups.44  
 Colonel Henry Lee's legion was even more brutal than Washington's men in its 
suppression of loyalist insurgents.  His dragoons, who sported green jackets and bearskin-
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tufted helmets in emulation of Tarleton's troopers, rivaled the British Legion in cruelty.  
In February 1781, Lee stumbled upon a party of 300-400 hundred loyalist militiamen 
commanded by Dr. John Pyle.  Seeing green uniforms and believing Lee's legionnaires to 
be friends, Pyle ordered his men to clear the road, allowing the horsemen to pass.  Once 
the disguised Americans were advantageously positioned parallel to their foes, the 
American dragoons attacked the unsuspecting loyalists.  One of Lee's officers, Joseph 
Graham, remembered that the dragoons "rushed on the Tories like lightening and cut 
away."  Instantly, the field was transformed into a charnel house.  As Lee later admitted, 
"the conflict was quickly decided and bloody on one side only.  Ninety of the royalists 
were killed and most of the survivors wounded."  The Americans suffered no casualties.  
Justifying the actions of his troops, who cut down unarmed men begging for their lives, 
Lee claimed that "our safety was not compatible with that of the supplicants," crying out 
for quarter.  Though he regretted the "most dreadful carnage" Lee's troopers had inflicted 
upon the loyalists, General Greene believed the violence would have "a very happy effect 
on those disaffected Persons, of which there are too many in this Country." Perhaps now 
the loyalists would abandon their futile resistance. He was mistaken.45  
 Southern loyalists were not simply innocent victims of revolutionary retribution; 
many were perpetrators of acts of violence every bit as cruel and devastating as their 
opponents.  Loyalist militia commanders David Fanning and Thomas Brown were 
notorious for their persecution of American prisoners.  In his postwar narrative, Fanning 
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confessed to turning over a captured American commissary of prisoners to "some of my 
men, who he had treated ill when prisoners; and they immediately hung him."  At other 
times, Fanning took personal responsibility for ordering the death of his prisoners.  
Having captured two American militiamen who he believed were implicated in the death 
of one of his officers, Fanning "hung them by way of retaliation, both on the limb of the 
same tree."  Perhaps the most hated loyalist leader of the war, Thomas Brown was 
reportedly responsible for hanging thirteen of his prisoners from a staircase "so that he 
might have the satisfaction of seeing the victims of his vengeance expire."  General 
Greene accused Brown of having hanged "About thirty persons" at Augusta.46 
 The loyalist militias of Fanning and Brown were relatively restrained, however, 
by comparison to the loosely-organized, and largely independent of British oversight, 
bands of loyalists that prowled the southern backcountry in search of victims.  In the 
aftermath of the Battle of Guilford Courthouse, Francis Cole was "taken by a party of 
tories who confined him about four weeks—on no food but bread & insufficiency of 
that."  He was finally released, but not before the loyalists had "branded him on both 
hands."  Regrettably, Cole's case was far from unique.  Horrified by the seemingly 
endless violence of the backcountry civil war, Nathanael Greene confided to Congress's 
president Samuel Huntington that he feared "the whole country is in danger of being laid 
waste by the Whigs and Torrys [sic], who pursue each other with as much relentless fury 
as beats of prey".  To his friend Alexander Hamilton, Greene was even less sanguine: 
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"the Whigs and Tories persecute each other, with little less than savage fury."  To 
Greene, this was not war, it was murder.47 
 Having experienced the violence of the war in the north first hand, Greene, much 
like Clinton, had hoped that the situation would be different in the south.  As he informed 
Lord Cornwallis in December 1780, Greene wished "to soften the rigors of war as much 
as possible."  Cornwallis, however, was still furious that the "men taken at King's 
Mountain were treated with an inhumanity scarcely credible."  The British general was 
determined to enact "severe retaliation for those unhappy men who were so rudely and 
unjustly put to death at Gilbert Town."  For his part, Greene was equally irate that 
Cornwallis had arrested and deported thirty-eight of "the Inhabitants of Charles-town to 
St Augustine contrary to the articles of capitulation."  The group included some of the 
most prominent civilians in Charleston, not least of whom was Edward Rutledge, a signer 
of the Declaration of Independence.  In Cornwallis's opinion, Rutledge and his 
compatriots were "the Ringleaders of Rebellion in this Province," and as such they had to 
be removed before they could "encourage the disaffected" to take up arms in opposition 
to British rule in the colony.  Following the execution of the nine King's Mountain 
prisoners, Cornwallis's subordinate in Charleston, Nesbit Balfour, sent another twenty-
two "of the violent and principal men, that were upon parole," to prison in Florida.  
Although Cornwallis assured Greene that "no man abhors Acts of Cruelty more than 
myself," the loyalists' "suffering" induced him "to retaliate on their inhuman Oppressors."  
In future, he would "observe the same Rule of Conduct, which you do in the treatment of 
the Officers & Soldiers of the Army, the Militia and the Inhabitants of the Country."  If 
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Greene really wanted to soften the rigors of war, then he could prove it by reining in the 
militias and protecting the loyalists from violence.48 
 Regrettably for prisoners on both sides, Greene was not the final arbiter of 
prisoner treatment in the southern theatre of the war.  The militia and partisan groups 
came and went as they pleased, rarely following his advice much less his orders.  
Moreover, the revolutionary governments of the Carolinas and Virginia still viewed 
loyalists as traitors and rebels against their country that deserved prosecution not 
protection.  Soon after taking command, Greene instructed a subordinate that enemy 
captives should be held for exchange as prisoners of war, not tried "for high treason," but 
he had little means of enforcing his orders beyond his immediate command.  
Compounding the problem, in early January Samuel Huntington informed him that 
Congress had determined that "Retaliation is become necessary" for the "cruel & 
unwarrantable Treatment" of American prisoners at Charleston and New York.  Congress 
expected Greene to treat British and loyalist prisoners every bit as severely as Cornwallis, 
Balfour, and Tarleton treated American captives.  Greene despaired.  In early January 
1781, there seemed to be little hope of ending the pernicious cycle of retaliation.49  
 The prisoners' luck appeared to change when Greene received word that 
Continental Brigadier General Daniel Morgan had routed Tarleton's legion at the battle of 
Cowpens on 17 January, capturing over five hundred of the enemy.  Determined to 
                                                
 48 Greene to Cornwallis. December 17th, 1780. Charlotte, NC. Greene Papers, 6:592; When 
Cornwallis addressed this letter he was unaware that Greene had taken over command of the American 
Army from Gates.  Cornwallis to Gates. December 1st, 1780. Cornwallis Papers, 3:405; Greene to 
Cornwallis. December 17th, 1780. Charlotte, NC. Greene Papers, 6:592; Cornwallis to Germain. 
September 19th, 1780. Waxhaw, SC. CSRNC, 15:282.  See also, Borick, Relive Us, 94; Balfour to 
Cornwallis. November 15th, 1780. Charleston, SC. Cornwallis Papers, 3:76; Cornwallis to Greene. 
December 27th, 1780. Wynnesborough, SC. Greene Papers, 7:6. 
 49 Greene to John Marshel. December 25th, 1780. Haley's Ferry, NC. Greene Papers, 6:612; 
Samuel Huntington to Greene. January 9th, 1781. Philadelphia, PA. Greene Papers, 7:86; JCC, 19:28. 
 361 
preserve the prisoners for exchange, Morgan restrained his men, overruling the demands 
of his militia to give the British "Tarleton's Quarter."  According to an American account 
published in the Pennsylvania Packet, Tarleton's soldiers did not expect generous 
treatment from their American captors.  "The Highlanders of the 71st British regiment, 
famous for their butcheries upon those whom the fortune of war had heretofore put within 
their power, plucked the feathers from their caps, and presenting them on their knees, 
cryed [sic], 'dear, good Americans, have mercy upon us!"  Understandably proud of his 
men, Morgan boasted that "Altho the Progress of this Corps was marked with Burnings 
and Devastations & altho' they have waged the most cruel Warfare, not a man was 
killed[,] wounded or even insulted after he surrendered."  While Morgan was not entirely 
correct—at least one British soldier had in fact been executed in retaliation for the 
wounding of an American prisoner—Greene was delighted.  Not only had Morgan bested 
Tarleton, but he had captured enough enemy soldiers to recoup the majority of the long-
suffering Continental army prisoners in Charleston.50 
 Keen to regain the veteran troops Tarleton had squandered at Cowpens, 
Cornwallis quickly contacted Greene with a proposal for a partial exchange of prisoners 
that would relieve the "many inconveniences and hardships" endured by prisoners on 
both sides.  In case the American general had forgotten the suffering of the American 
prisoners in Charleston, Cornwallis reminded him that "the close manner in which we are 
                                                
 50 Don Higginbotham, Daniel Morgan: Revolutionary Rifleman (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1961), 140; Pennsylvania Packet, February 17th, 1781; Morgan to Greene. January 19th, 
1781. Cane Creek, SC. Greene Papers, 7:153.  One of Morgan's militiamen Lawrence Everhart 
remembered that Major James Simons ordered a British prisoner "instantly Shot" as a "just Retaliation" for 
the wounding of one of his men. Simons to General William Washington. Charleston, SC. November 3rd, 
1803. Enclosed within the Pension Application of Lawrence Everhart. S25068. Transcribed by C. Leon 
Harris. http://revwarapps.org/s25068.pdf. Cornwallis claimed that other British prisoners had been abused.  
As he told Greene, "shedding their blood can admit of no apology. Cornwallis to Greene. March 4th, 1781. 
Cornwallis Papers, 4:76. For the best scholarly account of the Battle of Cowpens see Lawrence E. Babits, 
A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000). 
 362 
obliged to confine the prisoners in Charlestown to prevent their escape must prove fatal 
to many of them when the warm weather commences."  If the prisoners' impending 
deaths from disease aboard British prison ships were not motivation enough to accede to 
an exchange, Cornwallis threatened "to send them in the course of next month to His 
Majesty's islands in the West Indies" where they would be "permitted to serve in the 
British regiments employed there."  Greene could either exchange the men or never see 
them again.  Not one to be bullied, Greene informed Cornwallis that he would never 
agree "to make an exchange but upon just and equal terms."  Congress had deputized him 
with the authority to conduct an equitable exchange of prisoners, but it had also given 
him the power "to exercise the law of retaliation."  Greene could not ship British 
prisoners to the West Indies, but he could send them to Virginia to be indefinitely 
confined upon prison ships.  In the meantime, Greene ordered the Cowpens prisoners 
northward to the safety of the prisoner-of-war depot at Charlottesville.51  
 Despite their threats, both Cornwallis and Greene earnestly desired an equitable 
exchange, but many in the American camp were determined to delay it as long as 
possible.  Cornwallis's army was dwindling due to disease, exhaustion, and capture, and 
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Clinton was in no position to reinforce him.  Furthermore, after Ferguson's defeat, fewer 
and fewer loyalists had come forward to join his forces. As Horace Walpole quipped, 
"Lord Cornwallis has conquered his troops out of shoes and provisions, and himself out 
of troops."  Southern weather and southern militiamen were wearing Cornwallis down.  
To allow him to regain Tarleton's crack troops struck many in Congress as strategically 
unsound. North Carolina congressional delegate William Sharpe explained: "Was the 
exchange to take place immediately and the enemy at liberty to arm and send forth their 
liberated troops, it might be a fatal stroke to the State of North Carolina."  Although 
Sharpe was "opposed in this business of delaying the exchange by some of our 
neighbouring delegates, who has [sic] a passionate fondness for their friends" in 
captivity, he was convinced that the "critical situation to the southward" militated against 
the dictates of "humanity."  Frustrated by the continual delays to the exchange, 
"particularly the opposition made to it by the delegates of North Carolina," Cornwallis 
assured Greene that he did not have "the smallest wish to insist upon unequal conditions."  
Overriding the North Carolina delegation's objections, Greene appointed commissioners 
"with full powers to settle the terms of an exchange of prisoners."  The negotiations did 
not go smoothly.  Both sides continued to quibble, dissemble, and delay until an accord 
was finally reached in May 1781.52 
 Under the articles of exchange, the Continental prisoners in Charleston, who had 
been in custody for over a year, were finally to be exchanged for the British troops 
captured at Cowpens.  There were not many Americans left; disease, escape, and 
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enlistment in the British army had taken a toll on the captured garrison.  British records 
suggest that only 740 Continentals were released under the cartel in the summer of 1781: 
a far cry from the nearly four thousand Continental regulars captured during the course of 
the 1780-1781 campaign.  Few of these men, who were malnourished and disease-ridden 
after an arduous captivity, ever returned to their regiments.  Exchanged British prisoners, 
on the other hand, immediately rejoined Cornwallis's army.  In June 1781, Captain 
Robertson Duncanson of the 71st Regiment arranged the "Exchange of several Hundred 
British Prisoners for an equal Number of the Enemy then in our Possession."   Once the 
exchange was completed, Duncanson brought the men to join "the Army [und]er Lord 
Cornwallis.''  They could not arrive soon enough for the earl.  After his pyrrhic victory 
over Greene at Guilford Courthouse in March, Cornwallis's army was woefully 
undermanned.53 
 Unfortunately for Cornwallis and the remaining Cowpens prisoners, the exchange 
process broke down in late summer when Greene received word that the British had 
executed Colonel Isaac Hayne of South Carolina.  Having accepted British "protection" 
after the fall of Charleston, Hayne had promptly returned to the American cause, taking 
the field as a militia commander.  Commensurate with Cornwallis's earlier resolution to 
execute those Americans who had broken their paroles, Balfour decided to punish "all 
those, who shall be found in arms against his Majesty's Government, after having claimed 
and obtained their Sovereign's most gracious protection."  Following a perfunctory trial, 
Hayne went to his death on August 4, 1781.  Appalled by "the execution of Colonel 
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Haynes [sic]," Greene immediately halted all further exchanges.  He informed Cornwallis 
that he intended "to retaliate for every violence offered" to American citizens.  Conscious 
of the miserable conditions endured by his men in American custody, as well as those 
braved by the remaining American militia prisoners in Charleston, Cornwallis worried 
that Greene's "retaliation" would "prove fatal to many innocent individuals on both 
sides."  Greene would not be dissuaded. The remaining Cowpens prisoners would spend 
the rest of the war "Prisoners with the rebells [sic]."  Exasperated and out of troops, 
Cornwallis chose to march north in order to link up with British forces operating in 
Virginia.  Perhaps if Virginia could be subdued, he reasoned, American resistance in the 
Carolinas would finally falter.54   
 The violent civil war in the Carolina backcountry would continue without 
Cornwallis.  For two more bloody years, loyalists and revolutionaries persecuted one 
another without stop; each side seemingly keen to exceed the other in cruelty. Although 
he believed that "the Idea of exterminating the Tories is not less barbarous than 
impolitick," Greene was unable to restrain his mostly militia forces from "murder[ing] 
the defenceless [sic] people just on private peak [pique]."  According to one of Greene's 
officers, William Pierce, "scare a day passes but some poor deluded tory is put to death at 
his front door."  Viewing "such scenes of desolation, bloodshed and deliberate murder," 
Pierce regretted that "by copying the manners of the British," his countrymen had 
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"become perfectly savage."  Brutality did not belong to the revolutionaries alone; the 
British were equally incapable of curtailing their loyalist volunteers' violent excesses. 
One American officer described the war's pattern: "The British destroyed the Whigs, and 
the Whigs retaliated on the Tories, thus none escaped the devastation."  As had been the 
case in New York and Philadelphia after the British occupations of those cities, the cycle 
of retribution had escalated precipitously in the Carolinas.  Fiery rhetoric reinforced and 
amplified the gory reality in the minds of southerners on both sides, and they relentlessly 
retaliated for real and imagined enemy atrocities. One of Greene's officers aptly 
summarized the mood in both camps: "Our countrymen breathe nothing but revenge."  
Thenceforth, the war would be fought "with the greatest vigour and spite."  Loyalists and 
revolutionaries alike agreed that peace alone could end the bloodletting.55  
 
"Elated with victory, and reeking with revenge": The Capitulation of Yorktown 
and the Fate of Cornwallis's Army 
 
 In the summer of 1781, while Greene's partisans chased the remaining British 
troops in South Carolina from their backcountry posts, George Washington had an 
opportunity, for the first time in his long military career, to conduct a conventional 
European-style campaign.  The commander of France's expeditionary force in America, 
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General Jean Baptiste Donatien de Vimeur, Count de Rochambeau, informed Washington 
in June that a French fleet was on route to American waters.  Elated by the prospect of 
naval superiority over the enemy, Washington suggested that the combined Franco-
American force demonstrate against British-occupied New York.  Rochambeau, who 
knew that even with the addition of his French troops the allies were still outnumbered by 
Clinton's garrison, suggested that they use their forces where they could be most 
effective: in Virginia.  After leaving the Carolinas, Cornwallis had moved into Virginia to 
join forces with a larger British army commanded by the American traitor, and now 
brigadier general in the British army, Benedict Arnold.  With Arnold's troops, Cornwallis 
planned to conquer the state, but orders from Clinton obliged him to first establish a naval 
base on the Virginia coast.  Dutifully, Cornwallis fortified positions at Yorktown and 
Gloucester point on either side of the York river, there to await orders and reinforcements 
from Clinton.  To the British general's horror, it was a French fleet he spotted off the 
Virginia Capes in September.  Washington and Rochambeau's combined force of nearly 
nineteen thousand men arrived soon after.  Cornwallis was trapped.56   
 Proceeding in a textbook style that would have brought a smile to the face of 
Marshal Vauban, the siege of Yorktown was a spectacle of European military 
engineering.  Despite the heat and mosquito-born illnesses of early autumn in coastal 
Virginia, the Franco-American forces advanced steadily, digging saps and parallels to 
bring their guns within range of Cornwallis's fortifications.  Washington was in his 
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element: personally observing and directing the placement of his artillery.  On 9 October, 
the general had the honor, and no doubt the pleasure, of putting "the match to the first 
gun."  The entire American line erupted in flame and smoke.  The barrage was relentless.  
According to Continental army Surgeon James Thatcher, "the whole peninsula trembles 
under the incessant thunderings of our infernal machines."  Defiant to the end, the British 
troops endured the bombardment for eight more days before Cornwallis sent Washington 
word that he wished "to settle terms for the surrender of the posts of York and 
Gloucester."  Washington, animated by "an ardent desire to spare the further effusion of 
blood," acquiesced.  Lord Cornwallis's American campaigns were over.57  
 With his opponent's position totally surrounded and subject to cannonade by land 
and sea, Washington could have demanded Cornwallis's unconditional surrender; instead 
the American general promised Cornwallis that "the same honors will be granted to the 
surrendering army as were granted to the garrison of Charlestown."  The men would be 
prisoners of war, but they could expect "the benevolent treatment of prisoners which is 
invariably observed by the Americans."  Aware of the ordeal of the Convention army, 
this last promise must have been little comfort to the besieged Britons.  Nonetheless, 
Washington's terms were nothing to balk at: "the officers shall be indulged in retaining 
their side arms and the officers and soldiers may preserve their baggage and effects."  
More importantly for the common soldiers, they were to be "supplied with the same 
rations of provisions as are allotted to the soldiers in the service of America."  As soon as 
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convenient, the soldiers would march to internment "in Virginia, Maryland or 
Pennsylvania," while the bulk of the officers were "permitted to go on parole" to England 
or New York.  Cornwallis himself could take ship back to New York, there to be paroled 
to England, as soon as convenient.  Only a handful of staff officers and one junior officer 
for each fifty soldiers were required "to reside near their respective regiments, to visit 
them frequently and be witness of their treatment."  Although the garrison was not 
granted the full honors of war— they could not surrender with their flags flying—the 
American general did allow Cornwallis's dragoons to exit their entrenchments "with their 
swords drawn, [and] trumpets sounding."  These terms were as generous as the troops 
could hope for under the circumstances.  One of Cornwallis's Hessian soldiers, Stephen 
Popp, recorded the feelings of his comrades: "We were all glad and happy that this siege 
had finally come to an end and that it had turned out to be such a reasonable truce."58 
 At four o'clock in the afternoon on October 19, 1781, Yorktown's combined 
garrison of British and Hessian troops, encompassing roughly seven thousand men, 
marched out of their entrenchments to surrender to the Franco-American besiegers.  
Flanked on either side of the road by French and American soldiers, Cornwallis's army 
marched to an open field outside the siege lines and laid down their arms in defeat. No 
taunts or shouts of joy could be heard from the ranks of the victorious allies: a "universal 
silence and order prevailed."  To Captain Ewald, it was a "melancholy parade."  Surgeon 
Thatcher noted that "many of the soldiers manifested a sullen temper, throwing their arms 
on the pile with violence, as if determined to render them useless."  While the soldiers 
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surrendered their weapons, General Charles O'Hara, standing in for Cornwallis who was 
"pretending indisposition" according to Thatcher, offered the earl's sword to his fellow 
European officer, General Rochambeau.  Demurring in deference to his allies, 
Rochambeau motioned to Washington who in turn instructed O'Hara to give the sword to 
General Benjamin Lincoln.  By allowing Lincoln to accept the surrender, Washington 
symbolically wiped away the shame of Charleston.  The conquered had become the 
conqueror.59   
 Unlike the soldiers of Burgoyne's army who had capitulated to an American force 
composed largely of New England militiamen, Cornwallis's troops could take comfort in 
the knowledge that they were surrendering to fellow professionals.  The presence of the 
French army, and the strict accordance to European custom during the ritual of surrender, 
eased the defeated men's humiliation.  Captain Ewald observed that "after the troops were 
surrendered into captivity, every officer was greeted by the French generals and officers 
with the greatest courtesy…One scarcely knew whether he was among his friends or 
foes."  Similarly, British Captain Samuel Graham remembered that he received "much 
courtesy from the French" officers who offered him generous loans as well as hospitality.  
In the evening after the surrender, the French officers lavishly entertained their British 
and German counterparts, excluding their American allies.  Ewald thought "that the 
French officers preferred the company of the English, Anspach, and Hessian officers to 
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that of their own allies," who were clearly bothered by the camaraderie among the 
Europeans.60   
 The Americans were in no mood to fraternize with their erstwhile foes.  Ewald 
sensed anger and a desire for revenge from his American guards.  As the he phrased it, 
"the American officer, like his soldier, hates his foes more than we do."  The root of the 
animosity was clear.  The British had "practiced the most abominable 
enormities…spread[ing] terror and desolation throughout the Southern states," according 
to Thatcher. The French priest abbé Claude Robin feared for the British prisoners who 
"had to bear a great deal from the Americans, who seemed resolved to take ample 
vengeance for the robberies and murders that had been perpetrated in their habitations."  
Robin's concerns were well founded.  An American militia colonel who had been a 
prisoner of the British encouraged his comrades to vent their anger on the prisoners.  
"Boys, retaliate" he commanded.  "These are the very men that plundered our men, and 
used them so badly."  Washington's decision to separate the prisoners from his army 
prevented any widespread abuse, but the prisoners knew all too well that the Americans 
yearned to "steal or plunder or otherwise abuse us as is their usual practice."  The 
European-style siege and surrender ceremony belied the fact that this war was not a 
limited and restrained conflict anymore; it was a war of vengeance.61   
 When news of the victory reached Congress, the members' exuberance was 
quickly subsumed by concern over the generous terms Washington had granted 
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Cornwallis. Although the articles of capitulation were no more generous than those 
"allowed to our People at Charles Town," Washington had failed to account for the fact 
that the British had violated those terms repeatedly.  By negating the American militia 
prisoners' paroles and by executing Colonel Hayne, as well as numerous other American 
prisoners, the British had demonstrated once again that they could not be trusted.  Many 
in Congress believed that the time was ripe to exact retribution: placating their outraged 
constituents and demonstrating to the world that the United States was a force with which 
to be reckoned. When Congressman Elias Boudinot, a man who had seen British cruelty 
first hand while serving as commissary general of prisoners, received word of the 
capitulation, he feared the terms were "rather too favourable."  Reacting to the concern of 
his fellow members, Boudinot gathered a committee to investigate "the motives which 
led to the several Articles of the Capitulation."62  
 Conspicuously absent from Boudinot's committee, the delegates from South 
Carolina, whose state had suffered the most at the hands of Cornwallis's troops, were 
particularly infuriated.  In a letter to Aedanus Burke, Arthur Middleton fumed: "It is 
d[amne]d hard that rascals should be parol'd" when they "deserve[d] hanging."  Accusing 
Washington of having ignored the Renaissance political philosopher Niccolo 
Machiavelli's "Doctrine of retribution," Middleton urged Burke to "remember the 
Sufferings of our fellow men" and embrace "Retaliation."  For Middleton, retaliation 
"alone is the only magic rod which converts cruelty into mercy and effects wonders."  
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Unwilling to publically question the wisdom of Washington's decision so soon after a 
resounding victory, Boudinot's committee resolved to convey "the thanks of the United 
States in Congress assembled" to generals Washington and Rochambeau "for the wisdom 
and prudence manifested in the capitulation."  Less publically, many members continued 
to "think no treatment could have been too severe for the Garrison."  In the opinion of 
South Carolina delegate John Mathews, Cornwallis deserved to have his "neck stretched, 
as some small sacrifice to the manes of the numbers whose necks he has stretched."63 
 The revolutionary press agreed with the irate congressmen.  Even before his 
capture, newspapers across the continent had launched a concerted attack on Cornwallis's 
character and reputation.  The Pennsylvania Packet named him "the British Cerberus:" a 
reference to the three-headed hound that guarded the gates of the underworld in Greek 
mythology.  His "bloody-mindedness" had induced the British general to commit crimes 
so "heinous, that old Beelzebub himself would blush."  The author anticipated with glee 
"the moment when terrible vengeance from heaven may come hurling down upon" him.  
A columnist for the Impendent Chronicle thought all Americans should be "astonished at 
the generous terms granted to Cornwallis and his army" in light of "the innumerable acts 
of barbarity, with which the Britons have stained themselves and the nation in the 
American war."  In the opinion of the Freeman's Journal, Washington had done nothing 
less than grant "mild terms to Satan's firstborn son." Allowing Cornwallis to return to 
England on parole while American prisoners daily died in British prison hulks and jails 
was a "virtue too sublime" under the circumstances.  One budding poet captured his 
countryman's quest for revenge best in a pithy verse: "For Hayne, for Hayne! No death 
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but thine atones; For thee, Cornwallis, how the gallows groans!"  To wrathful 
revolutionaries everywhere, Yorktown looked like the ideal moment to enact "ample 
retaliation."64   
 Despite the generosity of the articles of capitulation, retaliation was exactly what 
the British prisoners feared, and many seized the first opportunity to escape their would-
be tormentors.  Having already escaped from the Convention army, Sergeant Roger Lamb 
knew well the rigors of an American internment camp before his recapture at Yorktown. 
Rather than starve in another American prison camp, Lamb "determined to attempt [his] 
escape to New York."  Fortunately for the British sergeant, confusion reigned in the 
aftermath of the siege, creating an ideal opportunity to run.  One American officer 
colorfully described the "Scene of Confusion" in the days following the surrender: 
"British officers, and French Sailors, Soldiers, Marines, fatiguemen, boatmen, British 
Merchants, American Speculators, Jews & Infidels.—Negroes, British Misses, Soldiers 
trolls with a song etc. So be-mixed, be-Hurried, be-knave’d, be-frighted & be-Devil’d, 
that nothing Short of the Pen or the Pencil of Hogarth, could Possibly do them Justice to 
Delineate or Describe.”  Capitalizing on his captors' disorganization, Lamb managed to 
"elude the French and American sentinels" and make good his escape, for the time 
being.65   
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 Those less daring prisoners prepared themselves to march into American 
captivity.  The articles of capitulation stipulated that the prisoners be confined in the 
interior parts of Virginia, Maryland, or Pennsylvania, but the last was already burdened 
with the prisoners of the Convention army.  Lancaster alone had over fourteen hundred 
prisoners, "exclusive of women & children", to feed and house.  Pleading with the 
Executive Council of Pennsylvania to remove the prisoners, a group of "burgesses and 
inhabitants" of the town claimed that the county was "exceedingly drained of Provisions 
for some years past" by all of the prisoners.  Furthermore, "a most contagious Disorder 
[had] raged for some time" which "proved fatal to very many" of the prisoners.  
Pennsylvania simply could not take any more enemy captives.  Cognizant of 
Pennsylvania's prisoner problems, Washington gave orders for the Yorktown prisoners to 
be divided into two sections: half would go to Winchester, Virginia and the other half to 
Fort Frederick in Maryland.66   
 Setting out for their respective places of confinement on the morning of October 
21st, the prisoners were escorted by members of the Virginia militia, who were none too 
thrilled about their assignment.  In theory, Virginia's governor, Thomas Nelson, was 
responsible for providing the prisoners with provisions along their route, but few were to 
be had, so the governor empowered Virginia militia general Robert Lawson to impress 
supplies, as a military necessity, from the local inhabitants if the need arose.  Apparently, 
Lawson's definition of necessity differed from that of the prisoners.  Private Johann 
Conrad Döhla of the Bayreuth regiment complained of having "very little food to divide 
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and eat." The rations he did receive were insufficient for men expected to march all day 
and camp in the open, exposed to the elements.  Those prisoners with hard currency 
could supplement their diets by patronizing the merchants and sutlers that flocked to the 
prisoners to sell their goods, but most of the prisoners had to subsist on "Indian bread," 
which Döhla found "very unfamiliar."  Thankfully, the Virginia militia guards, who 
"were all from the upper parts of the state, called backswoodsmen," turned a blind eye to 
the prisoners' creative procurement of provisions from the tidewater plantations along 
their line of march.  A Scottish officer, Captain Samuel Graham, remembered that the 
guards "did not scruple also to let us make free with a turnip field."  Discipline was lax 
and desertion rampant.67 
 For men already exhausted by a taxing summer campaign and an arduous siege, 
the march into the Virginia backcountry was grueling.  Their earlier trials had not 
prepared them for the "miserable marching" on a diet of "poor provisions."  Hessian 
prisoner Stephan Popp reported marching "18 to 20" miles a day, often in the rain.  
Compounding their predicament, the weather turned colder as the prisoners approached 
the Shenandoah River in early November.  Fording the river in their only dry set of 
clothing, the soldiers thought they "would freeze to death" when they immerged dripping 
and shivering on the opposite bank.  In Döhla's opinion, constant marching in cold wet 
clothes "caused all sorts of sickness" amongst the prisoners.   Exhaustion and hunger 
slowed the pace of the prisoners' progress, and the sick and injured began to lag behind.  
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Frustrated, the guards fired on a party of British stragglers, "which resulted in one 
English prisoner being killed and three men wounded."  As if their problems were not 
enough, the prisoners had to withstand constant harassment from angry onlookers.  
Hessian private Berthold Koch reported that "during the entire march, no matter where 
we went, men, women, and children…young and old, picked up stones and threw them at 
us as we marched along." In Koch's opinion, the Virginians sought vengeance against 
"the rascals, who killed [their] husbands, [and] fathers!"  In the aftermath of Yorktown, 
the loyalist Royal Gazette opined that revolutionary Americans were "a high spirited and 
vengeful populace, elated with victory, and reeking with revenge."68 
 To the prisoners' dismay and indignation, when the first contingent reached 
Winchester on 5 November, they discovered the barracks in complete disarray.  Upon 
their arrival, Stephan Popp and his comrades "were amazed when we saw" the "old 
tumbledown barracks."  Lieutenant Johann Prechtel from Anspach Bayreuth was shocked 
that the buildings "were truly very poorly put together" and "not half adequate for 
quartering the troops."  Döhla described the structures as "numerous wretched huts built 
of wood and clay, most of which have no roofs or poor roofs, no cots, only poor 
fireplaces."  Snow, rain, and biting wind coursed through the barrack's halls. Each room 
was crowded with between "twenty or thirty men" who "did not have room enough to 
stand.  "Locked in like dogs," the prisoners had little choice but to make due with 
quarters that Döhla called "worse than the pig stalls and doghouses are in Germany."69   
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 Despite orders from Governor Thomas Nelson for the purpose, the barracks at 
Winchester had not been adequately repaired or prepared for the prisoners.  The local 
commissary of prisoners, Colonel Joseph Holmes, informed the governor in late October 
that the barracks could hold only eight hundred men.  Furthermore, Holmes could not 
persuade the town's craftsmen to build any other structures because the governor had still 
not paid them for building the barracks last year.  If the prisoners wanted shelter, they 
would have to build it themselves Holmes regretted.  Resigned, the prisoners tried to 
repair their cells as best they could, but tools and materials were in short supply.  No one 
in town would so much as spare a hammer to help the prisoners build huts.  Under the 
circumstances, Commissary Holmes had no alternative but to order over a thousand 
prisoners to make camp in the open without tents. It was not long before snow blanketed 
the ground, covering the men as they slept.  British private John Robert Shaw recalled 
that at Winchester "we suffered much: our houses had no covering to shelter us from the 
inclemency of the weather; and we were exposed to cold, hunger and want of clothing; 
and all manner of ill treatment, insult and abuse."70 
 The paucity of provisions in Winchester was even more dispiriting to the 
prisoners than their shoddy quarters.  Because local farmers refused to trade their produce 
for promises of future remuneration, Commissary Holmes had not been able to establish a 
sufficient store of food at the barracks. The demoralized and downtrodden men pleaded 
with their American captors for foodstuffs that simply did not exist. Rations "were meted 
out to us very sparingly and of poor quality," Döhla griped.  "We received absolutely no 
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bread except for an occasional uncooked Indian bread."  Merchants in town were more 
than pleased to accept the prisoners' hard currency for goods at drastically inflated prices, 
but all shunned Congress's paper money.  Those prisoners without solid coin went 
hungry.  As Stephan Popp put it, "Hunger and cold we had daily in abundance."71   
 Although the prisoners themselves were unaware, their hunger pangs were the 
byproduct of a fundamental disagreement between Congress and the government of 
Virginia.  Years of printing unbacked currency had resulted in extensive inflation, and 
despite significant loans from France and other allied European powers, Congress was 
broke.  Completely incapable of providing for the prisoners' needs, Congress looked to 
the government of Virginia to take responsibility for the prisoners.  Having already 
supplied the Convention troops for years, Virginia's governor and Board of War were in 
no mood to be cooperative.  Determined to protect the state's financial future, the 
commissioner of Virginia's Board of War, William Davies, told Commissary Holmes that 
"it is the particular duty of Major Forsyth the continental commissary of provisions to 
make the necessary purchases and procure the proper supplies for the prisoners at 
Winchester."  Davies declared that he would "always be much averse to adopt any step 
that will have a tendency to throw the burthun [sic] of supplying these men on Virginia"  
In a letter to Congress's quarter master general, Timothey Pickering, Virginia Major 
Richard Claiborne was even more explicit: the "government [of Virginia] decline 
advancing any thing farther for the Continent."  The prisoners' could expect little help 
from the state of Virginia.72 
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 Virginia's intransigence meant the prisoners' had to survive on next to nothing.  
Men sold anything they had, including the coats off their backs, to local farmers in 
exchange for food.  They had little other option. As Döhla described on December 7, "the 
issue of rations is much behind schedule and we already were twenty days behind in our 
issue of flour, which was a bad situation."  Exposure and malnutrition weakend the 
prisoners' immune systems, and predictably disease flourished.  Lieutenant Prechtel noted 
the presence "of consumption in the barracks," which claimed the life of one of his 
grenadiers.  Döhla reported that "the wife of musketeer [Georg] Meichel" and "Private 
[Johann Georg] Korn had also perished.  Commissary Holmes knew that something had 
to be done or few of the prisoners would be left to see the spring.73 
 Frustrated by the apparent lack of preparation on the part of the American 
commissaries, and by the townspeople's indifference to their soldiers' misery, British 
officers began to take matters into their own hands.  Captain Graham, the senior British 
officer at the barracks, fired off a barrage of letters to anyone he thought might help his 
men.  One such letter arrived at the nearby home of Daniel Morgan: the victor of 
Cowpens.  Although the American general had resigned his commission, Graham hoped 
he would use his influence with Washington and Congress to relieve "the distresses of the 
Soldiers."  In the meantime, Graham appealed to Holmes for permission to quarter his 
men in one of the town's five churches.  Given the rapidly accumulating snow, the 
American commissary saw no reason to deny Graham's request.  "Accordingly, 500 men 
were brought in [to the church], and the huts thus emptied were distributed among the 
other prisoners."  For the first time since they left their entrenchments at Yorktown, the 
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prisoners all had shelter, dilapidated and cramped though it was.74    When Morgan 
learned of Graham's intentions, he was furious at the British officer's temerity.  To 
quarter Cornwallis's soldiers in a house of God was not only sacrilegious it was 
disrespectful to the memories of those Americans who had perished at their hands.  In a 
stern letter of reproach, Morgan told Graham that "Col. Holmes had no Right to bring 
them to town, thay [sic] were ordered to the Barrack[s], and thare [sic] thay ought to have 
continued."  Citing his own experience as a prisoner of the British during the Canadian 
campaign, Morgan claimed "I have been a prisoner as well as thay [sic], and was kept in 
close goale [sic] five month and twelve days; six and thirty officers and there [sic] servts 
in one room, so that when we lay down upon our straw we covered the whole floore 
[sic]."  Considering the British treatment of American prisoners, Morgan thought 
Graham's men had "nothing to grumble at."  Confident that his actions would meet with 
Washington's "approbation," Morgan ordered all of the prisoners back to the barracks.  
All Graham could do was continue his letter writing campaign, which to his dismay "had 
but little effect."  According to one American officer, by Christmas 1781, "The prisoners 
at Winchester [were] in a calamitous situation."75 
 Initially, Maryland seemed far more receptive to the second contingent of 
Yorktown prisoners than Virginia had been to the first.  Unlike the government of 
Virginia that had shirked its responsibility to the prisoners, the State Council of Maryland 
appointed merchant George Murdock as a commissary with instructions to purchase "a 
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sufficient Quantity of Supplies" for "at least 2000" men.  The council was less 
forthcoming with instructions for where to house the prisoners.  In his orders to the 
Continental Commissary General of prisoners, Abraham Skinner, Washington had 
suggested that the prisoners be confined at Fort Frederick, a Seven Years' War era stone 
fortification in western Maryland that had been used to confine prisoners from the 
Convention army.  The fort, however, was in ruins.  Skinner apprised Washington that 
"the barracks at Fort Frederick was [sic] insufficient for the reception of the prisoners—
indeed they are almost totally destroyed and cannot be repaired."  In Skinner's 
professional opinion as head commissary, the best option was to confine the prisoners in 
the stone barracks within the town of Frederick itself. In order to prepare the barracks for 
the prisoners, Skinner ordered a stockade erected around the buildings and a supply of 
"Beef & flour for about Six Weeks" put into storage.  With the prisoners on their way, the 
Council soon realized that the barracks alone would be "insufficient to hold the 
Prisoners," so they authorized Colonel Philip Thomas to appropriate "the Poor's House, 
Logged Gaol and every other empty House proper for Barracks."  If these buildings were 
still not sufficient to comfortably house the prisoners, Thomas had permission to "take 
Possession of any such Buildings which you may deem necessary."76   
 Thomas and Murdock's orders were far more detailed than those Holmes had 
received in Winchester, but they were incapable of fully executing the Council's 
commands.  The townspeople, who had lived amongst British prisoners since December 
1777, were overwhelmed by the additional captives.  The Convention troops had already 
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divested the area of cattle and grain and damaged most of the public buildings in 
Frederick. According to one Frederick resident, the Convention prisoners had "been 
pilfering & robbing for several miles around the town."  Another inhabitant described the 
neighbored as "continually plundered, owing as it is thought in great measure to the 
prisoners & Guards being so badly supplied with provisions."  Compounding the 
problem, the town had provided numerous soldiers to serve in Greene's southern army, 
many of whom had fallen in action with Cornwallis' troops.  The spirit of resentment ran 
high in Frederick.  Sergeant Lamb, who had been recaptured during his escape attempt 
after the siege and brought to Frederick, recalled being "used in the most cruel manner" 
by his guards who were constantly "rejoicing in my distress."  Explaining the "reason of 
the bad usage" he received, Lamb claimed that "this town had suffered much by the 
deaths of several young men, who had been killed during the war," which was the 
"source of general inveteracy to all British prisoners."  Murdock and Thomas could count 
on little assistance in quartering and feeding the prisoners from the residents of Frederick 
who yearned for vengeance and restitution.77   
  Just as at Winchester, when the first Yorktown prisoners arrived at Frederick on 
4 November, they were appalled by their accommodations and provisions.  According to 
Lamb, "our place of confinement was a most deplorable situation.  Forty or fifty British 
soldiers crowded together in a small room."  The men "huddled" together for warmth "as 
the winter was remarkably cold."  The contingent's commander, Captain Eyre Coote, was 
deeply concerned for his men's health.  He informed his superiors in New York that 
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"when the whole arrive, our numbers here will amount to near Two Thousand men, & 
very sickly."  The prisoners "suffer[ed] extremely for want of Blankets."  Worse yet, 
Coote feared that his troops would not be "supplyed [sic] with Provisions in the Winter, 
as there is no magazine here."  The men had already gone "two or three days without 
meat."  Officials in Maryland had done their best to acquire provisions, but there were 
simply none to be had.  Commissary Thomas Price had purchased cattle from 
neighboring Virginia, but the Virginians, looking "to rid that State of the Trouble of 
maintaining them through the Winter," had sent him a herd that was "intirely [sic] unfit 
for Slaughter."  At a loss for what to do, the Maryland Council was forced to admit that 
there were "many Difficulties and Impediments in providing for the British 
Prisoners…we are totally unprepared for their Reception."78   
 Frigid and starving, the prisoners soon became restive.  When American guards 
ordered a party of British prisoners to cut wood for their fires, the prisoners refused.  
Unwilling to brook revolt, the guards leveled their bayonets and charged at the prisoners.  
The guard's commander, Captain Montjoy Bayley, explained to Coote that his men had 
"been under the disagreeable necessity of making use of Violents [sic] to keep the 
prisoners in order."  Coote did not see it that way.  As he protested to Commissary 
Skinner, "there has been three soldiers wounded by the Militia with Bayonets, and I am 
induced to believe those men did not deserve that Treatment."  Predictably, Coote's 
protest availed him nothing.  Maryland's Commissary of Prisoners, Colonel Moses 
Rawlings, informed him that not only would the guards not be prosecuted, but that the 
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prisoners should expect equally harsh treatment in the future.  Rawlings was resolute in 
his determination "to punish [the prisoners] Agreeable to Offences."  American troops 
could and would use violence to control the restless captives.  Rawlings knew that 
violence alone would not solve his problem. The prisoners' situation was unsustainable.  
If fresh provisions did not arrive soon, he would have a full-scale rebellion on his 
hands.79 
 While the prisoners struggled to survive the increasingly deplorable conditions of 
their confinement, the governments of Virginia and Maryland took steps to rid 
themselves of the captives.  In mid-December, the Council of Maryland sent word to 
Congress's superintendent of finance, Robert Morris, "that from the exhausted Situation 
of this State, it is not within the Compass of our Abilities to subsist the Prisoners 
quartered upon us, without your Assistance."  If Congress could not produce £20,000 in 
hard currency, the prisoners would have to be moved.  The Virginia House of Delegates 
was even more determined to see the prisoners leave.  The House resolved "that 
provisions ought not to be impressed for the support of the British prisoners after the first 
day of January."  Without impressments, the prisoners could not possibly be fed, even at 
a bare subsistence level.  The Virginia House further resolved to inform Congress "of the 
inability of this country in the present exhausted state of its treasury to furnish" the 
prisoners at all.  The sooner the prisoners departed the better.80   
                                                
 79 Captain Bayley to Coote. December 1st, 1781. Frederick Town, MD. Coote Papers, Clements 
Library; Coote to Abraham Skinner. December 2nd, 1781. Frederick, MD. Coote Papers, Clements Library; 
Rawlings told Washington that he "inform'd the Officers this morning that unless their men behav'd better 
than they have done hitherto, that we should Continue to punish them Agreeable to Offences." Rawlings to 
Washington. December 2nd, 1781. Fredrick Town, MD. Founders Online. 
 80 Council of Maryland to Robert Morris. December 14th, 1781. Archives of Maryland, 48:24; 
Resolves of the House Of Delegates of the Commonwealth of Virginia. November 29th, 1781. PCC, Item 
75, p. 351. 
 386 
 Just as had been the case with the Convention army, congressional authorities 
settled on relocation.  Morris, acting on behalf of Congress, responded to Virginia's 
ultimatum by proposing to transport the prisoners "from Winchester to Frederick [Md.]."  
Congress followed up on Morris' suggestion by resolving to send half of the Yorktown 
prisoners to Frederick and half to Lancaster and York in Pennsylvania where they would 
be confined alongside the Convention prisoners.  Once settled in these locations, the 
office of the Secretary at War, which had been established by Congress in February 1781, 
would take responsibility for their maintenance.  In order to placate the Council of 
Maryland, Secretary at War Benjamin Lincoln promised that only the German prisoners, 
who were deemed by all concerned to be less of a security risk than their British 
comrades, would be housed in Maryland.  "Convinced that a strict hand will be necessary 
over the British," Lincoln ordered the British prisoners to be "closely confined under 
Continental Guards" at Lancaster.  The move was slated to take place in January, as soon 
as adequate wagons and guards could be assembled.81  
 The prospect of a second winter march so soon after their arrival in Winchester 
greatly distressed the prisoners in Virginia.  Commissary Holmes had finally succeeded 
in securing shelter for the remaining prisoners, and he regretted "the hardship & 
difficulty" they would "encounter on the March" due to the "extreme coldness of the 
season."  The men were "almost as naked as the hour they were born, & not an ounce of 
animal food" was to be had for them.  Without adequate provisions and clothing, how 
could they be expected to make another winter march?  As he confessed to Colonel 
                                                
 81 Instruction to Virginia Delegates, 29 November 1781. n.1. Founders Online; JCC, 21:1164.  For 
background on the formation of the office of Secretary at War see Lucille E. Horgan, Forged in War: The 
Continental Congress and the Origin of Military Supply (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002) 44-8; 
Benjamin Lincoln to the County Lieutenant of Frederick, VA. December 12th, 1781. CVSP, 2:653; 
Washington to Moses Rawlings. December 12th, 1781. Philadelphia, PA. Founders Online. 
 387 
James Wood, "it seems to shock the feelings of humanity to drive out of a warm 
habitation a poor creature stark naked in such a season.”  Holmes' appeal on humanitarian 
grounds had little traction with Virginia's governor, who could not wait to see the 
prisoners depart.  Consequently, on January 27th, 1782, the prisoners marched out of 
Winchester amid the worst snow storm they had yet encountered.  Lieutenant Prechtel 
reported that during the march, "three English private soldiers froze to death" because 
they had "to camp in the woods on the snow."  Stephan Popp left this vivid account of the 
agonizing march to Frederick: 
The first day we made a march of 12 miles, and then camped out in the open 
snow.  We did make large fires, but still could not keep warm, because of the 
great cold.  The snow was up to our knees where we had to remain over night.  
The sharp wind continued all night without letup, so that we believed we would 
all freeze.  Besides, we were poorly clothed…many had sold their uniforms and 
everything else out of poverty, just to stave off hunger…many had wrapped their 
feet in plain rags.  But they had to march along too, so it wasn't long before their 
feet were exposed and were completely frozen.82 
 
 
 The British prisoners, despised by the militia guards who had been habituated to 
think of all British soldiers as barbarians, had to contend with constant abuse as well as 
nature's trials during the march.  According to Private Shaw, "the cruelty of this new 
guard exceeded anything we had yet seen; their conduct was indeed shameful and 
altogether incompatible with the profession of either soldiers or christians [sic]; they 
drove us like so many bullocks to the slaughter."  He claimed that the captain of the 
guard "broke his broad sword by cutting and slashing the prisoners, who were too much 
weekend by hunger and former ill treatment to keep up in the march."  Shaw and his 
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comrades' only consolation was the hope that Pennsylvania would bring better rations, 
superior quarters, and speedy release "from such cruel bondage."83   
 Arrived at their new prison camps in early February 1782, both the German and 
British prisoners were profoundly distressed to discover that the conditions of their 
confinement were not much improved.  Stephan Popp observed that "as far as our 
quarters were concerned they were all much in ruins."  He and thirty-nine of his fellows 
were "too thickly quartered" in the barracks; they were "always bumping [one] another." 
Private Koch's entire company shared one room in the "poorhouse" that "was so small 
that no one could lie down."  All were covered with "vermin" that were "so numerous we 
could hardly bear it."  Döhla remembered that "frequent epidemics occurred, and bugs 
and lice in great numbers appeared in our tattered clothing."  Things were much the same 
at Lancaster and York where "the soldiers of lord Cornwallis's army were closely 
confined in their pen," according to Lamb.  Captain Graham described the barracks at 
Lancaster as "surrounded by a high stockade, and strictly guarded."  Years after the war, 
Sergeant Lamb sketched a depiction of his "Pen," emphasizing the makeshift and 
cramped character of the prison (Fig.4).  While the German prisoners in Lancaster were 
eventually allowed to hire their labor to local farmers, and thus escape the cramped 
barracks, the British prisoners were closely confined and forbidden to leave the stockade 
for any purpose.  In a note scribbled on the drawing, Lamb summarized the seething 
resentment of his fellow prisoners: "Lord Cornwallis' army was shut up here like a toad in 
a hole and as full of venom."  The prisoners' sole remaining hope was that Congress 
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would agree to exchange them for the American captives in New York.  They would be 
disappointed once again.84 
(Fig. 4) 
Scrapbook compiled by Roger Lamb, Circa 1800, 
(British National Army Museum, Accession Number 2010-11-16) 
 
 
 Soon after he received word of the terms of capitulation at Yorktown, Clinton 
reached out to Washington "to treat for the Exchange" of Cornwallis and his army.  
Although the two generals had never before been able to reach an agreement on a general 
cartel, Clinton was confident that the time was ripe for a large scale exchange.  Many of 
the American senior officers from Charleston remained un-exchanged, and Washington 
had earlier expressed concern for the captive American sailors in New York.  Clinton was 
particularly anxious to exchange Cornwallis, both to prevent the earl from being recalled 
from his parole at the capricious whim of Congress and to forestall any claim that he was 
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inattentive to Cornwallis's case because of personal enmity. Cornwallis had informed 
Clinton that Washington was willing to exchange him for the former president of the 
Continental Congress, and principal author of the nullification of the Convention of 
Saratoga, Henry Laurens.  En route to France to serve in a diplomatic capacity, Laurens 
had been captured in September 1780 by the Royal navy.  Instead of treating him as a 
prisoner of war, British authorities locked the South Carolinian in the Tower of London 
on charges of treason.  Exchanging Laurens for Cornwallis, though technically 
unorthodox since the American did not hold military rank, was not without precedent.  
Clinton was happy to acquiesce to the swap, but he was also willing to exchange 
Cornwallis by composition: that is to trade several American officers of lesser rank for 
the British general.  Washington responded with assurances of his intention to appoint 
commissioners who were "fully authorized to treat [for] the Exchange of Lord Cornwallis 
and the Honble [sic] Mr Laurens," but he could give no "assurance His Lordship should 
be exchanged for Mr Laurens" because the matter rested with Congress, and Congress 
had other plans.85 
 Just has they had opposed the generous terms of the capitulation of Yorktown, so 
too did the South Carolina congressional delegates object to exchanging Cornwallis on 
any terms whatsoever.  In a series of notes he made in preparation for a speech before 
Congress, Arthur Middleton enumerated the many disadvantages he saw to liberating the 
British general.  Some of his reasons had to do with Cornwallis's military acumen and 
Middleton's concern that he would return to America determined "to retrieve lost Honor," 
but the South Carolinian's principal objection centered on the manner in which 
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Cornwallis had waged the war in the south.  To Middleton, Cornwallis was "a Barbarian. 
An Infringer [of] Capitulations, sacred."  Releasing Cornwallis would deny the people of 
South Carolina their longed-for vengeance.  He knew his constituents; he knew their 
anger, and their thirst for revenge. He knew that it would "affect the people [of the] South 
to see a Beast let Loose."  In Middleton's estimation, Cornwallis's "nonexchange [was 
the] only mode of retaliating for his misdeeds and corrects the mild but impolitic 
Capitulation of York Town."86   
 Middleton was not alone in his determination to prevent the earl's release.  On 
February 18, 1782, Congress passed a secret resolve "prohibiting the exchange of Lieut[t] 
General Lord Cornwallis."  Washington was puzzled by Congress's decision.  He knew 
that the British would never agree to a cartel that specifically excluded Cornwallis.  In a 
letter of protest to Congress's president, John Hanson, Washington confessed feeling "so 
exceedingly embarrassed by the operation of the Secret Resolve." To detain Cornwallis 
when he could so easily be exchanged would seem like "a conduct so apparently strange" 
to the American prisoners who expected imminent release.  The American general 
believed that the resolve would "operate against the public interest" in the long run.87 
 Confident of failure, Washington nonetheless proceeded with exchange 
negotiations.  The general instructed Commissary Skinner that when meeting with the 
British commissary, he would have "to wave the exchange of Lord Cornwallis for the 
present… in as delicate a manner as possible."  Predictably, Skinner's efforts were of 
little avail.  He apologized to Washington that British Commissary Joshua Loring 
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"refuse[d] to Exchange the whole of our Officers without reserving a certain Number of 
them, equal to the Value of His Lordship."  Clinton still hoped to regain Cornwallis, now 
on parole in England, by trading him for a composition of several junior American 
officers. Unsure of how to proceed, Washington pleaded with Congress to reverse its 
decision on the earl.  As he later explained to John Laurens, whose father still occupied a 
cell in the Tower of London, "I am sorry to inform you, that upon my arrival at 
Philadelphia, and for a long time after I had been there, I experienced the greatest 
disinclination in Congress to the exchange of Lord Cornwallis; upon any terms."  For 
Congress, preventing Cornwallis's exchange was a symbolic gesture of retaliation for the 
earl's conduct of the war in the south.88 
 Mindful of his position as Congress's subordinate, but deeply concerned for the 
welfare of his officers in British hands, Washington continued to press Congress for an 
exchange that encompassed the earl.  Finally, after a long debate in which Middleton 
argued that Cornwallis "ought not to be exchanged by composition at this time, not from 
any apprehensions of his influence or superior abilities; but because they look upon him 
not in the light of a British general, but a barbarian," Congress relented, but not before 
tying his release to several perquisites to which the British were unlikely to agree.  
Washington could exchange Cornwallis by composition only if the British first released 
Henry Laurens on parole and discharged their debt for the subsistence of the Convention 
army.  If Clinton would not agree to these terms, Congress would cut the British 
prisoners' rations and compel them "to work for their livelihood."  The latter proviso was 
a direct violation of the terms of the capitulation of Yorktown, which guaranteed the 
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British prisoners the same rate of rations as the Continental army.  When Washington's 
commissioners, Gouverneur Morris and Henry Knox, met with their British counterparts 
at Elizabethtown, NJ in late March, 1782, they did so with their hands tied.  Washington 
and his commissioners were well aware that Clinton would never agree to pay the 
£200,000 Congress demanded for the subsistence of men he believed illicitly detained. 
Negotiations continued for weeks but amounted to naught.  Just as in the case of the 
Convention troops, the men of Cornwallis's army would never be exchanged.89 
 While the commissioners fruitlessly negotiated at Elizabethtown, a "regrettable 
incident," known to historians as "the Asgill Affair," roused the indignation of many 
revolutionary Americans to a fever pitch.  On April 12, 1782, a party of armed loyalists 
under the command of Captain Richard Lippincott executed American Captain Joshua 
Huddy near Sandy Hook, New Jersey.  Acting under directions from the newly formed 
Board of Associated Loyalists in New York, Lippincott had Huddy hanged as an act of 
retaliation for the execution of loyalist Philip White in late March.  Reportedly, 
Lippincott's men affixed a sign to the prisoner before hanging him that read: "Up goes 
Huddy for Phillip White."  To loyalists, Lippincott's actions were nothing more than 
proportional retaliation.  To the irate inhabitants of Monmouth County, Huddy's death 
was a "horrid and almost unparalleled murder."  Pointing to a congressional resolve 
promising to "take such exemplary vengeance" on the enemy in order to arrest "their 
present career of barbarity," the Monmouth residents demanded that Washington "bring a 
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British officer of the same rank to a similar end."  If Washington did not act, they would 
take matters into their own hands.  The Freeman's Journal reported that "the people of 
Monmouth were determined to retaliate;" they even had an officer in mind.90 
 Outraged though he was, Washington had no desire to execute an innocent British 
officer at a time when peace negotiations were on the horizon.  He begged Clinton to 
surrender Lippincott to American authorities for trial.  Washington must have realized, 
however, that Clinton could not turn over Lippincott without repudiating the Board of 
Associated Loyalists and infuriating all of the king's friends.  Clinton promised 
Washington that he would order "a strict inquiry to be made" and bring any perpetrators 
"to immediate trial," but Washington knew this promise would never placate those who 
demanded retribution.  Fanning the fire of vengeance, newspapers across the country 
demanded retaliatory justice for Huddy.  For many, his death came to personify British 
cruelty and perfidy.  British prisoner Captain Graham remembered that "in all the papers 
we observed many inflammatory paragraphs calling upon General Washington and 
Congress to retaliate for cruelties exercised upon the Americans."  Washington could not 
ignore the people's demands; he had little option but to act decisively.91  
 After conferring with his officers, Washington determined that "a British officer 
of equal Rank, must atone for the Death of the unfortunate Huddy."  On May 3, 1782, 
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Washington instructed Continental army Colonel Moses Hazen that because "the Enemy, 
persisting in that barbarous line of Conduct they have pursued during the course of this 
war, have lately most inhumanly Executed Capt. Joshua Huddy," he had no choice but to 
order Hazen to pick a British captain by lot "from among the Prisoners at any of the Posts 
either in Pennsylvania or Maryland" for the "disagreeable necessity" of retaliation.  As 
fate would have it, the subject of revolutionary retribution would be one of the prisoners 
captured at Yorktown: the aristocratic, affluent, and well-connected nineteen-year-old 
Captain Charles Asgill.92 
 When Washington received word of Asgill's selection, he immediately regretted 
the choice.  The general had already executed one popular young British aristocrat, Major 
John André, as a spy, and he certainly did not relish sending another to his grave.  
Moreover, as a prisoner under the capitulation of Yorktown, Asgill was supposed to be 
exempt from any act of retaliation.  The fourteenth article of the treaty stated that the 
terms could not be "infringed on pretence of reprisals."  In a letter to Benjamin Lincoln, 
Washington admitted that "Colo. Hazen's sending an officer under the capitulation of 
York Town for the purpose of retaliation, has distressed me exceedingly."  He had 
requested specifically that Hazen exempt both the Yorktown and Convention army 
prisoners, but Hazen had not been able to locate a suitable alternative.  Washington was 
in a quandary.  Executing Asgill would violate the treaty of capitulation and break his 
word to Cornwallis.  On the other hand, "if some person is not sacrificed to the Manes of 
poor Huddy," Washington thought "the whole business will have the appearance of a 
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farce."  Congress had made it abundantly clear that it approved of retaliation; his own 
officers had advised him to be swift and decisive; and the people demanded blood.  
Former Congressman Robert Livingston of New York summarized the situation: "It is a 
melancholy reflection that the innocent must suffer for the guilty; but it is to be hoped 
this will prove mercy in the end, as it may bring the most savage nation in the world to 
reflect that their crimes will in the end fall upon their own heads."  Unpleasant though it 
was, Washington was determined: Asgill would hang.93 
 The British, for their part, had no intention of allowing Asgill to be sacrificed 
without a fight.  Major James Gordon, Asgill's immediate superior at Lancaster, 
petitioned Congress, Washington, and Lincoln demanding the young man's release on the 
grounds that his death would be a violation of the articles of capitulation.  Aware that the 
revolutionaries had violated treaties of capitulation in the past, Gordon went one step 
further; he appealed to the French ambassador in Philadelphia to intercede on Asgill's 
behalf.  The Major hoped that the ambassador could get a letter to General Rochambeau 
or Admiral De Grasse who, as gentlemen and European officers, would undoubtedly be 
repulsed by the actions of their allies. Gordon's pleas worked; news of Asgill's fate soon 
circulated on the other side of the Atlantic.  When the young man's mother heard of her 
son's sentence, she implored the French foreign minster, the Count de Vergennes, to use 
his "high influence in behalf of innocence, in the cause of justice, of humanity."  
Vergennes, "as a man of sensibility" who had fully imbibed the norms of Europe's culture 
of war, was deeply moved by her words.  Acting with the blessing of his sovereign, 
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Vergennes beseeched Washington "to deliver Mr. Asgill from the fate which threatens 
him."  Killing the innocent was not justice, Vergennes argued.  Instead, in his opinion, 
Washington should exercise "clemency" in order to put an end to the cycle of violence.  
The French minister's letter, though deferentially worded, was not a request.  He 
reminded Washington that Asgill would never have been captured had it not been for 
French troops and French ships at Yorktown.  Vergennes was confident that Washington 
would do the right thing.94 
 Although he remained steadfast in his belief that "retaliation was apparently 
necessary," Washington, who had never been comfortable with the prospect of executing 
Asgill, looked to Congress for a final decision.  Forwarding Vergennes letter to his 
civilian superiors, Washington confessed his conviction that the Asgill affair was "a great 
national concern, upon which an individual ought not to decide."  In deference to their 
French allies, and to the peace negotiations then in process, the congressional delegates 
resolved on November 7, 1782 to release Asgill and to forgo retaliation for the time 
being.95   
 Unappeased, the southern delegates sought to tie Asgill's liberation to a formal 
declaration of retaliatory warfare.  They proposed a resolution that would authorize 
Washington and Greene "to cause suitable retaliation to be forthwith made on British 
officers without waiting for the directions from Congress on the subject." The resolution 
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was apparently "espoused by many; with great warmth in particular by the Delegates of 
N.C. & S.C.," but in the end it was deemed impolitic and unnecessary given the military 
situation.  The British had ceased offensive operations and were preparing to abandon 
Charleston.  Proclaiming a unilateral policy of vengeance would only infuriate their allies 
and complicate the peace settlement.   Instead, Congress directed Washington to inform 
Asgill that he was free to return to England on his parole.96 
 French intervention saved Captain Asgill's life, but the remaining Yorktown 
prisoners were not so fortunate.  The young officer's release did not temper the 
revolutionaries' enthusiasm for retribution nor Congress's decision to decline the 
prisoners' exchange for political purposes.  But neither could Congress afford to continue 
holding the men without British reimbursement.  Once it became clear that Clinton's 
replacement as commander-in-chief, British General Sir Guy Carleton, would never pay 
the Americans for the prisoners' expenses, Congress resolved to sell the German 
prisoners into indentured servitude and to provide all British prisoners with further 
reduced rations.  In early May 1782, Robert Morris convened a meeting of senior 
revolutionaries, including Secretary at War Lincoln and General Henry Knox, to 
determine what to do with the Yorktown prisoners.  After some debate, all present agreed 
that "the Hessian and other foreign Prisoners should be Sold, the British close confined 
and put to short allowance."   Congress officially approved Morris' plan in early June.97   
 American recruiters soon entered the Hessian barracks, eager to fill their quotas of 
recruits from among the well-disciplined Germans.  Telling the prisoners that Congress 
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could no longer afford to house or feed them, the American officers gave the German 
prisoners the choice of either enlisting into the Continental army for a term of three years 
or paying a fine of eighty Spanish dollars: an enormous sum for men who had not 
received their pay in months.  If they could not pay, they could indenture themselves to 
local farmers or craftsmen who would remunerate Congress for the use of their labor.  
One Hessian sergeant claimed that "the prisoners were mistreated in order to make them 
enlist."  Another group of Hessian prisoners informed their commander in New York that 
they were in "extreme despair" because the Americans had sent them a "barbarous 
proposition" to either pay up or indenture themselves.  The American propositions, which 
effectively transformed "free soldiers" into slaves, "completely stunned" them.  To the 
Hessians, it seems as if the Americans were determined to treat them "not like prisoners 
of war to a Christian Nation, but like wretches fallen into the hands of Barbarians."98 
 Draconian no doubt, but at least the Germans had a choice; the British prisoners 
were rounded up and closely confined in jails, dungeons, and camps throughout 
Pennsylvania. On July 11, 1782, Congress ordered the Secretary at War to "have all the 
British prisoners of war closely confined, and to stop all issues of provision to the women 
and children who are with them."  The soldiers' rations were also reduced again.  
Predictably, the jails soon became scenes of agony, anguish, and despair.  Hessian 
adjutant general, Major Carl Leopold Baurmeister, claimed that "instead of twenty men 
per room, thirty men were packed together, which makes the condition of these people 
even worse.  Eight hundred and eight-two English prisoners in Philadelphia endured their 
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misery within even narrower confines."  In October, a group of British prisoners begged 
Henry Knox to "consider our Masaurable [sic] Satuation [sic]."  The men had "No 
Cloaths [sic] But is all moste [sic] Nacat [sic] for want [of] Cloathing [sic] and the coald 
[sic] weather is Coming on and we have No Releaf [sic] Heare [sic]."  Knox could do 
nothing to help them without disobeying Congress.  Pitying the "wretched creatures" 
deplorable confinement, Baumeister decried the Americans' "unreasonably revengeful" 
policy as "contrary…to the law of nations."  As an aristocratic European officer, 
Baumeister could not comprehend what Congress and the American people knew all too 
well: Vattel and his laws had no place in a war of vengeance.  For the past seven years, 
the revolutionaries had endured innumerable British violations of the laws of nations, and 
they were no longer afraid to return the favor.99 
 
 The Yorktown prisoners' nineteen month ordeal finally came to an end when they 
received word in early May 1783 that Congress had ratified the preliminary articles of 
peace with Great Britain.  Despite some opposition to ratification on the grounds that the 
prisoners should be held as security for British compliance with the treaty, on 15 April, 
Congress authorized Washington to "inform the Commander in Chief of the British 
forces in America that the U.S. are ready to liberate…all prisoners of war."  The expense 
of holding the prisoners outweighed any political advantage that would be gained by 
detaining them.  When news of their impending release reached the prisoners in 
Frederick, they were exuberant.  The prisoners threw a raucous party in their barracks to 
celebrate their liberation and to honor the patron saint of England, Saint George.  The 
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prisoners' toasts of "Hyroh [sic] for the King George! God save the King George" elicited 
the ire of their American guards.  The American commander "sent in a large patrol and 
ordered it to beat [the prisoners] and arrest them."  Four prisoners were fatally wounded 
in the altercation.100   
 The death of their comrades could not dampen the remaining prisoners' 
enthusiasm.  Private Döhla was elated by "the joyful news and long-wished-for and 
passionately awaited order, to begin our departure march."  On May 13, 1782, Döhla and 
the German prisoners "marched out of the barracks at Frederick, having spent a year and 
three and one-half months here, wretchedly, very often hungry and thirsty."  Stephan 
Popp was just happy that he and his friends "had lived to see the day of our release."  
Many of his fellows had not.101  
 Although poor record keeping on the part of the revolutionaries precludes any 
definitive accounting of the surviving Yorktown prisoners, Secretary Lincoln estimated 
that there were approximately 6,000 enemy prisoners, including women, children, and the 
Convention troops, remaining in American custody at war's end.  Some of the best 
evidence of their mortality and desertion rates comes from German sources.  Of the 89 
members of Döhla's von Quesnoy company of Ansbach-Bayreuth troops who were 
captured at Yorktown, 73 were liberated that spring.  Only five of Döhla's comrades are 
listed as deserters (5.6%), while eleven prisoners in the company died during captivity 
(12.4%).  From the Hessian Regiment Von Bose's returns we learn that of the 365 
common soldiers who surrendered at Yorktown, 104 men deserted (28.5%), while thirty-
three soldiers (9%) perished in American custody.  These numbers are not likely to be 
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representative of all of Cornwallis's army.  The revolutionaries provided their German 
captives, who they deemed largely innocuous, with better provisions and 
accommodations than the British prisoners who were closely confined on meager rations 
for most of their captivity.  From a sampling of the muster rolls of the British 80th 
Regiment of Foot, we learn that of the 48 private soldiers in Captain Arbuthnot's 
company, 15 died in American captivity (31%).  Similarly, Captain George Cumine's 
company of the same regiment lost 15 of their 47 men during the same period (32%).  
The private soldiers of Major James Gordon's company were comparatively healthy: only 
10 of their 47 succumbed in American hands (21%). To put these numbers in perspective, 
the mortality rate of Union prisoners of war at the notorious Confederate prison 
Andersonville was 28%.  While we will never know exactly how many Yorktown 
prisoners perished in American hands, the prisoners' mortality rate was likely lower than 
that of the Convention army.  The Yorktown prisoners were only in American custody 
for nineteen months, while the Conventioners were captives for five and a half years.  
From the extant records, it appears that in the final months of the war, the Yorktown 
prisoners' captivity was every bit as arduous as that of Burgoyne's troops.102 
 
.............................. 
 The war in the south was violent, extremely so, but it was not an anomaly.  When 
General Clinton sailed south in the winter of 1780, he hoped to escape the cycle of 
violence that had characterized the war in the north.  Largely untouched by war, the south 
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seemed the ideal location to practice a new policy: magnanimity.  Yet his hopes were 
dashed, in part by his own misjudgment of the extent of southern loyalism, and in part by 
his officers' commitment to putting down the rebellion by force.  Instead of pacification, 
Clinton inadvertently inaugurated a war of vengeance.  For three years after the fall of 
Charleston, southern revolutionaries and loyalists persecuted each other with relentless 
fury.  Quarter was often denied, and when irregular forces did take prisoners, they were 
victimized, tortured, and at times murdered.  In short, "Lynch's law" replaced the law of 
nations.  The arrival of French troops in 1781 changed the course of the war in the south, 
but only temporarily. For a brief period, French officers protected their British 
counterparts and ensured that the lenient terms of the capitulation of Yorktown were 
observed.  But France's war was elsewhere: in the Caribbean, in the Mediterranean, and 
in India.  Soon after Yorktown, Rochambeau's army departed. With French troops 
removed, Congress saw no reason to deny its constituents' demands for retribution: it 
held the Yorktown prisoners without exchange for the remainder of the war.  These 
prisoners were either closely confined in deplorable conditions or sold into indentured 
servitude. Congress knew that the American people would never have approved their 
release. For many Americans, the Yorktown prisoners, along with their comrades in the 
Convention army, were the living embodiment of the radicalism of the revolutionary 
struggle. Eight years of bloody war had infected Americans, revolutionaries and loyalists 
alike, with the virulent contagion of vengeance for which peace alone was the remedy. 
Peace, however, could not hide the war's scars.  With the war won and independence 
secured, the new republic's elite would attempt to conceal the conflict's violence in 
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patriotic rhetoric and myth-making, but for those who experienced and endured it, that 











 New England-born Samuel Curwen was no friend to American independence.  
Like many loyalists, Curwen’s revulsion at the spirit of rebellion that gripped Britain’s 
American colonies in the mid-1770’s induced him to quit his native soil and seek the 
protection of England’s Constitution, Parliament, and monarch on the other side of the 
Atlantic.  Nevertheless, in February 1777 it was not concern over any American threat to 
the Constitution that worried Curwen, but rather the actions of Parliament.  He noted that 
“the American high treason bill having passed…has raised an alarm in people’s minds 
universally, as it suspends the habeas corpus act, that great bulwark of English liberty.”  
Parliament, at the urging of Prime Minster Lord North and his Secretary of State for 
America Lord George Germain, had passed “a Bill to empower his Majesty to secure and 
detain Persons charged with, or suspected of, the Crime of High Treason committed in 
North America, or on the High Seas.”  In one stroke, Parliament transformed His 
Majesty’s contumacious colonial subjects into traitors beyond the protection of traditional 
English legal safeguards.  Curwen summarized the opinion of many in England when he 
wrote, “May the remains of English liberty and the Constitution not be overlooked and 
lost in this fatal quarrel.”1 
 The American High Treason Act had implications beyond its purported threat to 
the English Constitution; it articulated the British ministry’s vision of the war in America.  
Americans captured in arms against their sovereign were rebels and traitors without any 
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legal standing. Although the act did not specifically condone summary justice, Britons 
and Americans alike knew that the customary fate for traitors was death by hanging.  For 
many of the crown’s officers in North America, only the king’s generosity and the hope 
of peaceful reconciliation prevented the wholesale execution of captured Americans.  
From the beginning of the war Britain’s army and navy, acting under Parliamentary 
orders, had refused their rebellious American adversaries the usual protections of 
legitimate belligerent status.  With the passage of the High Treason Act, the further 
protection of legal recourse was also denied them.  The act called on the king’s officers to 
commit Americans taken at sea “to the common goal, or any other place of confinement.”  
This was not simply a case of Parliamentary bravado.  As Continental navy Captain John 
Paul Jones explained, "our cruel Enemies are enforceing [sic] an Act of their Parliament, 
by the indiscriminant confinement of our Subjects in English dungeon’s [sic], not as 
Prisoners of War.”  In Jones's estimation, the British viewed the Americans as nothing 
more than “‘Traitors,’ & Pirates & ‘Felons’! Whose Necks they wish to destain [sic] to 
the Cord!”  While the ministry chose to forgo executing the king’s maritime foes, the 
men were condemned upon capture to indefinite confinement on board overcrowded, 
noisome, and disease-infested prison ships from Halifax to Saint Augustine or in damp 
stone prisons in England and Scotland.  Edwin Burrows estimates that over sixty-percent 
of American prisoners perished in British custody: a statistic unprecedented in 
eighteenth-century European warfare.2 
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 American sailors serving on board private ships of war, or privateers, were the 
principal targets of the High Treason Act and consequently suffered the most at the hands 
of their foes.  From the outset of the conflict, the British commanding general in 
America, Sir William Howe, desired that "a Distinction . . . be made between Prisoners 
taken on Shore and on the Sea," because in his opinion, privateering "will hurt us more 
effectually than any Thing they can do by Land."  He hoped that sending American 
sailors "to suffer by the Hands of Justice" would "spread great Terror among the sea-
faring People in this Country."  British government officials on the other side of the 
Atlantic shared Howe's severe stance.  Although privateering had a long tradition in 
European naval warfare, from the point of view of the British ministry these sailors 
combined indefensible rebellion with piratical cupidity, and they should be punished 
accordingly.  The British would continue to deny American maritime prisoners either the 
recourse to British civil law or the customary protections of prisoner-of-war status until 
1782; a decision that escalated the violence of the conflict precipitously.3  
 Much has been written about the insalubrious conditions on board the British 
prison hulks anchored in New York's Wallabout Bay, and although many of these 
accounts would benefit from a more nuanced reading of the sources, the general picture 
of British indifference and cruelty remains.  In November 1782, over a year after 
Cornwallis' surrender at Yorktown and months after Parliament officially recognized 
American captives as prisoners of war, one Massachusetts privateer imprisoned on board 
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Prisoners of War," The Emporia State Research Studies, Vol., 22, No., 1 (1973), 5-32, 6. 
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the prison ship HMS Jersey described his surroundings as “one of the worst places in the 
World, and the Prisoners are suffering; Sickly and dying daily not having the common 
necessaries of life.”  His situation was far from unique.  Packed into “the putrefied 
stagnated air of the hold of a vessel crowded with vermin” American seamen were forced 
to survive on two-thirds the subsistence allotted to British sailors.  In reality, their 
provisions rarely amounted to even that much.  The available foodstuffs were the refuse 
of the British commissary: often moldy, rotten, and maggot-infested.  Poorly nourished 
and closely confined in stagnant air, the prisoners were easily susceptible to myriad 
contagions. Even the British Commissary for Naval Prisoners, David Sproat, admitted in 
September 1780 that "contagion, and death" were likely in store for the American sailors 
on board "the crowded Prison ships" were they not soon released.  For the majority of the 
captured Americans, liberation would come too late.4 
Given the treatment American maritime prisoners received at the hands of the 
British, how did the revolutionaries respond?  What would become of British naval 
personnel and privateers in American custody as the war progressed?  This chapter 
examines how the revolutionaries captured, confined, cared for, and eventually 
discharged British maritime prisoners over the course of the war.  It contends that the 
revolutionaries adapted their deeply-ingrained cultural understandings about the practice 
of war at sea to the conditions of combating a reactionary enemy that not only denied 
                                                
 4 For the most recent account of the British treatment of American martime prisoners see Burrows, 
Forgotten Patriots. William Russell to Mary Russell. November 25th, 1782, in Francis D. Cogliano, 
American Maritime Prisoners: the Captivity of William Russell (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 
2001),142. Captured at Fort Washington in November 1776, James Little was put on board the Grovesnor 
prison ship, "where he was kept till into January following and suffered every inconvenience but death."  
Pension application of James Little. W8256. Revolutionary War Pension Applications, Record Group 15. 
National Archives of the United States; Sproat had already released numerous American sailors because of 
fear of overcrowding and disease. David Sproat to Thomas Bradford. September 10th, 1780, New York. 
Thomas Bradford Papers. Naval Prisoners. Box 13 F 12. HSP. 
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Americans the customary protections of prisoner-of-war status by confining thousands of 
diseased and starving sailors in wretched conditions but also encouraged a sanguinary 
civil war on the high seas by licensing loyalist privateers. As the war progressed, and 
allegations of British and loyalist misconduct mounted, the revolutionaries began to re-
envision their enemies as uncivilized and thus unworthy of the humane conventions of 
European naval warfare.  Because American sailors suffered a disproportionate share of 
British abuse, captured British and loyalist mariners were prime targets for American 
retaliation.  Constrained both financially and politically from ever establishing a 
centralized naval institution capable of enforcing policy for the treatment of maritime 
prisoners, Congress was forced to rely on local and state officials to superintend the 
prisoners.  In this decentralized system, enemy sailors often endured a confinement far 
more severe than that of their terrestrial counterparts. Rather than insisting on European 
customs and ameliorating the prisoners' plight, in the last years of the war Congress 
responded to its constituents' demands for retribution by engaging in a cycle of retaliatory 
violence unimaginable at the war's outset. 5 
 
"Americans are humane as well as brave": Maritime Prisoners in American 
Custody, 1775-1777 
 
When the thirteen disparate colonies organized for mutual defense in the 
aftermath of the bloodshed at Lexington and Concord, colonial Americans possessed a 
                                                
 5 This chapter is the first study of American treatment of British naval prisoners since Gerald 
Haffner's useful, but limited, 1952 unpublished dissertation chapter "Naval and Marine Prisoners of War." 
Haffner, "The Treatment of Prisoners of War," 406-435.  For works that emphasize the revolutionaries' 
adherence to the European laws of war and the humane treatment of British prisoners broadly defined see 
Fischer, Washington's Crossing and Harold E. Selesky, "Colonial America," in Howard, Andreopoulous, 
Shulman, eds., The Laws of War, 59-85.  Although more critical of the revolutionaries than Burrows, Paul 
Springer nonetheless concludes that "the United States lived up to Washington's decision to treat prisoners 
with decency and humanity, and at no time did the conditions used by the United States approach the 
horrors of captivity reported by prisoners of the British." Springer, America's Captives, 41. 
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normative set of expectations about the conduct of war derived from their understanding 
of European conventions and their experience in prior imperial conflicts.  Although 
experienced in frontier warfare with Native American groups, most Americans were 
novices at European-style conflict that stressed the restriction of violence between 
“civilized” peoples to the locus of the battlefield.  Civilians, noncombatants, and those 
incapable or unwilling to continue the fight were at least theoretically immune from 
hostility.  The revolutionaries' senior military leaders, many of whom had previously 
served in European armies, insisted that their fledgling forces imitate European customs.  
Reinforcing this cultural inheritance was the practical concern that the revolutionaries 
initially hoped for reconciliation with the British crown and Parliament.  Abusing the 
king’s soldiers, sailors, and loyal subjects would do little to demonstrate the justice and 
legitimacy of their grievances.  As one American officer told his men in December 1775, 
“We must show him [a British naval officer] & such as fall into our hands that Americans 
are humane as well as brave, you will therefore… treat the prisoners with all possible 
Tenderness.”  The revolutionaries were thus both predisposed and incentivized to strictly 
adhere to the customs of war prevailing in Europe.  If they were to be seen by the British 
and potential European allies as anything other than rebels and traitors, the 
revolutionaries would have to guard against any abuses against enemy prisoners in their 
custody.  Such caution was especially important at sea where, individual commanders 
operated far removed from the chain of command and civilian oversight.  As 
revolutionary leaders soon discovered, upholding this humane vision of naval warfare 
would prove harder than enunciating it.6  
                                                
 6 William Bartlett to George Washington.  December 9th, 1775, Beverly, MA. PGW. 
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When war erupted, the revolutionaries had no shortage of sailors keen to take the 
conflict beyond the shores of the Atlantic—all but one of the twenty most populous 
towns in the colonies was a port—but because the colonies could not boast the 
infrastructure necessary to support the construction of massive warships, they had little 
hope of launching a fleet to match the might of the Royal navy.  Undaunted, Congress 
and eleven of the thirteen colonies established naval forces to combat the perceived 
ministerial threat to American liberties within the first year of the war.  These official 
maritime forces, however, never equaled, in terms of sheer numbers or effectiveness, the 
revolutionaries' privateer fleet.7  
In outfitting privateers, the revolutionaries drew on a long and lucrative tradition 
of sending private ships of war to harass Britain’s enemies during the imperial wars with 
France and Spain.  For well over a century, the British crown, through the auspices of 
colonial royal governors, had issued letters of marque, or official commissions, to 
American ship-owners willing to risk it all for gold and glory.  It is little wonder then that 
liberty-loving New England mariners, eyeing the wealth of the British West Indian trade, 
took up arms and went to sea en masse as privateers when the imperial crisis escalated to 
war.  Both Congress and individual colonies approved of any menace to British trade that 
might persuade the ministry to rethink its belligerent stance.  Owners of privateers, who 
outfitted, manned, provisioned, and armed their ships at no expense to Congress or the 
colonies, stood to gain a financial windfall if their captains were successful.  The 
proceeds of the sale of any captured British vessel were divided between the owner, the 
captain, and the crew with the bulk of the wealth going to fill the coffers of the ship’s 
                                                
 7 James M. Volo, Blue Water Patriots: The American Revolution Afloat (Westport, Ct: Praeger 
Publishers, 2007), 2, 6. 
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financial backer.  The practice of privateering in New England was so popular that 
Washington despaired of losing eligible recruits for his army to these private ships of 
war. Historians estimate that by the war's conclusion over 2,000 ships bore American 
colors as privateers.  Hardly the legalized pirates of popular lore, privateers were 
accepted participants in naval warfare, and they were expected to abide by the customary 
laws of war.8 
 Those Americans who remained loyal to the king were equally enthusiastic to try 
their fortune as privateers.  For American merchants who remained faithful to their 
sovereign, outfitting a privateer to prey on their rebellious competition was a high-risk 
but high-reward venture.  With regular trade curtailed by war, privateering presented to 
ship owners a lucrative alternative to recoup their investment.  The British, however, 
feared that by licensing privateers to attack their own subjects, they would not only 
damage British trade, but also de facto recognize the colonies as an independent polity 
engaged in a legitimate conflict.  Letters of marque were traditionally granted by a 
sovereign state to its own subjects to harass the shipping of another sovereign state in 
times of war: anything else was piracy.  The European laws of war, as codified by Swiss 
jurist Emmerich de Vattel, were silent on the issue of privateering in wars of rebellion, 
but for a king to issue letters of marque against his own subjects was unheard of.  
                                                
 8 For the tradition of New England privateering during the imperial wars of the eighteenth century 
see, Carl E. Swanson, “American Privateering and Imperial Warfare, 1739-1748,” William and Mary 
Quarterly (1985) 42 (3), 357-382.  For privateering during the American Revolutionary War see Volo, Blue 
Water Patriots, chapter 2, Robert H. Patton, Patriot Pirates: The Privateer War for Freedom and Fortune 
in the American Revolution (New York: Pantheon, 2008), William M. Fowler, Rebels Under Sail: The 
American Navy During the American Revolution (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1976), and Gardner 
Weld Allen, A Naval History of the American Revolution (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1913), 2 vols.  
Richard Pougher, the foremost expert on loyalist privateering has estimated that the revolutionaries 
outfitted over 2,000 privateering vessels during the war. Richard D. Pougher, "'Averse…to Remaining Idle 
Spectators:" The Emergence of Loyalist Privateering During the American Revolution, 1775-1778," (Ph.D. 
diss., University of Maine, 2002), 2 vols., 1:44.  See also, Cohen, Yankee Sailors, 24-25 and John B. 
Hattendorf, "Maritime Conflict," in Howard, Andreopoulous, and Shulman, eds., The Laws of War, 98-115, 
103-4. 
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Nonetheless, many ambitious loyalist mariners skirted the issue by waging an often 
successful, though limited, campaign without official sanction.  More often than not, 
crown officers in North America turned a blind eye to these unofficial activities.  The 
loyalist privateers' efforts remained attenuated, however, until France's entry into the war 
in early 1778 escalated the rebellion into an international conflict.  Facing a much larger 
struggle than they had ever imaged, British naval authorities relented and began to 
encourage loyalist privateering.  Notwithstanding the British ministry's official 
opposition to loyalist privateering in the first years of the war, Royal navy officials in 
occupied New York accepted, if begrudgingly, responsibility for captured American 
crews brought in by loyalist vessels.  These men joined their comrades captured by Royal 
navy vessels in New York's cramped jails and hulks.9 
 The fate of British subjects taken by American vessels remained unclear however.  
Despite the well established practice of privateering, in prior conflicts, American crews 
had usually turned over enemy prisoners to British authorities.  No longer able to rely on 
the British naval bureaucracy, many American privateers, eager to divest themselves of 
their prisoners and resume the hunt, released the men in neutral ports or landed them on 
British islands in the West Indies.  For prisoners who made it back to America, their fate 
fell by default to the only thing passing for government in many of the colonies in the 
wake of the dissolution of official British rule: local councils and committees of safety.  
As South Carolina merchant Josiah Smith informed a friend in London in September 
1775, “Our Assembly being dissolved, the Council to the King’s Officers all under 
proscription for non-Associating with the People— we have now no other Government, 
than by a Council of Safety.”  These assorted bands of prominent whigs struggled to 
                                                
 9 Pougher, "'Averse…to Remaining Idle Spectators," 1:10, 8-9. 
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maintain control over their often fiercely divided constituencies in the power vacuum that 
resulted from the departure of the king’s officials.  When the crew of a Massachusetts-
commissioned privateer brought the Sloop Sally into the port of Plymouth in November 
1775, members of the Massachusetts Council were at a loss for what to do with the 
prisoners.  The Council opted to release the women and ordered that the men “be held in 
close confinement,” most likely in Plymouth’s jail.10   
 Jails in the port towns of New England rapidly became overcrowded, and the 
sustenance and support of British maritime prisoners soon strained the resources of 
America’s costal communities.  Continental army commander General George 
Washington warned the President of Congress, John Hancock, that "many of the Towns 
where prisoners have been already sent, not having convenience for, or the means of 
keeping them, complain they are burthensome.” Seeking to relieve this burden, General 
Philip Schuyler of New York suggested to Hancock that it was advisable “to remove all 
the Prisoners from Connecticut to some of the Interior Towns in Pennsylvania” where 
they could be more easily supplied.  But even this solution was only temporarily viable 
because inland communities had little desire or motivation to pay, without the least 
prospect of remuneration, for the upkeep of prisoners taken by private adventurers.11   
 The conditions of confinement for naval prisoners also varied tremendously 
during the first year of the war.  In some communities, officers were allowed the freedom 
to rent rooms in town and to come and go as they pleased provided they gave their parole 
                                                
 10 Josiah Smith to Mr. James Poyas, September 21st, 1775, Charleston, SC. Josiah Smith Letter 
Book. Call Number 3018. Wilson Library. Southern Historical Collection. The University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill; Council of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay to the Sheriff of the County of 
Plymouth. November 13th, 1775. NDAR, 2:1008. 
 11 George Washington to John Hancock May 11th, 1776, New York. PGW; General Philip 
Schuyler to John Hancock. November 27th, 1775, Ticonderoga, NY. NDAR, 2:1160. 
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of honor not to abscond to British lines, while in others officers were rigorously confined 
in jails alongside their men.  Midshipman Richard Fisher of the Royal navy petitioned the 
Massachusetts Council for his release from “close jail, having only straw to lye on.”  He 
felt his situation to be “realy [sic] very miserable.”  The Massachusetts Council agreed 
and granted the young officer “the liberty of the Goal Yard on his giving his Parole in 
writing that he will not pass without the limits of the same.”  Similarly, in December 
Washington requested that the Committee of Safety of North Hampton, Massachusetts 
grant midshipmen Bateman Baker and John Larkin the "indulgence" of the customary 
parole for officers while five "private sailors" captured with them were "to be confined."  
Lacking large prison facilities or detention centers, the Americans housed most enlisted 
men in communal jail rooms where sanitary conditions often deteriorated precipitously.  
Thomas Slater of the British merchant vessel Betsey complained to the Pennsylvania 
Committee of Safety in July 1776 that the “the weather [was] so Warm and Cooking all 
in one room where there is nine persons Confin’d, which, for my part, I must Confess, 
without Inlargement [sic] I cannot say what will be the consequents [sic].”12   
 Other prisoners, like their counterparts in the British army, were permitted to seek 
employment at local farms or to earn their living as dockworkers or tradesmen.  In late 
1776, the Massachusetts Council even offered a group of Irish seamen the option of 
either returning home on the next European bound vessel or to be put “into families 
where they may maintain themselves by their labor thro’ the winter.”  Allowing maritime 
                                                
 12 Midshipman Richard Fisher to the Massachusetts Council. June 3rd, 1776. NDAR, 5:356-7.  
Washington's instructions were conveyed to the committee by Horatio Gates. Horatio Gates to the 
Chairman of the Committee of Safety at North Hampton. December 3rd, 1775. Copy of a letter sold by 
Early American History Auctions, Inc, January 3, 1999. Copy held by The Library of the Society of the 
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prisoners the option of working to supplement their provisions was a customary European 
practice.  Captured French sailors during the Seven Years’ War had created a cottage 
industry by producing trinkets and souvenirs for curious English civilians who visited 
their jails. With many of their young men away on military service, many American 
communities welcomed the prisoners for their commercial contributions, but others 
considered them an onerous burden.  In the absence of congressional policy, confusion 
reigned.13  
 Concerned that the disparity in prisoner treatment occasioned by local 
management would reflect poorly on American arms, Washington pushed for a more 
consistent policy.  In October 1775, he gauged the opinion of a delegation of 
representatives of the New England colonies and Congress on the issue of marine 
prisoners.  Were these men "to be detaind [sic] as prisoners or released?  If the former, 
what distinctions are to be made in those taken by the Continental Vessells [sic], & the 
[privateers]?”  All were in agreement that “Persons taken in Arms on Board any Prize be 
deemed prisoners at the Disposal of the General,” but they were unwilling to go so far so 
as to say all prisoners taken at sea, regardless of whether or not they were captured by 
private vessels or congressionally-sanctioned ships, belonged to Congress.  Subject to 
many different interpretations, these orders left plenty of room for local authorities to 
insist that they, not Congress, could dispose of maritime prisoners captured by their 
forces as they saw fit.  At this early stage, the delegation's principal concern was not to 
adjudicate jurisdiction but to ensure that all captive sailors “be treated as prisoners of War 
                                                
 13 Orders of the Massachusetts Council. November 21st, 1776. NDAR, 7:208. For more 
information on the commercial practices of French marine prisoners during the Seven Years' War see: 
Clyde L. Lloyd, The Arts and Crafts of Napoleonic and American Prisoners of War, 1756-1816 (New 
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but with Humanity" and granted the same "allowance of Provisions to be the Rations of 
the [American] Army.”  Those seamen not taken in arms were free to go.14 
 These generous terms conformed to the revolutionary leadership's understanding 
of the customs governing war at sea between European nations as codified by European 
legal scholars and British naval regulations.  The Continental Congress possessed copies 
of the "Admiralty laws of great Britain" [sic] and several other European countries, as 
well as myriad naval histories, and an impressive assortment of the writings of Grotius, 
Vattel, and Puffendorf.  At the commencement of the war, the revolutionaries assumed 
that their British adversaries would adhere to a similar code of conduct, and they were 
anxious to prevent any potential infraction of the customs of war from reflecting poorly 
on the American cause.  Washington was even adamant that prisoners be allowed to keep 
their private property, an order that proved unpopular with many privateersmen who 
desired to take full pecuniary advantage of their prisoners’ vulnerability.  William 
Bartlett, Washington’s agent for naval affairs, advised the general that his order “shall be 
Punctually Obey’d” in the future but its enforcement had been previously “impracticable” 
due to Congress's lack of authority over private ships.15  
 To ward against any future violations, Congress added teeth to Washington’s 
directives by promising punishment for any Continental navy captains or masters of 
private vessels who mistreated their prisoners.  The April 1776 resolve warned: “If you, 
or any of your officers or crew, shall, in cold blood, kill or main, or by torture or 
                                                
 14 "Minutes of a Conference of the Delegates of the Honorable Continental Congress, the Deputy 
Governours of Connecticut & Rhode Island, the Committee of Council of Massachusetts Bay with General 
Washington begun at Head Quarters Cambridge October 18th 1775 & continued to the 22d of the same 
Month." PGW. 
 15 PCC, Item 183, 2:31, 37; William Bartlett to George Washington. Beverly, MA. December 
20th, 1775. NDAR, 3:181. 
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otherwise, cruelly, inhumanly, and, contrary to common usage, and the practice of 
civilized nations in war, treat any person or persons surprised in the ship or vessel you 
shall take, the offender shall be severely punished.” Congress demanded that any armed 
ship under its jurisdiction strictly observe these customary practices.  Members of 
Congress saw themselves as the legitimate representatives of a just cause, and they were 
determined to operate within a culture of naval warfare that licensed certain types of 
violence, such as the capture of an enemy’s merchant vessels, but prohibited the murder 
or mistreatment of enemy prisoners.  Within the same set of instructions, Congress 
officially affirmed its jurisdiction over prisoner-of-war policy but simultaneously 
admitted that the prisoners' administration would often fall to the "general assembly, 
convention, or council, or committee of safety" of individual colonies.16 
 Unfortunately for enemy prisoners, Congress lacked the resources and authority 
to either enforce this resolve or provide for the prisoners itself.  Even those prisoners 
captured by congressionally sanctioned privateers or the Continental navy were often 
turned over to local authorities better positioned to feed and house the men.  When James 
Forrest, a British passenger traveling to Halifax from Antigua, was captured by a 
Continental navy vessel commanded by Captain Isaiah Robinson in the summer of 1776, 
he was "treated with the greatest humanity" by his captors.  In a letter to the President of 
Congress, John Hancock, Forrest proclaimed that Robinson's "humanity to us while we 
were his Prisoners, was equal to his bravery."  Yet once the men arrived in Philadelphia, 
they were "carried immediately from the Vessel to Prison" and deprived of their clothing 
and personal effects, contrary to Robinson's promises.  Despite strict congressional 
mandates on the treatment of enemy maritime prisoners, local officials in Philadelphia 
                                                
 16 JCC, 4:254.  
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had few qualms about breaking the terms of the surrender agreement by jailing the men 
without parole.  Because Forrest was in the custody of Pennsylvania authorities, Hancock 
could do nothing for him.17   
 Congress and the individual colonial governments agreed, however, that the 
ultimate purpose of holding British maritime prisoners was the prospect of exchanging 
them for Americans in British custody.  In prior European conflicts, the belligerent 
powers quickly established formal arrangements, known as cartels, for the exchange of 
prisoners.  Neither side in the conflict could afford to support continually increasing 
numbers of captured enemy combatants for long, and both parties were desirous of 
returning their soldiers and sailors to their regiments and ships.  Customarily, men of 
equal rank were exchanged for one another.  In the opinion of the British ministry, 
however, the American rebellion was not a European war and the American Congress 
was not a legitimate political entity capable of entering into any formal cartel.  Making 
such an agreement with rebels would implicitly acknowledge the independence of the 
colonies.  If exchanges were to occur, they would have to be off the record. 18 
 As well as infuriating the revolutionaries, the British ministry’s decision to deny 
Americans the benefits of an official cartel had the initial effect of depriving a number of 
their own officers of their liberty. Washington, who took every British discourtesy as a 
personal insult, was of the firm opinion that “England ought to be obliged to 
acknowledge us an independent State, at least as far as respects Prisoners of War.”  When 
it became clear that that was not to be the case, the American general refused prisoners' 
                                                
 17 James Forrest to John Hancock. September 13th, 1776. Philadelphia Prison. Elias Boudinot 
Papers. MMC 721. Library of Congress.  There is no record of any response to Forrest's petition in the 
Papers of the Continental Congress. 
 18 George Germain to Sir William Howe. Whitehall. February 1st, 1776. NDAR, 4:881. 
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requests for exchange.  General Horatio Gates explained to captive Royal navy 
Lieutenant Edwin Stanhope in January 1776 that any release from his confinement was 
impossible because “the Admiral [Lord Howe] Has already declined every negotiation 
for Exchange of prisoners.”  Yet Gates was not being strictly truthful.  Even though he 
did not have the authority, or inclination, to settle a formal treaty, Admiral Howe would 
have been happy to informally exchange Lieutenant Stanhope, whose uncle was a peer of 
the realm, for an American officer of equal rank.  Howe could negotiate with Gates only 
on the basis of their own honor as gentlemen however.  Such an agreement would have to 
remain ad hoc and precedent could not be admitted.  Predictably, Gates refused, and 
Stanhope remained a prisoner.  He was not the last British sailor to have his dreams of 
exchange thwarted.  Despite numerous attempts at compromise, the dissonance resulting 
from Britain’s official stance that the colonies were in rebellion, and Congress's 
unwillingness to treat without a British acknowledgment of its legitimacy, prevented any 
holistic prisoner exchange throughout the war.19 
 Although an official exchange agreement could not be achieved, neither Congress 
nor the British high command was willing to give up on the prospect of recovering their 
captured countrymen.  Just weeks after declaring independence from Great Britain, 
Congress granted Washington the authority to conduct unofficial exchanges of prisoners 
"in the land or sea service" on an equitable basis: "soldier for soldier, sailor for sailor, and 
one citizen for another citizen."  In order to conduct these exchanges, Congress acceded 
to Washington’s request that a commissary department be established to handle prisoner 
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affairs.  Washington cited the customary practice of European nations in previous wars.  
In his opinion, “Such establishments are agreeable to the practice & usage of the English 
and other Nations, & are founded on principles of necessity & public utility.”  
Washington reiterated the prevailing American opinion that they must conduct this war 
within the culturally accepted norms of European warfare. Drawing on British precedent, 
Congress appointed a Commissary General of Prisoners to oversee prisoner 
administration.  Despite increased congressional control, individual states maintained 
they had a right to conduct exchanges of their own.  Deeply wary of concentrated 
executive authority and unwilling to trample on the prerogatives of individual states, 
Congress agreed, resolving "that each state hath a right to make any exchange they think 
proper for prisoners taken from them or by them."  For the remainder of the war, both 
Congress, through the auspices of its commissary of prisoners, and the executive 
leadership of the states conducted separate prisoner exchanges with the British, resulting 
in continual confusion and resentment between the states.20 
 During the first two years of the war, however, Congress, Washington, and the 
state governments all agreed that British sailors captured by American forces merited the 
highest standard of treatment according to the conventions of European warfare.  
Occasionally, the decentralized nature of the revolutionary government and the financial 
limitations of an inchoate nation resulted in hardships for British maritime prisoners, but 
Robert Harrison expressed the opinion of Washington and Congress when he instructed 
the Springfield, Massachusetts Committee of Safety in February 1776 that “the prisoners 
in our hands should be treated with humanity & kindness and have every thing really 
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necessary for their support.”  British prisoners released from American custody 
corroborated the revolutionaries' position on prisoner treatment.  Merchant sailing master 
William Jenkins, who had been captured by the Continental navy and allowed to return 
home to England after a brief confinement in Massachusetts, hoped that “the Humanity 
with which he has been treated may be an Inducement to the like Treatment of others in 
similar Circumstances on the other Side.”  Most revolutionary Americans agreed with 
Jenkins and assumed that as long as they conducted themselves within the culturally 
proscribed limits of European warfare, their enemies would eventually acknowledge 
them as legitimate combatants engaged in a just cause.  With this in mind, the Navy 
Board of South Carolina issued standing orders to all of its captains that prisoners must 
be treated with “the greatest humanity and tenderness, and upon no consideration suffer 
the honour of the American arms to be stained by any act of cruelty or inhumanity.”  
Contending not simply for victory, but also to demonstrate the legitimacy of their claim 
to independency to the "civilized" world, revolutionary Americans insisted upon the 
restrained conduct of both her navy and privateers.  In their idealized vision of war, 
captivity in America would be short, comfortable, commensurate with rank and station, 
and above all, benign.21 
 
"To Revenge the innocent Blood of your murdered Children": Retaliation, 
Escalation,  and the Ordeal of British Maritime Prisoners, 1777-1783 
 
 In the fall of 1777, the American position on British maritime prisoners began to 
harden.  With graphic, and often exaggerated, accounts of British mistreatment of 
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American sailors flooding the revolutionary press, an explosion of loyalist privateering, 
and Parliament’s enactment of the American High Treason Bill, revolutionary Americans 
began to rethink their humane stance on the treatment of prisoners of war.  In the quest 
for retribution for British misconduct, the distinction between proportional retaliation and 
unbridled vengeance began to erode.  Americans did not abandon their commitment to 
the Enlightenment's culture of restrained warfare over night, however, and many senior 
revolutionary leaders such as George Washington continued to insist that their actions 
conform to the customary practice of war in Europe.  Nonetheless as the conflict dragged 
on, most came to re-imagine their British foes as uncivilized and therefore undeserving of 
the customary protections of European warfare.  Convinced that the British had violated 
the norms of civilized war, the revolutionaries increasingly characterized captured British 
mariners as piratical mercenaries and bloodthirsty barbarians deserving little mercy.  
Viewed as rebels and traitors to their country by the revolutionaries, those American 
loyalists in arms against the glorious cause were considered by many to have no rights at 
all; they might be impressed, jailed, and even executed at their captors' whim.  This 
alteration in how the revolutionaries conceived of their enemies had drastic consequences 
for the treatment of enemy prisoners in American hands.  
  The roots of this shift in American perception can be traced to the 
revolutionaries' rapid mobilization of the press to exploit both real and imagined British 
atrocities for propagandistic purposes.  Hoping to motivate their own forces, as well as to 
persuade the unconvinced of the justice of the American cause, revolutionary printers 
from Savannah to Boston published accounts of British misconduct.  In January 1777, the 
Massachusetts Spy reported that American sailors in British custody in New York were 
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"very sickly and died fast."  The author placed the blame for the men's distress squarely 
on the British, who were guilty of "cruel and barbarous treatment."  Later that month, The 
Connecticut Journal informed its readers about the treatment of “a Gentleman of Honor 
and Distinction, a Prisoner in New-York.”  The article described in vivid detail “the 
distress of the prisoners” and observed that “twenty or thirty die every day, they lie in 
heaps unburied.”  In the opinion of the author, “nothing can stop such treatment but 
retaliation…It is due to the manes of our murdered countrymen.”  According to the 
British commissary of naval prisoners, David Sproat, the allegations were utterly false.  
Radical firebrands painted a picture of British inhumanity in order "to deceive the world 
into a belief of the necessity of using our people [British prisoners], ill."  He feared such 
fictions would "inflame the minds" of the people and encourage the mistreatment of 
British prisoners.  Sproat was right; by the second half of 1777, revolutionary Americans 
clamored for revenge.22 
 Unable to ignore the flood of sorrowful petitions from captured American sailors, 
and facing increasing pressure from constituents to seek retribution, Congress made the 
momentous decision to exact retaliation.  In June 1777, General Washington, on 
Congress's orders, informed the British high command that “Congress most sincerely 
laments the necessity to which they are driven by the cruel policy of their enemies, of 
entering into any resolutions which have any appearance of severity towards those 
prisoners of war who have fallen or may fall into our hands,” however it was “their 
determined resolution to carry into execution the law of retaliation.”  Officially 
sanctioned by Enlightenment jurists such at Vattel, proportional retaliation had deep 
                                                
 22 Massachusetts Spy, January 9th, 1777; Connecticut Journal. January 17th, 1777; New-York 
Gazette, February 12th, 1781.  
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cultural valence in early modern European warfare.  Intended to ensure that both parties 
in a conflict observed the laws and customs of war, the law of retaliation rarely had to be 
enforced; the mere threat of retaliation was often enough to persuade the offending party 
to desist. The revolutionary leadership believed that the British were unlikely to persist in 
their mistreatment of American prisoners if their own countrymen might endure a similar 
fate.  Regrettably for prisoners on both sides, the British ministry had no intention of 
treating the Americans as anything other than rebels and pirates.23   
 Having chosen the path of retaliation, Congress's first course of action was to 
order maritime prisoners in American custody into close confinement.  Aware that the 
crown made no distinction between American sailors captured aboard commissioned 
Continental navy vessels and those who served on privateers or state vessels, Congress 
declared in October 1777 that all British subjects captured by Continental vessels, 
regardless of their belligerent status, were to be deemed congressional prisoners and 
"confined in the gaols" of the state to which they were brought.  Realizing that state 
forces and privateers were responsible for the majority of maritime captures, Congress 
"recommended to the several states to consider and treat" all British maritime prisoners in 
like manner.  For those British officers enjoying the freedom of their paroles, and those 
common seamen at liberty to labor for wages, the order to report to jail must have come 
as a shock.  Unlike captured American sailors who had never known anything but close 
confinement, these British mariners had expected, and largely received, the customary 
treatment due to their rank and station.  By incarcerating these men, many of whom had 
surrendered on the promise of parole and generous treatment, Congress usurped the 
power of its naval officers to conduct capitulations based on their word of honor and 
                                                
 23 Resolve of Congress. June 10th, 1777.  JCC, 8:449-450; Lee, Crowds and Soldiers, 194-96. 
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reneged on its own resolutions to treat captive enemy prisoners with humanity: a clear 
violation of the norms of maritime warfare in Europe.24    
 Congress's sweeping departure from its earlier position did not have the desired 
effect however.  American maritime prisoners continued to endure close captivity on both 
sides of the Atlantic.  When informed of the congressional resolution, Lord George 
Germain countered by issuing a directive to the Royal Governor of New York stipulating 
that "when any prisoners, taken in any rebel privateer, or armed cruizer, shall be brought 
into any of the ports within your government, you do commit them to the common gaol."  
Despite growing domestic pressure in favor of the American prisoners, the British 
ministry would neither recognize Congress for the purposes of negotiating a formal cartel 
of exchange nor amend the High Treason Act to allow the Americans the protections of 
prisoner-of-war status.  If that meant British seamen would see the inside of an American 
jail cell, so be it.  By invoking the law of retaliation, Congress had hoped to ameliorate 
the plight of American prisoners, but by Christmas 1777, the miserable conditions of the 
New York prison hulks showed no sign of improvement.25 
 For many senior revolutionaries, including Continental Commissary General of 
Prisoners Elias Boudinot, the answer was simple: retaliation had not gone far enough.  
Cognizant that the scarcity and the poor quality of provisions was a primary cause of 
complaint among the New York prisoners, Boudinot ordered captured British sailor's 
rations reduced to match the stated two-thirds allotment received by Americans in British 
                                                
 24 JCC, 9:776-7. 
 25 Interestingly, Germain ordered that "the crews of any trading vessels belonging to the 
rebels…must be left at liberty." The revolutionaries were no longer willing to differentiate between 
merchant and armed vessels. Germain did stipulate that American merchant mariners were eligible for 
impressment however. Lord George Germain to the Governor of New York. Whitehall. January 10th, 1778. 
The Parliamentary Register, 11:201-2.  
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captivity.  He informed his deputy, Robert Hooper, "not to suffer the Prisoners to receive 
more than 12 oz of Beef & as much Bread pr Man pr day that being the Quantity the 
Enemy pretend our Prisoners receive."  From the outset of the conflict, British military 
officials maintained that American prisoners required only a two-thirds portion of the 
provisions supplied to active duty British soldiers and sailors; the theory being that their 
sedentary confinement necessitated the consumption of fewer rations.  Published 
prisoners' accounts circulating in the American press claimed that the men rarely, if ever, 
received even that much.  In a missive to Connecticut's commissary of prisoners, Ezekiel 
Williams, Boudinot made his motive abundantly clear.  "The cruel, savage, Treatment 
our Prisoners meet with, calls aloud for this just act of severity."  In Boudinot's mind, the 
British had abandoned accepted standards of the practice of war among "civilized" people 
in favor of "savagery" little better than the conduct of their Native American allies.  
Nonetheless, he refused to abandon the principle of proportional retaliation.  As he 
informed assistant commissary Joshua Mersereau, "we must treat they [sic] as they treat 
us."  Congress confirmed Boudinot's actions on January 21st, 1778.  Henceforth, British 
prisoners would be "subsisted and treated in such manner, as shall render their situation 
similar in all respects to that of the officers and privates who are prisoners with the 
enemy."26 
 Unfortunately for British maritime prisoners in American custody, Congress 
lacked the authority and influence to guarantee that retaliation remained proportional.  
Once Congress opened the door to retaliation, local communities housing enemy 
                                                
 26 Boudinot to Robert Hooper. White Marsh, December 4th, 1777. Boyle, "Their Distress is 
almost intolerable," 55; Boudinot to Ezekiel Williams. White Marsh. December 1st, 1777. Ibid., 53; 
Boudinot to Joshua Mersereau. Valley Forge. December 30th, 1777. Ibid., 68; JCC, 10:80-81.  Congress 
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prisoners often escalated the severity of their response beyond any semblance of 
proportionality.  After all, it was their husbands, children, and neighbors starving aboard 
British prison hulks and suffering in British jails.  A columnist for an English paper 
believed that the abuse was widespread.  He claimed to have "yet to hear of a man 
returned from among them [the Americans], who speaks favourably [sic] of them.  It is 
well known, that boys and mobs are set on to insult and abuse every English prisoner."  
Crowd action was not a novel phenomenon in revolutionary America.  Groups of 
concerned citizens had long gathered, often armed with clubs and cudgels, to regulate the 
morality of their communities, to protest perceived political and economic grievances, 
and to demand extra-legal justice.  It is little wonder that that when confronted with 
British violations of the norms of naval warfare as they understood them, revolutionary 
crowds came to see the British sailors confined in their communities as suitable 
surrogates for retaliatory punishment.  In December 1777, paroled British naval officers 
William Otway and William Brooks became the victims of such a crowd when the people 
of Killingly, Connecticut, vented their anger on these unarmed prisoners.  A state official 
informed Connecticut's governor, Jonathan Trumbull, that the men were "much abused" 
by the Inhabitants.  In their official remonstrance, the prisoners claimed that they were 
"in no measure treated with that Respect and Kindness etc. which is due to Prisoners in 
the hands of their Enemys [sic]," instead they experienced "brutish treatment" from their 
captors who seemed "determined to oppress and injure" them.  Their complaints garnered 
little sympathy from Connecticut revolutionaries.  Outraged at Britain's conduct of the 
war, ordinary Americans were not afraid to express their rage.27 
                                                
 27 New-York Gazette, April 13th, 1778; Lee, Crowds and Soldiers, chapter 1. See also, William 
Pencak, Simon Newman, and Mathew Dennis, eds., Riot and Revelry in Early America (University Park, 
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 Revolutionary fury soared when, in the aftermath of France's entry into the war, 
British military and naval authorities openly encouraged loyal Americans to take to the 
sea to plunder and harass their rebellious neighbors.  Unfettered by naval regulations, 
loyalists waged a destructive campaign largely devoid of the civilities of European naval 
warfare.  Forced from their homes, persecuted by revolutionary committees, and stymied 
by British authorities for years, loyalist privateers had every motive for vengeance.  To 
the revolutionaries, who by now had ample evidence of British cruelty, these "tory 
pirates" were further proof of the British ministry's abandonment of "civilized" warfare.  
In the eyes of their enemies, by becoming "Pirates, Robbers & Murderers," the loyalists 
transformed themselves into "Barbarians."  One enraged whig, writing under the 
pseudonym "An Enemy to Tories," wondered rhetorically, "Can any Infliction of 
Punishment (though ever so severe) be called too Cruel" for loyalists?  In his estimation, 
those Americans still loyal to the king were "Vermine" [sic] who deserved "the Halter."  
A Connecticut revolutionary was even more adamant in his denunciation of loyalist 
privateers.  Upon hearing that a loyalist captain sailing from Halifax had impressed 
several Americans and forced them to fight and die for the crown, he enjoined his 
countrymen to "let your JUSTICE whet her Sword to Revenge the innocent Blood of 
your murdered Children."  No wonder that from the perspective of many state 
governments, now deeply mired in their own civil wars, loyalist privateers looked more 
like criminals and traitors than legitimate enemy combatants.28 
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 Although there was no national law defining treason or its punishments during the 
war, soon after independence each new state passed acts criminalizing loyalty to King 
George.  Punishments varied widely from fines and banishment to imprisonment and 
execution.  In the case of captured loyalist privateers, however, the revolutionaries' 
response was fairly uniform.  If granted quarter in the first place, which was by no means 
a fait accompli, loyalist sailors would usually be turned over to local civil authorities 
rather than military commissaries.  Congress confirmed this policy in December 1777 by 
ordering that all "inhabitants of any of these United States, who…join the enemy" should 
be handed over to their respective states to be "confined in close gaols" and "dealt with 
agreeable to the laws thereof."29   
 Because Congress relinquished the authority to administer captured loyalists, 
loyalist sailors were often at the mercy of local officials bearing private grudges, dolling 
out vigilante justice at will.  The experience of Jonathan Hayes, the loyalist prize master 
of the privateer ship Jack in the Lanthorn, was typical.  Captured in 1781, Maryland 
officials deprived him of his supplementary apparel and threw him into "the most Dismal 
Goal in America" where he subsisted on "5 ounces of pork" and "8 oz flower [sic]" per 
day: a quantity far below the two-thirds share the Continental commissaries allotted to 
prisoners of war for the purpose of retaliation.  Some days he received nothing at all.  His 
circumstances improved little when he was transferred to Fort Frederick.  Marching 
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upwards of thirty-five miles a day—often in the driving rain— he and his crewmembers 
were "lock'd up in a small Dark Room not half big Enough for us [to] lay…on the stone" 
at night.  Once arrived at the fort, which he described as "the Most Dismal place that Ever 
Eyes beheld full of Durt [sic] vermin & Every[thing] Disagreeable to Humain [sic] Bein 
[sic]," his rations were reduced once more.  Now denied any protein or vegetables, the 
loyalist sailors were forced to pick herbs "to Eat with the flower [sic]" in order to survive.  
Although Hayes requested to be treated as an officer and a gentleman, he remained 
imprisoned "with out [sic] Distinction amongst Common prisoners and Neagros [sic]," 
bereft of adequate nutrition, and "Espos'd [sic] to all sorts of weather."  Because Hayes 
was American born, and thus a traitor to his country according to the revolutionaries, he 
was forced to endure "Nuisances too much for the human shell to bear" for the remainder 
of the war.30   
 Some loyalist sailors had more to fear than prolonged confinement in pestilential 
prisons.  Once in state custody, these men could face trial for treason or piracy. When an 
American privateer commanded by James Montgomery captured the loyalist brig 
Impertinent in 1779, Montgomery turned over the vessel's captain, Jacob Getcheus, along 
with several of her crew, to civil authorities in Philadelphia.  Having accepted Getcheus' 
surrender and treated him as officer and prisoner of war, Montgomery hoped that state 
officials would liberate the man on parole.  The Philadelphia Council of Safety had other 
ideas.  The officers and principal crewmen of the Impertinent would face trial by the 
civilian court of Oyer and Terminer for waging "War & Rebellion" against the state as 
"Traitors & Rebels."  Although the Chief Justice of Pennsylvania, Thomas McKean, 
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considered the issue of loyalist privateers an "unprecedented and doubtful case" and 
argued that "all late inhabitants of this state taken in open war" should be considered 
"prisoners of war," he also believed that "traitors, pirates, &c., offending upon the Sea" 
should be "tried for the same in any court of Oyer & Terminer."  Possessed of a British 
letter of marque, Getcheus believed he could "be Considered in no other light but as 
prisoner of war" and thus he deserved to be exchanged according to "the Custom of 
Nations."  Unsure of how to proceed, the Council remanded him to confinement for the 
simple reason that he had once been an "Inhabitant of this State."  Getcheus, as well as 
his pilot Samuel Saunders, and crewmen Jason Thompson, Zachariah Hutchins, Charles 
McClain, and John McDonald, were confined for nearly a year before they were finally 
paroled to New York.31     
 Others were not so fortunate.  Upon his capture in the winter of 1781, Levin 
Disharoon was stripped of all his belongings and "committed to Goal" while the 
Maryland General Court considered his case.  Despite the fact that he had earlier been 
paroled by a congressional commissary, Maryland officials found him guilty of serving 
aboard the loyalist schooner the Cat, commanded by John Dempsey of New York.  In the 
court's opinion, Disharoon was a "Traitor and Rebel against the State of Maryland."  For 
his crimes against the state, Disharoon was sentenced to suffer the customary English 
punishment for traitors: he was "hanged by the Neck" until barely alive, his intestines 
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were "taken out and burnt before his face," and mercifully "his head cut off and his body 
divided into four Quarters."  Because he was an American who refused to embrace the 
blessings of liberty, Disharoon represented an existential threat to the revolutionary cause 
by openly espousing an alternate vision for America's future.  In the eyes of the 
revolutionaries after independence, those Americans in arms for the king merited the fate 
of traitors, rebels, and pirates, not prisoners of war entitled to the protections of the laws 
of nations and humanity.32 
 After Congress's October 1777 order to confine all naval prisoners, it was not 
only loyalists who faced rigorous imprisonment in American custody.  When word of the 
resolution reached the maritime communities of New England, state governments seized 
the opportunity to exact vengeance for the myriad wrongs committed against their sailors 
by the British. The Connecticut General Assembly wasted no time in empowering 
Commissary Williams to ready a prison ship to house maritime prisoners.  The governor 
of Connecticut, Jonathan Trumbull, had heard in early November that British occupying 
forces in Newport had confined "a great number of the Inhabitants of Newport…on board 
prison ships."  His informant, Thomas Shaw, believed that the revolutionaries were 
"obliged by the sufferings of our unfortunate friends, on board their Prison ships" to 
"confine our prisoners in like manner.”  If American seamen, soldiers, and civilians were 
to languish on board prison ships, so too would the subjects of the crown.  On Trumbull's 
orders, Commissary Williams began converting an antiquated Dutch merchant ship for 
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the purpose.  Williams was confident that the ship could "be fitted out for the reception of 
5 or 600" prisoners "without a very great Expence [sic]."33   
 While government officials in Connecticut prepared their floating prison, 
Massachusetts authorities in Boston ordered British seamen onto prison ships every bit as 
crowded, fetid, and foul as those the British employed in New York.  Long before the 
congressional orders for retaliation, Massachusetts revolutionaries had used prison hulks 
to house suspected loyalists.  As early as April 1777, the Massachusetts Council, without 
congressional approval, had authorized the state Commissary of Prisoners Robert 
Pierpont to prepare the brigantine Rising Empire for the reception of “such Prisoners as 
may be put on board the said Vessel [and] kept secured.”  The initial occupants were 
primarily suspected loyalists, but it was not long before Massachusetts authorities began 
to pack British sailors, soldiers, and Brunswick auxiliaries into the Rising Empire as well.  
The ship was soon filled to capacity, forcing local officials to commission two more 
floating prisons.  By October 1777, the prison ships in Boston harbor were so congested 
that Commissary Robert Pierpont feared insurrection.  He cautioned the Council: “If their 
[sic] is not A large number of Men to guard the Prison Ships in this Harbor that some 
Mischief may soon Arise.”  Pierpont’s warning proved effectual.  Continental army 
General William Heath sent the commissary thirty-six more guards who were “firmly 
attached to the American cause.”  Despite the added security, prisoners on board the 
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Kingston attempted to seize the ship and very nearly made their escape.  The Council 
responded by ordering Pierpont to instruct his guards “on board said ship to fire upon the 
said Prisoners” if they continued to “behave in a very turbulent insolent manner.”34 
 More guards and more threats, however, did not solve the root problem; the 
prison ships were overcrowded, disease-infested, and poorly supplied.  Predictably, the 
conditions on board American prison ships deteriorated quickly, as did the health of the 
prisoners.  According to a group of Canadian prisoners, the captured sailors were in “a 
truly deplorable Situation…quite naked…devoured by Vermin… [and] without the 
Means of cleaning themselves from filth.” Their distress was compounded by the early 
advent of the Boston winter.  They huddled together in the ship’s hold “almost frozen 
without the power of warming themselves.”  The prisoners, who claimed to be “ready to 
perish with hunger,” begged only to “be removed from the Ship, And to be put into some 
place where they may have a fire.” The masters of the prison ships, however, were under 
strict orders “not to permit any Persons to visit the Prisoners, neither are you to suffer 
them to go on Shore, or to write to or receive Messages or Letters from any Persons 
whatever.”  Depriving prisoners of the ability to communicate with friends and relatives 
was unusual in eighteenth-century warfare, but Massachusetts’ revolutionary leadership 
wanted British prisoners to be just as isolated as the American sailors in New York 
harbor.  The Council responded by sending them firewood and candles, but denying their 
request for confinement on land.  Not even the onset of warm weather could alleviate the 
prisoners' sufferings.  The Massachusetts Board of War was informed in August 1778 
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that the prisoners on board the Adams were “subject to great inconvenience, & distress by 
being so closely & early shut down under Deck.”  Rather than allowing them to come 
ashore, the Board of War instructed Captain Doble “to leave the Hatches open when the 
Heat of the Weather may make it necessary.”  Immersed in squalor, the hundreds of 
seamen confined aboard likely found the board's gesture little comfort.35 
 Even British officers, no longer protected by their paroles of honor, were 
crammed below deck with no distinction paid to their exalted social and naval status.  
Midshipman Daniel Dobrée of the HMS Bristol confided to his brother his experiences 
aboard a prison ship in Boston.  “I shall not repeat all the cruel treatment I have met with 
from them: suffice it to say they brought us to this place [Boston], where we are confined 
on board a guardship [sic] with 250 more poor wretches, sailors, soldiers, and Hessians, 
without being suffered to have any communication with the shore.”  Prior to being 
confined, Dobrée was robbed of all his possessions except a threadbare suit of clothes.  
Even for an experienced mariner like Dobrée, enduring a Boston winter without the 
benefit of a fire or warm clothing must have been arduous.  Dobrée was not alone 
however.  By 1778, British naval officers could no longer count on receiving the relative 
freedom and hospitality enjoyed by captive officers on parole in Massachusetts in 1775 
and 1776.36  
 Merchant marine officers were little better off.  Despite British orders to release 
all American merchant mariners, the officers of British commercial vessels were 
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consigned to the prison ships.  Henry Shirley, a merchant ship's officer who had been 
paroled by Governor Trumbull, was seized in early September 1778 and "confined in a 
small cabbin [sic], about 10 feet square, nearly filled with trunks & other Baggage, (& 
where 30 people are obliged to sleep)."  He and his comrades were denied "meat, drink, 
Bedding or Cloathing."  Joseph Henderson, an assistant commissary of prisoners for 
Massachusetts, admitted that the room was "so crowded that its impossible for them to 
Lay down."  Shirley could not understand why the Council would want "to treat, so 
severely, Gentlemen who have not broken their Parole."  For the Massachusetts' Council, 
these sailors' imprisonment was symbolic.  The Council was under great pressure from 
constituents to exact revenge upon British seamen for the hardships American sailors 
endured on board British prison ships. The American Commissioners to the Court of 
France summarized the popular American opinion in December 1777: “They [The 
Americans] have wished that this war, into which they entered with reluctance, might be 
distinguished by the humanity with which it was conducted,” but the British treatment of 
American prisoners required them “to make ample retaliation upon the numerous 
prisoners of all ranks in their possession.”  The American commissioners felt justified in 
their conduct because Britain had abandoned “every rule of war among civilized 
nations.”37 
 Unlike the British, who controlled only the port cities of New York, Philadelphia, 
and Newport at this time, the revolutionaries possessed the vast expanse of the interior of 
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the continent in which to confine British maritime prisoners.  Washington had earlier 
advocated that British seamen be removed to inland towns where they could be more 
easily provisioned and quartered.  Within the first year of the war, the revolutionaries had 
established detention facilities in the Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia backcountry 
that could have housed British and loyalist sailors but instead were reserved primarily for 
terrestrial prisoners.  Prison ships were neither an economic nor a military necessity for 
the revolutionaries, their primary purpose was vengeance.  By 1779, Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, New York, Virginia, and South Carolina were all confining enemy prisoners 
on board prison ships.38 
 Although Congress had not initiated the use of prison ships, Commissary General 
Boudinot approved of their usage for the purpose of retaliation.  Having seen first hand 
"the cruel & unprecedented sufferings of the American Prisoners…on board the prison 
ships in New York," in June 1778 Boudinot was more convinced than ever of "the 
propriety of retaliation."  For a man who had boasted only a year before that "humanity to 
Prisoners of War has ever been the peculiar Characteristic of the american [sic] Army," 
such a change of heart is telling.  Like his colleagues in Congress, Boudinot had had 
enough of British atrocities compounded by false promises, denials, and excuses.  Only 
swift and harsh action would bring them to heed American protests.   That month 
Boudinot informed British authorities that in light of their treatment of American sailors, 
no further exchanges, either formal or informal, would take place.  Boudinot's orders 
likely pleased Continental navy Commodore William Whipple, who had earlier 
suggested that Congress keep captured British sailors confined “as a security for those of 
                                                
 38 Pierre Van Cortlandt to Brig. General George Clinton. Kingston, NY. June 10th, 1777. NDAR, 
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our People who are sentenced by the British Tyrant & his Infernal Minions to a long 
imprisonment.”  The misery of British prisoners, in Boudinot's opinion, would do more to 
relieve the distress of American prisoners than any strongly worded petition or 
remonstrance. The exasperated commissary hoped that "the complaints of the sufferers" 
would be enough to convince the British to adhere in future to "the laws of Justice or 
humanity."39 
 Not all revolutionaries were as comfortable with retaliation as Boudinot.  When 
handed "orders for Retaliation," Connecticut Commissary Williams initially 
procrastinated, blaming the weather for his dilatory response.  He hoped to delay the 
harsh measures until a general exchange could be effected, liberating the prisoners under 
his care.  Like numerous prior attempts, the cartel of 1778 failed miserably, and Williams 
was forced to confine captured British mariners aboard the prison ship at Norwich.  He 
was soon deluged with protests from the prisoners.  Writing to Boudinot, he confessed 
that "the Complaints have not been altogether groundless."  Upon visiting the hulk, 
Williams discovered that many of the prisoners were "sick and Blind."  The guards often 
deprived the prisoners of the full allotment of their already reduced rations, and the men 
were "very naked, & greatly in want of cloathing [sic]."  Six prisoners perished within a 
month of confinement and a "Great part" of the rest were "sick, and feable [sic]."  In 
early June, Andrew Huntington, one of Williams' subordinates based at Norwich, 
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informed him that "these Prisoners will Starve to Death" unless provided with adequate 
provisions quickly.  In less than a month, the conditions on board the ship had 
deteriorated to such an extent that one Connecticut revolutionary remarked, "the Misery 
there Exceeds Description."  Repulsed by his role in the prisoners' ordeal, Williams 
prayed that "the necessity of the measure may soon Cease."  As he told Boudinot, 
"Retaliation is hard work."40 
 Most revolutionaries, however, believed the British sailors received exactly what 
they deserved.  To Thomas Shaw of Connecticut, the rigorous confinement "of those 
unhappy wretches in the prison Ship" was absolutely "necessary" in order to teach them 
"the dreadful effects of British cruilty [sic]."  According to privateer captain Alexander 
Dickey, only by "Retaliating on those Tyrants" would the plight of captive American 
sailors ever improve.  Samuel Blachley Webb, himself a survivor of British captivity, 
thought British prisoners should "die as ours do in New York from three to Eight a day."  
In his opinion, Connecticut authorities in charge of the prison ships should "shut them 
close under deck at sunset and starve them on two oz. of pork by day. Cruelty is 
oftentimes productive of the best consequences."  If the British had adhered to the 
normative practice of naval warfare among European powers, none of this would have 
been necessary in their opinion.  Americans had not wanted to fight this way— as one 
New-Jersey columnist explained, "we have borne their cruelty and frauds with a patience 
unparallel'd in history"— but the time to turn the other cheek had passed.  The people of 
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America would be "trampled on no longer."  From now on, "every injury [would] meet 
its proper retaliation."41 
 Retaliation did not end with the prison ships; American privateers, who were the 
principal target of British persecution, were eager to exact retribution.  Aptly named ships 
such as the Retaliation, Revenge, and Reprisal prowled the Atlantic searching for British 
booty and dolling out American vengeance.  Steeped in resentment, revolutionary 
privateers increasingly ignored the customary courtesies of naval warfare.  When the 
British merchant vessel Scipio was captured by Massachusetts' privateers Mars and 
Fanny in early December 1777, the Scipio's crew and passengers were treated “very 
roughly” and the ship plundered.  Later that month, the British transport brig Symmetry 
[sic] ran aground off Wilmington and fell into American hands.  According to a 
passenger, Sergeant George Thompson, the Americans boarded the ship and "made all 
the people on Board Prisoners, violently forcing the prisoners from the Deck of the 
Vessel, into the Long Boat—beating the lame, the Sick and Wounded with Clubs."  
Unsatisfied with the speed with which the prisoners debarked, one American sailor threw 
Thompson and his comrade Adam Grierson overboard.  Unable to swim, Grieson 
drowned, while Thompson narrowly escaped a similar fate.  As their American captors 
shuttled them to shore, the prisoners huddled together in the longboat for warmth, but 
because the Americans had "plundered the prisoners of their Hatts [sic] and Blankets," 
they suffered terribly in the late December air.  Another prisoner, William Savage, "was 
so much Frost Bitten that the Skin and flesh dropped of [sic] his hand and feet."  He soon 
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succumbed to his wounds.  Thompson blamed Savage's death on the "severe treatment" 
he received.  Once ashore, guards hurried the men, along with several women who were 
aboard, to jail where they were closely confined.  Rather than being afforded their parole, 
the brig's officers were "confined in the same apartments with the private Prisoners, and 
subject in every respect to the same treatment."  Thompson reported that 139 men and 
women were promiscuously crowded in jail with only four small kettles to cook their 
meager provisions.42   
 Even vessels sailing under the theoretical protections of continental colors could 
fall victim to voracious American privateers.  In July 1778, the unarmed brigantine 
Elizabeth, proudly sporting the new American flag, was forced to surrender to the 
Marblehead privateer brig Freemason after being riddled by grapeshot at near point blank 
range.  Built in New York, and on an apparent course for the British-occupied city, the 
Elizabeth must have looked suspicious to the Freemason's captain who likely discounted 
the American ensign as a ruse de guerre.  Despite the captured crews' protestations that 
the Elizabeth was in fact owned by "persons friendly & subject to the United States of 
America," the privateers boarded her with drawn cutlasses and "in a barbarous cruel & 
savage like manner, strip'd, beat, & wounded the crew" before putting several of the men 
"to pain & torture" to extract a confession that the ship was in fact bound for New York.  
Were the ship to prove American-owned, the privateers would not only forfeit a lucrative 
prize, they might also face criminal proceedings upon their return to Massachusetts.  
According to the owners of the Elizabeth, loyal revolutionaries and Boston merchants 
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William and Godfrey Hutchinson, the privateers abandoned caution, choosing instead to 
commit "divers[e]… acts of Violence [,] Cruelty & Tyranny… unprecedented but by 
pirates" against the suspected loyalist crew.  Massachusetts authorities must have agreed 
with the aggrieved Boston merchants.  The Elizabeth was not condemned as a lawful 
prize but instead auctioned by her original owners in May 1779.43 
   Unlike the men of the Elizabeth who possessed affluent allies in Boston to argue 
their case, those captured sailors whose loyalty to the crown was not in question were 
prime targets for American recruiters.  Emulating their British adversaries who regularly 
trolled the prison ships of New York and Newport for recruits to augment their ships' 
crews, American privateers had no qualms about impressing British seamen.  Once 
captured, British sailors faced a grim choice: enlist on board an American privateer or 
suffer a rigorous confinement for noncompliance.  Although contrary to the accepted 
practice of naval warfare, the British had openly committed what the American 
Commissioners in Paris described as “the deepest of all crimes:” forcing American 
seamen to take up arms against their countrymen.  While American political and military 
officials admonished the British for this practice, American privateer and Continental 
navy officers regularly encouraged, prodded, and even coerced British prisoners to serve 
on American warships.  The captain of the Massachusetts privateer Speedwell was not 
alone when he “ordered seven of the crew to be put in irons and threatened to keep them 
confined” unless they joined his crew.  Another privateer officer “intered” [sic] William 
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Brown, a British sailor, into his crew only to decide that Brown was a “Dangerous Man” 
who wished to “have the pleasure of stretching our Necks.”  Men like Brown who could 
not be induced to abandon their king were chained and brought to America to be confined 
on the prison ships.  A British merchant sailor in Martinique witnessed “many English 
Sailors in chains, on board the Philadelphia Brig.”  When he inquired “why they were so 
treated, [he] was answered that the Captains of the privateers had orders so to do, and to 
carry, or send all those they should take to America.”  Just like for those American 
prisoners in New York, a rigorous confinement awaited British sailors who did not join 
forces with their foes.44  
 Despite congressional orders for retaliation, those British and loyalist seamen 
captured in European waters were more likely to receive lenient treatment and speedy 
exchange than those taken closer to revolutionary communities bent on revenge.  As late 
as 1779, Continental navy captains sailed to Europe with orders to treat their "prisoners 
with humanity."  After the 1778 French alliance, these orders were more easily carried 
out as Continental vessels refitting in French ports could rely on the assistance of their 
new allies to provide support for prisoners.  Prisoners captured by American navy 
vessels, as well as privateers, now joined those captured by their French counterparts in 
the coastal prisons of France.  Hardly comfortable, these prisons, which had been used to 
house British captives during the imperial wars of the preceding century, were 
nonetheless significantly better constructed, administered, and provisioned than the 
congested jails and prison ships in America. Of signal import to the prisoners, 
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incarceration in a French prison also carried with it the promise of exchange. Under no 
political constraint from treating the French as legitimate combatants, the British 
admiralty willingly traded these men for French prisoners in its custody.  The British 
were even willing to exchange American prisoners, provided the agreement conferred no 
acknowledgement of American independence.  The American Commissioners in France 
headed by Benjamin Franklin worked tirelessly with the British admiralty to release 
hundreds of American sailors from their confinement in England.  Only a 
misunderstanding between Franklin and the French naval minster over who was 
responsible for sending in the British prisoners to be exchanged prevented the wholesale 
release of American captives in Britain.45   
 In North America, the exchange situation could not have been more different.  
The hopes of maritime prisoners on both sides for a general exchange were dashed when 
in March 1778 a conference to establish a cartel ended in failure.  Although the British 
were increasingly anxious to divest themselves of diseased American prisoners and to 
recoup their well-trained sailors and socially prominent officers, Congress, weighing the 
cold calculus of war, concluded that a general exchange was not mutually advantageous 
because those American prisoners whose health had not been shattered by lengthy 
confinement were unlikely to return to their ships to run the risk of a second captivity.  
On the other hand, British soldiers and sailors, trapped on the wrong side of the Atlantic, 
would have little choice but to return to the colors if they ever hoped to see home again. 
Seeking to sabotage the negotiations, Congress resolved that "that no exchange of 
prisoners be made" until the British paid for all of the provisions previously provided to 
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prisoners in American custody, including the expenses of the Convention army.               
Despite being aware that it was Congress not the British that owed the lion's share of 
expenses for prisoner upkeep, Congress insisted that the British reimbursement be paid in 
specie rather than continental currency.  This was a demand Congress knew the British 
would never agree to because the influx of hard cash might stabilize the drastically 
deflated continental dollar and improve Congress's international credit.  The conference 
was effectively over before it had even begun.  No friend of Congress, Alexander 
Hamilton denounced the "refined politicians" for their "Neronian maxims" that 
overstepped their authority and nullified Washington's negotiations.  He believed that 
Congress sought "to put off an exchange, perhaps forever," thus consigning "those men 
who are foremost in defence [sic] of their country to the miseries of hopeless captivity."  
Such civilian meddling in military affairs, uncountenanced in European warfare, would 
"ruin our national character."  From Congress's perspective, British violations of the 
customs of war more than justified the subterfuge.  Although not a matter of military 
necessity, derailing the cartel was certainly in the best interests of the new nation.  As the 
congressional committee tasked with reviewing the cartel informed Washington, "Interest 
alone (and not Principles of justice or Humanity) governs Men."  A far cry from its 
earlier professed commitment to the humanitarian underpinnings of "civilized warfare," 
Congress was now willing to let prisoners on both sides suffer in silence with little hope 
of release.  Fortunately for the prisoners, Congress, largely impotent at the local level, 
could not prevent state officials from taking matters into their own hands.46  
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 With Congress blocking a general exchange, state governments realized that the 
only prospect of seeing their captured constituents released was through informal, 
individual exchanges.  Naturally preferring to reclaim men from their own communities, 
these governments pressed their privateer fleets to bring in prisoners for exchange.  
Privateer captains, who had previously preferred to release their captives on parole, were 
now induced to hold the prisoners in the hopes of redeeming their friends, crewmen, and 
countrymen.  Predictably, social status and personal connections played a considerable 
role in determining who was exchanged when.  Captured officers or elite passengers with 
prominent friends who could pester governors and state commissaries on their behalf 
were far more likely to be exchanged than common seamen.  This practice infuriated 
Washington, who from the beginning of the contest sought to exchange men based on 
length of captivity, not social prominence.  In his opinion, state-sponsored exchanges 
should be "soon abolished" as "the system has been productive…of great inconveniences 
and discontents."  Congress, however, could not oblige the general without meddling in 
state affairs and thus repudiating the very republican principals upon which it was 
founded.  The best it could do was pass a resolution in early 1780 that "earnestly 
recommended" the suspension of state exchanges.  Unsurprisingly, state officials 
continued to do as they pleased.  But without an established cartel or routinized system of 
exchanging prisoners, enemy seamen began to accumulate in America's port cities at an 
alarming rate.47 
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 The revolutionary capital of Philadelphia was no exception.  Within a short walk 
of congressional meeting halls, British sailors clung to life in Philadelphia's New Jail.  
The prison's name belied the deplorable conditions found inside its walls.  Used by the 
British to confine American prisoners during the city's occupation, the jail had been the 
scene of manifold agonies.  Poor provisions, lack of sanitation, and overcrowding 
resulted in untold deaths from disease, privation, and exposure in the winter of 1777-
1778.  With Philadelphia once more in American hands in the fall of 1778, only the 
political allegiance of the jail's occupants changed when American authorities began to 
confine British prisoners in the now dilapidated prison.  Captured by Pennsylvania state 
forces in November 1778, the crew of the British Sloop Hotham soon found themselves 
locked inside the New Jail, "destitute of almost every kind of Cloaths [sic], without even 
Blankets to cover them from the inclemency of the night."  Summarizing their "distress'd 
situation," the crew's commander, Lieutenant Christopher Hale, noted that "several of the 
crew are already Ill the rest will naturally fall as nature cannot possibly support" so harsh 
a confinement.  Pennsylvania's commissary of naval prisoners, Thomas Bradford, who 
was responsible for Hale's imprisonment, confined the men with the approbation of 
Congress's new Commissary General of Prisoners, Jonathan Beatty, who had replaced 
Boudinot in the summer of 1778.  Within weeks of accepting his new position, Beatty 
suggested to Bradford that he closely confine "any of the sea officers or sailors" in his 
custody who might become "impudent."  Bradford took his advice to the extreme.  All of 
the maritime prisoners were crowded together in three of the jail's rooms, deprived even 
of a daily stroll in the prison yard.48   
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 Loyalists in New York were outraged.  While American papers boasted of the 
revolutionaries' "heroism, generosity, and sentiment," British "sailors, taken by [rebel] 
pirates" were "abandoned in places where they have no acquaintance, protector, or 
friend," according to the New-York Gazette.   Such was the "enthusiastic hatred raised 
against" the prisoners that no one could "shew [sic] them even common civility, for fear 
of persecution" by rebel "mobs."  Hardly the proportional retaliation legitimized by the 
laws of war in Europe, this mistreatment was particularly galling because conditions 
aboard British prison ships had much improved in the wake of the appointment of Sir 
Henry Clinton as the new crown commander in the colonies.  The ships remained 
crowded and disease was unavoidable, but according to an American privateer confined 
aboard the Jersey, then serving as a hospital, in 1779, the prisoners "are treated 
Extremely Well by the officers here…& live Very Happy together."  He and his fellow 
captives had the pleasure of going "ashore almost Every Day" to get exercise and 
consequently they were "Very Healthy… (Not a Man sick)."  To the loyalists, it looked 
as if the revolutionaries were using the British prison ships as a pretext to indulge their 
innate cruelty. When informed that privateer Captain James Duncan and Royal navy 
Captain Hawker were "kept close confined in a dirty durance" in Philadelphia and fed 
only "rations of salt provisions," a loyalist correspondent for the Royal Gazette— who 
claimed that the only American sailor of captain's rank in the city enjoyed a indulgent 
parole— demanded that the Americans take a lesson from "the sensibility and lenity of 
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our government to the rebel officers who have become prisoners" and "Reform this 
altogether."49   
 Lenience was not the lesson Congress had learned from the British.  With famed 
American privateer Gustavus Conyngham chained in England under charges of piracy in 
early 1779, the congressional Marine Committee approached Pennsylvania's commissary 
Bradford for a suitable subject for retaliation. Bradford had just the man: Lieutenant 
Christopher Hale of the Hotham.  Hale, whose commission from King George should 
have entitled him to lenient terms under his parole of honor according to the customs of 
European naval warfare, was already closely confined in a noxious cell among common 
sailors without "the smallest hope of an Exchange” when Bradford came for him.  Rather 
than allowing the lieutenant to go into New York on his parole to arrange his exchange, 
Bradford, on Congress's instructions, shackled Hale in solitary confinement in the jail's 
dungeon.  Only Conynham's eventual escape from an English prison convinced Congress 
to relax the severity of Hale's confinement.  To Commissary Beatty, no stranger to the 
law of retaliation, Congress's actions seemed "so harsh like obstinacy."  He feared "it will 
produce some bad effects in the Line of naval Prisoners."50 
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 New to his post, what Beatty could not understand was that by the summer of 
1779, Congress was convinced that cruelty was the only language the British understood.  
Daily petitioned by suffering seamen in New York and constantly apprised of the 
depredations of loyalist privateers, Congress was now officially prepared to fight British 
fire with fire.  On July 15th, 1779, Congress ordered the Marine Committee “to cause the 
crews of vessels captured from the enemy, to be confined on board prison ships, and 
supplied and treated in all respects in the same manner as the crews of vessels belonging 
to these United States and captured by the enemy, are supplied and treated.”  
Congressional exchanges of maritime prisoners ground to a halt as British sailors were 
funneled into prison ships and jails for the purpose of retaliation.  Even before the July 
resolution, Congress had discouraged exchanges, preventing Commissary Beatty from 
meeting his obligation to his British counterpart.  Beatty thought "the conduct of 
Congress in this particular" was "preposterous."  Without "full & impartial Exchanges of 
all Sea prisoners," the American captives in New York would have "no other alternative 
before them than entering the enemy's service or starving to death in a loathsome prison 
ship."  The men were "neglected by their countrymen, their employers & the public."  
Beatty was in the minority.  By late June 1779, most ardent revolutionaries agreed with a 
correspondent for the Virginia Gazette who exhorted his countrymen "to wreck your 
vengeance upon an enemy the most barbarous and cruel."  He was confident that 
"indignation shall hurry us to action."  A Connecticut paper proudly predicted that 
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American "retaliation" and "vengeance" would soon make the British "repent in tears of 
blood!"51 
 Predictably, when congressionally sanctioned retaliation became the order of the 
day, local revolutionary officials turned a blind eye to their prisoners' misery like never 
before and the allegations of American mistreatment of British sailors proliferated.  In 
November 1779, British privateers complained to the Board of War that “they were 
confined in the Prison Ships & extremely ill treated.”  In a similar vein, Captain Ourry of 
the HMS Somerset reported that he experienced "ill usage" during his confinement in 
"Boston harbour on board a Prison Ship which had no Cabin Windows, very Cold 
Weather, and without any furniture or Comfort."  Ourry was fortunate to escape.  The 
situation in American jails and prison ships continued to deteriorate as the war dragged 
on.  Congressional and state orders for retaliation only served to exacerbate omnipresent 
provision shortages and overcrowding.  When the Massachusetts Council gave orders 
"for Curtailing Rations for Prisoners on board [the] Guard Ships," the state commissary 
of prisoners, Joshua Henderson, was forced to admit that "for three Months past it has 
been out of the Commissary Genl's power to furnish [them] with half the stipulated 
Rations not having them in his Possession."  The British sailors survived on "Salt Beef & 
Bread" alone.  Rather than ameliorating the prisoners' plight by improving their supply of 
food, the Council sent Henderson "fifty pair of Hand Cuffs for the Prisoners on Board the 
Guard Ship as also fifty fathom of Rope" to bind the prisoners should hunger make them 
unruly.52 
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 Unfortunately for the captured British seamen, the severity of their confinement 
did not slacken with the passage of time.  In September 1780, the newly established 
American Board of Admiralty demanded that the “the same severe discipline which the 
British use with regard to our men” be employed against the maritime prisoners on board 
the prison ships.  They hoped these measures would “suppress their refractory sprits” and 
“prevent their doing mischief.”  The prisoners' predicament was so perilous that the 
British Commissary of Naval Prisoners, David Sproat, who understandably had been 
largely silent on the issue of prisoner treatment previously, admonished Thomas Bradford 
that “there are more complaints of ill treatment received in Philadelphia, than from all the 
other places in the Country.”  Sproat begged Bradford “to use the prisoners with a little 
more delicacy,” and ended with the thinly veiled threat that Bradford should remember 
that “the old Golden rule was to ‘do as you would be done by.’”  If the revolutionaries 
still hoped that retaliation would end the suffering of their prisoners, they would be 
disappointed.  Abuse only begat more abuse.53 
 The British, however, had a plan to end the odious cycle of retaliation.  While 
Congress continued to demand retribution and capricious committees and commissaries 
vented their frustrations on British sailors in their custody, the British proposed an 
exchange, in Commissary Sproat's words, "for humanity's sake," that might finally prove 
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mutually beneficial.  The war at sea had been going Britain's way, and the British high 
command in New York found itself in possession of far too many American mariners to 
adequately quarter and provision without remuneration from Congress.  Aware that the 
bulk of British and loyalist seamen were held under the jurisdiction of individual states 
rather than the Continental Congress, Sproat devised a proposal in January 1781 to 
alleviate the distress of prisoners on both sides; he would offer to accept British soldiers 
in return for American privateers.  Congress still detained enough enemy soldiers under 
the Convention of Saratoga to liberate every American sailor in New York.  For the time 
being, Sproat would even overlook Congress's debt.  Knowing that without proper 
clothes, blankets, and provisions, the American sailors would suffer "from the hardships 
of the then approaching winter," Sproat hoped "to free as many as possible."  Despite the 
seeming equitability of his offer, Congress had no intention of acceding to it.  In its 
collective opinion, the return of General Burgoyne's veteran regiments for a pack of 
mercenary adventurers was a bad bargain.  Given the military situation in the winter of 
1781— Pennsylvania troops had mutinied in early January and France's expeditionary 
force in Rhode Island had shown no sign of offensive alacrity— Congress's decision 
makes sense.  Yet even a year later, with thousands more British soldiers in American 
custody after the capitulation of Cornwallis, Congress remained unwilling to agree to the 
British proposition.  Although Washington deeply regretted "the situation of these 
unfortunate people," in his opinion, "Mr. Sproat's proposition" was simply not in the best 
interest of "the public good."  The return of Burgoyne's troops might turn the tide in 
Britain's favor. There would be no exchange.54 
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 Outraged at being accused of deliberately murdering American maritime 
prisoners while Congress refused the only practical solution for their relief, Sproat went 
on the offensive.  He informed the American prisoners aboard the Jersey prison hulk that 
he would gladly "grant you speedy relief, by exchanging you for a part of the British 
soldiers, prisoners" of Congress, but that American authorities responded with "a flat 
denial."  Not only was Congress to blame for the American naval prisoners' misfortune, 
the revolutionaries were likewise guilty of gross mistreatment of British prisoners under 
the spurious pretence of reciprocity.  Writing to Bradford, Sproat blamed the Americans 
for forcing British marine prisoners to march "five or six hundred miles" from prison to 
prison while all time depriving them of adequate sustenance.  He scathingly reproached 
the American commissary: "Bread and water is the subsistence of Felons Sir, and our 
prisoners with you have been fed upon that alone."  Sproat followed up his private 
complaints with a widely published letter to the new Continental Commissary General of 
Prisoners, Abraham Skinner, in which he accused the Americans of treating loyalist 
privateers "with every species of insult, outrage and cruelties' sufficient to disgrace any 
nation beyond the mountains." Not even Jacobite Scottish highlanders had been guilty of 
such inhumanity. Through their treatment of British prisoners, under the guise of "an 
exercise of the law of retaliation," the revolutionaries abrogated any claim to being a 
"civilized" nation in his opinion.55  
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 There was much truth to Sproat's accusations.  With little hope of exchanging 
British maritime prisoners in light of Congress's resolution, state and congressional 
commissaries shuttled the captives from one prison to the next to spread the burden of 
provisioning them, losing men to disease, privation, and escape along the way.  In July 
1781, Congress's deputy commissary of prisoners in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, informed 
Bradford that he planned to send most of his "Marine Prisoners" to Philadelphia because 
the camp was "most horridly crouded [sic]…the Prisoners very sickly."  Once arrived in 
the city, these men were jammed into the New Jail.  Even if he had been so inclined, 
Bradford could not release either the officers on parole or the men on their own 
recognizance to labor for local craftsmen because he had orders from the congressional 
Board of War to "confine all naval prisoners of war of whatever description in close Jail."  
According to the British commissary of prisoners in Bermuda, two privateer captains, 
who spent the summer of 1781 incarcerated in the American capital, were "treated with 
such Severity—as to have been kept several weeks with hardly a sufficiency of provision 
to sustain them and that of the very worst kind."  Unwilling to accept any personal 
responsibility for either the treatment of British prisoners in his custody or the American 
seamen in New York awaiting an exchange that would never come, Bradford placed the 
blame on the British and "their cruel treatment of our prisoners."  In his opinion, British 
action justified "a severe Retaliation on the heads of some poor unfortunates, who may 
fall into our hands."  For the remainder of the war, ardent revolutionaries like Bradford 
continued to insist that the prisoners' misfortune stemmed from British "savagery" not 
American intransigence and that retaliation was the only means of obtaining redress.  Yet 
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even Bradford knew that Congress's obstinacy in matters of exchange had "proved fatal 
to a number of our poor Seamen."56   
 Relief finally arrived for the unfortunate sailors in New York when the new 
British commander, Sir Guy Carleton, received word in July 1782 that Parliament, 
realizing that military victory was improbable, had relented to American demands and 
granted American captives official prisoner-of-war status.  With this impediment to an 
exchange removed, Carleton immediately reached out to his American counterparts to 
implement a general cartel.  While he awaited a commission from General Washington, 
Carleton liberated hundreds of American seamen as a show of good faith.   Hundreds 
more American sailors left jails in Britain and the West Indies as freemen for the first 
time in years.  British authorities were confident that the Americans would return an 
equal number of the king's men.  No longer seeking to suppress the rebellion, Carleton's 
only concern was to extricate as many British soldiers and sailors as possible from 
American custody.57 
 Congress was unimpressed.  Fearing that the British would use these unilateral 
prisoner releases to avoid paying the debts accrued for the upkeep of British prisoners in 
American custody, Congress informed Washington that he was forbidden to free any 
British prisoners until Carleton agreed to remuneration.  Without the authority or funds to 
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acquiesce to Congress's demands, all Carleton could do was propose a general exchange, 
man for man.  Just as in all prior exchange conferences, when the commissioners from 
both sides met in late September, the negotiations immediately broke down.  Carleton 
was convinced that the Americans had never had any intention of exchanging the 
prisoners; they planned to hold the men as hostages to guarantee that Parliament would 
recognize the new nation's independence.  Exacerbating an already precarious situation, 
Congress resolved to threaten Carleton that if prompt payment were not soon made, 
"Congress would be compelled to take measures however disagreeable, for diminishing a 
burthen which has become intolerable."  Carleton got the hint, if he did not pay up, the 
British prisoners' rations and other necessaries would be further reduced.  Incensed, the 
British general accused Washington of violating the customs of war: "It has not been 
usual I think, since the barbarous ages to use any menaces, however obscure, towards 
prisoners and still less to practice towards them any acts of barbarity."  By refusing to 
release British prisoners when so many Americans had been sent home, Congress 
appeared to intend "to bring the war to the last extremities of rage."  He had no choice but 
to cease releasing American prisoners.  Relinquishing the hope of ever obtaining the 
prisoners through exchange, Carleton requested and received permission to send them 
sorely needed supplies.  When thirty-eight wagonloads of provisions were seized by 
Pennsylvania militia forces in April 1783, neither Congress nor the Pennsylvania 
Assembly could do anything about it.  The prisoners would simply have to do without.  
Fortunately, they would not have to endure for long.58 
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 When word of the articles of peace ordering the mutual release of prisoners 
reached New York in April 1783, both sides opened the hatches of their hulks and 
unbarred the doors of their jails.  For the hundreds of British and American sailors still 
languishing in prison, their ordeal was finally over.  These were the fortunate few; 
thousands more would never return from captivity.  Because of the decentralized 
character of revolutionary prisoner administration, we will never know how many British 
and loyalist seamen suffered and perished in American custody. It is clear, however, that 
the cycle of violence continued until the very end, costing the lives of countless prisoners 
who so easily could have been exchanged had both Congress and Parliament privileged 
humanitarian concerns over national pride and material advantage.  Long after Cornwallis 
surrendered at Yorktown, neither the Americans nor the British forswore the use of 
prison ships and neither side made a concerted effort to alleviate the sufferings of the 
maritime prisoners in their hands.59 
 Revolutionary Americans' initial commitment to the humane treatment of enemy 
prisoners of war was no mere rhetoric however.  Scholars are correct to highlight how the 
deeply-engrained conceptions of Enlightenment humanitarianism and the laws of nations 
conditioned American thinking about the conduct of war between "civilized peoples."  
Nonetheless, in stressing this point, they have often ignored or glossed over just how 
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easily this commitment eroded when war began.  In light of how devoted elite 
revolutionaries were to upholding European customs of war at the conflict's outset, this 
oversight is unsurprising.  At its inception, the revolutionaries themselves could never 
have imagined the violence of the war that would ensue.  Despite a keen awareness of the 
British military's prior suppression of rebellions among the Irish, Scots, and native 
peoples of North America, they were unprepared for the severity with which the British 
forces prosecuted the war.  Unlike these former groups whose customs, languages, and 
religions made them alien to their British opponents, Americans thought of themselves as 
Englishmen, and by extension members of the "civilized" world.  Their grievances 
required the resort to violence, but that violence would be limited to the clash of arms in 
battle.60 
 Once Parliament declared American combatants traitors and pirates beyond the 
protections of either English law or prisoner-of-war status, however, the revolutionaries 
authorities responded not by reaffirming their dedication to the restraint of violence as 
enshrined in the Enlightenment customs of the laws of war, but by declaring the British 
"barbarians" and loyal Americans "rebels."  Reconceived in this way, British maritime 
prisoners became ideal targets for retaliation.  Legitimized by congressional resolve, the 
policy of retaliation soon spiraled well beyond Congress's initial intent.  Outraged by the 
British mistreatment of American sailors, ordinary Americans vented their frustrations on 
enemy seamen.  Even when revolutionary officials sought to improve prisoners' 
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conditions and to reaffirm the nation's commitment to the customs of war in Europe, 
Congress's reluctance to compromise either political or military advantage prevented the 
optimal solution: a large-scale informal exchange.  Held with little prospect of release in 
increasingly deplorable conditions, enemy mariners were at the mercy of local 
administrators, largely independent of congressional oversight.  This confluence of 
factors created a climate of persecution and vengeance unthinkable when the first 
American vessels brought the war to the high seas in 1775.  Although America’s political 
and military leaders escalated the severity of their treatment of enemy sailors in order to 
induce the British to conform to the customary practices of prisoner treatment in 
European naval warfare, by war's end the distinction on the ground between America's 




The Memory of War 
 
 
 In the years after 1783, revolutionary Americans of all stripes sought to put the 
war's violence behind them.  George Washington and his generals resigned their 
commissions, and Congress disbanded the Continental army soon after the peace treaty's 
ratification.  The men who had survived British captivity in New York, Philadelphia, 
Newport, Charleston, Canada, and Britain itself, returned to their homes to ply their 
peacetime trades.  Sailors took to the seas without fear of capture and farmers returned to 
their fields unburdened by the threat of British patrols or loyalist marauders.  No longer 
occupying their cities and imprisoning their citizens, the British now seemed innocuous 
to most Americans.  Trade with their former tormentors soon resumed, and Americans 
once again read British books, wore British woolens, and drank British tea.  In the now 
peaceful United States, even former loyalists could be forgiven.  Defeated and 
dispossessed, the loyalists looked like objects of pity, not prosecution.  All of the states 
soon passed laws pardoning those people they had once so vigorously persecuted.  The 
memory of British and loyalist atrocities, as well as American acts of retaliation and 
retribution, began to fade.1 
 Nonetheless, elite revolutionaries remained uneasy about the war and their role in 
its violence.  Having taken to arms to defend their inalienable rights, men like George 
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Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and Nathanael Greene had believed that the manner in 
which the war would be fought would reflect the justice of their grievances, the nobility 
of their cause, and the legitimacy and civility of their new nation in the eyes of their 
European peers.  They were soon disappointed.  The realities of the war looked nothing 
like their idealized vision of restrained and decorous European combat.  No believers in 
perpetual peace, the revolution's leaders were determined that this would never happen 
again.  In future, vengeance would have no place in America's wars. 
 In September 1784, Jefferson sketched a series of rules for the future conduct of 
war, and especially the treatment of prisoners, in his draft of a model "treaty of Amity 
and Commerce" between the United States and the kingdom of Denmark.  Far more than 
a straightforward trade agreement, Jefferson's treaty was nothing short of a repudiation of 
the way America's independence had been won.  Article 24 of the document— the 
longest and most detailed article in the draft— forbade either nation from confining 
prisoners "in dungeons, prisonships [sic], nor prisons" in times of war between the two 
powers.  Once captured, the enlisted men were not to "be put into irons, nor bound, nor 
otherwise restrained in the use of the[ir] limbs," and the officers were to "be enlarged on 
their paroles within convenient districts and have comfortable quarters."  Both sides 
would furnish their prisoners with the same "ration[s] as they allow to a common souldier 
[sic] in their own service," the cost of which would be reimbursed equitably at the 
cessation of hostilities.  Most importantly, both nations would "sacredly" uphold the 
treaty and under no pretense violate its articles.  Bad behavior by one side did not justify 
retaliation by the other.  This was a significant departure from Vattel's The Law of 
Nations, which authorized proportional retaliation in cases of gross violation.  Unlike the 
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mid-eighteenth-century Swiss jurist, Jefferson made no allowance for retaliation, no 
matter the provocation.2  
 While serving as governor of Virginia during the war, Jefferson had seen first-
hand how easily proportional retaliation could devolve into a violent cycle of vengeance.  
He had personally ordered British officers to be chained and locked in dank and 
overcrowded prisons.  He had sent loyalist civilians and British enlisted men to their 
deaths aboard disease-infested prison ships. And he had refused to supply the prisoners of 
the Convention army with anything resembling rations equal to those received by 
American soldiers.  Jefferson had fought a war of vengeance, he knew its horrors, and he 
never wanted his countrymen, or their opponents, to endure it again.  Inexplicably, 
Article 24 was not included in the final treaty with Denmark, but it was reintroduced and 
agreed to in the 1785 treaty between the United States and the kingdom of Prussia.  
Defending the inclusion of the article to Prussian envoy, Baron Friedrich Wilhelm von 
Thulemeier, Jefferson and his fellow commissioners, Benjamin Franklin and John 
Adams, asked: "Why should not this Law of Nations go on improving?"  In their opinion, 
though still necessary for adjudicating national disputes, war could be further moderated 
"by softening and diminishing" its "calamities."  Though the treaty was popular, for many 
in the new republic, lessening the severity of future wars was not enough; the war of the 
revolution itself had to be re-imagined.3 
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The Capture of the Hessians at Trenton, by Jonathan Trumbull  
Yale University Art Gallery 
 
 In the late 1780s and early 90s, believing the brutality of retaliatory warfare 
behind them, elite Americans crafted a narrative of their revolution as a glorious conflict 
between virtuously inspired republican Americans and wrongheaded, though civilized 
and refined, British professionals.  British and Hessian officers were no longer portrayed 
as barbarians beyond the pale of civilization, but instead as the innocent tools of a corrupt 
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British ministry.  In this re-imagination, the war was limited, restrained, and moderate; its 
violence was safely enacted under the watchful eye of gentlemanly officers on both sides 
who shared a common code of honor.  Working out of a London studio, the painter John 
Trumbull, the son of Connecticut's wartime governor Jonathan Trumbull and himself a 
former prisoner of the British, crafted a series of dynamic historical paintings that 
portrayed the nobility and humanity of American forces and the civility and refinement of 
the enemy.  Illustrating the Hessian surrender at Trenton in 1776, Trumbull placed a 
mounted Washington center stage, empathetically reaching out to comfort the mortally 
wounded Hessian Colonel Johann Rall, who is gently supported by one of the American 
general's aides.  Compassion, not anger or vindictiveness, characterizes the countenance 
of every American soldier present. Trumbull, in his autobiography, claimed that he 
"composed the picture, for the express purpose of giving a lesson to all living and future 
soldiers in the service of their country, to show mercy and kindness to a fallen enemy, — 
their enemy no longer when wounded and in their power."  The viewer cannot escape 
Trumbull's message: revolutionary Americans had treated their genteel, though 
misguided, captives with humanity.4 
 Trumbull's humanitarian vision of the war comes through even more forcefully in 
his most violent depiction of the conflict: "The Death of General Warren at the Battle of 
Bunker's Hill." At the battle's climax, the painter shows a wounded Joseph Warren 
threatened by a British grenadier's bayonet.  Rather than allowing the American officer to 
be impaled, in Trumbull's oeuvre, British Major John Small restrains his soldier, grasping 
his weapon before it can harm the dying man.  Despite little evidence that Small had done 
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anything in Warren's favor, Trumbull wanted to honor the British officer, who he 
described in his catalog as a man "equally distinguished by acts of humanity and kindness 
to his enemies, as by bravery and fidelity to the cause he served." Trumbull knew well 
that a depiction of Warren's actual death, his face shattered by a British ball and his body 
riddled with bayonet wounds, would have done little to reconcile American viewers to 
their erstwhile foes.  For Trumbull, and many of his contemporaries in the upper echelons 
of early republican society, British officers were not barbarians capable of butchering the 
virtuous Warren; they were gentlemen of humanity and sensibility who curtailed the 
violent instincts of the common soldiery.  None of Trumbull's works contain the least 
inkling of the violent war of vengeance that gripped the continent after 1776.5 
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The Death of General Warren at the Battle of Bunker's Hill, by Jonathan Trumbull  
Museum of Fine Arts, Boston 
 
 
 In a similar vein, the early historian of the revolution, David Ramsay, who too 
had been a British prisoner, portrayed the war as a gentlemanly contest and lavished 
encomiums on formerly odious enemies.  He praised General John Burgoyne for the 
restrained conduct of his army on its march toward Albany in 1777.  Ramsay went to 
great pains to describe Burgoyne's determination to "repress [the] barbarity" of his Native 
American allies.  While the revolutionary press had felt no compunction at demonizing 
Burgoyne after the death of Jane McCrea, Ramsay excused the general of any 
"premeditated barbarity."  "The cruelties of the Indians," not any failure on Burgoyne's 
part, were the cause of her unfortunate death.  So impressed by Burgoyne's conduct, 
Ramsay was "at a loss whether to admire most, the magnanimity of the victorious 
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[Horatio Gates], or the fortitude of the vanquished general."  Although he did not deny 
the war's violence—he had experienced too much of it for that—the historian all but 
absolved the revolution's European opponents of blame for its escalation.6   
 For Ramsay, "the calamities of the American war" could be directly traced to the 
conflict's democratizing effect on American society.  In order to raise recruits for their 
forces, he argued, American propagandists had painted the British as barbarians who 
instigated their loyalist and native allies to ever-greater acts of atrocity.  The propaganda 
had succeeded.  Tales of terrorism "impressed on the minds of the inhabitants a general 
conviction, that a vigorous determined opposition was the only alternative for the 
preservation of their property, their children and their wives."  Thus radicalized and 
acting "under the specious veil of patriotism," the "common people" vented their anger 
on their loyalist neighbors and British prisoners. Narrating a cycle of retaliation common 
to civil wars, "which produce the greatest quantity of human woes," Ramsay described 
how local revolutionary committees punished loyalist prisoners for treason against a 
country they never claimed.  Once released, embittered loyalists "carried with them a 
keen remembrance of the vengeance of committees, and when opportunity presented, 
were tempted to retaliate."  In this manner, "one instance of severity begat another, and 
they continued to encrease [sic] in a proportion that doubled the evils of common war."  
By relying on ordinary Americans to fight the war, thus allowing the conflict to devolve 
into civil strife, revolutionary leaders had failed, suggested Ramsay, in their 
responsibility to restrain the violent tendencies of their social inferiors.  He despaired: 
"Humanity would shudder at a particular recital of the calamities which the whigs 
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inflicted on the tories, and the tories on the whigs."  From Ramsay's perspective, the 
mistreatment of prisoners during the revolution's civil war was a lamentable consequence 
of independence, but it did not mar the glorious cause.  Portraying the revolutionary 
conflict largely as a conventional and restrained war between the Continental army and 
its British opponents, Ramsay banished the stories of civil war and prisoner abuse to the 
obscurity of an appendix at the end of his second volume.  There the tales of abuse and 
retaliation would be comfortably forgotten until the next generation of Americans faced 
the prospect of war with their old enemy the British.7 
 In the first decade of the nineteenth century, with Europe engulfed in war, some 
Americans sought to revive the memory of the revolution's prisoners for partisan 
purposes.  In the imaginations of those Americans who sought closer ties to revolutionary 
and imperial France, usually identifying themselves as Democratic-Republicans, the 
British were once again savages and barbarians.  In 1807, the National Aegis, a staunchly 
Republican paper, reminded its readers that the British government had "murdered our 
fellow citizens at Lexington…[,] carried on a seven years war to reduce this country to 
unconditional submission…[and] added to the necessary calamities of honorable warfare, 
the horrors and barbarity of the tomahawk and scalping knife."  Most importantly, the 
author wanted every Republican to recall that it was the British that had "incarcerated 
upwards of twenty thousand of our seamen and soldiers, in the prisons and prison ships at 
New-York."  The Republican New-Hampshire Gazette was even more explicit in its 
denunciation of Britain's treatment of captured Americans.  The British, according to the 
gazette, were responsible for "the poisoning of thousands of farmers in the Jersey prison 
ships [sic] at New York."  For the Public Advertiser, "the unhappy victims of British 
                                                
 7 Ramsay, The History, 55, 365, 364, 365, 376. 
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barbarity" deserved to be remembered.  Although their deaths had been slow, "those who 
perished in thousands on board [the] Jersey prison ships" had been "murdered" by the 
British nonetheless.  Nowhere in these denunciations of British mistreatment of American 
prisoners can be found mention of the thousands of British, German, and loyalist 
prisoners who expired on American prison ships or in American jails and camps.  The 
popular American cry for retaliation, and Congress's acquiescence to it, were scrubbed 
from the history of the revolution in the nineteenth century, coloring even to this day our 
popular and scholarly conceptions of the conflict.8   
 
.............................. 
 Both Trumbull's image of courtly combat and the Republicans' picture of 
deliberate British brutality obscure the real war that secured American independence.  
When colonial Americans took up arms to defend their English liberties, they did not 
envision nor desire a revolutionary war.  In their vision of "civilized" warfare, violence 
was restricted to the field of battle and captive enemy soldiers could expect generous 
treatment according to their rank and social station.  It was not long, however, before the 
revolutionaries realized that the realities of their war for independence looked nothing 
like their idealized rendition.  Atrocity rhetoric compounded real accounts of British 
mistreatment of American captives in the public sphere, radicalizing an enraged populace 
to wage an ever more violent war for retribution.  Seen as rebels and traitors by their 
former friends and neighbors after independence, loyalists received the brunt of 
revolutionary fury.  But the quest for revenge did not end with the subjugation of the 
                                                
 8 National Aegis, April 8th, 1807; New-Hampshire Gazette, March 31st, 1807; Public Advertiser, 
May 6th, 1807.  See also, Burrows, Forgotten Patriots, 212-16. 
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loyalists.  For years, Congress detained large numbers of British and German prisoners 
for the purpose of retaliation, despite being politically constrained from raising the 
necessary funds to provide for their needs.  The results were predictably gruesome.  
Although the total number of enemy prisoners who perished in American custody eludes 
us, the prisoners' suffering did not escape the notice of the founding generation.  Winning 
independence had been messy, violent, and horrifying.  The real war of the American 
Revolution was incompatible with the lofty ideals that had inspired Britain's American 
colonists to pledge their lives, fortunes, and sacred honor to defend.  It had to be 
forgotten. 
 While the founding elite was content to shroud the war in a haze of patriotic lore, 
enemy prisoners, and the ordinary Americans who captured, guarded, tortured, and at 
times killed them, could not so easily forget the war's violence.  Men like William 
Gibson, a North Carolina militiaman, were not ashamed of the role they had played in the 
war.  Radicalized not by lofty republican rhetoric but by British brutality, and perhaps 
more importantly, heavily embroidered atrocity stories, Gibson and his fellow soldiers 
had wreaked havoc on their British and loyalist opponents in the name of retribution.  In 
his 1832 pension application, Gibson admonished his readers not to judge him "cruel" for 
the torture of loyalist prisoners.  Had they seen "the unrelenting cruelties of the Tories," 
they too would have felt "no little satisfaction" at having achieved vengeance.  Gibson's 
revolution did not look like a Trumbull painting, but his was the revolution that enemy 
prisoners remembered.  Loyalist pension applications read like a laundry list of 
persecution, imprisonment, sorrow, and suffering.  Similarly, deprivation, hunger, 
exposure, and cruelty filled every extant memoir of British and German prisoners of war.  
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These men had survived the radicalization of the Revolutionary War, and they could not 
forget its horrors.  Reflecting on the plight of the war's prisoners, British Private John 
Shaw could not have summarized his fellow prisoners' experience better: "The treatment 
of prisoners in general during the American war was harsh, severe, and in many 
instances, inhuman."9 
                                                
 9 Pension Application of William Gipson. S17437. Transcribed by Will Graves, 
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